WHAT DRIVES ACTIVE CITIZENS?

Testing our assumptions through a comparative analysis of citizen data from seven countries

www.oxfam.org

OXFAM

CONTENTS

Summary **3**
Introduction **5**
Towards a Worldwide Influencing Network **6**
Data and Methods **8**
Citizens' voice **10**

How many people took action? 10
How did people voice their concerns? 12

Determinants of citizens' actions **14**

Socio-demographics 14
Interest in politics 16
Efficacy 17
Trust in civil society actors 19

Which civil society actors do citizens trust? 20

Does trust in civil society actors matter for taking action? 21

Attitudes and norms towards CSOs 23

Do norms and attitudes about CSOs matter for taking action? 24

Synthesis: What matters most for citizens' actions? 25

Conclusion **28**
Recommendations **28**
References **30**
Annex **32**

Annex 1: Theories of Change from R2F, F4D and C&F 32

Annex 2: Technical information on methods 35

Annex 3: Percentage of people who took any action, by project 41

SUMMARY

This paper investigates the characteristics of active citizens who raise their voice towards duty-bearers. First, we look at the demographics of people who raise their voice towards duty-bearers. Then, we investigate the various types of citizens' actions and which attitudes and norms active citizens hold.

Supporting citizens in raising their voices is one of the intervention strategies employed in the Strategic Partnership between Oxfam Novib, SOMO, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs called 'Towards a Worldwide Influencing Network' (from now on referred to as SP). In the SP programme, projects engage with citizens, often in some form of collective action (for example, signing a petition, contacting authorities, joining demonstrations). The objective is to gain a 'critical mass' of citizens who claim their rights and, in turn, pressure duty-bearers (governments and private-sector actors) to change their policies and practices. Such intervention strategies, which cultivate active citizenship and raise citizens' voices (particularly among marginalised groups), are commonly employed across the Oxfam federation (see, for example, Mayne et al., 2019).

This paper analyses who raises their voice and who refrains from raising their voice. The analyses rely on large-scale survey data that can be compared across projects. The data were collected in 2019–2020 within the SP from more than 4600 respondents in Uganda, Vietnam, the Occupied Palistinian Territory (OPT), Myanmar, Burundi, Niger, and Cambodia. We focused on the socio-demographics of active citizens, feelings of efficacy, trust in various civil society actors and attitudes and norms towards civil society organisations (CSOs). We studied how these determinants related to active citizenship behaviour and whether that differed between men and women and across programmes and projects.

The results showed that women and young people were less likely to be active than men and older citizens, despite the strategy specifically targeting women and young people. Feelings of efficacy were the most crucial determinant in raising citizens' voices, especially for women. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the particular civil society actors the citizens trusted varied considerably. International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO)s and the media were viewed as the least trustworthy, but traditional and religious leaders and local governments were trusted the most. Trust in INGOs, local governments and CSOs was related to citizens' actions, but trust in higher-level governments, traditional leaders and the media was not related to citizens' actions. We concluded that trust in the actor mobilising citizens (in the SP, mostly CSOs and INGOs) was more important than trust in the actor that was the influencing target (in the SP, often higher-level governments or the private sector). Attitudes towards CSOs were not associated with taking action, and social norms related to active engagement with CSOs were only weakly related to active citizenship behaviour. These results were consistent across projects and programmes in the SP (Finance for Development, Right to Food, and Conflict and Fragility) and for different types of citizens' actions (ranging from signing petitions and attending community meetings to contacting officials and attending demonstrations).

Based on the analyses presented here, we make several recommendations for other projects and programmes that aim to raise citizens' voices. We found that despite actively targeting women and youth in some SP projects, men and older people were more likely to participate. Thus, **projects run the risk of reinforcing existing inequalities in raising the citizens' voice**. Also, these analyses showed that feelings of efficacy was the most important driver of active citizenship, especially for women. Hence, **increasing the confidence of citizens that they can be drivers of change can mobilise people to take action**. This finding held regardless of the issue, programme or type of action citizens were encouraged to participate in. Finally, we found substantial variation in the perceived trustworthiness of civil society actors. Generally, civil society actors closer to citizens (traditional and religious leaders, CSOs and local

governments) were perceived as more trustworthy. In contrast, INGOs, in particular, were distrusted by the majority of respondents. Thus, future projects should not make the (implicit) assumption that INGOs are perceived as trustworthy actors by default. Instead, **programmes should aim to reach out to citizens in partnership with those civil society actors viewed as trustworthy by citizens, such as local CSOs and traditional and religious leaders**.

INTRODUCTION

Supporting citizens in claiming their rights is an important aspect of Oxfam's work (Mayne et al., 2019). Citizens who take action to demand their rights and influence policies that affect them are vital for democratic societies and for inclusive development to defeat poverty. But what makes someone raise their voice towards those in power? What are the characteristics of people who raise their voice and those who do not? What kinds of attitudes and norms induce citizens to voice their concerns towards duty-bearers?

This paper investigates these questions, drawing on large-scale survey data that can be compared across projects. The data were collected from over 4600 people interviewed within nine projects in seven countries. These data were collected as part of the impact evaluations for Oxfam Novib's Strategic Partnership (SP) with SOMO and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs – 'Towards a worldwide influencing network'.

Mobilising citizens to raise their voices is an intervention strategy that aims to contribute to changing government and private-sector policies. In the SP, this complements other strategies that ultimately seek to change government and private-sector policies, such as capacity strengthening of CSOs for influencing, building alliances and direct lobbying and advocacy towards duty-bearers. Citizen mobilisation is a common thread across the SP programme. In practice, these efforts take different forms and focus on various topics depending on the project focus and the country context. Some projects organised large-scale public campaigns that encouraged citizens to sign a petition or participate in a demonstration. Others were more narrowly focused, engaging smaller groups of citizens to understand, participate in and influence government and private-sector decision-making. The SP focuses on three thematic areas: Conflict and Fragility (C&F), Greater Responsibility in Finance for Development (F4D) and Right to Food (R2F).

Within the SP programmes, large-scale quantitative baseline and endline surveys were conducted to measure the impact of raising citizens' voices. These impact evaluations measured changes in whether and how citizens raised their voices and assessed the contributions of Oxfam's work to these changes. In this paper, we combined the data from the endline surveys of all nine projects in seven countries to investigate:

- Which types of action did people use to voice their concerns within the SP?
- Which people voiced their concerns, which did not and what were the individual determinants of active citizenship?
- Which determinants were more important for raising one's voice, which were less important?
- What were the commonalities and differences in these determinants across countries?
- Given the questions above, what are the main implications for projects and programmes that aim to mobilise citizens in raising their voice towards duty-bearers?

Section 2 presents a description of the SP programme, its thematic areas and objectives. Section 3 describes the data and sets out the methodology and analysis techniques used in this study. In section 4, we define 'citizens voice and its measurements'. Section 5 describes the main results of the analysis, and section 6 draws conclusions and makes recommendations for programmes that work on raising citizens' voices.

TOWARDS A WORLDWIDE INFLUENCING NETWORK

The SP 'Towards a Worldwide Influencing Network' programme ran from 2016 until the end of 2020 and covered three thematic areas: R2F, F4D, and C&F. The thematic programmes were implemented in 23 projects in 16 countries and three global projects. All thematic programmes worked towards several or all of the following seven outcomes: improved policies of governments and public actors, improved policies of private sector actors, increased political will, strengthened CSOs, stronger and wider alliances, increased citizens' voice, and shifted norms and attitudes. This paper focuses on the outcome of increased citizens' voice (as shown in the Theory of Change for the SP programme in Annex 1).

Greater Responsibility in Finance for Development (F4D)

The F4D projects in Uganda, OPT, Niger and Vietnam focused on increasing citizens' voice as one of their outcome areas. All projects worked toward greater transparency in finance on public policies with their own context and focus. The overall objective of the F4D project in Uganda was to ensure an efficient public finance system that promotes equality and enhances inclusive growth. In Niger, the project worked to ensure that more public resources were available for development through increased participation of vulnerable groups in a more efficient and transparent management and fairer mobilisation of public resources. In OPT, the F4D project aimed to ensure budgets became more responsive to the needs of poor and marginalised citizens and to ensure that the tax system in the OPT became more autonomous, progressive and transparent. In Vietnam, the project worked to reduce inequality and improve the quality of life through equitable and accountable fiscal policies and practices.

Citizens' voices played an important role in these F4D projects, though all targeted their own specific sub-groups in society. The target group in Uganda were the citizens who participated actively in the neighbourhood assemblies – a forum where people in a given locality come together to deliberate on issues that affect the community. The project in OPT targeted young people living in Area A and parts of Area B in the West Bank. In Niger, the project targeted women and young people organised in Anti-Corruption Clubs and Citizen Participation Groups. The project in Vietnam worked with an equal proportion of men and women farmers, womens' unions and community groups, often from ethnic minorities.

These F4D projects organised different activities to support people in raising their voice. These activities included organising community-based meetings, public campaigns, radio broadcasts, online and social media awareness-raising campaigns, online and offline petitions, media coverage, booths, public accountability sessions, spaces for multi-actor dialogues, training, contests, engagement of citizens in monitoring initiatives and exchange workshops.

Right to Food (R2F)

R2F projects in Uganda, Burundi, Cambodia and Myanmar had citizens' voice as one of the outcome areas. The projects worked on different aspects of the right to food, each with its own context and focus. Land rights and sustainable agriculture were the most dominant projects, but other aspects, such as seeds, private investments and gender inequality, were also included. The main objective of the R2F project in Uganda was to ensure better local, national and private-sector policies that protect and promote land and seed rights, especially women's land rights. In Burundi, the overall objective was to develop and influence local and regional public and private-sector policies for equitable access to agricultural inputs, land and credit for sustainable agriculture livelihoods.

The R2F project in Cambodia aimed to empower small-scale food producers and agricultural workers in claiming and demanding access to and control over their natural resources, particularly the land where they conduct traditional farming activities. In Myanmar, the project objective was to support rural communities in engaging in

policy advocacy with local and national policymakers and decision-makers in the policy areas of land, seeds, forestry, and private-investment policy frameworks and governance systems.

In Uganda, the project targeted women, especially through farmers' groups and community land associations. The target group in Burundi included agricultural producer organisations ('Organisations de producteurs' in French) that participated directly in project activities. In Cambodia, the project supported small-scale food producers and agricultural workers in rural areas, especially women, youth and indigenous peoples. Finally, the project in Myanmar targeted smallholder farmers, and landless and forest-dwelling women and men.

The R2F programme organised different activities to support people in raising their voice. These activities included delivering awareness-raising sessions, media and community advocacy activities, mobilisation of citizens, capacity-strengthening, cascade learning, media campaigns, strategic engagement with local decision-makers, legal services support, public forums, multi-stakeholder dialogues, support for learning events for networks, linking communities to business and NGOs, and evidence-based documentation and fact-finding.

Conflict and Fragility (C&F)

Under the C&F thematic programme, only the project in Niger measured citizens' voice as one of its outcome areas. The project aimed to build a Niger in which populations affected by conflict enjoy more protection of their rights and live in a more secure and stable environment.

The C&F project in Niger worked towards involving more women, young people and men (directly or through CSOs) in peaceful conflict management at various levels (local, regional and national).

DATA AND METHODS

We combined the data on whether people had taken action and the relevant determinants from all endline surveys conducted in 2019–2020 for the SP.

The questionnaires included questions that referred to determinants of citizens' voice. Question formulations were largely comparable between projects. However, questionnaires were translated and sometimes adapted to the country context to aid the interpretation of questions for the respondents. We carefully merged datasets to make the different projects as comparable as possible and address slight differences in the questionnaires. We used international standards and classification schemes to improve comparability (for instance, ISCED-classifications to determine the national education system).

The data in this comparative analysis only included people who participated in the SP project – its target groups[1].

We use multivariate analyses to investigate to what extent the socio-demographic attributes of people and other determinants explained whether people took action. Such multivariate regression analyses can be imagined as a giant switchboard where we can flip a switch for a certain determinant, say political interest, and then isolate the effect that particular determinant has on whether people take action.

The effect of each determinant was analysed in conjunction with or controlling for other determinants. The statistical techniques employed combined an effect for a single determinant, say trust in CSO's, while at the same time controlling for other factors such as education and age (which might be correlated with trust). We used a variety of statistical techniques to analyse these relationships between determinants and taking action. In the analyses presented and visualised here, we relied on multivariate models and controlled for the core socio-demographic factors. The results of these various regression analyses were converted into predicted probabilities. In this way, we were able to predict the probability of taking action for a person who views, for instance, CSOs as not at all trustworthy, versus someone who finds CSOs not trustworthy, versus someone who finds CSOs somewhat trustworthy. By doing this, we determined the nature of the relationship between trust in CSOs and taking action – who is more likely to take action, those who find CSOs more trustworthy or those who do not find CSOs trustworthy?

Suppose we find a positive effect for trust in CSOs on voicing concerns – people who have more trust in CSOs are more likely to voice their concerns. The multivariate analyses ensure we take into account other factors as well. For example, a positive effect for trust in CSOs might be explained by, for instance, more educated people being more likely to trust CSOs or more educated people being more likely to participate in actions in general as these determinants have been controlled for'.

There were differences between project contexts. For instance, a substantially smaller proportion of people engaged in any form of citizens' action in Burundi than in Cambodia. Explaining such differences between projects and countries is beyond this paper's scope. The context in which a project is implemented and how such projects are implemented likely influences how successful mobilising efforts are. This paper does not include the idiosyncrasies of each country and project implementation. Rather, we are interested in assessing whether there are common patterns across the programme in the characteristics of active citizens and

[1] The impact evaluations carried out previously relied on a counterfactual approach that included comparison groups in its design for some projects. This was not possible for all projects in the data set for this paper. For reasons of comparability, we have only included respondents in the intended target groups and excluded respondents in the comparison groups.

determinants of taking action. For instance, do we find that older people are more likely to take action in all countries where we have implemented projects?

The interpretation of the results was verified by several experts in Oxfam Novib to ensure our interpretation, conclusions, and recommendations were correct and valuable for improving programmes that support citizens in raising their voice. More technical information on our analysis can be found in the technical annex (Annex 2)

CITIZENS' VOICE

We understand citizens' voice as citizens taking action to have their concerns heard by duty-bearers to challenge the power of the authorities and the private sector, and to have a say in the future direction of society. The large-scale quantitative surveys within the SP programme focused on activities that aimed to mobilise a large number or a critical mass of citizens to pressure duty-bearers[2]. Participants were encouraged to make their voice heard in a variety of actions within the SP. The type of action for which citizens were mobilised differed across programmes. Thus, some activities were particularly relevant to projects under the umbrella of C&F (for instance, participation in peace and conflict resolution mechanisms), whereas others were specific to F4D (for example, community discussions on private-sector investments) or R2F projects (for example, demonstrations organised by producer organisations). The types of activities that participants were encouraged to engage in are listed in Figure 1.

In the analyses, we merged all these actions into one. Thus, respondents were classified as having taking action if they engaged in at least one of the activities listed in Figure 1 in the 12 months before the surveys in 2019–2020.

Figure 1: Types of activities included in the analysis.

- Attended community discussions or community discussion on planned private investments / Participated in debates at local level
- Raised an issue with local authorities or contacted a local government official
- Raised an issue with or contacted central government or national government
- Contacted radio, TV or newspapers
- Refused to pay taxes or fees to government
- Attended a demonstration, protest march or strike / joined a demonstration organised by a farmers' organisation or local producers' organisation
- Used force or violence
- Signed a petition / participated in online activism
- Donated to an NGO, CSO or CBO
- Contacted a member of a CSO
- Participated in activities organised by peace committees (C&F only)
- Participated in a peace monitoring mechanism (C&F only)
- Used a mechanism for recourse to justice (C&F only)
- Participated in a mechanism for concertation for peace (C&F only)

HOW MANY PEOPLE TOOK ACTION?

Across the nine projects included in our analyses, we found that 64% of the people targeted by our projects took at least one form of action (see Figure 2, total).

The people targeted within the R2F programme were more active (82% of those targeted engaged in at least one type of citizens' action) than those targeted by the C&F and F4D programmes.

More men than women were active in the C&F and R2F programmes. In the C&F programme, which only covers Niger in this paper, many more men took action (63%) than women (32%).

[2] Note that these activities aim to mobilise citizens into a critical mass that pressures duty-bearers. Other influencing and advocacy efforts, for instance where a select group of people advocated on behalf of others and lobbying, were not included in these activities.

There was no difference between the proportions of men and women who took action in the F4D programme.

There were large differences between projects in the proportion of active people (not shown, see Figure 13 in Annex 3). For instance, in Myanmar, we found that 68% of people targeted voiced their concerns to duty bearers. Whereas in Niger, for the F4D-project, this was only slightly more than 1 out of every 8 people targeted (13%). Despite these large differences in the proportion of active people between projects, we did see a similar pattern emerging when analysing the proportion of active citizens on a project-by-project basis. We consistently found more active citizens within the R2F projects compared to projects in the other programmes.

Figure 2
Overall a majority (64%) of those targeted by our programmes have taken at least one form of citizen action, in 2019-2020.



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=4437.

HOW DID PEOPLE VOICE THEIR CONCERNS?

The types of action that people engaged in differed between projects. Several types of citizens' action were available, but the type of actions that citizens were encouraged to engage in through the project activities differed between programmes and projects.

In Figure 3, we present the three most popular actions people engaged in. We found that 'attending community-level meetings and discussions' was often the most popular type of action taken to voice concerns. 'Contacting local government authorities or CSOs' was also a popular type of action across projects and programmes.

Figure 3: Most popular actions, by project

Percentage of people that took (any) action:
top 3 most popular actions by project



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=4437.

We found a large difference between the types of citizens' actions. In countries where attending community meetings and discussions was very popular, the proportion of citizens who took part in the second most popular activity was much smaller.

In Myanmar, Cambodia, Uganda (F4D), Burundi and Vietnam, most people attended community meetings. The percentage of people who participated in the second most popular activity in Myanmar (contacting CSOs) was roughly half the number that attended village meetings and discussions[3]. Similarly, 86% of Burundian respondents said they had attended community meetings, almost 3.5 times greater than the next most popular activity (raising issues with local authorities).

Finally, we did not find actions directed at national or higher-level governments to be popular actions. Popular modes of action centred on the local level for the target group. This further emphasised the importance of community meetings as a way of influencing local decision-making.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

These analyses of the data from the SP allow us to put forward several recommendations for other programmes that aim to raise citizens' voices.

Overall, we saw that men were generally more likely to take action than women. Thus, future projects should note that men are generally easier to mobilise to raise their voices than women.

Community discussions capture the largest audiences and are a good way of mobilising citizens, as this was the most popular type of citizens' action. However, to change the policies and practices of duty-bearers, more intensive forms of active citizenship may be necessary.

Other forms of active citizenship, such as contacting a CSO or government officials, are less common. They require more effort, time and expertise from both citizens and programmes, and the number of citizens raising their voice in this way was substantially lower compared to for instance attending community discussions. .

We saw that actions whose influencing target was close to citizens (local actors, such as local governments or CSOs) attracted more support than actions directed at national/higher-level governments (such as contacting or raising issues with national governments). This held for all programmes. Thus, actions that ultimately target duty-bearers close to citizens are more likely to be successful and mobilise larger groups of people than actions that target remote and more abstract duty-bearers such as national-level governments, irrespective of the programme of issues put forward.

[3] In discussions with colleagues in-country, we questioned the extent to which attending community meetings can be understood as a form of active citizenship when compared with signing petitions or attending a demonstration. We learned that in some countries attending community meetings is a common part of village life, whereas in other countries and projects, attending such meetings requires effort and resembles other, types of more difficult, time-consuming citizen actions requiring expertise or knowledge, such as contacting government authorities. However, in both cases, active participation in community meetings is a window of opportunity to influence decision-makers. Moreover, the results presented here, particularly those on determinants of citizen action, do not qualitatively differ when attending community meetings as a type of citizen action is excluded.

DETERMINANTS OF CITIZENS' ACTIONS

In all surveys, we identified several determinants that served as barriers or key enablers to citizens raising their voice (see Figure 4). These determinants are characteristics of people, which may explain whether or not citizens engage in an action. These determinants are commonly used to study active citizenship, political participation and other mass-mobilisation efforts (for example, Brady et al., 1995; Linssen, 2016; Putnam, 1993; Newton, 2014).

In this analysis, we investigated whether there were commonalities across projects in the type of people who raised their voice and the attitudes they held. Figure 4 lists the questions and determinants of citizens' voice included in these analyses. This analysis provided a test of the assumptions behind our theories of change on how citizens would engage with project activities aimed at raising citizens' voice.

Figure 4. Determinants of citizens' voice included in this study

- Socio-demographic characteristics: Who is more likely to take action? Younger or older citizens? Higher or lower educated people?
- Institutional and political trust: Which actors do citizens trust? What is the relationship between trust and voicing concerns? Who is more likely to take action: people with high levels of trust, or people who have less trust in certain actors?
- Political interest: are people interested in political issues? What is the relationship with citizen action?
- Attitudes and norms towards CSOs: do people value CSOs and are there norms that would prevent them from participating?
- Efficacy: Do people feel change is possible and that they are capable of playing a role in this? How does that relate to voicing concerns?

We studied how the key determinants related to either raising your voice or refraining from taking action. The first step in our analyses was to look at these determinants in isolation. For instance, who is more likely to take action – younger or older people? – those that have more trust in institutions or those that have less trust in institutions?

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS

First, let us look at the socio-demographic characteristics of those who participated in the SP programme. We investigated whether younger or older people were more likely to engage in action and whether the person's level of education played a role.

Our analysis estimated the probability that a respondent voiced their concerns (in at least one type of action) given the levels of the determinant of interest[4,5]. This probability always ranged between 0 (lowest) and 1 (highest). These results are presented in Figure 5. In Figure 5A, we plotted the probability of taking action on the vertical axis against a respondents' age on the

[4] In these analyses, we took into account the substantially different *level* of participation between projects. For example, Figure 4 shows that for OPT roughly 1 in 10 people participated in an action, but in Myanmar this was 8 out of 10 respondents. The analysis techniques used allowed us to control for these very different levels of participation. The probabilities reported here can thus be colloquially interpreted as the probability to participate in any form of action, given the age for a respondent from an 'average' project.

[5] Or, in more technical terms: We have estimated a probit model for the probability of taking action, with country fixed effects. The values represent the adjusted predictions transformed into probabilities, at representative values for age and education.

horizontal axis. It is clear that as age increases, the probability of having taken an action increases.

Thus, generally, young people were less inclined to take action than older people. For education, we found that more educated people were more likely to raise their voice than less educated people.

This finding is consistent with the literature on political participation and modes of civic engagement more broadly (for example, Brady et al., 1995), which argues that those who have more resources and skills to participate, such as those with higher levels of education, are more likely to participate in citizens' actions.

These patterns were also consistent when scrutinising individual projects. Even in contexts where the overall level of activism was low, we found that older people were more likely to take actions than younger people. For instance, in OPT, where a small fraction of people engaged in any form of action, we still found that younger people aged 15–25 were much less likely to take action (Probability = 0.62) than older e.g. people aged 60 (Probability = 0..70), see Figure 6.

This picture was slightly more nuanced in Cambodia, Burundi, and Myanmar. Although we still found that younger people were less likely to participate than older people, the difference between young and old respondents was smaller than for other projects. This was likely due to the high popularity of village meetings – an overwhelming majority of respondents stated that they attended. If most people attended such meetings, differences between younger and older people become less pronounced.

Figure 4: Probability of taking action by age (A), and education (B); The older and the more educated were more likely to take action.

A



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=4423.

B



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=4423.

We did not find major differences between thematic areas. Thus, generally, older people were likely to raise their voice in F4D, R2F, and C&F projects.

The finding that more educated people participated held for all projects individually. Additionally, we did not find any difference between men and women for the relationships between age or education on the one hand and taking action on the other. Thus, although we did find that women were generally less likely to participate, the pattern that younger people participated less and more educated people participated more held for both men and women.

Younger people and less educated people were less likely to participate in any type of citizens' action. This held for contexts in which taking action was relatively common and in countries where voicing concerns through citizens' actions was uncommon.

The SP specifically targeted the relatively poor and marginalised, combined with explicit efforts to raise

women's voices. Traditionally, these are groups that are hard to reach. Moreover, these results demonstrated that these people were the groups of citizens who were most difficult to mobilise to raise their voices. But even with such targeting strategies, we found that men, the relatively well educated, and older citizens were more inclined to raise their voice.

Even within the narrow subset of relatively poor and marginalised groups targeted in our SP projects, we saw a tendency for men, older people, and the more educated to engage in all types of citizens' actions. These results showed that, despite often specifically targeting more marginalised groups, the projects often mobilised those citizens who were already likely to voice their concerns. Thus, these results indicated a risk of perpetuating existing inequalities in the groups of citizens who raised their voice to duty-bearers.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

Younger people and less educated people were less likely to participate in citizens' actions. This held for contexts in which taking action was relatively common (high participation contexts) and in countries where voicing concerns through citizens' actions was uncommon.

The SP specifically targeted the relatively poor and marginalised (combined with explicit efforts to raise women's voices).

However, the results showed that marginalised groups of people were the most difficult to mobilise to raise their voices. Moreover, even in projects that developed specific targeting strategies to mobilise women and youth, we found that the relatively well-educated, men and older citizens were more inclined to raise their voices than the marginalised groups that these interventions specifically aimed to involve.

First, future programmes should take into account that targeting marginalised groups is not the most effective route to reach scale and mobilise a critical mass of people.

Second, our findings showed that despite the success of supporting citizens in claiming their rights, the efforts to target marginalised groups came with the risk of perpetuating existing inequalities involving those who raise their voice. Even when reaching out to marginalised groups, it is still the relatively well-to-do, older citizens and men who are likely to take action.

INTEREST IN POLITICS

Citizens who discuss politics regularly are more likely to understand different political positions, discuss the pros and cons of different political standpoints, form opinions and attitudes and be more likely to hold duty-bearers accountable for their actions (Klingemann, 1979).

Political interest was measured using the following question adapted from Pew Research Centre: When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

We estimated the probability (between 0 and 1) that an 'average' individual in our sample would voice their concerns towards duty-bearers, given how often they discuss political matters with friends and family. This is visualised in Figure 6.

For an otherwise 'average' person who never discussed politics, the probability of voicing concerns was 0.57, whereas if someone discussed politics occasionally, the probability of

voicing concerns increased to 0.74. Thus, someone who never discussed politics had a 51% chance of voicing their concerns, against 76% for someone who often discussed politics. Note that these estimates were controlled for age, level of education, gender and the project in which people were targeted. This effect (the more political interest, the stronger the likelihood of taking action) was found consistently across the individual projects included here.

Figure 5: Probability of taking action according to political interest:
The more respondents discussed politics with family and friends, the more likely they were to take action.



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=4282.
Shaded areas represents 95% confidence interval of the estimate.

Through discussions, citizens become knowledgeable about politics, which fosters the acceptance of democratic principles and their political participation (Galstone 2001). Interest in political affairs is an important motivating factor for citizens in voicing their concerns (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995; Dalton, 2008). This was confirmed in this comparative analysis. Hence, we assumed that citizens who engaged in political discussions more often were also more likely to be sensitive to actions promoted by the SP. In some countries, this was part of their strategy for citizens' engagement. They first built people's interest in political processes before asking for their participation in the political process. These results showed that this strategy was effective.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

Whether people discuss politics often or not and whether they have a general interest in politics is often not in the sphere of influence of our projects. However, this might be a basis upon which we can target citizens to encourage them to participate in projects. Targeting citizens with a general interest in politics and political issues helps in mass mobilisation as these people are more likely to transform their interest into action and raise their voice.

EFFICACY

Efficacy is understood here as citizens 'feeling that political and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change' (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954, p. 187). Feelings about whether changes within their communities are possible and whether they consider themselves able to play a role in whatever change is sought can be a determinant of someone's willingness to take action. This is closely linked to what is termed in the literature as 'internal political efficacy'. Efficacy is about how a person feels about their own capabilities (knowledge and skills) in influencing decision-making in the wider community. Efficacy is expected to influence the extent to which an individual may engage in citizens' actions within the SP – people must believe change is possible and that they can play a role in this change in order to start participating.

We measured efficacy by asking the question: 'Do you feel that people like yourself can generally change (improve) things in your community if they want to?'

We found that those who displayed higher levels of efficacy were more likely to voice their concerns towards duty-bearers (see Figure 7). Figure 7 shows that the probability of participating in any action for respondents who felt it was very easy to change things in their community was 0.81 compared with 0.57 for those who felt it was not easy to bring about change in their communities.

In Figure 7B, we estimated the effect of efficacy on taking action for men and women separately. What is notable here is that women generally had lower levels of efficacy than men. This was reflected in the finding that women were less likely to voice their concerns in general.

Moreover, women who felt it was not possible to change things in their community had a 0.50 probability of voicing their concerns, compared with 0.64 for men. This difference was statistically significant. Yet, when we moved higher up the efficacy scale, the differences between men and women disappeared (for example, the probability of taking action for men who felt that it was fairly easy to change things in their community was 0.76 and 0.72 for women, with confidence intervals that overlapped) and were not statistically significant.

We concluded that, although women generally participated less, feelings of efficacy were strongly related to participation for both men and women. Women with the lowest levels of efficacy were the least likely to take action. However, these results showed that an increase in efficacy for women led to a greater increase in voicing concerns, particularly for women at the lower end of the efficacy spectrum. Thus, women's participation benefited slightly more from increased levels of efficacy than men's participation. This finding was consistent across programmes and across projects and for different types of action. This indicated that feelings of efficacy were important for citizens before engaging in any type of action (for example, signing petitions or contacting government officials) and that a sense of efficacy was important irrespective of the issue for which people mobilised themselves.

Figure 6: Probability of taking action by feelings of efficacy – average (A), for men and women separately (B).
The higher the feelings of efficacy, the more likely participation in any action.



IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

Increasing the confidence citizens have in their own capacity to effect change (efficacy) is an important determinant in mobilising people to action. Compared with the other determinants studied here, having feelings of efficacy was the most important determinant (see also the section: synthesis, which determinants matter most).

Feelings of efficacy positively influenced active citizenship behaviours, especially for women.

Therefore, increasing the self-confidence of citizens in their capability to be the drivers of change should be an integral part of interventions that aim to mobilise people to take action, regardless of the issue or the type of citizens' action. Women's participation, in particular, benefits greatly from increased feelings of efficacy.

Raising efficacy is often done in projects by taking participants along the process of raising their voice – through working with several 'champions' who aim to serve as role models for others in the community.

TRUST IN CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS

Trust is defined as the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm if they can avoid it and will look after our interests if this is possible. Citizens may trust or distrust institutions (such as local and state governments, NGOs, and other civil society actors) based on their sense of how these institutions work (Newton, 2009; 2014). Countries where citizens display high levels of trust in such actors have been associated with more democratic development (Inglehart, 1997), more equal income distributions (Knack & Keefer, 1997), and less corruption (Della Porta, 2000). Moreover, in countries where trust in other people and (political) institutions is high, citizens are more likely to pay their taxes and get better social services in return (Scholtz & Lubell, 1998). Furthermore, the level of trust in institutions is related to the willingness of citizens to actively engage with them. In our study, trust was measured using the survey item 'I would like to know whether you trust the following institutions and organisations to do the right thing? Do you trust them all the time, most of the time, not very often, or never?'

Additional questions then distinguished between trust in government institutions at various levels (local, state, and national/federal government), civil society actors, the private sector, international NGOs, local CSOs, the media, and traditional and religious leaders.

Which civil society actors do citizens trust?

Figure 8 shows the percentage of people who trusted a certain civil society actor 'most of the time' or 'always' broken down by civil society actor and project. For instance, in Niger, in our sample for the C&F project, 89% of people stated that they trusted traditional and religious leaders 'most of the time' or 'always'.

We found that there were major differences *between* projects in the perceived trustworthiness of civil society actors. For instance, in Uganda (F4D and R2F) and Niger (C&F), even the least trustworthy actor was trusted more than the most trusted actor in OPT and Burundi.

The data also showed that there were major differences *within* projects. The overall pattern in most projects was that the institutions that were closer to citizens, such as local CSOs, traditional and religious leaders, and local government actors, were trusted more often than central governments and the media. Finally, the differences in trustworthiness that citizens ascribe to INGOs should be noted. In Uganda, this was rather high for both R2F and F4D, with about 9 out of 10 people stating that they trusted INGOs 'most of the time' or 'always'. Whereas in Burundi, this was just 3% of respondents. Overall, the majority of respondents did

Figure 7: Trust in civil society actors:
Percentage of people who trust civil society actors 'always', by project.



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, n=3765
% of people that trust institution most of the time or always
No data available for Vietnam and OPT-trust in media

not view INGOs as trustworthy. The media was among the least trusted civil society actor in all projects.

Does trust in civil society actors matter for taking action?

Aside from whether people trust a certain actor to do the right thing or not, we now assess whether trust in such actors was related to taking action. Distinguishing between levels of trust in different actors is important in understanding to what extent projects can successfully raise the citizens' voice. Low levels of trust in government actors might induce dissatisfaction and apathy, where citizens refrain from voicing their concerns towards duty-bearers (Hardin, 1998). On the other hand, lower levels of trust could be related to higher levels of action, where distrust and dissatisfaction or a sense of aggrievement might spur people to voice their concerns. However, the confidence of citizens in INGOs influences whether people are likely to engage with project activities. Figure 9 presents our findings for a selection of civil society actors. Like our previous analyses for age and education, we estimated the probability that someone voices any action (vertical axis) and then offset that against various levels of trust on the horizontal axis (ranging from '1-never' to 4-'all the time').

Our findings showed that trust in INGOs and CSOs was strongly related to citizens raising their voice. Those who had more trust in local governments were more likely to take action than those that lacked trust. However, trust in local governments was a weaker association with voicing concerns than trust in INGOs and local CSOs. This can be accounted for by most citizens actions focusing on local decision-makers. Trust in central governments and trust in the private sector was not associated with higher levels of participation (model coefficients were not statistically significant, and the confidence intervals overlapped as trustworthiness increased). Although there was some fluctuation between the probability of participating and the extent to which someone trusted the central government and the private sector, these effects were not statistically significant.

Figure 8: Relationship between trust in civil society actors and taking action



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=3765.
Shaded areas represents 95% confidence interval of the estimate.
Estimates controlled for respondent's age, gender, and level of education.

Hence, the level of trust someone places in CSOs and INGOs mattered most for their level of participation. The level of trust in local governments mattered less. Trust in traditional and religious leaders, the private sector, and the national government was not related to the respondent's likelihood of voicing concerns.

We did not find gender differences in the relationships between trust and taking action. Women were generally less likely to take action, but we found that the effect of trust in INGOs, CSOs, and local governments on taking

action was similar for men and women. This meant that although women participated less and had, on average, a smaller chance of voicing their concerns, the benefits of viewing these actors as more trustworthy for voicing concerns was the same as for men.

These findings need to be interpreted with reference to the context in which these projects were implemented and the actors that were viewed as trustworthy. As shown in the previous section, some projects were implemented in low-trust environments (virtually all civil society actors were viewed as untrustworthy, for example, in Burundi or OPT). Nevertheless, the relationship between trust and taking action was found for all the projects. Thus, even in a generally low-trust context, such as Burundi or OPT, we found that increases in trust for civil society actors were associated with more participation. Similarly, in comparatively high-trust contexts, such as Uganda, we also found that those who viewed INGOs, CSOs, and local governments as trustworthy were more likely to take action. Surprisingly, we did not find a relationship between trust in traditional and religious leaders and taking action. Traditional and religious leaders were generally viewed as one of the most trustworthy actors (see Figure 9), but this did not affect whether or not people took action.

Finally, data analysis led us to reject the idea that distrust or aggrievement towards these institutions spurred people into becoming more active.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

These findings show that it is important to take into account which actors are viewed as trustworthy and which are not in each project context.

Future projects should not assume that actors like Oxfam or even local CSOs are viewed as trustworthy by citizens. The data showed that most respondents distrust INGOs (like Oxfam).

There were substantial differences between countries and projects in the extent to which people view INGOs as trustworthy. In some cases (Cambodia, Burundi), fewer than 1 in 5 citizens trust INGOs.

Similarly, the media was often among the least trusted civil society actors. This can be taken into account in, for instance, decision-making around the branding of campaign materials and the channels through which projects reach out to citizens.

Civil society actors closest to citizens (traditional and religious leaders, local governments, and CSOs) were viewed as most trustworthy. Such high trust in actors close to citizens can be leveraged in targeting strategies. Therefore, future programmes should seek partnerships with traditional and religious leaders, local governments, and CSOs to target and reach out to citizens, especially in environments where trust in INGOs is particularly low.

Additionally, in most cases, we found that trust in the actor that mobilises citizens (CSOs and INGOs in the SP) is more important than trust in the actor that makes policy changes (such as higher-level governments or the private sector).

Building trust in CSOs and INGOs is conducive to mobilising citizens to act.

Future interventions that aim to mobilise citizens may benefit more from building trust in CSOs and INGOs (the actor that mobilises citizens) rather than building trust between citizens and the actors that determine policies and make changes (higher-level government actors and the private sector).

ATTITUDES AND NORMS TOWARDS CSOS

Civil society organisations are at the heart of the SP. Therefore we assessed whether attitudes people held towards CSOs bore a relationship to citizens' actions. Here, we focus particularly on how people would feel if a government would take steps to limit the work of CSOs. To measure these attitudes, we asked respondents, 'How would you feel if the government took steps to limit the work of CSOs or steps that led to the closure of many CSOs in this country?'. Respondents who said 'I would be concerned' or 'I would be outraged' were considered to have a positive attitude towards CSOs. The expectation was that more positive attitudes would increase the likelihood of taking action.

Figure 9: Norms about CSO involvement:
What would other people in your community think if you were actively involved in the work of a CSO? Percentage of people who stated others think it would be a bad thing (negative), they would have a neutral opinion (neutral), or others would think it is a good thing (positive).



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=3647No data available for OPTI (F4D)

Figure 10: Attitudes towards CSOs: How would you feel if the government took steps to limit the work of CSOs or steps that led to the closure of many CSOs in this country? Percentage of people who stated 'it would not bother me', vs. 'I would be outraged', by project.



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020, total n=3538
No data available for Vietnam (F4D)

Attitudes towards CSOs showed some variance across projects in the extent to which respondents would be against limiting the work of CSOs (see Figure 10). Generally, citizens held positive attitudes towards CSOs. In most projects, an overwhelming majority of participants would be against measures to limit their work. Attitudes towards CSOs were slightly more negative in the OPT than in the other countries. However, even in the OPT, a majority of participants were against limiting the work of CSOs.

We also assessed whether the prevailing norm about participation in the activities of CSOs affected taking action. We defined a social norm as 'an unwritten behavioural rule to which individuals prefer to conform on the condition that they believe that most people in their reference group conform to it, and most people in their reference group believe they should conform to it' (adapted from Bicchieri, 2006 and Bicchieri et al., 2014). This definition relates to what citizens believe others do and what an individual believes others think he or she should do. To capture these norms, we posed

the following question to respondents 'What would other people in your community think if you were actively involved in the work of a CSO?' Norms about participation in a CSO's work or activities could be related to taking action. ICSOs within the SP nudge people into taking action. Citizens take the prevailing norms about working with CSOs into consideration before engaging with them. Postive norms about working with CSOs are conducive to taking action together with such CSOs. When looking at the prevailing norms about CSO participation across projects, a more mixed picture emerges. In Figure 11 the responses to the question 'What would other people in your community think if you were actively involved in the work of a CSO?' are shown. In most projects, the prevailing norm was that it is a good thing to work with CSOs. However, in Niger (F4D) and Myanmar (R2F), there are sizeable shares of responsdents who feel that people in their community would perceive such work in negative ways (22% in Niger and 29% in Myanmar).

Do norms and attitudes about CSOs matter for taking action?

We found that attitudes towards limiting the work of CSOs were not related to taking action. Figure 12A shows a person's probability of participation against the response to the question 'How would you feel if the government took steps to limit the work of CSOs or steps that led to the closure of many CSOs in this country?'. There seems to be some variation in the probability of participation shown in Figure 12A. Counterintuitively, the more positive the attitude, the less likely it was that a person would take action. However, these differences are within the sampling margins and thus not statistically significant. This rather surprising finding – that attitudes towards CSOs are not related to taking action – could be explained by the question used as a proxy for these attitudes. Admittedly, this is a rather crude instrument that likely does not capture the full breadth and depth of attitudes towards CSOs.

We found that our expectations were confirmed when looking at norms about participation in CSO activities (see Figure 12B) and the relationship with active citizenship. Social norms about working with CSOs matter for taking action – the more positive the norm, the more likely that people take citizens' actions. Again, there were no differences between men and women.

Figure 11: Probability of taking action by attitude towards limting the work of CSOs (A), and norms about participation in work of CSOs (B); The attitude towards CSOs does not affect taking action. The more positive norms about CSOs participation increase the likelihood of taking action



IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

Attitudes towards CSOs were generally positive, except for Niger (F4D) and Myanmar (R2F). Norms about working with CSOs were equally positive – in most projects in the SP, citizens held positive views towards fellow community members who engaged in activities instigated by CSOs. However, these positive norms and attitudes were not related to taking any form of citizens' action.

As attitudes and norms about CSOs did not play a role in whether someone takes action, changing such norms and attitudes should not be a priority in programmes that cultivate active citizenship.

SYNTHESIS: WHAT MATTERS MOST FOR CITIZENS' ACTIONS?

In the previous analyses, we investigated how each determinant affected citizens' actions in isolation, for example, the relationship between trust in CSOs and citizens' actions[6].

The interplay between socio-demographics, trust, interest, efficacy, and norms and attitudes towards CSOs was not fully taken into account in the previous analyses. So, we examined which of these determinants were more or less critical for taking action. A simultaneous assessment of the strength of the relationships between these determinants and citizens' actions allowed us to explore the explanatory power of each determinant and thereby infer which determinants were most important.

The results of these models showed that socio-demographic factors such as age and education did play a role. Older people were more likely to take action, and more educated people were more active citizens. Trust in local governments, INGOs, and CSOs also withstood this multivariate litmus test. Trust in these institutions mattered for citizens' actions, regardless of the person's level of education or age. Attitudes towards limiting the work of CSOs and norms about CSO participation were not related to citizens' actions, and that did not change when we took into account the interplay with other determinants. Thus, those who trusted local governments and CSOs, the more educated and older citizens, were more likely to raise their voices.

The most important determinants for citizens' actions were feelings of efficacy and political interest. The effects of trust, age, and education were unimportant in comparison. Hence, having a higher level of education, trust in CSOs and INGOs and being older helped to raise voices, but judging yourself as capable of changing things in your community mattered most. **Thus, future projects that explicitly focus on building this efficacy and increasing the confidence of people in their own ability to change their communities are potentially most effective in mobilising people to raise their voices, especially among women.**

Next, we wanted to explore whether the mechanism outlined here differed for different actions. For example, were young people more likely to choose a certain type of action (for instance, attending a demonstration)? Or were people with more trustworthy attitudes towards national governments more likely to take a specific type of action?

To investigate this, we analysed the relationships between these determinants and also each type of action *separately.* Thus, we did not combine all actions together (i.e. participation in any mode of citizen participation) actions together but instead considered each action seperately

[6] We did take into account socio-demographics, age, education, and level of education in these analyses and controlled for differences in the overall level of participation between countries in the estimation of these relationships.

(i.e. only attending community discussion, only signing petitions, etc.)() a single type of citizens' action in each analysis[7].

The results and the mechanism that underpins all these separate types of citizens' actions were remarkably similar. Thus, it was still the more educated and older people, those who trusted CSOs and local governments and especially those with high efficacy, who were most likely to raise their voice in any type of action (except community discussions). Moreover, the effects of our determinants were more pronounced for 'hard' actions (requiring more skills, time, and expertise, such as contacting government officials). Here we saw larger disparities in age, education, the trustworthiness of INGOs, CSOs and local governments and feelings of efficacy between those that engaged in such harder types of citizens' actions and those who were not. The exception was attending community discussions. This might be explained by our finding that attendance at such community meetings was fairly commonplace. In many projects, most people stated that they had attended community meetings. If almost everyone in a community participates, there are naturally fewer socio-demographic and attitudinal differences to discern between those who attend and those who do not. Community discussions are thus a type of action with few barriers to entry and can reach a wide diversity of people.

The issues around which citizen's rally were markedly different between programmes. These ranged from issues related to peace and reconciliation processes in the C&F project in Niger, taxation and public spending in Uganda, to land rights and private sector investments in Myanmar. We found that the relationships between the key determinants and taking action were noticeably consistent across the projects in these programmes. This consistency of findings across programmes suggested that the issue around which people were mobilised did not play a crucial role in deciding whether to take action or deciding on the type of action[8]. The groups of people who were likely to engage and raise their voice were similar. For each programme (R2F, F4D and C&F) and each type of citizens' action, older people, the more educated, politically interested and, first and foremost, those with high levels of efficacy were most likely to raise their voice.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RAISING CITIZENS' VOICES

Programmes that include activities that aim to increase people's confidence in their abilities to change their communities are potentially the most effective in mobilising citizens to raise their voices, especially among women.

In general, the 'harder' the type of citizens' action (requiring more skills and more time-consuming), the more pronounced the differences between the groups of people who participated. The harder and more time-consuming types of citizens' action predominantly attracted men, the more educated, those who trusted CSOs and INGOs, and older people.

Women, youth, less educated people, and those with low levels of efficacy were less likely to raise their voices in all types of action. However, these differences between groups were less pronounced for community discussions. Thus, future programmes should seek to mobilise such marginalised groups first by engaging with them in community discussions to build the confidence needed for taking further actions.

Despite the vast array of projects covered by the programmes analysed here, the determinants of active citizenship were remarkably similar across those projects. This

[7] The data allowed us to do this for the types of action measured in each project: raised an issue with local authorities, contacted the media (radio/tv/newspaper), and attended a demonstration or protest march.

[8] If the issue or theme around which citizens rally was markedly important, we would have found large differences between the type of active citizens in the F4D, R2F and C&F programmes. For instance, younger instead of older people that take action on a specific theme. The data did not provide evidence for that.

suggested that citizens rally around a certain type of action more than a specific programme.

Thus, future programmes should carefully consider whether the action they seek to mobilise people to take matches the target groups they seek to engage, especially because harder modes of citizens' actions are likely to be taken by the relatively better off in the community.

CONCLUSION

This paper investigated the types of citizens' actions participants in the SP projects have taken and who was more likely to participate. The key determinants of active citizenship were also assessed. Using data on people's attitudes, norms and behaviour collected within the SP from more than 4600 participants across nine different projects, we analysed the relationship between key determinants and a wide variety of types of action available to citizens to pressure duty-bearers. **We found that older people, more educated people and those who trusted INGOs, CSOs and local authorities were all more likely to engage in citizens' actions.** Regardless of how people choose to voice their concerns (whether signing petitions, attending community meetings or attending a demonstration) or which programmes citizens engaged in, **feelings of efficacy and interest in politics were the most critical drivers of active citizenship, particularly for women.**

Young people, less educated people, and women were significantly less likely to engage in any type of active citizenship. However, these people were often the marginalised groups specifically targeted in the various projects in the SP.

We found major differences between projects in the extent to which people trusted the different civil society actors. Trust in traditional and religious leaders was high in virtually all projects studied. Whether people trusted INGOs varied between projects and was noticeably low in some countries (for example, Burundi and Cambodia). **People who viewed CSOs and INGOs as trustworthy were more likely to take action**. Similarly, those who trusted local governments were slightly more likely to take action. Trust in the actor mobilising people (for example, CSOs and INGOs) was more important for engagement in citizens' actions than trust in the actor being influenced (for example, the private sector and higher-level governments). Attitudes and norms about CSOs were not related to taking action.

Overall, these results showed the locus of active citizenship in the SP was at the community level. Efficacy, or the extent to which people felt that change was possible *within their own community,* was the most important determinant. Furthermore, the data demonstrated that trust in the civil society actors closest to the citizens, such as CSOs and local government authorities, spurred people to take action.

Finally, we found that, **despite the wide variety of projects, types of action and contexts in which these projects were implemented, how these determinants shaped active citizenship was surprisingly consistent**. Even in contexts where raising one's voice was the exception rather than the rule (where the proportion of people who had engaged in any action was very low), the most important drivers for engagement in any type of action were still trust in the same civil society actors, younger people and women were still hardest to engage, and more interest in politics and the self-belief of citizens in their capability of standing up for their rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Increasing the confidence that citizens themselves can be the drivers of change should be an integral part of interventions that aim to mobilise people to take action. Feelings of efficacy is the most important determinant for taking action. Women's participation in particular benefits greatly from increased feelings of efficacy. Attitudes and norms towards CSOs deserve less attention as these are generally positive and not related to taking action.

Future programmes that aim to mobilise citizens should be aware that there is a risk of sustaining or even reinforcing existing inequalities in the type of citizens who raise their voice. Our analyses showed that, despite specific targeting and efforts to mobilise marginalised groups, such as youth and women, it was still men, older citizens and the relatively well off who were most likely to raise their voice.

Programmes should not a priori assume that INGOs are viewed as trustworthy civil society actors by citizens. Trust in INGOs varied across projects and countries, but most respondents did not view INGOs as trustworthy civil society actors. Among participants in the SP projects in Myanmar, OPT, Niger and Burundi, most citizens distrusted INGOs. Trust in traditional and religious leaders was generally high, whereas the media was consistently one of the least trusted civil society actors. Future programmes can take this into account by reaching out to citizens in partnership with those civil society actors viewed as trustworthy by citizens, such as traditional and religious leaders.

This paper shows that the trustworthiness of the actor that mobilises (such as CSOs or INGOs) was more important in raising citizens voices than trust in the actors whose policies we sought to change in the SP (such as the private sector or higher-level government institutions). Furthermore, the data demonstrated that trust in civil society actors closest to the citizens, such as CSOs and local government authorities, spurred people to take action.

Attitudes and norms towards CSOs were generally positive in all projects studied. Moreover, the attitudes people held about CSOs were not related to taking action. Social norms about CSO involvement held by fellow community members were only weakly related to taking action. Building a more positive image and more positive norms about participation in CSO activities can thus take a lower priority in future projects.

Thus, programmes that aim to mobilise citizens to take action should focus their efforts as close to the people they seek to mobilise as possible, stimulate citizens' confidence in their own ability to make changes in their communities and seek to engage citizens in partnership with the people and institutions they trust, such as traditional and religious leaders.

REFERENCES

Bicchieri, C. (2006). *The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms*, Cambridge University Press, 2006

Bicchieri, C., Lindemans, J., Jiang, T. (2014). A Structured Approach to the Diagnostic of Collective Practices. *Frontiers in Psychology*, Vol. 5.

Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American political science review*, *89*(2), 271-294.

Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 999–1023.

Cameron, M. et al. (2014). From knowledge to action: participant stories of a population health intervention to reduce gender violence and HIV in three southern African countries. AIDS Care, Vol. 26, No. 12, p. 1534–1540.

Clausen, B., Kraay, A., & Nyiri, Z. (2011). Corruption and confidence in public institutions: Evidence from a global survey. The World Bank Economic Review,25(2), 212-249.

Craig, S, Niemi, R, & Silver, G, Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on NES Pilot Study Items, Political Behaviour, Vol 12, No. 3, 1990, p. 290

Della Porta, D. (2000). Social capital, beliefs in government, and political corruption. Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries? Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univeristy Press. pp. 202-228.

Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (1999). Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks. Journal of ethnic and migration studies, 25(4), 703-726.

Finkel, S., Sabatini C., and Bevis, G. (2000). Civic education, civil society, and political mistrust in a developing democracy: The case of the Dominican Republic. World Development, 28(11): 1851–1874

Galston, W. A. (2001). Political knowledge, political engagement, and civic education. Annual review of political science, 4(1), 217-234.

Goldfinch, S., Gauld, R., Herbison, P. (2009). The Participation Divide? Political Participation, Trust in Government, and E-government in Australia and New Zealand, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2009, pp 333–350

Gurr, T. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilisation and conflict since 1945. International Political Science Review, 14(2), 161-201.

Hardin, R. (1998). Trust in Government. In V. Braithwaite & M. Levi (Eds), Trust and Governance (pp.9-27). New York: Russell Sage.

Hope, E., Jagers, R. (2014). The Role of Sociopolitical Attitudes and Civic Education in the Civic Engagement of Black Youth. Journal of Research on Adolescence (3): 460-470.

Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernisation and postmodernisation: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies (Vol. 19). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Klingemann, H.D. (1979). The background of ideological conceptualisation. In: S. Barnes & M. Kaase (Eds.) Political action: Mass participation in five Western democracies (pp. 255–277). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1251-1288.

Lambsdorff, J.G. (2007). The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Linssen, R. (2016*). Participation in context: contextual and individual determinants of political participation in Europe and the Netherlands*. Datawyse / Universitaire Pers Maastricht.

Mayne, R., Stalker, C., Wells-Dang, A., & Barahona, R. (2019). *Influencing to Tackle Poverty and Injustice: Learning from the past, looking to the future*. Oxfam. DOI 10.21201/2019.3958

Morrell, M, Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure of Internal Political Efficacy, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter, 2003), pp. 589-602, Oxford: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research.

Newton, K. (2009). Social and Political Trust. In R. Dalton & H. D. Klingemann (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (pp. 342-361). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Newton, K. (2014). Trust and political disenchantment. In M. Quandt, C. Eder & I. C. Mochmann (Eds), Political Trust and Disenchantment with Politics: International Perspectives (pp 19-30). Leiden: Brill.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2002). Islamic culture and democracy: Testing the 'clash of civilisations' thesis. Comparative Sociology, 1(3), 235-263.

Oxfam Novib (2015). Towards a Worldwide Influencing Network, Programme Document for the Strategic Partnership with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Annex 1: Outcome and Output Indicators

Pew Research Centre (2014). 2014 American Trends Panel Wave 1, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/

Pew Research Centre, Beyond Distrust: How Americans View their Government, November 2015, q.107v, http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/

Putnam, Robert (1993). Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ray, M. R. (2002). The changing & unchanging face of US civil society. Transaction Publishers.

Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). "What is Quality of Government: A Theory of Impartial Political Institutions." Governance 21.2:165-190.

Scholz, J. and Lubell, M. 1998. Adaptive Political Attitudes: Duty, Trust, and Fear as Monitors of Tax Policy. American Journal of Political Science, 42:903-920

Serek, J., Petrovicova, Z., Macek, P. (2015), Civic Organisations and the Internet as opportunities for minority youth civic participation, in Barrett, M. & Zani, B. (Eds.) Political and Civic Engagement (pp. 213-230), New York: Routledge

ANNEX

Annex 1: Theories of Change from R2F, F4D and C&F



Theory of change Greater Responsibility in Finance for Development

IMPACT

More citizens enjoy their basic rights and financial inclusion and experience equal opportunity in more democratic societies

LONG-TERM OUTCOME

More women, youth and other citizens benefit from higher quality and quantity of finance for development, an enhanced fiscal system and a sustainable and inclusive financial and corporate sector, tackling extreme inequality

Targeted outcomes

- National civil society increasingly holds governments, international institutions, regional bodies and the private sector to account for extreme inequality and poverty
- Governments, international institutions and MNC's take measures against tax evasion and avoidance (A3, A4)
- Governments ensure more pro-poor fiscal policy and with the private sector, are more transparent and accountable,
- Governments and international institutions enhance (new forms of) development aid and innovative finance
- Governments, international institutions and private sector ensure an inclusive, sustainable and stable financial sector

Early and intermediate outcomes

Increased public and private sector support for improved policies and practice (A8)

- Strengthened citizens and CSO capacities to research and influence
- Enhanced space for CSOs to advocate
- Enhanced transparency and access to information for CSOs

(A1)

- Strengthened national and international coalitions (A6, A7)
- Increased political will in the public and private sector
- Increased public pressure towards policy makers (A2, A5)
- Increased media coverage for demands of citizens

Interventions

- Assessment of capacity building needs
- Build skills of CSOs in research, advocacy, campaign strategies
- Facilitate exchange and learning
- Convene stakeholders and collaborate in platforms and coalitions on joint campaigns
- Open space for civil society on international level
- Engage/lobby key decision makers

- Build evidence on impact of harmful and positive approaches and policies
- Work in partnership with public and private sector champions to develop and pilot innovative approaches and policy alternatives
- Develop and implement tools to assess and rank information on governments and companies
- Publish and distribute evidence, opinions and demands
- Develop national advocacy strategies with coalitions of civil society actors
- Co-strategise in multi-stakeholder platforms (MSIs)
- Develop mechanisms and space that facilitate public mobilisation
- Engage/lobby with policy makers and influentials
- Use existing engagement and complaint mechanisms

ASSUMPTIONS

A1 As the influencing capacity of CSOs is strengthened, more will engage in the topic of financing for development, joining forces around a shared agenda.

A2 As champions in the media and public advocate for change, the terms of the debate will shift, creating an enabling environment for policy change.

A3 Political support for change will motivate the private sector to change and vice versa.

A4 While governments are the main determinants of fiscal policies, donor countries and institutions also have influence.

A5 Evidence based debates on aid effectiveness can increase public support by responding to concerns and highlighting the international spillover effects of poverty.

A6 The financial sector's voice in financial sector reforms and regulation has not been sufficiently balanced by CSO voices.

A7 A critical mass of citizens and CSOs organised in networks is needed to influence decision makers

A8 Fair and effective taxation and pro-poor budget allocation will only be achieved when civil society is involved.

Theory of change Conflict and Fragility

IMPACT

The basic rights of people affected by conflict and fragility are respected by national and international duty bearers and human security is improved

LONG-TERM OUTCOME

Marginalised groups have a say in policies that affect their lives; governments and international institutions support inclusion of women and promote protection of marginalised groups in security and peace building; and the private sector contributes to peace and development

CSOs increasingly advocate for the active and meaningful participation of women and marginalised groups in security and peace processes and play an active role in support of conflict prevention and mitigation and peace building at different levels of society (A2)

INCLUDE Women are included in security and peace building policies and processes (A1)

PROTECT Women and vulnerable groups are protected during and after conflict and fragility (A10)

CLAIM With the support of CSOs, women and vulnerable groups have a voice in policies that affect their lives

COMMIT Private sector actors do no harm, behave conflict-sensitively and are accountable to citizens (A7)

Capacity to represent women, men, girls and boys (A3)

Space for CSOs and priority to protection (A6)

Engagement with the private sector

Link local and global agendas

International community holds governments and the private sector accountable and advocates for inclusion and protection (A5)

Government and informal authorities implement effective policies and mechanisms for inclusion and protection (A9)

Companies start to include conflict-sensitivity considerations in their strategies and policies (A8)

Increased awareness and political will in the international community on inclusion and protection (A4)

Formal and informal government decision makers understand, collaborate and have capacity to create stability (A8)

Private sector actors are aware of their impact on conflict and respect (inter)national norms and standards

Targeted and intermediate outcomes

- Assessment of capacity building needs
- Build knowledge on existing standards and regulations
- Build skills of CSOs in research, advocacy, campaign strategies
- Facilitate exchange and learning
- Convene stakeholders and collaborate in platforms joint campaigns
- Open space for civil society on international level
- Create space for men and women to voice their concerns
- Engage / lobby key decision makers

- Build evidence on impact of harmful and positive approaches and policies of international actors, national authorities and companies
- Develop proposals for improved policies and practices and present evidence on potential impact
- Lobby and direct engagement with international security and peacebuilding community.
- Direct engagement with the investment and private sector related community
- Publish and distribute evidence, opinions and demands
- Develop national advocacy strategies with coalitions of civil society actors
- Cultivate and stimulate corporate leaders and business frontrunners who are willing to change business policies
- Develop mechanisms and space that facilitate public mobilisation (public voice)
- Engage with and build capacities of formal and informal authorities and decision makers

Interventions

ASSUMPTIONS

A1 CSOs can become influential stakeholders in fragile societies and respected as legitimate representatives, if they are well organised, properly capacitated and able to bring together vulnerable groups under a common agenda

A2 A strong civil society is a precondition for inclusive gender-sensitive peace building and essential for accountable governance and conflict-sensitive private sector behaviour

A3 As CSOs effectively represent the voice of women and marginalised groups, these groups are capable of voicing their concerns and have a say in decisions that affect their lives, and connect with (inter)national political processes

A4 To be an actor of positive change, the international community must be aware of the need for inclusive peace building and protection of civilians

A5 Pressure from the international community influences national stakeholders to change policies and practice, including those of the private sector

A6 International community support for inclusive policies will open up space for citizens to have their voices heard

A7 The private sector can be(come) a force for good when it implements international standards for responsible conduct

A8 Companies will engage on inclusion and protection and conduct meaningful due diligence if there are regulatory or economic drivers to do so

A9 Awareness of the need for participation and protection creates the political will to act, and this (state-society) interaction can be strengthened by pressure from the international community

A10 (Sub)national governments in fragile and conflict affected states have sufficient capacity to implement policies with a substantial impact on society

Annex 2: Technical information on methods

To assess how each determinant related to taking action, we estimated multivariate probit regressions for each of the figures presented in the main body of the paper. To isolate the effects of a certain determinant but still account for the composition of each sample, we controlled for the respondents socio-demographics, age, level of education and gender (except for Figure 5, where these were the main determinants of interest). Additionally, we included fixed effects at project level to capture project-specific variance.

For these reduced-form models, we also estimated models that included interaction terms between gender and our determinant of interest. This was done to assess whether the effects were different between men and women, which was only the case for political efficacy, where we found a markedly stronger effect for women on taking action than for men.

The estimates behind the figures presented for these so-called reduced-form regressions are presented in Tables 1–3. Table 1 shows the socio-demographics and the estimations behind Figures 6, 7, and 8. Note that the interaction term for assessing divergent effects for men and women is also included.

To visualise the effects clearly, we chose to visualise the marginal effects of each coefficient. Therefore, we have transformed the coefficient from the probit estimates into predicted probabilities at representative values (for example, in Figure 6B for no education, primary education, etc.) For each figure and corresponding estimates, the controls were set at their average values. Note that the determinants of interest were estimated for each level separately (for example, for each level of education or each level of trust) rather than including these determinants as continuous terms. This was done to allow for non-linear relationships and to ease the estimations of the marginal effects. The exception was the determinant 'trust in traditional and religious leaders' as in some projects, this question was posed as one question, but in others, these were two separate survey items – one for traditional leaders and one for religious leaders. We took the average value of the two items in cases where the questionnaire items were separated between traditional and religious leaders.

Table 1 Reduced-form probit regressions: Age, level of education, political interest and efficacy.

Model	Fig 5a Age	Fig 5b Level of educa-tion	Fig 6 Political interest	Fig7a Efficacy	Fig 7b Efficacy (interac-tion terms)
Gender					
Men	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Women			-0.246***	-0.222***	-0.343***
			(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.114)
Age					
Age	0.005***	0.007***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Level of education					
No education	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Primary		0.330***	0.285***	0.252***	0.254***
		(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Secondary		0.545***	0.461***	0.430***	0.429***
		(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Tertiary		0.899***	0.767***	0.731***	0.729***
		(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Political interest (how often discuss politics)					
Never			(ref.)		
Occasionally			0.307***		
			(0.059)		
Frequently			0.465***		
			(0.083)		
Efficacy (easy to change things in community)					
No, not at all				(ref.)	(ref.)
Great deal of difficulty				0.172**	0.086
				(0.069)	(0.106)
Little difficulty				0.422***	0.327***
				(0.072)	(0.113)
Fairly easily				0.479***	0.357***
				(0.080)	(0.123)
Very easily				0.705***	0.691***
				(0.108)	(0.146)
Interaction terms: Efficacy*Women					
Women*Great deal of difficulty					0.141
					(0.136)
Women*Little difficulty					0.157
					(0.145)
Women*Fairly easily					0.207
					(0.159)
Women*Very easily					-0.045
					(0.211)
Constant	0.369***	-0.116	-0.086	-0.188	-0.113
	(0.094)	(0.111)	(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.148)
Project fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pseudo R^2	0.2552	0.2697	0.2827	0.2906	0.2911
N	4,423	4,417	4,282	4,365	4,365

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ref.= reference category.

Table 2 Reduced-form probit regressions: Attitudes and norms towards CSO, controlled for age, gender and education.

Model	Fig12a Norms about CSOs	Fig12b Attitudes towards CSOs
Norms about CSO involvement		
Would be a bad thing	(ref.)	
Neutral	0.113	
	(0.113)	
Would be a good thing	0.230**	
	(0.109)	
Attitudes towards CSOs		
Would not bother about closure of CSOs		(ref.)
Would be outraged about closure of CSOs		-0.104
		(0.075)
Constant	-0.085	0.165
	(0.167)	(0.143)
Controls		
Gender		
Men	(ref.)	(ref.)
Women	-0.197***	-0.297***
	(0.052)	(0.053)
Age		
Age	0.005***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Level of education		
No education	(ref.)	(ref.)
Primary	0.322***	0.342***
	(0.063)	(0.066)
Secondary	0.519***	0.447***
	(0.077)	(0.084)
Tertiary	0.891***	0.793***
	(0.172)	(0.129)
Project fixed effects	YES	YES
Pseudo R^2	0.21	0.298
n	3,626	3,511

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,
ref.= reference category.

Table 3 Reduced-form probit regressions: Trust in various civil society actors, controlled for age, gender and education.

Model	Fig 9 Trust in local gov.	Fig 9 Trust in central gov.	Fig 9 Trust in CSOs	Fig 9 Trust in INGOs	Fig 9 Trust in private sector	Fig 9 Trust in trad. and rel. lead-ers
Trust in local governments						
Never	(ref.)					
Not very often	0.145*					
	(0.081)					
Most of the time	0.119					
	(0.084)					
All the time	0.131					
	(0.093)					
Trust in central governments						
Never		(ref.)				
Not very often		0.042				
		(0.068)				
Most of the time		-0.107				
		(0.077)				
All the time		0.047				
		(0.091)				
Trust in CSOs						
Never			(ref.)			
Not very often			0.122			
			(0.083)			
Most of the time			0.117			
			(0.090)			
All the time			0.225**			
			(0.093)			
Trust in INGOs						
Never				(ref.)		
Not very often				0.127		
				(0.087)		
Most of the time				0.088		
				(0.091)		
All the time				0.224**		
				(0.094)		
Trust in private sector						
Never					(ref.)	
Not very often					-0.025	
					(0.067)	
Most of the time					0.195**	
					(0.094)	
All the time					0.020	
					(0.120)	
Trust in traditional and religious leaders[b]						0.025
						(0.030)
Constant	-0.026	0.148	-0.045	-0.007	0.170	-0.254*
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Project fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls: Gender, age & education	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pseudo R^2	0.3117	0.3138	0.308	0.3026	0.3184	0.2933
n	3,765	3,576	3,577	3,461	3,211[a]	3,645

Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1, a No data for Vietnam & OPT, b estimated as continuous

Table 4 presents the full model, where the effects for all determinants were estimated simultaneously. These analyses served as the backbone of the section 'synthesis: which determinants matter most for citizen action'. This full model allowed us to identify the most important determinant or which determinant had the most explanatory power, as all determinants were included simultaneously in this model.

Note that we only included those determinants which proved to be related to taking action. We excluded some of the trust indicators and the attitudes towards CSOs that were not related to taking action in the first place (the reduced-form models) in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

In order to make a more thorough assessment of which determinant was the most important, we standardised (where possible) the determinants. Thus, for all values of the determinants in our model, we subtracted the mean and divided that by the standard deviation of that determinant (except those for which we used dummy variables). This means that the 'scale' on which a determinant was measured was the same for each determinant (expressed in terms of its own standard deviation, instead of its true values). This standardisation allowed us to compare the relative importance or effect size for each determinant in the estimation of our probit model.

In contrast to the reduced-form models, we included the determinants measured on Likert scales (efficacy, interest in politics, trust indicators, etc.) as continuous predictors. This was different from the reduced-form models. There, we included the determinants as dummy variables for each level, as this eased the interpretations of the visualisations, the estimation of the marginal effects and predicted probabilities, and allowed for the detection of non-linear associations between determinant and taking action. In the full model, we chose to include these determinants, where possible, as continuous predictors for several reasons. First, to assess the relative importance of each determinant with respect to the other determinants (what's more important – being interested in politics, or the feeling that you can influence your community?), we needed to standardise the values of our determinants, which was not possible using the non-continuous specification in the reduced-form model (dummy variables). Second, we tested whether an estimation with dummy variables versus continuous predictors led to a significantly better model fit using likelihood ratio tests[9]. We found that the model where we loosened our linearity assumptions (the model including dummy variables) did not lead to a significantly better model fit (at $p<0.01$) compared to the more restrictive model (the models with continuous predictors, assuming linear relationships). For these reasons, we chose to present the more parsimonious model that has the additional ease of interpretability of standardised coefficients as presented in Table 4. The results of this full model in Table 4 show that feelings of efficacy was the most important determinant in explaining whether someone took action or refrained from taking action.

[9] Here we tested the model with dummy-variables (less restrictive specification) against the model with continuous predictors (more restrictive specification). The difference in likelihood ratio between the more and less restrictive model then follows a Chi-square distribution with the difference in the number of predictors as degrees of freedom.

Table 4 Multivariate probit regressions, full model: All determinants estimated simultaneously, standardised determinants.

Model	Synthesis section/full model
Interest in politics	0.156***
	(0.035)
Trust local governments	-0.005
	(0.035)
Trust in CSOs	-0.070
	(0.051)
Trust in INGOs	0.025
	(0.054)
Efficacy	0.257***
	(0.033)
Attitudes towards CSOs	0.025
	(0.033)
Socio-demographics	
Men	(ref.)
Women	-0.190***
	(0.063)
	(0.135)
Age	0.087***
	(0.031)
Level of education	
No education	(ref.)
Primary	0.301***
	(0.073)
Secondary	0.392***
	(0.097)
Tertiary	0.714***
	(0.191)
Constant	0.444***
	(0.107)
Project fixed effects	YES
Pseudo R^2	0.2796
n	2,647
Standard errors in parentheses Estimates represent standardised co-efficients (mean 0, SD=1, for each determinant)	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Annex 3: Percentage of people who took any action, by project

Figure 12: Percentage of people who took any action, by project



Source: Strategic Partnership Endline Studies, 2020
total n=4437.

Oxfam Research Reports

Oxfam Research Reports are written to share research results, contribute to public debate and invite feedback on development and humanitarian policy and practice. They do not necessarily reflect Oxfam policy positions. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Oxfam.

This paper was written by the Impact Measurement and Knowledge team of Oxfam Novib, with Dr Rik Linssen and Dr Saskia van Veen as lead authors. Rik Linssen and Caroline van Koot designed the conceptual framework and questionnaires. Data analysis was carried out by Francisco Bolanos and Marieke Meeske with guidance from Rik Linssen. Saskia van Veen coordinated the process. Oxfam staff and partners in the seven countries played an important role in designing and implementing the data collection and validating the results.

We would like to acknowledge the relentless efforts of all projects involved in this research. Without their effort in gathering quality data, we could not make such substantive analyses. Further, we would like to thank all 4600 respondents who took the time to fill in our survey to help Oxfam understand our impact and improve our programmes.

For more information or to comment on this report, email rik.linssen@oxfamnovib.nl

© Oxfam Novib June 2021

This publication is copyright, but the text may be used free of charge for advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured, and a fee may be charged. Email policyandpractice@oxfam.org.uk

The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.