



A FRESH ANALYSIS OF THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM IN SOMALILAND, PUNTLAND AND SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

Somali State Agencies and Local Organisations' Capacities to Manage Humanitarian Action

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"Where rain comes before humanitarian aid"

Somalia is made up of many different territories with different political allegiances dominated by clan structures and facing a constant complex humanitarian crisis. This results in the International Community mixing its political interests with its humanitarian agenda. Insecurity severely hampers access in many parts, making it difficult to implement and monitor humanitarian responses. International humanitarian actors need to revisit their two decades' old strategy and invest more in working with local agencies to deliver aid. Local humanitarian actors need to take courageous humanitarian leadership with full accountability and transparency. Many international donors often appear to give priority to security and transparency over humanitarian action to save lives.

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1 CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

Oxfam International’s strategic plan states that, “National state institutions and civil society in the most crisis prone/affected countries, supported by the international community, are able to deliver high quality, impartial and independent assistance to those in need, and resilience to increasingly frequent natural disasters and conflict is strengthened through improved preparedness and risk reduction”.

This report’s main focus is on an analysis of humanitarian capacities of Somali territories (Puntland, Somaliland, and South-Central Somalia) government structures, and civil society organisations.

It should be noted that the change goal statement “National state institutions” has to be understood contextually. In this case, as the report will explain there are different power holding authorities controlling different regions and governing different groups of people with different levels of recognition or acceptance nationally and internationally. This report does not take a stance on the validity or otherwise of different claims of statehood, rather it focuses on the capacities of the main institutions and actors in each sector.

Production of this report was in three phases: documentary review, field visits, and interviews and workshops with stakeholders. However this report covers only phases 1 and 2. This report avoids repetition of elements already well captured in other Oxfam documents and focuses on a fresh analysis with proposals to increase the Humanitarian capacities in the Somali Territories.




Working together from the community level enhances effective humanitarian response

Photo: Oxfam

2 APPROACH, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This analysis has taken into account work already produced by Oxfam in Somalia, as well as other studies and reports done externally to Oxfam. At the same time it has used a critical perspective to question certain assumptions that otherwise may not allow fresh thinking.

The methodology applied follows this logic setting:



The guiding methodology has been termed “HUCOCA” (Humanitarian Country Capacities Analysis methodology), specifically developed for this exercise by the consultant.

28 organisational interviews were conducted including local and international NGOs, as well as international and Government agencies (see Annex 1 for reference). Also specific practices developed by Oxfam and its partners, such as the Somali Civil Society Initiative Support (SOCSIS) programme, have been explored to enrich the analysis.

3 HUMANITARIAN ACTORS TYPOLOGY

There are many different humanitarian actors working in the Somali Territories, some of them having a pure humanitarian mandate and role, while others focus on humanitarian work as part of their broader responsibilities or by contextual circumstances. The table below illustrates the basic typology of the Somali humanitarian actors and actors who influence the humanitarian response plus their main characteristics:

Humanitarian Actor Typology	Organisations	Mandate/ responsibility	Presence	Relevance
UN agencies.	UNOCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, etc.	Under UN mandate Provide overall humanitarian aid and humanitarian coordination across Somalia.	In all regions with the exception of militia controlled areas.	Very high. They dominate the humanitarian agenda, influencing by funding key implementation partners (Local NGOs and INGOs).
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).	FGS Ministries and Disaster Management Agency (DMA).	Within the responsibilities of the State: delivery, disaster risk management and coordination.	Mainly Federal Government Controlled Area (FGCA) South Central (particularly Mogadishu).	High in political terms. Very limited in coordination and delivery capacity.
Somaliland Government.	Somaliland ministries and National Environmental Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority.	Within the responsibilities of the state: delivery, disaster risk management and coordination.	All Somaliland.	High in political terms. Medium in delivery terms. Medium in coordination terms.
Puntland Government.	FGS Ministries, Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Management Agency (HADMA).	Within the responsibilities of the state: delivery, disaster risk management and coordination.	All Puntland.	Medium in political terms. Very low in delivery terms. Medium in coordination terms.

Humanitarian Actor Typology	Organisations	Mandate/ responsibility	Presence	Relevance
NSAG (Non State Armed Groups)	Militias.	As NSAG are the de-facto authority in some places: delivery, DR Management and coordination.	South Central.	High in political terms. Medium in delivery terms.
Local Somali NGOs	TARDO, CED, HIJRA, SADO, SOMALI AID, HARDO, DIAL, HAVOYOCO, CANDLELIGHT, HIRDA, KAALO, etc.	Some with exclusive humanitarian mandate others mixed with development and peace building mandates.	All country.	Low in political terms. Very high in delivery terms. Low in coordination terms.
International NGOs	Oxfam, CARE, DIAKONIA, NRC, Save The Children, ACF, Concern, Goal, etc.	Humanitarian and development mandate. Presence dominated by humanitarian mandated agencies.	All country with exception of some militia controlled areas.	High in political terms. Medium in delivery terms. Medium coordination.
International Islamic Cooperation Organisations	Islamic Relief, several Islamic solidarity groups.	Support Muslims around the world.	All around the county.	Very relevant within Somali society. Very high delivery. Low in coordination.
Red Crescent and ICRC	Somali Red Crescent and ICRC.	Working in partnership but with clear division of roles the two organisations and ways of intervening.	All country with exception of some militia controlled areas.	High in Humanitarian Terms. ICRC keeps distance from UN and other actors to preserve its neutrality. High in delivery terms. High in humanitarian access.
Donor agencies	ECHO, DFID, CIDA, etc.	Supporting Humanitarian agencies.	Mainly in South Central, some presence elsewhere.	Highly influential on INGOs' programmes through funding conditionality.

Humanitarian Actor Typology	Organisations	Mandate/ responsibility	Presence	Relevance
Community Based Organisations	Several.	Support communities at grass root level.	All Somalia.	High in delivery terms. High in access.
Clans' Elders committees	Multiple.	Make decisions and solve disputes within communities and between clans.	All Somalia.	High in political terms. High in negotiating humanitarian access.



The team behind the fresh analysis of Somalia

Photo: Oxfam

4 HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

We will not repeat here the country context analysis that can be found in several other locations. Nevertheless some key points should be highlighted in order to understand the content of this report, these are:

- The extreme fragility of the state since 1991.
- The internal conflict and the realities among the three main differentiated regions and the presence of militia groups in significant areas of South Central Somalia.
- The extreme low human development indicators translated in very low ratios of educational enrolment, income below \$2 per day for the majority of the population and some of the lowest health indicators across the world.
- The lack of humanitarian access and insecurity in large areas of South Central Somalia.
- The influential dominant role and vast presence of UN agencies and its complex humanitarian and diplomatic machinery.
- The vulnerability of livelihoods (crops and livestock grazing) dependent on rain cycles.
- The pastoral life of many Somali people and the traditions associated with this way of life are important.
- The chronic food shortages that have affected the country in recent decades.
- The growing process of urbanisation, with little urban planning for growth and service provision.
- The enormous impact that the Somalia Diaspora has in the economy of the country and in its politics.
- The strong role that clans play in Somali society.
- The highly influential role that religion has in Somali life.
- The growing interest of Turkey, China and Gulf countries in the country and its natural resources.

Humanitarian actors need to move beyond diplomatic debates around international recognition of States, to centre their humanitarian action into real existing political and social structures within which to support and promote humanitarian capacities to save lives.

5 HUMANITARIAN CAPACITY

Taking into account the premises exposed above, below is a summary of the global country contextual analysis and a synthesis of organisational capacities per region: South Central, Somaliland and Puntland.

GLOBAL SOMALI CAPACITIES

The global contextual analysis has been done by enquiring and exploring three main blocks: society strength, state and politics, country infrastructure. Each one of these has been subdivided in areas of interest as follows:

A	Society Strength	Content
A.1	Strength and power of Civil Society. (NGOs, community movements, religious groups etc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Typology of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). • Influence of CSOs in politics, economy and social life. • Fluent interaction among CSOs. • Structure of CSOs: Community Based Organisations (CBOs), NGOs, religious organisations, sports organisations etc. • Fluidity of interaction of CSOs with society in general. • Interaction of National CSOs with regional and international organisations.
A.2	Human Development. (Education, Health, Income)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of education of population (gender desegregated data). • Health services and facilities. • Income per capita. • Livelihood and income vulnerability. • Cultural heritage and use of it. • Customary law.
A.3	Human rights respect. (Violations of human rights, gender equity and justice, minorities respect)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights societal knowledge. • Human rights in practice from customary and common law. • Gender justice, societal gender roles and rights. • Minorities inclusion. • Knowledge of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and respect for it.
A.4	Humanitarian Access. (Respect of Humanitarian agencies INGO and LNGO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IHL is respected in practice. • LNGOs have unimpeded access to communities. • INGOs can do impartial humanitarian work. • Humanitarian workers and their equipment are respected.

B	State and Politics	Content
B.1	Governance and Institutional structures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the legitimacy of the Government? • Is there a Government present across all territory? Is there a democratic base? • Does government benefit from regional or international recognition?
B.2	Public administration efficiency, delivery, reliability, accessibility.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which service delivers public administration? • Service quality and outreach. • Can all citizens access public services, (geographical and economic access). Is there a big gap among urban and rural coverage? • Is there any mechanism to influence improvement of public services? • Is public administration supported with a fair tax system to subsidise basic social services?
B.3	Rule of law.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is there a separation of powers, (legislative, executive, and judiciary)? • Is there a distinction between civil, police and military roles? • Rule of law is generally respected by society? • Is there a solid body of law? (including customary law) • Rule of law is applied across all areas.
B.4	International legitimacy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extension and quality of Diplomatic relations. • Engagement in regional and international fora. • Presence of foreign embassies in the country. • Regional bodies' presence. • UN presence and relationship. • INGO presence and active role.

C	Country infrastructure	Content
C.1	National infrastructure: communications transport, services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of country road access. • Communication networks, telephone, internet, commercial radio systems, TV, newspapers. • National vehicle fleet, quality, and accessibility. • Heavy truck availability. • Public transport for individuals, network, and quality. • Other transport infrastructures: railways, airports, harbours, etc. • Health and education infrastructure.
C.2	National civil protection services. (DRR infrastructure, emergency response units, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administration entities able to deal with disaster response. • Policy to mobilise resources at highest level to deal with big crises, (legal governance scheme, effective capacity to integrate resources from different Departments or Ministries, etc.). • Presence of Local Organisations able to deal with disasters. • Population's culture and knowledge of DRR. • Capacity to coordinate national bodies with international bodies. • Capacity to deal with international standards. • Capacity to absorb efficiently external resources.
C.3	Human geography	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographical population distribution urban/rural. • Accessibility to different populations. • Diversity of cultures, languages.

The summary results of this analysis are as follows:

Somali global context capacities				
Capacity Block	Capacity/thematic area	Score (0-5)	Strengths	Weaknesses
A. Society strength	A.1 Strength and power of civil society.	2.3	<p>Clans and elder committees play a very important role in maintaining solidarity among people and communities.</p> <p>There is a wide portfolio of CSOs including religious groups, diaspora, LNGOs, etc.</p> <p>Diaspora is very influential in socio-economic and political life.</p>	<p>Fighting and disputes of clans and sub-clans sometimes makes it difficult to reach agreements beyond local areas.</p> <p>CSOs are not yet well coordinated among themselves.</p>
	A.2 Human development.	1.3	<p>Somali people are known to have a high level of resilience and great sense of initiative/ entrepreneurship.</p> <p>Customary law supports solidarity and unity among clans.</p>	<p>Rates of literacy, health indicators and income per capita are at the lowest level in the world. Particularly worrying is the low levels of school enrolment of girls which in some regions does not reach 20%.</p>
	A.3 Human Rights respect.	1.7	<p>Some CSOs are addressing human rights issues. Mainly those born after year 2004.</p>	<p>Still significant violations of human rights and IHL are taking place in Somalia affecting mainly, IDPs, women and children.</p> <p>Gender justice is still far away to be fully in place even within several Local and some International NGOs.</p>
	A.4 Humanitarian access.	2.0	<p>Somaliland has good humanitarian access with the exception of the disputed provinces of Sanaag and Sool in the region disputed with Puntland. Puntland has good humanitarian access.</p>	<p>Large areas of South Central have serious problems of security and humanitarian access even for local NGOs and CBOs.</p>

Somali global context capacities

Capacity Block	Capacity/thematic area	Score (0-5)	Strengths	Weaknesses
B. State and politics	B.1 Governance and institutional structures.	2.0	<p>There is an improvement of Governance and institutionalisation of government structures across the three main regions.</p> <p>Somaliland has an acceptable level of Governance and security.</p>	<p>The FGS is still in the process of creating its structures and ways of working.</p> <p>There is a lot of overlapping across ministries.</p> <p>Security still remains the main issue in South Central parts of Somalia.</p> <p>Areas of South Central are not yet in any recognised governance.</p>
	B.2 Public administration efficiency.	1.3	<p>Public administration capacity is increasing at all levels thanks to the entry of qualified Somalis in all States and ministries.</p> <p>Somaliland and Puntland are setting good examples of public administration, particularly in the Departments of Planning and Environment.</p>	<p>Public services are still almost non-existent in many places despite the launch of education campaigns, (such as the “go to school” campaign”)</p> <p>Some improvement of transport infrastructure is taking place.</p>
	B.3 Rule of law.	2.0	<p>There is a growing institutionalisation of rule of law across the three main regions.</p> <p>Somaliland has an acceptable respect for the rule of law with well defined divisions of power (Legislative, executive and judiciary).</p>	<p>Rule of law still not in place in many parts of the country .</p> <p>Customary law, Sharia and civil law are not yet well harmonised.</p>
	B.4 International legitimacy.	2.0	<p>FGS has wide international recognition.</p> <p>International agencies and INGOs operate in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia, despite an ambiguous situation in terms of legitimacy or recognition.</p>	<p>Somaliland does not have the international recognition it claims.</p> <p>Puntland, Jubaland and other emerging states are in limbo in terms of legal status and international legitimacy.</p> <p>Areas in South Central outside FGS control remain a blind area for the international community.</p>

Somali global context capacities				
Capacity Block	Capacity/thematic area	Score (0-5)	Strengths	Weaknesses
C. Country infrastructure	C.1 National infrastructures.	1.7	Infrastructure improvement is taking place in Mogadishu. Telecommunications infrastructure is good throughout.	National infrastructure is extremely weak in most part of the country. Making humanitarian logistical access very complex and expensive in some areas.
	C.2 National civil protection services.	1.3	There is an attempt to build disaster risk management humanitarian structures across the territories. Somaliland and Puntland have a legal frameworks for this as well as policies and strategies in place. But South Central does not yet.	Humanitarian state agencies such as DMA, NERAD or HADMA do not have yet effective operational capacity. Recognition of the role of these agencies is more theoretical than practical.
	C.3 Human geography.	2.3	Somalis have significant cultural unity including language which generates opportunities for peoples' mobility and conflict solving.	Dispute among different clans is a feature of recent history . There is a rapid growing trend to urbanisation and loosing traditional pastoralist culture and ways of life. This affects poverty levels, unemployment among young people and sometimes conflict in urban areas.

This analysis can be represented for the full territory with these diagrams:




Figure 1a




Figure 1b

SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

The humanitarian capacity analysis in South Central Somalia is based on the documentary review done and interviews held with TARDO, CED, UNICEF, Hijra, SADO, SOMALI AID, HARDO, DIAL, ICRC, Somalia Disaster Management Agency (DMA) and Oxfam Staff working in Somalia.

There is high density of local organisations and international organisations together with International agencies (UN, ICRC) working in South Central Somalia. Most of these organisations have good access to the areas controlled by the Federal Government, particularly in Mogadishu and Jubbaland, but many the so called “liberated” towns such as Kismaayo or BulaBurte have limited access.

In South Central Somalia the issue may not be so much about the humanitarian capacity available, which might be good enough, but it is about the possibility to deploy those capacities effectively and with security. On the other hand it is widely accepted that the Federal Government institutions have an extremely limited capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance or manage DRR programmes, although there are assigned departments within the government for this purpose, such as DMA.

The context assessment for South Central gives the following profile:




Figure 2a




Figure 2b

ORGANISATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES IN SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

This organisational humanitarian capacity analysis in South Central Somalia covers more detail on State and Local NGO actors and provides brief information on the rest of the humanitarian actors.

SOMALIA DISASTER MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DMA):

This is an official agency set by the FGS to manage disasters. It is an entity with a certain degree of autonomy at operational level although still under the political supervision of the Ministry of Interior and Federalism. Its mandate is very broad, from coordination to prevention, response and recovery. The DMA abides to a set of values of no discrimination, priority to those most vulnerable and dignity. They are aware of international humanitarian values of impartiality, independence, etc., but they inevitably have to operate under the political framework under which they are created.

Financial capacity is very low, dependent on donors for any programme. Management systems are still basic and not able to cope with complex programmes. Likewise human resource management is still at a very early stage with about 25 staff at the time of writing of which five are seconded by IOM for a short period of time to work on profiling of IDPs. Currently there is no surge capacity and as of September 2014 they did not have established agreements with other ministries or entities to second people when required.

Logistical capacity is minimal but it is intending to open five small reference offices in South Central Somalia. It has a basic strategic plan but there is recognition that great support will be required to have more analysis and strategising capacity, as well as capacity to translate these strategies into operational plans and specific tools for delivery. They have a monitoring and evaluation unit within the agency although it has limited operational capacity. The Agency's organisational structure is basic with some assigned units on administration, IDPs and monitoring and evaluation. A stronger structure should be developed to cover the basic areas of work that the DMA is supposed to attend to.

The DMA pays high attention to coordination with other agencies including the UN and this is managed directly by the chair of the Agency. In terms of communications it produces quarterly reports and regular newsletters, but lacks an advanced communication system utilising the internet. The DMA does not have institutional risk management within its own organisation, making it vulnerable to any threat that may affect them such as loss of data.

In terms of approach DMA is aware of gender and rights based approaches but its translation to practical work is still to be developed. It has a good understanding of conflict sensitivity as well. It is starting to implement some DRR programmes with the EU, but still at an early stage.

An HIV-AIDS sensitive lens is not applied in its working approach. DMA has no specialised capacity in any cluster although some individuals do have some expertise in working with IDPs and on Food Security. Humanitarian standards such as Sphere or HAP are not known, neither implemented by the DMA.

In terms of volume, DMA is still a small organisation with limited resources at all levels, limited developed policies and strategies and a geographical outreach limited to areas in FGS control.

The DMA's capacity profile is as follows:




Figure 3

LOCAL NGOS IN SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

The analysis of Local NGOs working in South Central Somalia, based on the aggregated analysis made is presented in the table below.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
1. Identity and Mission	1.1	1. Values mandate. 2. Purpose.	2.6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most NGOs have a strong sense of commitment. • They have clarity on the dual mandate: humanitarian and development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is little questioning about how their mandate should evolve in the new changing context. Mainly it is new NGOs bringing new approaches to this.
	1.2	3. Leadership. 4. Attitudes.	2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most organisations show strong personal leadership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGOs' leadership is mainly dominated by men. • Institutional leadership within the humanitarian sector is not very visible in the LNGOs in South Central.
2. Managerial Capacities	2.1	1. Finances.	2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Several NGOs have enough financial capacity and adequate procedures, thanks in part to previous support of Oxfam (programmes like SOCSIS, EPARA) and the type of institutional support provided by organisations like CARE. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficulty of fundraising and lack of diversity of funds is common and a critical problem to all LNGOs. • Dependency on UN Agency funds is a common pattern among LNGO. • There is growing concern about the need for increased financial accountability, particularly in South Central.
	2.2	2. Human Resources (HR).	2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most NGOs have HR management procedures. • There are some specialised humanitarian staff with the LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HR development and retention of staff is very difficult. • There is a high turnover of humanitarian staff within LNGOs. • International NGO and UN Agencies compete for qualified people with Local NGOs.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
	2.3	3. Logistics. 4. Time management.	2.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> South Central NGOs are good at making timely decisions and moving forward response programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most NGOs have limited logistical capacity although this varies enormously from organisation to organisation. Despite LNGOs' good time management, donors' slowness retards LNGO responses.
	2.4	5. Analytical. 6. Strategising. 7. Planning and Programming.	1.8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most NGOs have standard Strategic Plans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most NGOs have weak capacity to do contextual analysis, strategising and translating this into effective institutional planning.
	2.5	8. Programme Management (includes M&E) 9. Knowledge Management.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NGOs are generally good at traditional programme management and reporting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Knowledge management is a weak point as the M&E systems are often not translated into institutional knowledge management.
	2.6	10. Governance and decision making. 11. Organisational Structure and processes.	2.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are governance structures and management structures in place, with quite detailed developed manuals on procedures of different management areas: finances, HR, Procurement etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some of these manuals are standard and not updated.
	2.7	12. Networking and alliance building	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNGO have good networking capacity with international NGOs, agencies and Diaspora. Networking among LNGOs is made on ad-hoc basis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are not powerful strategic networks of LNGO that could impact on shaping the humanitarian agenda.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
	2.8	13. Communications 14. Advocacy	1.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is great awareness of the need of good communication and advocacy strategies and tools. Few NGOs have good communication tools and strategies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In practice this is one of the weakest areas declared by most LNGOs.
	2.9	15. Risk management. 16. Institutional resilience.	1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some NGOs have data protection mechanisms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is not consciousness of Institutional Risk Management in most LNGOs. Hand over in leadership roles is rare.
3.- Approach, Commitment	3.1	1. Gender approach.	1.6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NGOs are aware of gender issues in humanitarian work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender does not emerge as a spontaneous priority or relevant topic for most LNGOs.
	3.2	2. Conflict Sensitivity. 3. Rights based approach.	2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost all NGOs show a good understanding and practice of conflict sensitivity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rights based approach is only adopted in practice by few organisations, most are oriented to a needs based approach.
	3.3	4. Connectedness, resilience & DRR.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good understanding of Resilience and DRR concepts as part of Humanitarian action. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is little evidence of a sustained effort by LNGOs doing DRR and Resilience programmes.
	3.4	5. HIV/AIDS.	0.3		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost totally ignored in the LNGO's humanitarian interventions. Seems to be a taboo issue in some places.
4. Technical Expertise	4.1	1. WASH competencies. 2. EFSL competencies. 3. Other competencies.	2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost all organisations have some degree of sectoral expertise and do participate in cluster coordination meetings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most organisations work in the same sectors: WASH and Livelihood. Level of specialisation seems to be low.
	4.2	4. Standards compliance & accountability. 5. Quality Control management.	2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most NGOs are aware and try to apply Sphere standards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sphere standards implementation seems to be a bit loose and not well monitored.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
5. Size / Capability	5.1	1. Organisational volume 2. Financial capacity / autonomy 3. Sustained investment and evolution 4. Human Resources available	2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are a large number of NGOs operating in South Central Somalia and some of them with a significant volume. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information provided by LNGOs does not show a coherent picture of the ratio of size versus impact or targeted population served. There are limited sustained investments of LNGOs. Short term programmes and dependency on big donors' conditions their capacity in the medium / long term. There is a strong limitation on the availability of qualified HR across the organisations.
	5.2	5. Geographical outreach	1,9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs are able to work with local communities and reach difficult to access areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Each organisation has a limited number of geographical areas of intervention.

The average humanitarian capacity profile of Local NGOs in South Central Somalia is as follows:




Figure 4

SOMALILAND

Somaliland claims status as an independent State with all its powers, institutional systems and tools in place without international recognition.

Security is quite acceptable, Somaliland lives in a tense calm with its neighbour Puntland with whom it disputes territories of Sanaag and Sool provinces.

Despite the Somaliland's Government official stance that the country is in a development phase, the reality is that the country still requires humanitarian assistance and DRR programmes.

Somaliland capacity and humanitarian access is the highest in the Somali territories, but at the same time humanitarian needs in Somaliland are the lowest of the territories.

The global humanitarian context analysis in Somaliland provides this profile:




Figure 5a




Figure 5b

ORGANISATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES IN SOMALILAND

As in South Central, this report provides more details on the State agency and Local NGOs, than on international actors.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (NERAD)

This is the official agency set by the Somaliland Government to manage disasters in Somaliland. It was created by law in 2003 and was put in place in 2006.

The agency is under the direct supervision of the President of Somaliland and has a fully developed legal framework which defines its mandate functions and accountability.

The leadership style of the agency has to evolve according to the new challenges that NERAD will confront in the near future so that more people within NERAD share greater responsibilities to ensure the continuous effective engagement of NERAD with the rest of humanitarian actors.

There is a lack of capacity in terms of human and material resources, and in terms of effective influence in the humanitarian sector.

The legal architecture on which NERAD is built could be more effective within the seven ministries chaired by the vice president for DRM in which NERAD plays secretariat role, if they had more resources and technical capacities to influence the agenda of the DRM office.

Their capacity profile is as follows:




Figure 6

LOCAL NGOS IN SOMALILAND

The analysis of Local NGOs working in Somaliland is based on the aggregated assessment made to several LNGOs, (HAVAYOCO, TAAKULO, CANDLE LIGHT, HIRDA) and the NGO Consortium. This analysis includes organisations that work in Somaliland regardless of if they operate in other parts of Somalia too.

It is worth mentioning that the disparity of capacities among LNGOs working in Somaliland is enormous, therefore comments below are not equally applicable to all LNGOs, but are rather a global picture of strengths and weaknesses of the sector.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
1. Identity and Mission	1.1	1. Values mandate. 2. Purpose.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most LNGOs working in Somaliland have development oriented values and they see humanitarian work as something ad-hoc, rather than at the core of their mandates. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is little clarity for most LNGOs on what are the implications of being a fully fledged humanitarian agency. • Institutional values are mainly understood as instrumental-managerial values, such as transparency or efficiency. Fundamental humanitarian values such as impartiality and independence do not emerge spontaneously.
	1.2	3. Leadership. 4. Attitudes.	2.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some organisations are willing to take a more proactive leadership role within the humanitarian sector. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LNGOs' leadership is dominated by men, with the exception of Candlelight. • There is a subordination attitude to INGOs and UN systems that blocks emerging LNGO leadership .
2. Managerial Capacities	2.1	1. Finances.	3.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some LNGOs have a substantial budget with enough stability from donors to allow them to take more initiative and an active role in humanitarian action. • Most LNGOs have good enough financial procedures and accountability mechanisms. • Diaspora provides regular income to LNGOs in Somaliland. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some LNGO are instrumentalisised financially by INGOs and used as implementing partners only. • There is not local fundraising in Somaliland among business people, despite the growing opportunities emerging there. • Diaspora community income is very little in percentage terms, (as an average, below 5% approximately).

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
	2.3	3. Logistics. 4. Time management.	2.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Somaliland LNGOs are quick in doing needs assessments and responding to humanitarian crises, within their capacities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is almost no logistical capacity at LNGO level. Decisions on response is delayed due to the hyper centralisation of decision making at Nairobi level by most INGOs and donors. LNGOs do not have emergency reserve funds or materials' stocks to allow them to respond quickly. Needs assessments done by LNGO are not used in most cases because it requires validation from Nairobi or metropolitan HQs.
	2.4	5. Analytical. 6. Strategising. 7. Planning and programming.	2.6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most LNGOs have standard Strategic Plans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is very limited capacity to conduct contextual analysis and strategizing. Programming is mostly based on donors' opportunities.
	2.5	8. Programme management. (includes M&E) 9. Knowledge management.	3.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several LNGOs have project administrative management capacity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> M&E is embedded in most programmes but it seems to be a data collection process rather than a learning process. Few organisations have specific M&E units or specialised capacity. Knowledge management seems to be non-existent.
	2.6	10. Governance and decision making. 11. Organisational structure and processes.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most organisations have formal governance and management structures in place. Most LNGOs have documented procedures on different areas: finances, HR, procurement etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs have mixed responsibilities between governance bodies and management levels. This affects accountability.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
	2.7	12. Networking and alliance building	2.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNGOs have good networking capacity with Diaspora. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Humanitarian networking among LNGOs is almost non-existent. LNGOs are not active participants in the NGO Consortium which is dominated by INGOs.
	2.8	13. Communications. 14. Advocacy.	2.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several LNGOs have websites and communications facilities making use of the good internet network available in Somaliland. A limited number of LNGO do have an advocacy agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most LNGOs do not raise their concerns with INGOs or UN agencies due to fear of losing support.
	2.9	15. Risk management. 16. Institutional resilience.	2.4		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutional risk management does not seem to be a concern for LNGOS in Somaliland.
3.- Approach, Commitment	3.1	1. Gender Approach	2.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A few LNGOs are powerful in moving ahead the gender agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender applied to humanitarian context is still a terrain to explore by LNGOs.
	3.2	2. Conflict sensitivity. 3. Rights based approach.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most LNGOs have a good understanding and practice of the conflict sensitiveness approach in humanitarian interventions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rights based approach is only adopted in practice by few organisations. Most LNGOs are oriented to a basic Needs based approach.
	3.3	4. Connectedness, resilience & DRR.	3.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several LNGOs work on development programs with a Resilience approach. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is not a systematic knowledge and implementation of DRR and resilience programmes.
	3.4	5. HIV/AIDS.	1.6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs have developed some expertise in this area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost totally ignored aspect by most humanitarian LNGOs working in Somaliland.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
4.- Technical Expertise	4.1	1. WASH competencies. 2. EFSL competencies. 3. Other competencies.	2.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Almost all organisations have some practice in different sectors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is almost no specialised sectoral capacity, although there are practical experiences developed by most LNGOs following the instructions of UN agencies and INGO. • Lack of specialization does not seem to be perceived as an issue; on the contrary multisectoral interventions are proudly presented, despite the lack of expertise in most of the sectors.
	4.2	4. Standards compliance & accountability 5. Quality Control management	2.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some LNGOs do have some staff trained in Sphere Standards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sphere standards knowledge is very limited among LNGOs in Somaliland.
5.- Size Capability	5.1	1. Organisational volume. 2. Financial capacity / autonomy. 3. Sustained investment and evolution. 4. Human resources available.	3.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are a good number of LNGOs in Somaliland that could play a bigger role in humanitarian responses. • Some LNGOs have substantial annual budgets (above \$1 Million). • Volume of Human Resources available, staff contracted plus volunteers, is large in many LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most LNGOs work on development programmes and have a reductionist emergency response approach to humanitarian interventions. • There is a strong limitation on the availability of qualified people across the organisations.
	5.2	5. Geographical outreach.	2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Somaliland is geographically well covered by the numerous LNGOs present. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The eastern regions of Somaliland have less coverage due to security issues.

The average humanitarian capacity profile of Local NGOs in Somaliland is as follows:




Figure 7

PUNTLAND

Puntland is a disaster prone area affected by drought and some conflict, mainly in the State borders with Somaliland and South Central. Also cyclones affect the country.

Puntland operates as a member state of Somalia with a high degree of decentralisation of powers, that has translated into a quite vibrant dynamic and a proliferation of new ventures, such as universities, new businesses, as well as presence of local and International NGOs, etc.

Despite the political will to move into a “development phase”, Puntland still has a significant number of its population requiring humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless as in other parts of Somalia, the humanitarian setting and its complex machinery together with the lack of trust among international and local actors, makes delivery of humanitarian aid very slow. As the director of HADMA said, “sometimes the rain comes before the humanitarian aid arrives.”

The overall humanitarian context analysis in Puntland provides this profile.




Figure 8a




Figure 8b

ORGANISATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES IN PUNTLAND

Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Management Agency (HADMA)

HADMA is the official agency set by the Puntland State Government to manage disasters. It was created after the Tsunami in 2005, and in 2011 it was equipped with a set of policies, strategies, contingency plans, response framework etc. On this front the theoretical framework of operations for HADMA is clear but it lacks resources to implement its mandate and strategies.

At the time of writing, HADMA deals with a regular budget of \$4,500 per month and 16 staff of which seven have some humanitarian experience, skills or training. It does not have much logistical capacity and its means to coordinate is very limited. Nevertheless it tried hard in the last drought response in 2011 and the tropical cyclone of 2013, it has a certain degree of recognition within the rest of the humanitarian community.

Leadership is in the hands of a senior official and new generations are ready to take a more proactive role that could be very beneficial for HADMA.

Their capacity profile is as follows:




Figure 9

LOCAL NGOS IN PUNTLAND

Puntland local NGOs have their own specificities with some of them having developed significant humanitarian experience during the Tsunami 2004 response, although not all have translated that experience in capacity building of the humanitarian sector.

In summary this is the analysis of the Local NGOs operating in Puntland based on the interaction with several stakeholders, (ADESO, KAALO, ASAL, SFS, and other international actors).

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
1. Identity and Mission	1.1	1. Values mandate. 2. Purpose.	2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several LNGOs have developed a clear humanitarian mandate and abide to humanitarian principles. The engagement in the 2004 Tsunami response was a critical positive element for this. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most LNGOs do humanitarian work as a reactive component of their regular development projects. There are not humanitarian comprehensive strategies embedded in their mandates.
	1.2	3. Leadership. 4. Attitudes.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs like KAALO and INGOs like ADESO show leadership and can make a real contribution to promote the role of humanitarian NGOs in Puntland. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most LNGOs are driven by projects and donors' interests.
2. Managerial Capacities	2.1	1. Finances.	3.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs have a good financial volume and reliable systems of transparent financial management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most of the LNGOs in Puntland do not have any degree of financial autonomy vis a vis INGOs or UN agencies.
	2.2	2. Human resources.	2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some diaspora young professionals are engaging with LNGOs in Puntland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Turnover of staff in LNGOs is high, INGO and UN agencies drain some of the most qualified staff within LNGOs and local

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
				and their level of commitment, and professionalisation is high.	local government (some of the best people are in international organisations but within the country).
	2.3	3. Logistics 4. Time management	1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs are able to move decisions quickly in terms of timely response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With one exception none of the LNGOs have logistical capacity. The time required to make decisions and respond is largely dominated by the bureaucratic procedures and a lack of trust amongst the NGOs, UN agencies and its respective donors.
	2.4	5. Analytical. 6. Strategising. 7. Planning and programming.	2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SFS is probably the most capable LNGO in terms of analysis and strategising capacity. Operational planning is done regularly by most LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is a serious limitation of strategic critical analysis and thinking, which could overcome the project oriented view that most LNGO still have.
	2.5	8. Programme Management. (includes M&E). 9. Knowledge management.	3.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most LNGOs have enough expertise to manage projects. Some have M&E mechanisms in place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project Management and its M&E do not seem to match with a knowledge management system. There is no evidence on how knowledge is captured and used by LNGOs.
	2.6	10. Governance and decision making. 11. Organisational structure and processes.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Governance structures, management structures and systems are in place in all Organisations met. Procedures are well developed and the support offered in this regard in the past years by organisations like Oxfam and CARE is paying back. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some NGOs have mixed Governance and management structures.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
	2.7	12. Networking and alliance building.	3.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are some interesting Non State Actors fora in Puntland. • The NGO consortium which is led by a member of KAALO creates a good basis for a future of more strategic coordination among LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Networking is mainly done on project related basis. • Coordination among LNGOs is still very weak, compared to International coordination or Local-International coordination.
	2.8	13. Communications. 14. Advocacy.	2.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LNGOs' communications capacities are good in Puntland. • There is an emerging interest in developing a joint advocacy agenda. • Organisations like SFS could play a leading role in this front. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a lack of joint advocacy agenda among LNGOs that initially could consider points such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accountability. • Mutual support and cooperation. • Local ownership in implementation of programmes. • Recognition of role and capacities of LNGOs • Effective humanitarian coordination.
	2.9	15. Risk management. 16. Institutional resilience	2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some LNGOs have started to handover responsibilities to new generations which is very promising in terms of institutional evolution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LNGO management of leadership associated risks is good in contract with what happens in government structures.
3. Approach, Commitment	3.1	1. Gender approach.	2.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender agenda has been picked up by most Puntland LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender balance in decision making structures within LNGOs is not visible.
	3.2	2. Conflict sensitivity. 3. Rights based approach.	2.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LNGOs are aware of conflict sensitiveness issues and manage this adequately. • Rights based approach is adopted by several LNGOs and linked to governance programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is not a mature debate between Rights based approach and Needs based approach when it comes to humanitarian in practice.

Cluster	#	Thematic area	Score 0-5	Strengths	Weaknesses
	3.3	4. Connectedness, Resilience & DRR	3.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Humanitarian programmes are embedded into development programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is not a clear setting for DRR and resilience programmes that will integrate humanitarian programmes with development programmes.
	3.4	5. HIV/AIDS	1.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some Organisations deal with HIV-AIDS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIV-AIDS does not emerge naturally as a component of the LNGOs programmes
4. Technical Expertise	4.1	1. WASH competencies. 2. EFSL competencies. 3. Other competencies.	1.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some limited humanitarian sectoral expertise is owned by few LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specialised humanitarian sectoral competencies are not very high among Puntland LNGOs.
	4.2	4. Standards compliance & accountability. 5. Quality control management	1.8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Knowledge of Sphere standard does exist with in some members of some LNGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no evidence that LNGOs do apply and monitor consistent implementation of Sphere Standards and other humanitarian standards in their humanitarian activities.
5.- Size Capability	5.1	1. Organisational volume. 2. Financial capacity / autonomy. 3. Sustained investment and evolution. 4. Human resources available.	3.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some LNGOs have enough capacity in terms of funds, human resources, geographical coverage to have enough critical mass to start leading a process of the humanitarian sector in Puntland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost none of the LNGOs have enough logistical capacity to engage in major humanitarian response operations by themselves.
	5.2	5. Geographical outreach.	1.8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Puntland State could be almost fully covered by LNGOs operating there. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are some gaps of access or coverage in the border conflict area with Somaliland.




Figure 10

6 SOMALI HUMANITARIAN PROFILE

Based on the aggregated organisational analysis and humanitarian context of the country, the Somali humanitarian profile could be described as follows:



Figure 11

GLOBAL CONTEXT CAPACITIES IN SOMALI TERRITORIES

Humanitarian crises in Somali Territories

- Each of the three described humanitarian areas (South Central, Somaliland and Puntland) have different humanitarian crises contexts and should be treated with specific and differentiated strategies (Drought and conflicts are the most relevant threats).
- Rural vulnerability will be gradually replaced by urban vulnerability in several parts of the country (Drought and conflict major threats, will be gradually replaced by unemployment and urban violence threats).

The understanding of humanitarianism

- These areas are still under an old paradigm of understanding humanitarian work as a “short intervention to feed bodies”, rather than as full set of actions to save lives with dignity, reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and restore and protect rights of people affected by crises.
- Stereotypes of high efficiency of external “parachuted” international interventions are still dominant in the humanitarian machinery operating with new emerging actors.

The humanitarian sector

- The humanitarian sector is fully dominated by UN agencies and international NGOs.
- International actors’ rhetoric of building humanitarian local capacity are in many cases empty of real content and reduced to a set of trainings and instrumentalisation of local NGOs which are subcontracted as implementers particularly in the most risky areas.

- INGOs are still acting under the assumption that to be influential, power must be achieved by an aggressive growth strategy. This behaviour provokes a funding competition amongst INGOs and Local NGOs. This is often used by large donors to drive their own agenda through the lure of funding.
- When it comes to programme delivery there is an immoral cascade of transfer of risk from UN Agencies down to community level, while quality is claimed to be always higher at UN and international level.

This can be visualised as follows:





Figure 12

- This is correlated with the perception of accountability and standards required: while risk is transferred down to CBOs and LNGOs, accountability and quality requirements remain invariable, despite the hard context in which some LNGOs and most CBOs have to operate.

See graph below for a visualisation of this issue:



Perceived relation between Risk (size of bubble), Quality (X axis) and Accountability (Y axis)

Figure 13

It is assumed by donors and international actors that as risk increases (size of bubbles), quality and accountability shrinks. So most international actors and donors prefer to work in the safe areas, (even if this has a clear impact on not saving lives), rather than working in the most difficult environments with risky and complex humanitarian access, which is “reserved” for LNGOs and CBOs.

Humanitarian responsibilities

- The FGS, the Somaliland Government and the Puntland Government have not yet translated their humanitarian responsibilities into an effective priority vis a vis their respective populations and in accordance to international practices and IHL.
- As declared by several humanitarian actors, UN humanitarian mandated agencies are politically aligned with the international political agenda of supporting the FGS and there is serious questioning about their independence and impartiality in regards to delivery of humanitarian aid and protection.

State authorities’ humanitarian capacity

- The three State agencies in charge of humanitarian assistance in the three respective areas are not equipped to deliver effective humanitarian coordination or direct response at this moment. This is due to four main factors:
 - i. Lack of strong leadership at agency level
 - ii. Lack of resources
 - iii. Lack of political priority for the humanitarian agenda by the respective governments
 - iv. Lack of space given by UN agencies and INGOs.

Local Somali NGOs’ humanitarian capacity

- Local Somali NGOs have been dependent on external conditional funding for over two decades coming mainly from UN agencies via INGOs. Actually, several LNGOs were founded in 1992 after the collapse of the State, to channel UN funds and provide basic humanitarian assistance in Somalia. This dependency and pattern of relationship between LNGOs, UN and INGOs systems is still in place.
- Local NGOs are accused of lacking accountability and quality in delivery, according to international standards. This does not match with the level of risk they are requested to assume.
- LNGOs humanitarian capacities analysis has been described in detail by region and it is still weak but with high potential if there is political will, leadership and trust/space by INGOs /UN to develop these capacities.

Role of INGOS

- INGOs have a massive presence, but operational activities on the ground are inversely proportional to the level of security (“No security, No aid”).
- INGOs are amalgamated around the different States in the NGO Consortium which mainly deals with issues related to the presence of INGOs and relations with their respective governments, rather than with a complete humanitarian agenda.
- INGOs do not create incentives gradually to give space to LNGOs and State Agencies for them to assume their responsibilities.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL TO ALL SOMALIA REGIONS

- Facilitate rapid response by local actors by developing a response framework that overcomes the systematic slow response of donors.
- Develop a strategy to support small CBOs in the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- Humanitarian assistance should move from an approach of “saving human bodies” to saving “dignified lives.” This means that beyond the basic survival thematic areas of work i.e. food, shelter, WASH, etc., other aspects of education, society building, peace building, resilience, etc., should be included as an integral part of humanitarian delivery.
- State agencies such as DMA, NERAD and HADMA besides focusing on coordination of humanitarian aid and ensuring quality standards, the capacity of state agencies should be developed in the short run because, “State Agencies are representing their respective communities in their areas and have the full mandate as government agencies to take full leadership when it comes to provision of humanitarian aid.”
- Logistical capacity should be embedded in some LNGOs. This should be done in agreement with the key humanitarian international stakeholders who already have significant humanitarian logistical capacity.
- LNGOs willing to play a leading humanitarian role should build emergency funds, leadership and surge capacity, to ensure enough capacity of response in the first days of a crisis.

SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

- Develop a practical Partnership-Accountability Framework that takes into account the realities of the region.
- Invest in building humanitarian capacity of the FGS through the DMA, while developing a combined modus operandi of authorities and civil society organisations.
- Humanitarian and development programmes should include approaches to bring some formal governance at clan level, balancing traditional authorities with State authorities.

SOMALILAND

- INGOs should promote a critical reflection on their future role in Somaliland and revisit the current added value of their presence vis a vis the opportunity of moving to a more strategic supporting role for a selected number of capable LNGOs.
- Assessments done by LNGOS should be professionalised and recognised by donors in order to speed humanitarian response in Somaliland.
- LNGOs in Somaliland should have better timely support by INGOs and UN agencies which are currently based in Nairobi. Decentralization of decisions should be transferred from Nairobi to Hargeisa, taking into account the stability of Somaliland.
- Incentives should be made to provide more space for LNGOs in the NGO Consortium (e.g. reducing the fee contribution and enriching the agenda of the consortium with substantive matters affecting LNGOs humanitarian work).

PUNTLAND

- Puntland LNGOs should start a process of leading the humanitarian sector by making a strong network led by those organisations with more capacity such as KAALO and international organisations such as ADESO.
- INGOs working in Puntland need to acknowledge, give space and support in practice LNGOs that show leadership, enough capacity and potentiality evolve to become robust humanitarian NGOs. This should be done beyond funding and training; including secondments and allowing LNGOs more space to implement their programmes.
- LNGOs together with HADMA, INGO and UN agencies should implement simple and reliable Early Warning Mechanisms in Puntland that could be trusted by all actors and will facilitate a quick response when needed.

LOCAL HUMANITARIAN CAPACITY OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS

The analysis presented above and related recommendations could generate a broad set of objectives in terms of humanitarian capacities to be achieved. Intentionally this has been reduced to a limited number of key objectives and indicators/milestones in order to make it manageable, understandable and straight forward in its monitoring.

This set of objectives and indicators are presented globally and should be adjusted in every geographical area in order to ensure they are contextualised and owned by local actors. This should be done by the stakeholders who will own the process and take into account the recommendations.

Objectives: Humanitarian Capacity to achieve	Progress Indicators	Monitoring Mechanism
1. ACCOUNTABILITY: LNGOs and State Government Agencies (SGA) are accountable and trusted by international stakeholders.	1.1. A practical Partnership-Accountability Framework is developed and agreed by all humanitarian actors, (LNGOs, Governments, INGOs, UN, Donors) . 1.2. LNGOs and SGAs implement the accountability framework. 1.3. There is an increase of humanitarian funds going to LNGOs and SGAs.	A more enriched and balanced NGO Consortium monitors this quarterly.
2. TIMELY RESPONSE: LNGOs and SGAs are able to respond to humanitarian crises timely and efficiently.	2.1 There is an agreed “response framework” (embedded in States’ Contingency Plans and agreed with donors and international actors), that facilitates rapid and timely humanitarian response by LNGOs and SGAs. 2.2 LNGOs build their own emergency reserve funds, emergency logistic stocks and human resource surge capacities.	Incorporated regularly in the Clusters meeting agendas. Monthly review. NGO Consortium monitors this quarterly. Ad hoc impact response evaluations.

Objectives: Humanitarian Capacity to achieve	Progress Indicators	Monitoring Mechanism
	<p>2.3 Donors, INGOs and UN Agencies decentralise decision making from Nairobi, bringing it back to the country to speed decision making process.</p> <p>2.4 LNGOs and SGAs increased the quality and speed of their needs' assessments using recognised humanitarian standards and these assessments are accepted by international stake holders.</p> <p>2.5 Decision makers give up the comfort zone of requiring more and more hard data before initiating a response, and accept reasonable degrees of uncertainty inherent to the context and complexities of humanitarian crisis in the territories.</p>	
<p>3. ROLES AND COMPLEMENTARITY:</p> <p>Local humanitarian capacities exist within State Agencies and civil society Local organisations and they are complemented by international humanitarian Stakeholders.</p>	<p>3.1 State Agencies and LNGOs have clarity of roles and mandates and enough capacity to implement agreed roles.</p> <p>3.2 State Agencies focus on coordination of humanitarian aid and ensuring quality standards of humanitarian aid provided by different stakeholders.</p> <p>3.3 SGAs are supported mainly through secondments and coaching of staff from INGOs, international agencies, and LNGOs.</p> <p>3.4 There is a fluent articulation between SGAs and LNGOs</p> <p>3.5 There is an articulated relationship among LNGOs, SGA and international stakeholders.</p> <p>3.6 INGOs and UN Agencies move away from a command and control model to a more decentralised participatory model.</p> <p>3.7 INGOs and UN Agencies change their model of intervention to a model of partner support rather than subcontracting them for programme delivery.</p>	<p>Incorporated regularly in the Clusters meeting agendas.</p> <p>Monthly review.</p> <p>NGO Consortium monitors this quarterly.</p>

Objectives: Humanitarian Capacity to achieve	Progress Indicators	Monitoring Mechanism
<p>4. HUMANITARIAN ACCESS:</p> <p>Humanitarian assistance in conflict areas.</p>	<p>4.1 LNGOs and International humanitarian stakeholders address the issue of humanitarian access and risk management and agree on a protocol of action for negotiating humanitarian access.</p> <p>4.2 Some reputed LNGOs are able to negotiate principled humanitarian access with NSAG (Non State Armed Groups) through mediation and acceptance of elders at community level following the existing guidelines on engaging with NSAGa.</p> <p>4.3 Humanitarian Aid reaches those in need regardless the region they are in.</p>	<p>Ad hoc committee on Security Risk Management and Humanitarian Access composed of a reduced number of representatives for LNGOs, UN agencies and INGOs.</p> <p>Strategies are shared and informed with ICRC from whom advice is sought. Ad hoc impact response evaluations.</p>
<p>5. SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT:</p> <p>Security and risks are fairly shared among all humanitarian actors. Conditionality of humanitarian access by lack of security is reduced.</p>	<p>5.1 There is an agreed risk management agenda among all humanitarian stakeholders to agree on threats and risks for humanitarian actors, coping mechanisms and role of each actor and ways of sharing risks jointly.</p> <p>5.2 Risk factors are embedded in the Partnership-Accountability Framework.</p>	<p>The same ad hoc committee on Security Risk Management and Humanitarian Access composed of a reduced number of representatives for LNGOs, UN agencies and INGOs.</p>
<p>6. RESILIENCE AND DRR:</p> <p>Development and humanitarian programmes include DRR and resilience approach.</p>	<p>6.1 A strategy to support small Community Based Organisations in the performance of humanitarian aid is developed and implemented in projects in each of the three defined humanitarian regions.</p> <p>6.2 Humanitarian programmes include always a DRR and resilience approach and specific components.</p>	<p>Annual joint evaluations on DRR and resilience done across the NGO Consortium Incorporated regularly in the Clusters meeting agendas.</p> <p>Monthly review.</p>
<p>7. DIGNIFIED HUMANITARIAN AID:</p> <p>Somalia humanitarian community moves from an approach of “saving human bodies” to saving “dignified lives”.</p>	<p>7.1 Humanitarian programmes go beyond the basic survival thematic areas of work: Food, Shelter, WASH, etc., and include systematically other aspects such as: Education, Society building, Peace building etc as an integral part of the humanitarian delivery.</p> <p>7.2 Humanitarian action in urban contexts is developed as a new specific approach. This gives particular relevance to youth and employment.</p>	<p>Specific ad-hoc group within the NGO consortium and with UN invited members to monitor quality of humanitarian aid.</p>

Objectives: Humanitarian Capacity to achieve	Progress Indicators	Monitoring Mechanism
<p>8. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:</p> <p>LNGOs move from project based donor driven approach to a strategic own led approach.</p>	<p>8.1 LNGOs lead humanitarian sector by making a strong network led by those organisations with more capability.</p> <p>8.2 Incentives are implemented to give more space of LNGO in the NGO Consortium. The ratio of LNGOs vis a vis INGO will be at least 1:1 by the end of 2016.</p> <p>8.3 LNGOs gain access to international donors. LNGOs increase their funding by direct access in 300% by the end of 2016.</p>	<p>NGO Consortium</p>
<p>9. QUALIFIED HUMAN RESOURCES:</p> <p>LNGOs and SGA have professional, motivated and stable qualified humanitarian staff.</p>	<p>9.1 Turnover of staff is reduced within LNGOs.</p> <p>9.2 Brain drain from LNGOs and State Agencies is drastically reduced.</p> <p>9.3 INGOs, UN Agencies and LNGOs have a protocol of responsible management of humanitarian human resources.</p>	<p>NGO Consortium</p>

ANNEX 1 ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

A total of 28 organisations were interviewed as follows:

Interviews held at Nairobi (10); 19t– 20 June 2014:

Local NGOs (7):

- TARDO
- CED
- HIJRA
- SADO
- SOMALI AID
- HARDO
- DIAL

International NGOs (1):

- Oxfam

International agencies (2):

- UNICEF
- ICRC

Interviews held at Hargeisa (Somaliland) (9); 21 – 23 June 2014:

Local NGOs (4):

- HAVOYOCO
- TAAKULO (Tasko)
- HIRDA
- CANDLELIGHT

International NGOs (2):

- World Vision
- NGO Consortium (international and national NGOs)

International agencies (2):

- OCHA
- WFP

Government State Agencies (2):

- DMA (South Central Somalia)
- NERAD (Somaliland)

Interviews held at Garowe (Puntland) (9); 24 – 26 June 2014:

Local NGOs (3):

- KAALO
- ASAL
- SFS

International NGOs (2):

- CARE
- ADESO

International agencies (2):

- OCHA
- ICRC

Government State Agencies (1):

- HADMA (Puntland)

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