FINAL EVALUATION

Gender Transformative and Responsible Agribusiness Investments in South-East Asia (GRAISEA) programme

Period: 1 April 2015–30 June 2018

Author: Vierna E. Tobing-David
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<td>Vierna E. Tobing-David</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>ASEAN CSR Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>AICHR</td>
<td>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>AMAF</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Aquaculture Stewardship Council</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ATFF</td>
<td>Association of Thai Fisherfolk Federation</td>
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<td>AVC</td>
<td>Agricultural value chain</td>
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<td>BTP WEE</td>
<td>Benchmark of Transformational Partnership for Women's Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate social responsibility</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Change Fusion</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development assistance criteria</td>
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<td>DARD</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Vietnam)</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Development and Partnership in Action (Cambodia)</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental impact assessment</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
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<td>GALS</td>
<td>Gender Action Learning Systems</td>
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<td>GAP</td>
<td>Good agricultural/aquaculture practices</td>
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<td>GIN</td>
<td>Global Impactors Network</td>
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<td>GOs</td>
<td>Growers’ organization</td>
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<td>GOG</td>
<td>Gender overview group</td>
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<td>GRAISEA</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Impact assessments</td>
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<td>ICAFIS</td>
<td>International Collaborating Centre for Aquaculture and Fisheries Sustainability</td>
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<td>IDEALS</td>
<td>Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (Philippines)</td>
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<td>ISEA</td>
<td>Institute of Social Entrepreneurships in Asia (Philippines)</td>
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<td>IIX</td>
<td>Impact Investment Exchange (Singapore)</td>
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<td>KIARA</td>
<td>Koalisi Rakyat untuk Perikanan (The People’s Coalition for Fisheries Justice)</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>MCD</td>
<td>Centre for Marine Life Conversation and Community Development (Vietnam)</td>
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<td>MEL</td>
<td>Monitoring, evaluation and learning</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multinational corporations</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of the Environment</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Multi-stakeholder initiative</td>
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<td>MSME</td>
<td>Micro, small or medium enterprise</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Multi-stakeholder Platform</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National action plan</td>
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<td>NGOF</td>
<td>NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) Forum on Cambodia</td>
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<td>ONL</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib (Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGB</td>
<td>Oxfam Great Britain</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
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<td>PROSE</td>
<td>Promoting the role of social enterprise</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Programme management unit</td>
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<td>PMUAC</td>
<td>Preah Vihear Meancheay Union of Agricultural Cooperatives</td>
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<td>Programme steering committee</td>
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<td>P-SIA</td>
<td>Participatory social impact assessment</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Regional action plan</td>
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<td>RSPO</td>
<td>Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil</td>
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<td>SAVC</td>
<td>Sustainable agricultural value chains</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Social enterprises</td>
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<td>SEASAIP</td>
<td>South-East Asian Aquaculture Improvement Protocol</td>
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<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special economic zone</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small or medium enterprise</td>
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<td>SPKS</td>
<td>Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit</td>
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<td>TSWA</td>
<td>Thai Sea Watch Association</td>
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<td>UNGPs</td>
<td>UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</td>
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<td>WG</td>
<td>Working group</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Gender Transformative and Responsible Agribusiness Investment in South-East Asia (GRAISEA) programme is a three-year programme that aims to improve the livelihoods of women and men small-scale producers in the South-East Asia region through more responsible and inclusive value chains and private sector investments, where women are recognized as the central actors and demonstrate economic leadership.

This overarching development objective is assumed to be contributed to by changes in more-sustainable production practices and increased incomes of women and men small-holder farmers in South-East Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines) and Pakistan in selected value chains (rice, shrimp, wild-catch fisheries and palm oil), and supported by the responsible and sustainability policies and practices of leading agribusinesses and financial institutions, and the provision of effective support services by multi-stakeholder initiatives and improved legislation in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

This evaluation sought to address the question of relevance and to provide evidence of the extent to which results have been achieved and of the effectiveness of key strategies within multiple mechanisms to provide explanations of how results were achieved or not achieved in any given context as well as answer the question of the sustainability of the positive effects of the programme in the lives of women and men smallholder farmers.

METHODOLOGY

We used a combination of methods to answer the sets of evaluation questions – a combination of outcome evidencing, contribution analysis and process tracing – to build the overall contribution story and analyses of the effectiveness of strategies within multiple mechanisms that work to generate the desired outcomes. This builds on the premise that the study of strategy effectiveness within programme mechanisms could explain how outcomes were achieved or not achieved. The outcome evidencing and contribution analysis processes suggested the selection of the most significant outcomes that theoretically showed the strongest logical link and empirically demonstrated positive results to generate learning. Case selection strategy was used to choose the typical case(s) (or successful cases) of the most significant outcomes in order to identify causal links between the intervention and the intended result. The process tracing method was employed to delve deeper into successful cases because the high investment in this method is most efficient when there is an ‘initial positive suspicion’ that the causal mechanism has actually been at work and been effective.

KEY FINDINGS

Relevance

On regulatory framework relevance, we found that the GRAISEA design has a strong conceptual and practical relevance in approaching national government to influence policy change, yet failed to link these efforts with influencing policies at regional level, despite various entry points being tried to influence ASEAN. We also argue whether the entry point of influencing ASEAN through the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) alone could have been more effective than considering this entry point as embedded in efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (see Section 2).

On the improvement of market-linkage relevance, we found a high relevance of GRAISEA’s design within the context of women and men smallholder farmers in South-East Asia who are in need of market linkage in order to improve their livelihoods, while simultaneously conserving the environment. Yet the current design poses a question of sustainability for smallholder farmers as they face the transition from subsistence farming into market-orientated farming and from conventional farming towards sustainable agriculture practices.

On the promotion of corporate agribusiness gender-sensitive corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and plans relevance, we found that GRAISEA’s design conceptually acknowledged the potential role of corporations/the private sector as the drivers of change, yet in practice, it lacked a strong strategy to target and reach out to specific corporations/private sector partners as potential drivers of change as well as to study the extent to which the adequate presence of specific corporations, micro, small or medium enterprises (MSMEs) and/or family-owned businesses are open to change (to adopt inclusive and sustainable practices) in order to recalibrate private sector engagement strategy with the evolution of CSR in a South-East Asian context.

On the relevance to gender transformative and women’s economic empowerment in agriculture, we found GRAISEA’s intention, and the approach to address gender inequality at selected value chains, highly relevant, yet evidence strongly suggests incoherence between GRAISEA’s intervention and prevailing realities on gender inequality across selected value chains at regional and national level. This is an issue that could have been tackled by a proper gender analysis at regional level together with gender analysis at country level to inform GRAISEA’s overall design and strategies.

Results

Despite GRAISEA’s initial assumption that suggests vertical and horizontal connections across different components and levels of outcome, we found these components and results to be more independent of each other and not mutually enforcing. There is evidence of outputs being delivered and paving the way towards the realization of improved livelihoods of women and men smallholder farmers – mainly contributed to by the effects of the rice value chain programme and shrimp value chain in Indonesia (West Kalimantan). The overall potential contribution of influencing ASEAN policy change, as well as influencing MSIs and corporations, are yet to be observed during this final evaluation period.

Result 1: The policies of ASEAN, its member states and Pakistan promote responsible practices, which include attention to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, in agribusiness, agribusiness investment, small-scale agriculture and social enterprise.1

The most significant outcome under Result 1 is contributed by the national influencing work of Cambodia and Vietnam whereby recommendations of policy change were accepted by the respective national governments. GRAISEA’s added value is the creation of space for civil society organizations (in the Business and Human Rights (BHR) Caucus) to engage in ASEAN policy dialogue. Yet this claim requires further substantiation, and we found some sustainability factors in the BHR Caucus in question, particularly in the area of the steer, future plan and committed resources. The overall effects of Result 1 are paving the way towards achieving the Result 1 objective and hold room for improvement in the following areas; (1) strengthening the adaptive capacity of the PMU and country teams to adjust a theory of change and indicators of particular component that do not work – accompanied by the capacity to conduct strong policy and political mapping, (2) reshaping
GRAISEA’s design by engaging other entry points to influence ASEAN; (3) exploring the potential pathway of leveraging SDG’s momentum.

**Result 2: Small-scale producers are effectively connected or engaged in agri-commercial value chains in equitable partnerships and women are recognized as central economic actors.**

We found strong evidence that could be traced from most outcomes under Result 2. This suggests that the overall results of the rice value chain programme in Vietnam and Cambodia and shrimp value chain in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, are the most significant outcomes as they demonstrate improved market linkage, increased income, and equitable partnership between women and men smallholder farmers with the respective private sector partners. We traced some critical issues across different value chains, such as perpetuating debts (Pakistan and Cambodia, palm oil farmers in Indonesia), the effect of price volatility (shrimp value chain) and wider social norms that prohibit gender equality (all value chains). The work of all selected value chains has great potential to improve the livelihoods of a significant number of women and men farmers in the region.

The overall effect of value chain work demonstrated the relevance of market-linkage initiatives to the smallholder farmers’ primary need to improve their livelihoods. On the other hand, we found that the absence of a market-linkage initiative in some GRAISEA targeted areas does not demonstrate similar effect. Another outcome contributing significantly to Result 2 is the positive result of Global Impactor Network (GIN) mentorship in increasing the capacity of 15 start-ups, including the Fisherfolk Enterprise that also demonstrated significant progress in advancing both economic and environmental objectives through the development and application of the Blue Brand standard.

**The progress of women’s economic empowerment** suggests a mixed result that is yet to reach the ultimate objective. Further impact assessments specifically designed to capture and analyse the majority of women’s voices from GRAISEA’s targeted beneficiaries may be required. The shortcomings of the GRAISEA MEL framework and reporting, along with the time constraints of this final evaluation, do not allow for the acquisition of comprehensive and representative data that capture women’s unique empowerment journeys as the effect of GRAISEA’s interventions. From the sampling of programme areas (Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia) we visited, we found Vietnam, Thailand, and to small extent Cambodia and Indonesia, demonstrate positive progress in advancing gender transformation agenda (from the Gender Ladder perspective). However, in other instances, increased access to economic opportunity does not automatically lead into systemic change that brings about changing norms and policies in favour of women in agricultural value chains. There is recognition of women’s role in rice production, as conveyed by the rice programme private sector representatives, yet we found weak evidence to suggest changes in policies and plans in favour of women at the systemic level. For instance the systemic and/or trickle-down effect of mainstreaming gender transformative (responsive) principles into international standards and principles of sustainable agricultural practices on women smallholders’ lives, that was done through influencing the Sustainable Rice Platform or Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). Cambodian women farmers explained that they are experiencing a double workload and feel unable to negotiate role-sharing in domestic chores with their husbands. We also found weak evidence to suggest a change in household decision-making in terms of managing household income or making major decisions on household spending in all respective countries.

**Result 3: Corporate agribusiness in SE Asia and Pakistan have adopted corporate social responsibility policies and plans that support responsible practices in the value chains for women and men small-scale producers, as well as including gender equality and women’s economic empowerment in their core business.**

The result of direct private sector engagement in Vietnam, where companies adopt CSR policies and practices as the effect of constant communication, engagement and trialling gendered CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Reporting, is the most significant outcome under Result 3. We found
that the design and implementation of Result 3 reflected major priorities in indirect engagement with the private sector through convening multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and influencing MSIs, but the effects of this engagement are yet to benefit women and men smallholder farmers. We found that systematic reporting to capture the effectiveness of influencing the private sector through MSIs has to be improved.

Result 4: Financial institutions and investors in agriculture invest responsibly by introducing/developing innovative financing solutions to assist the overcoming of specific investment requirements (investment risks) for women, smallholders and buyers from these smallholders.

Strong evidence suggests significant progress in Result 4. A significant amount of impact investment has been committed to benefit six enterprises in the region. A regional mentor network is in place and has benefited a handful of start-ups in the area paving the way towards its eligibility to access alternative financing. A gendered benchmark has triggered growing interest and its scorecard was developed to pave the way to responsible financing. We found that the majority of Result 4 shortcomings were the result of insensible design and assumptions that did not hold true. It also suffered from, inter alia, the lack of strong coordination and communication to build synergy between country teams with regional partners and among regional partners. However, despite major constraints, we found regional partners adaptive and high performing.

STRATEGY EFFECTIVENESS

Within the policy influencing mechanism, we found that the effectiveness of the power politics strategy employed in the Vietnam and Cambodia national influencing work and the community organizing strategy employed by Myanmar strongly contributed to the positive progress of Result 1. The large leaps strategy employed by the Philippines is making its way towards the achievement of Result 1. It is important to note that the advocacy coalition strategy employed to influence ASEAN from various entry points yields varying results. Hence, it has room for improvement to build constituencies at national level that will support regional influencing.

An analysis of strategies within the private sector engagement mechanism provided the explanation of how it generated a mixed result, as the direct private sector engagement strategy demonstrated positive progress, whereas the indirect private sector engagement strategy remains challenging. We found weak evidence to suggest the effectiveness of influencing MSIs as a strategy to indirectly influence the private sector. This is crucial, as influencing MSIs is a key strategy that is widely used to bring about scalable impact over other strategies. Evidence also suggests the lack of clear categorization of the targeted business sectors that could have been informed by a strong engagement and outreach strategy. We found the overall result of private sector engagement to be potentially challenging to track and to report should iteration of GRAISEA takes place.

Evidence strongly suggests that strategies within the farmers’ empowerment mechanism for value chain work have tremendous potential for scalable impact as it has connected with the private sector and global value chains as well as local and national government. Yet it poses questions about future direction and some sustainability factors, such as whether GRAISEA’s effect will lead into a linkage-dependent or linkage-independent relationship, or whether or not farming organizations will be instrumental in voicing women and men farmers’ aspirations at a higher level (wider networks, national forum or even MSIs), as well as further steps for farmers to transition from subsistence farming into market-orientated farming that strongly adheres to environmental sustainability.

We found positive evidence of strategies within the piloting best practices or new initiative mechanisms in implementing market-linkage initiatives to the increased income of women and men smallholder farmers in the rice value chain in Vietnam and Cambodia and the shrimp value chain in...
West Kalimantan, Indonesia. We found evidence that suggests a market-linkage initiative is not unique to the Sustainable Rice Platform, yet the effort to advance a gender transformative agenda is a unique characteristic of GRAISEA’s intervention. Furthermore, within this mechanism, evidence suggests GRAISEA has proved to be an effective laboratory for the incubation and maturing of a gendered benchmark for transformational partnership in agriculture value chains (BTP WEE AVCs) of ISEA and the GIN mentorship model of Change Fusion.

We found that strategies within the **women's economic empowerment and the diffusion of gender transformative principles mechanism** have room for improvement in the area of strengthening the link between regional, national and local strategy, optimizing the merits of gender analysis, including analysis of policy implication of gender and value chain at regional and national level to inform and adjust overall strategy and implementation, as well as to build critical and civic awareness of women in parallel with greater opportunities to access economic opportunities. This mechanism demonstrates a need to strengthen the reporting of women's unique journey of empowerment and men's involvement to support gender transformation efforts.

An analysis of strategies within the **collective governance mechanism** provided an explanation of positive results in convening and establishing multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) as evident in the case of Pakistan and Myanmar. Some (e.g. MSP Pakistan and CSR Platform Cambodia) are likely to be sustainable upon GRAISEA departure while others (e.g. KSCA Myanmar) remain fragile. However, we found relatively weak evidence in convening and influencing MSIs mechanism in the case of CSR Asia.

An analysis of the **effectiveness of the GRAISEA strategy** in communicating messages to internal and external stakeholders suggests a weak communications strategy and the lack of clear direction, yet good execution in producing communication products. The future communications strategy should go beyond a traditional donor-and-development-professionals-orientated visibility strategy.

We found that both the donor review and the GRAISEA internal review have acknowledged and perceived the implementation structure to be overly complex for a similar size and type of programme in the region. As for the governance structure, the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) could have played a more active role in guiding and steering the Programme Management Unit (PMU) rather than having only an accountability role. The Programme Management Unit, key in holding together the different aspects of the programme, was vastly understaffed for the number of entities involved in the programme, and given the expectations of the donor. Countries and partners appreciated the support Oxfam provided in brokering links with other organizations or offices in the region; face-to-face advisory support; blended forms of support, and the MEL support provided by the MEL officer.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the evaluation findings and conclusions, we offer several key recommendations summarized as follows:

1. **Focus on design.** GRAISEA or future similar initiatives should focus the theory of change into a more streamlined two or three agriculture value chains that are relevant for South-East Asian consumers, brands (SEA or global), and alignment with national governments’ priorities.

2. Due diligence in **planning and design** should be undertaken to sharpen the strategy, such as to strengthen capacity in policy and political mapping.

3. **Strengthen the mechanism to influence ASEAN** by exploring other avenues or strategies, for example by direct engagement with a minimum of three ASEAN member states (i.e. relevant ministerial bodies) that are open to change.
4. **Strengthen value chain work**, particularly in strengthening farmers’ groups to be better organized and in preparing for a transition from subsistence farming to export-orientated farming.

5. Explore other avenues to **influence the private sector** as well as to reshape the strategy to influence the private sector via various multi-stakeholder partnerships.

6. **Advancing the WEE and Gender Transformative agenda** by piloting gender-sensitive business strategy with the private sector, more engagement to raise awareness of women's issues in civil society organizations, and improving gender analysis through participatory approaches.

7. **Innovative financing solutions**. To continue the next stage of implementation of the new models/initiatives being developed under Result 4.

8. **Communications strategy** to be integrated into all approaches and components, to include tangible and communicable positive results that contribute to the national or local government priorities as well as focusing on investment in social media capability.

9. Strengthen and reshape the **governance structure**, should an iteration of GRAISEA take place, by reviewing the role of the Programme Steering Committee, to increase capacity support for PMU in donor compliance and finance function, adding coordinator roles for each key value chain including, among others, gender coordinator.

10. **Capacity building**: adapt the partner assessment tool for the programme so that it focuses on the specific skills and knowledge that would be needed to implement GRAISEA (technical as well as management), and assess partners based on these.

11. **On learning**: consider reorganizing the WGs so they focus on a particular value chain and with the participation of relevant advisers as needed and to consider how a ‘webinar approach’ would work best, and ways to support adaptive learning.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides contextual information about the GRAISEA programme. It builds on the main programme documents and on a summary of the main findings from previous GRAISEA evaluations. It also presents the purpose and the scope of this evaluation. The chapter closes with an outline of the evaluation methodology, main challenges and overall limitations.

1.1 BACKGROUND/DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAMME

The Gender Transformative and Responsible Agribusiness Investments in South-East Asia (GRAISEA) Programme (December 2014–June 2018) is a joint initiative led by Oxfam GB, Oxfam Novib and Oxfam US regional programme in South-East Asia and financed by the Embassy of Sweden Bangkok office, with a total budget of SEK 58.5, equivalent to USD 6.87 million.

GRAISEA is based on the recognition that financial viability and gender equitable/sustainable supply chains are not mutually exclusive, and that win-win-win propositions are possible where communities/environment win, women and men small-scale producers win, and larger businesses win. Building on Oxfam’s pilots in selected commodities (palm oil, rice and aquaculture), the programme utilizes a multi-stakeholder approach, with Oxfam acting as a convener to bring together a diverse range of stakeholders around gender transformative approaches and responsible agribusiness policies and practices.

- **Result 1:** ASEAN, its member states’ and Pakistan’s policies promote responsible practices, which include attention to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, in agribusiness, agribusiness investment, small-scale agriculture and social enterprise.

- **Result 2:** Small-scale producers are effectively connected or engaged in agri-commercial value chains in equitable partnerships and women are recognized as central economic actors.

- **Result 3:** Corporate agribusiness in South-East Asia and Pakistan has adopted corporate social responsibility policies and plans that support responsible practices in the value chains for women and men small-scale producers, as well as including gender equality and women’s economic empowerment in their core business.

- **Result 4:** Financial institutions and investors in agriculture invest responsibly by introducing developing innovative financing solutions to assist overcoming specific investment requirements (investment risks) for women, smallholders and buyers of these smallholders.

The programme operates at regional level and in seven countries in the South-East Asia area (Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and Pakistan by collaborating with regional partners: SEAFish; ASEAN CSR Network (ACN) – (under the Oxfam GROW Campaign); the Business and Human Rights Resource Center (BHRRC) – (under the Oxfam GROW Campaign); Change Fusion; CSR Asia; ISEA, IIX/Shujog; and national partners: DPA Cambodia; Doaba Foundation (Pakistan); ICAFIS (Vietnam); IDEALS (Philippines); KAIRA (Indonesia); MCD (Vietnam); NGOF (Cambodia); SPKS (Indonesia); WWF (Indonesia); and TSWA (Thailand). Oxfam in Myanmar and Oxfam in Thailand directly implemented activities that contributed to GRAISEA results.
As the overall GRAISEA programme has ended, the Programme Management Unit (PMU) has commissioned a final evaluation of the programme to gather evidence of the GRAISEA programme to demonstrate results, foster learning and improve future programming. Before presenting the specific scope of work (SoW), it is necessary to understand previous GRAISEA evaluative efforts to better situate the value add of the final evaluation.

### 1.2. PREVIOUS EVALUATIVE EFFORTS AND FINAL EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

Prior to this final evaluation, a number of GRAISEA evaluative efforts had already been undertaken by independent consultants. These are:

- **The mid-term evaluation (MTE):** The MTE was conducted by two independent consultants, the lead evaluator focused on the GRAISEA Results 1–3 whereas the member evaluator focused on Result 4 (responsible financing). The team visited two countries, Indonesia and Vietnam. It specifically highlighted strong incoherence between some outputs and outcomes at the country level with the higher-level result of the overarching GRAISEA Result Framework. It pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of the multiple programme governance structure of GRAISEA and the three established Working Groups that failed to function properly for the first year due to their novel concepts to implementing partners who prioritized implementing their own programmes.
  - The MTE stated that under Result 1, national advocacy has been more effective than regional advocacy due to stronger relationships and contacts with national government and the lack of regional advocacy strategies leading to stagnant activities. Value chain work under Result 2 at the time of MTE reporting comprised only three selected value chains: shrimp, palm oil and wild-catch fisheries. It was a huge success to increase technical capacity and gender awareness of women and men smallholders and appeared to show promising results. Result 3 pointed out the progress on CSR influencing work in Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand and highlighted different focuses of the work in the Philippines and Myanmar, yet these experiences were seen as valuable for learning about different strategies. Finally, under Result 4, it stated that the results of the implementing partners’ work were not linked up to achieve the intended objectives, despite the hard work deployed in their respective fields. It emphasized the need to gain greater understanding of the nature and
demands of social enterprises/SMEs in agriculture value chains to ensure financial products and impact investments are well targeted throughout the rest of programme period.

- Strategically, MTE recommended improvement in forming stronger coherence in objectives and architecture of GRAISEA’s design to facilitate easier implementation to create impact, by – among other things – allocating adequate resources for management to support a complex, innovative partner network and adviser system design.

- **Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) special review for GRAISEA:** Moore and Stephen, LLP, was an external party hired by the Embassy of Sweden in Bangkok to conduct a ‘donor-side’ of GRAISEA assessment of effectiveness from a value for money perspective. It sampled 10 entities within GRAISEA (country teams and implementing partners) and 20 financial transactions to test compliance with selection/procurement regulations, valid agreements/contracts and approved budgets. It highlighted room for improvement in the areas of systems, controls, and rules or procedures within the programme management spectrum (particularly of financial management) in order to mitigate the identified programme risks.

  - Programme-wide findings pointed out issues in the unusually high-turnover of GRAISEA staff and the corresponding risks from the major internal restructuring Oxfam was undertaking while implementing a complex programme and recommended a simplified structure to focus on fewer countries, with more programme sites in the countries selected by developing a much deeper working relationship with a smaller number of highly performing implementing partners, which are easier to retain an overview of, and better control over. It pointed out concerns about some partners’ performance, value for money and relevance to GRAISEA core objectives that led to recommendations to improve partner selection process and criteria.

  - The review also found the challenge of managing the complexity of a multi-country programme and the need to set up much stronger internal finance control systems since compliance with policies was an issue. Finally, a lack of SIDA visibility in some external communication products (i.e. linked to campaigns and partners’ websites) and the need for improvement of social media outputs were emphasized.

- **GRAISEA process review:** as part of this final evaluation, a separate work strand to review the governance mechanism and the entire process implementation was conducted by a UK-based independent consultant. The entire review process was done remotely using Skype and a questionnaire survey to collect the data. The findings and recommendations of this piece of evaluation are discussed and integrated into this report in chapters 6 and 7.

### 1.3. SCOPE OF THE GRAISEA FINAL EVALUATION

For this evaluation, many of the same successes and challenges emerge as in previous assessments, but are approached differently when set against previous efforts (as listed above). The goal of this evaluation is to answer the following evaluative questions:
### Box 1: Evaluation questions vis-à-vis the evaluation criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
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| **Relevance**                | Is it reasonable to conclude that the programme design and approaches are relevant to address the prevailing needs of women and men smallholders, country and regional themes (private sector engagement, responsible business and investment, gender inequality gaps), and targeted sector value chain opportunities?  
In which ways has it been relevant?  
What evidence is there to prove that GRAISEA design and intervention is targeting the underlying root causes of the identified problems rather than the symptoms? |
| **Results**                  | Is it reasonable to conclude that the programme has made a difference on the following?  
• Result 1: The policies of ASEAN, its member states and Pakistan promote responsible practices, which includes attention to gender equality and women's economic empowerment, in agribusiness, agribusiness investment, small-scale agriculture and social enterprise  
• Result 2: Small-scale producers are effectively connected or engaged in agri-commercial value chains in equitable partnerships and women are recognized as central economic actors  
• Result 3: Corporate agribusiness in South-East Asia has adopted corporate social responsibility policies and plans that support responsible practices in the value chains for women and men small-scale producers, as well as including gender equality and women’s economic empowerment in their core business values  
• Result 4: Financial institutions and investors in agriculture invest responsibly by introducing/developing innovative financing solutions to assist in overcoming specific investment requirements (investment risks) for women, small-scale producers and buyers from these small-scale producers  
How, and in what circumstances, has GRAISEA made a difference and what is the evidence? |
| **Strategy effectiveness**   | Is it reasonable to conclude that strategies within the following GRAISEA programme mechanisms have been effective to contribute to generate the desired outcomes?  
1. Policy influencing  
2. Farmers’ empowerment (in the selected sector’s value chain)  
3. Private sector engagement  
4. Piloting best practices/new models  
5. Local collective governance/alternative governance  
6. Women’s economic empowerment and diffusion of gender transformative principles  
7. Diffusion of GRAISEA’s message.  
What are the influencing factors and barriers to the effectiveness of strategies within these programme mechanisms? |
| **Effectiveness of programme governance, capacity building, institutional support and learning** | To what extent have programme governance structure, capacity building (technical and thematic support), institutional support and learning been effective to help achieve programme results? |
| **Testing of assumptions**   | Does the win-win-win proposition hold true? Do GRAISEA programme assumptions hold true? |

The findings of this final evaluation are presented in seven chapters, organized according to the evaluation criteria identified, plus an introduction and chapter for conclusions and recommendations.

Following the introduction, methodology and background, Chapter 2 addresses the question about GRAISEA’s main assumption: that financially viable and gender equitable/sustainable supply chains are not
mutually exclusive, and that win-win-win propositions are possible, where communities/environment win, women and men small-scale producers win, and larger businesses win. The subsequent chapters showcase the findings that substantiate this claim.

In Chapter 3, Relevance, we discuss GRAISEA’s relevance to the South-East Asian context, particularly key factors influencing CSR practices, gender and agriculture value chain, and similar initiatives/movements in the region as well as a snapshot of GRAISEA’s primary stakeholders’ (private sector partners, women and men smallholder farmers, representatives of national government) perception of relevance.

In Chapter 4, The Effectiveness of Results, we attempt to establish a causal link between some of GRAISEA’s most significant outcomes and provide the contribution story of GRAISEA’s intervention under each of the four programme Results. This process is supported by gathering all evidence and evidence-testing (for case studies analysed by Process Tracing). In addition, reflection on key assumptions employed by Oxfam and implementing partners is widely elaborated throughout the entire section’s analyses to challenge whether or not these assumptions hold true and are worth maintaining.

In Chapter 5, Strategy Effectiveness, we discuss how the strategies within GRAISEA’s key programme mechanisms have been effective or ineffective in contributing to the generation of the desired outcome or the achievements of each respective Result as outlined in the previous chapter. It also discusses the influencing factors and barriers of each strategy.

Chapter 6 – The Effectiveness of Implementation and Governance Structure, Capacity Building, Institutional Support and Learning – covers the summary of programme implementation review in governance structure, capacity building for partners’ effectiveness and learning platforms that play a supportive role in the achievement of Results.

Finally, based on the information analysed and compiled throughout the report, Chapter 7 provides conclusions about the different areas examined and offers 12 recommendations for GRAISEA managers, stakeholders, partners, donors and allies involved in future programming in inclusive value chains and responsible agribusiness practices.

### 1.4 METHODOLOGY

The field work of this evaluation primarily took place between mid-May and mid-July 2018, and involved extended trips to four countries: Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia. The evaluation team consisted of the Evaluation Team Leader (V.E. Tobing-David) assisted by one part-time interpreter in Thailand and two full-time local interpreters in Cambodia and Vietnam respectively. The evaluation team dedicated around 50 workdays to collecting data and drafting the report. In order to present more nuanced analyses on three technical components of GRAISEA (influencing, value chain and gender) the team leader conducted expert interviews where overall programme context, annual reports and initial findings of the fieldwork were presented and discussed.

This final evaluation employed a combination of outcome evidencing,7 contribution analysis8 and process tracing9 methods in the process of data analysis. In the evaluator’s own interpretation, these three methods have commonalities in terms of demonstrating the key features and research principles of the critical realist ontology, particularly the effort to construct causal mechanisms and to evaluate corresponding evidence.10 Among other methods of evaluation, these three methods allow the exploration and investigation of causality to unravel the deep structure of a complex setting or system. In the spirit of realist evaluation (or precisely, critical realist evaluation), this evaluation employs the reconceptualization of the C-M-O configuration (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) suggested by Porter (2015) that is:
This formula means that the outcome is the result of multiple mechanisms at work in combination with the responses and concerns of women and men’s involvement as direct and indirect beneficiaries/participants of the programme. It focuses clearly on the experience of the targeted men and women, more than merely the processes leading to its effectiveness or otherwise. This configuration is consonant with the realist evaluation’s mantra that evaluation research should entail the examination of ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’ (Pawson, 2003: 474; Porter, 2015).

In general, mechanisms are underlying entities, processes, or structures that operate in particular contexts to generate outcomes of interest (Leeuw & Astbury, 2010). While a programme mechanism may have been developed on the basis of someone’s theories, and its effects may be subject to theoretical analysis to identify its nature, it is not in itself a theory – it is something that has real effects upon people’s lives (Porter, 2019). In the evaluator’s understanding, the strategies lie at the heart of the programme mechanism, and thus become the subject of the analysis.

As guided by the evaluation questions and the purposes of this evaluation, we focused the ‘effectiveness’ element of the development assistance criteria (DAC) on the analyses of the programme result and the investigation of the strategies employed within key programme mechanisms. The effectiveness of results is discussed in Chapter 4 and the effectiveness of the strategies is discussed in Chapter 5. It attempts to answer the question of how GRAISEA’s strategies have been effective or ineffective in contributing to the generation of the desired outcome. Time and resource constraints do not permit the analysis of the entire element of the programme mechanism and the evaluation is bound to its scope of work to address the evaluation questions of the respective commissioning agency (Oxfam).

Furthermore, the use of the process tracing method is nested within the overall steps of outcome evidencing and contribution analysis to delve deeper into cases that are considered successful, as the high investment in process tracing is most efficient if we have an ‘initial positive suspicion’ that the causal mechanism has actually been at work and effective. This evaluation followed a seven-step process to achieve the proposed objectives. This is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Steps of the hybrid methodology employed for the GRAISEA evaluation

After the review of the evaluation and uses of the evaluation result at step 1, a case selection strategy was developed and employed to choose these successful cases (steps 2 to 4). The cases were identified under most significant outcomes, which in turn were selected through the steps of outcome evidencing and contribution analysis (step 4). Following data collection with partners, people we worked with, and key stakeholders through key informant interviews (KIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), expert interviews and a desk review (step 5), we conducted testing of evidence to provide confidence upon the theory of change used to achieve the most significant outcomes (under Result 1–4 in GRAISEA context) (step 6). Step 7
consisted of analysis of the findings against the proposed evaluation objectives, report writing and validation of the conclusions with the GRAISEA team.

Moreover, these three methods placed the necessity to scrutinize case materials that built up evidence of various GRAISEA theories of change used by Oxfam country offices, partners and regional partners. This process reveals the existence of varying level of evidence, namely the evidence of results,\textsuperscript{13} the evidence of assumptions,\textsuperscript{14} and the evidence of other influencing factors\textsuperscript{15} to build conclusions to make up the overall contribution story of GRAISEA based on three levels of contribution analysis. These three different levels lead to different degrees of robustness in statements of contribution. The first level is minimalist contribution analysis\textsuperscript{16} in which statements of contribution are based on the inherent strength of the theory of change and on evidence that the expected outputs were delivered. The second level is contribution analysis of direct influence\textsuperscript{17} in which statements of contribution are based on (1) observed results, (2) confirmation that the assumptions about direct influence are supported by factual evidence, and (3) the inherent strength of the theory of change in areas of indirect influence. The third level is contribution analysis of indirect influence\textsuperscript{18} where statements of contribution attempt to provide factual evidence for at least the key parts of the entire theory of change.

During the planning stages and in the course of the evaluation, six main challenges and limitations were identified. These are presented in Box 2.

**Box 2: Challenges and limitations of GRAISEA final evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time constraints given GRAISEA scale and complexity</td>
<td>A short time span of the final evaluation and delay due to obtaining local authority’s permission to conduct field visit and to gather evaluation data pose a risk of the ability to interview most of primary stakeholders involved to provide strong evidence and to comprehensively capture GRAISEA’s complexity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological and budgetary challenge</td>
<td>In an ideal setting, evaluating a programme with complex elements, such as GRAISEA, requires a rigorous methodology, possibly a mixed of quantitative and qualitative methods to be undertaken by a team of experts in gender and value chain, alternative financing for MSMEs, and/or private sector engagement and policy influencing. The allocated budget for this evaluation was prohibitive to such holistic arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The methodology used in this evaluation demands rigorous validation and gathering of evidence to confirm or disconfirm the theory of change as well as to assist in writing GRAISEA’s contribution story. However, GRAISEA’s MEL system and reporting do not demand evidence-based reporting, hence the evaluation team had to collect every single piece of evidence and triangulate from various sources. At times, contribution analysis (when only supported by limited evidence or sources, i.e. reports that were not validated) will appear like a list of outputs. This is a challenge when in-depth analyses are truly demanded. It particularly applies to gathering data for women’s empowerment.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In some contexts, not all evidence is always accessible, especially with respect to the disclosure of private sector practices or certain governments’ commitment. This probably contributes to the reason why gathering evidence from some country teams was challenging, especially when substantiating claims of achievements stated in some country annual reports. Exploring various sources of evidence, not only the evidence of results but also the evidence of activities, assumptions and other influencing factors, compensated this challenge. Possible sources of this evidence are other evaluation reports, research, and commentaries that are available online.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>During the substantiation process (field visit, data collection), some Oxfam staff and partners felt there have been numerous internal reflections and evaluations taking place, hence they felt reluctant to engage in the data collection process due to evaluation fatigue and conflicting priorities.</td>
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<td>During the field visits, the evaluator was accompanied by local translators that provided an overall translation rather than simultaneous translation. This created a</td>
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risk in language distortion and the possibility of missing some stories needed to understand the entire process of beneficiaries’ experiences with regard to the effect of GRAISEA during the programme period. This risk was tackled by asking the interpreters to provide additional notes that explained the entire stories of experiences they heard during the field visit. One translator immediately changed his translating approach on receiving feedback from the field visit team member.
CHAPTER 2: DOES THE WIN-WIN-WIN ASSUMPTION HOLD TRUE?

Throughout GRAISEA narratives is the belief that to be able to create the desired impact, working with companies and government might not be enough. Through GRAISEA, Oxfam aims to demonstrate the win (smallholders and SMEs) – win (agribusiness company) – win (society – for addressing social and gender inequalities – and planet) proposition that comes from collaborative, trust-based relationships between various actors in the commodity value chains.

The findings that will be presented in the subsequent sections of this evaluation suggest that the win-win-win assumption holds true under the following conditions:

1. **Private sector participants are committed to inclusive and sustainable business practices and not merely driven by compliance, but a realization that their operation triggers either a cycle of destruction or sustainability.** An interview with a private sector company in Cambodia suggests that their willingness and commitment to be involved in GRAISEA’s market-led initiative comes from a realization that their company values are beyond CSR and a belief that long-term sustainability is an investment; that the effect of opening greater access for smallholder farmers to grow and to earn more benefit will in turn brings about benefit to themselves. This company believes that equitable partnership means equal profit or benefit for all. Such realization is a result of learning from the interaction with European exporter companies.

2. **Smallholders are well capable, understand the constraints/opportunity of their value chain, committed to sustainable practices that conserve the environment, acquire strong entrepreneurial skills, and place women in a position of control over their own lives and resources in the value chain activities.** A reflection upon the practice and standpoint of women and men smallholder farmers involving Fisherfolk Enterprise suggested an exemplary practice of concerted efforts to pursue economic, social and environmental gains. Throughout GRAISEA’s implementation, Fisherfolk Enterprise has been very committed to promoting sustainable fishing practices and has translated this into the development of the Blue Brand standard. Furthermore, as a form of certification, the Blue Brand standard is used as a means to help women and men smallholder farmers to obtain a foothold in markets they would otherwise never attain, and additionally to increase their income. The findings suggest that the smallholder farmers of Fisherfolk Enterprise have gradually grown into very capable farmers who understand the constraints/opportunities of the wild-catch fishery value chain in their area, wisely use their modalities, are committed to sustainable fishing practices and are building their entrepreneurial skills as evidenced by the growth of Fisherfolk coverage, income and capacity to access grant-type financing. Most importantly, a space for women to assume leadership, to gain access and control over resources is provided and has increased women’s confidence and capacity.

3. **The government is responsive and supportive, eliminating vested interests, and pro-poor.** A strong regulatory framework that serves as an enabling environment to realize win-win-win propositions and a commitment to enforcing these regulations are in place. An interview with D-FISH in Vietnam suggests the priority of the Vietnam government to place the shrimp value chain as national strategic product while emphasizing the necessity to pursue environmental sustainability by requiring smallholder farmers to produce sustainably. Evidence suggests that the Vietnam government is responsive to society’s aspiration, and active in providing the necessary support for smallholder farmers (extension workers, subsidy) and allocating resources to strengthen the shrimp value chain in the country. The government of Vietnam views the call for, and ensuring the participation of, all stakeholders in the shrimp value chain, as a necessity.

The collaboration between local government, companies and shrimp farmers in North Kalimantan is an example identified throughout the evaluation that shows how the triple wins are mutually enforcing. A similar example can be seen in the collaboration between local government, companies and rice farmers in Soc Trang, Vietnam. The requirement to adopt sustainable business practices that are nested within the
smallholder farmers’/private sector’s/enterprises’ contractual arrangements to meet market demands in the case of Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam is a tactful and vital way to ensure sustainable practices that simultaneously serve environmental conservation purposes and provide equal benefit for companies, enterprises, smallholder farmers and government (win-win-win). In addition to the examples provided, evidence from the evaluation suggests that often a win-win arrangement between two of the three elements takes place rather than the triple win proposition.

One thing that is almost overlooked is that Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development envisions a similar aim and is articulated as a ‘plan of action for people, planet and prosperity’. Its preamble observes that the Sustainable Development Goals ‘seek to realise the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls’. Today, global value chains affect significant proportions of the people whose needs are targeted by the SDGs – those whose human rights are furthest from being realized. However, the potential risk of companies being seen as perpetrators of human rights infringements makes it arduous for the Business and Human Rights agenda to advance at a speed that many parties hope for.

Moreover, a paper of the Business and Sustainable Development Commission suggests that the proposition that not only can all companies contribute at scale to sustainable development through various channels of business relationships and engagement, but they also have a responsibility to do so, is a major shift that sits at the heart of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. This realization is partly reflected in a statement of one of large global corporation’s CEO, as follows:

‘The purpose of business is first and foremost to serve society. It is, after all, not possible to have a strong, functioning business in a world of increasing inequality, poverty, and climate change. We are entering a very interesting period of history where the responsible business world is running ahead of the politicians and taking on a broader role to serve society.’

In that respect, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) present an opportunity not just to redefine the role of business in sustainable development, but also to change it fundamentally. It means placing respect for the dignity of every person at the core of sustainable development. Hence, a comprehensive understanding of the business side of sustainability may open an opportunity for innovative solutions (Verberne, 2018). Yet it should be built upon, and practically implemented, as part the contribution of companies to all elements of sustainability, particularly the ‘people’ element to realize the win-win-win proposition. It further suggests that the realization of SDGs and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) should be seen as mutually enforcing and integrated rather than mutually exclusive.

The momentum of the SDGs calls for the open collaboration between all elements of society – companies, government, civil society and women and men smallholder farmers – in working together to achieve these goals. Moving forward, this narrative should give a clear direction to Oxfam, donors, other stakeholders and allies to best design the approach to engage with the private sector, ASEAN and national government, and civil society as well as women and men smallholder farmers, for equal benefit for all.
CHAPTER 3: RELEVANCE

The relevance question implies an analysis of how well the programme’s design ‘fits’ with the policy and overall contexts in the South-East Asia region. In what follows, we briefly analyse GRAISEA’s design against the prevailing realities of policy and contextual conditions.

Box 3: Main conclusions on relevance

Is it reasonable to conclude that the project design and approaches are relevant to address the prevailing needs of women-men smallholders, country and regional thematic (private sector engagement, responsible business and investment, gender inequality gaps), targeted sector value chain opportunities? In which ways have it been relevant? What evidence to prove that GRAISEA design and intervention targeting the underlying root causes of the identified problems rather than the symptoms?

- **Link up between the design and plan of country team and partner with regional design and plan is to be improved.** Our findings suggest while majority of the effort of various fronts at different level were able to serve its respective goal well, it does not add up into an integral result and interconnectedness between different components that are mutually enforcing as predicted by the Theory of Change (especially, Result 1). It does, at a micro scale, but not generally observable for the entire components. Designing a programme that features a seamless connection across different components should be an aim when an iteration of GRAISEA is to be implemented.

- **Influencing corporations takes time. It requires relationship and trust building. Hence, a three-year programme should be well strategized.** Strong evidence suggests private sector outreach strategy should be strengthened to engage with only the most strategic companies or multi-stakeholder initiatives and/or other social movements. The strategy should be informed by proper assessment of the current state of CSR in South East Asia, market structure and corporate structure of each ASEAN member state.

3.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REFORM

GRAISEA sought to address national and regional level regulatory gaps to influence corporates’ behaviour and to create a conducive environment for business to operate in a socially responsible manner, particularly one that recognizes and values the important role of women (smallholders, labour force) in economic activities. This approach is relevant since one of the key factors influencing CSR practices in the South-East Asia region is in the hands of national government. The desk review suggests that the current landscape of CSR in the region is defined by the absence or presence of a strong state to mandate the adoption of CSR or to facilitate it (although this view might contrast with values of countries in the global North, such as the Netherlands). It is important to note that despite significant improvements in the agriculture and fishery sectors in the South-East Asia region, medium-term projections point to a slowing of this growth that suggest the need for a new wave of reforms to ensure strong and sustainable productivity growth where women play significant role. In this regard, the attempt to approach national government is highly relevant to such a projected aim.

At ASEAN level, GRAISEA sought to strengthen the policy implication of the negative impacts of unregulated private sector investments on food and livelihood security, unfair business policies that undermine women’s power to produce and/or earn enough money to procure food and meet other household expenses, including the issue of unequal wages between men and women that exacerbates and feeds into the vicious circle of poverty. Conceptually, such an intention is relevant to the South-East Asian context, yet it is necessary to put into perspective the nature of ASEAN and its way of diplomacy (further discussed in this chapter). While GRAISEA might have considered the progress of influencing ASEAN to be slow, it is critical to set realistic
objectives about what can be achieved within three years of implementation, given the fact that GRAISEA’s theory of change built upon ‘the on-going work’ implemented at country and regional level as point of departure.

3.2 IMPROVEMENT OF MARKET LINKAGE AND PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABLE PRACTICE

Another important CSR and inclusive and sustainable business practice driver is the management of the supply chain, including links to production in developing economies, often in response to well-articulated consumer concerns or activism in developed countries. A desk review suggests it is a growing trend that there are strong incentives for exporters to adopt appropriate practices in the global marketplace and their supply chains (e.g. human rights, labour practices, environmental practices and food safety) to access markets or to attract overseas investment. Moreover, weaker regulatory frameworks or more limited capacity to enforce legislation in some contexts tend to provide space for global protocols to influence CSR practices to overcome these local weaknesses and promote the capacity of local businesses to compete in global markets. GRAISEA design acknowledges and carefully considers these key drivers and therefore demonstrates its extreme relevance. Interviews with women and men smallholder farmers in Vietnam and Cambodia suggest that market linkage is the primary requirement for them to increase their income and to improve their livelihoods. However, while aligning donor-funded programmes with market-led company initiatives is assumed to contribute to effective, sustainable systems, there is a trade-off in that private sector actors could perceive their involvement as merely a CSR programme, as opposed to a business opportunity. This implies that when private sector partners perceive their involvement as a CSR programme that will last for a certain period of time, the market linkage is highly likely to be unsustainable. This also has a lot to do with the current state of CSR evolution in the South-East Asia region.

Moreover, a market-linkage initiative is not unique in the region, especially among Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP) members. A review on the SRP website suggests there have been similar initiatives implemented by SRP members that are acknowledged by SRP in four countries of GRAISEA’s intervention: Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and Cambodia (yet different locations). The uniqueness and relevance of GRAISEA’s approach lies in its aim to improve market linkages in combination with addressing gender inequality in agriculture value chain policies and practices in the region.

3.3 PROMOTION OF GENDER-SENSITIVE CORPORATE AGRIBUSINESS CSR/INCLUSIVE AND RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS POLICIES, PLANS AND PRACTICES

GRAISEA’s aim in promoting and stimulating the adoption of gender transformative or gender-sensitive Corporate Agribusiness CSR policies and relevance demonstrates an acknowledgement and strong understanding that the business sector is at the centre of CSR implementation that recognizes women’s contribution within the sector. It acknowledges the fact that in addition to companies adopting gender-sensitive CSR, they have the power to influence their corporate peers to become socially responsible and to integrate CSR into their extended supply chain by encouraging its dealers and suppliers to adopt more responsible practices.

These designs and assumptions are highly relevant to remove the systemic barrier that inhibits equal economic opportunity for women and recognition of their contribution in the agricultural value chain,
particularly in the South-East Asian context. However, the success of this aim demands the adequate presence of fully aware and committed corporations, MSMEs and family-owned businesses to drive the change. It is well known (also by GRAISEA) that a significant portion of the economy in the region is primarily driven by MSMEs and family-owned businesses, which constitute the majority of the businesses registered in the region economy. Desk reviews suggest that the main challenge for these MSMEs is the lack of financial capacity to adhere to environmental and labour laws, which might lead to a strong temptation to be less than fully compliant. It implies that unless there is a strong drive to adopt responsible business conduct policies and practices, especially ones that recognize the significant role of women, these MSMEs will be less likely to adopt. Moreover, despite the possibilities and troubling risk of influencing MSMEs and family-owned businesses in South-East Asia, there is evidence that suggests some countries’ strategy under GRAISEA attempted to influence these MSMEs to adopt inclusive and responsible business practices. In addition, there is a growing presence of Chinese companies in some countries in the region that should also be factored in. They may or may not be interested in promoting and adopting inclusive and sustainable business practices, including gender transformative and responsible business conduct policies and practices. In this respect, Cambodia and Myanmar’s efforts to reach and engage Chinese companies in their respective countries were relevant.

3.4 GENDER TRANSFORMATIVE AND WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT IN AGRICULTURE

GRAISEA aimed to overcome the barriers that impede women smallholders in the region to access and have control over economic activities and the opportunity to increase their individual and collective capacity. It attempted to push for regulatory reform to uphold recognition of the important role and contribution of women in the value chain, particularly in realizing sustainable agriculture. This is based on the acknowledgement of the lower status accorded to women in many Asian societies. It means that women’s contribution is undervalued and unrecognized. For example, a desk review suggests many of the landless women in the Mekong Region are the ‘poorest of the poor’ in fisheries. Their invaluable contribution is often overlooked and undocumented, such that they do not benefit from adequate working conditions, facilities, training and access to information. GRAISEA’s intention is highly relevant in tackling these conditions, and the title of the programme suggests a rigorous attempt to address prevalent gender injustice in agriculture/selected value chains. While the aim of Gender Analysis is to identify the root cause of gender inequality in specific contexts to inform programme design, reviews of GRAISEA’s proposal and Gender Analysis reports at country level suggest that GRAISEA’s design was not built upon these analyses.

3.5 A SNAPSHOT OF GRAISEA’S PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTION ON RELEVANCE

Focus group discussions with various stakeholders during fieldwork in Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand suggest varying perceptions of the primary stakeholders of GRAISEA’s relevance that corresponds to their respective needs and interests. We will present these perceptions as they were originally conveyed.

- Women and men farmers (in the rice programme in Vietnam and Cambodia) perceive that GRAISEA addressed the gap in technical capacity of good agricultural practices, organic certification, farming techniques and market linkage. This is extremely relevant to increase their income (Vietnam), environmental conservation and improve health and safety practices (all aspects: Cambodia). The market-linkage initiative has triggered some sort of security that the market is fixed when they are
harvesting and also linked to increased income. Otherwise, they would have sold the harvest to middlemen.

- Women farmers (in the shrimp value chain in Vietnam and wild-catch fisheries in Thailand) perceive that GRAISEA is relevant to address unequal power relations in the domestic sphere that opens the way for negotiation of income-generating activities and household-chore role-sharing with husbands (shrimp value chain in Vietnam) as well as access to economic opportunities to improve livelihood skills (Thailand).

- Private sector partners (in the rice value chain programme in Cambodia and Pakistan) perceive that the contract-farming business model (centralized model) is an effective approach to strengthen their value chain and provide an easy way to handle and communicate with smallholder farmers as compared to dealing with individual smallholder farmers.

- The government (only in Vietnam) perceives that GRAISEA is relevant to addressing capacity-building gaps, piloting and testing sustainable agriculture practices and strengthening value chains they have relatively limited capacity to meet.
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This chapter presents the main findings for effectiveness of GRAISEA’s four results. The chapter also discusses the findings related to women’s economic empowerment across the different results. At the end of each result section, there is a brief analysis of the findings against the outcome trajectory identified at inception stage to identify what is the most significant achievement for each result. The detailed discussion and process tracing of the causal link under the most significant outcomes identified by result is outlined in Chapter 5.

Box 4: Main conclusions on results

Is it reasonable to conclude that the programme has made the difference towards the results its intended to achieve? How and in what circumstances have GRAISEA made the difference and what is the evidence?

- Within three years of implementation, GRAISEA has positively contributed to the adoption of sustainable production practices and made a significant difference in increased incomes of women and men smallholders in 4 countries, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Cambodia and Pakistan.
- On upstream work, the progress to put forward strong enabling environment through regulatory reform at ASEAN and in Philippines has been relatively slow. Similarly, efforts to influence leading agri-business and corporations’ practices remain challenging.

Main findings by results are the following:

- Result 1: Despite continuous challenges, GRAISEA has tried various tracks and pathways to influence ASEAN, and there are still more avenues to explore, should GRAISEA continues. Evidence suggests the progress of the market-linkage initiative (downstream work) has outrun the progress of influencing work (upstream work).
- Result 2: This has been successfully achieved. It demonstrated the relevance of market linkage initiatives with the smallholder farmers’ primary need to increase income. Yet, some elements of value chain work strategy need further strengthening.
- Result 3: The assumption about the effectiveness of the strategy of indirectly influencing the private sector through existing MSIs needs to be revisited. Engaging with them might require further assessment of their respective Theories of Change and the journey towards success they are on.
- Result 4: GRAISEA is an effective laboratory for partners to test and pilot its new model of intervention, as it is evident in the case of ISEA and Change Fusion.

Women’s economic empowerment however, yields mixed results. Access to economic opportunity does not automatically lead to gender equality. Bringing about gender transformation progress requires influencing the change at individual/agency level and political process that may require a long-term shift in organizational thinking.

Overall, there is evidence to suggest a recognition and growing realization of women’s central role in value chains that is attributed to high quality of production particularly conveyed by the representatives of companies involved in the rice programme. On the other hand, there is evidence of women and men smallholders increasing in confidence and the increasing capacity of women in taking an active role in value chain activities that opens up their economic opportunities (all value chains except shrimp value chain in South Sumatra, Indonesia), raising their voice to tackle critical issues pertaining to their environment as well as assuming leadership (only in Thailand). The pathways for these contributions are direct and clear.

In general, the slow progress of influencing work, particularly to influence ASEAN and corporate agribusiness and companies has made the win-win-win proposition unlikely to be achieved within the three-year programme duration. Evidence suggests the progress of the market-linkage initiative (downstream work) has outrun the progress of influencing work (upstream work). It implies GRAISEA’s initial assumption that suggests a three-year programme implementation is realistic to achieve the ultimate objective as it has built upon the
ongoing work of Oxfam and partners in influencing ASEAN and expertise in gender, does not hold true (see Box 2 for challenges and limitations) to establish a conclusion on the extent to which Oxfam and partners’ ongoing work’ and expertise in gender were sufficient to be used as GRAISEA’s points of departure). However, there are instances in which this proposition holds true, for example joint efforts between the private sector, smallholder farmers and government policy think-tanks to pilot SRP applications, to support market-linkage initiatives in parallel with work to influence rice production policy in Vietnam are mutually enforcing. It also implies careful consideration is necessary when assigning the proportion and priority between downstream and upstream work should an iteration of GRAISEA take place to provide tangible results and demonstrate effectiveness.

A significant contribution can be traced, particularly in the case studies of rice programme implementation, as rice farmers engaged with local rice exporter companies enjoy a premium price as is evident in the case of women and men farmers in Vietnam and Cambodia. Moreover, there is evidence that Vietnam rice farmers (in Soc Trang) are beginning to embark on a mutual trust relationship with local rice companies, whereas in Thailand, a women-led fisheries processing enterprise has made increased income possible for smallholder fishermen on the southern coast through the development of a Blue Brand standard, a certification scheme that focuses on smallholder fishermen/women adopting sustainable fishing practices and helping them to get a foothold in the national market. Reports on shrimp value chain progress suggest that GRAISEA has linked shrimp farmers in (North Kalimantan) Indonesia and Vietnam with local shrimp processing companies, where significant variation of income between Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) certified shrimp farmers (in North Kalimantan, Indonesia) and non-ASC certified farmers (in South Sumatra, Indonesia and Vietnam) can be observed.

Box 5 below provides a summary of the total number of direct beneficiaries and the percentage of women and girls reached by GRAISEA in its three years of implementation.

### Box 5: Number of direct beneficiaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number of direct beneficiaries</th>
<th>% of women and girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (non-rice)</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (rice)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,416</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (rice)</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (non-rice)</td>
<td>3,583</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (rice)</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,084</strong></td>
<td><strong>45%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GRAISEA final reports from Oxfam country teams, August 2018.

### 4.1 RESULT 1

The policies of ASEAN, its member states and Pakistan promote responsible practices, which include attention to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, in agribusiness, agribusiness investment, small-scale agriculture and social enterprise.

The Result 1 theory of change rests on the assumption that ASEAN is open to influence the way member states define produce and invest in ‘good’ food. Moreover, it is assumed that ASEAN is just a few steps away from advancing a strong regulatory framework in food and livelihood security that will mitigate the
negative impact of unregulated private sector investment and unfair business policies that relegate women’s rights and exacerbate poverty. Findings suggest that these assumptions do not hold true.

4.1.1 Policy influencing at the regional level

While there might be appetite to set forth a strong regulatory framework, ASEAN’s tradition of diplomacy is unlikely to change even beyond the three-year implementation of GRAISEA. However, the Management Response of MTE Recommendations document indicated adjustment through some strategy shifts in regional influencing work. The GROW Year 3 annual report highlighted that GRAISEA’s added value in regional influencing is to facilitate and enable the participation of CSOs in regional processes, such as the AICHR-led formulation of a regional strategy in promoting CSR and human rights in the ASEAN. GRAISEA is reported to be instrumental in creating alternative spaces (i.e. civil society networks) that provide opportunities for greater leverage in promoting proposed transformation models, like the Benchmark of Transformational Partnerships (BTPs).

Moreover, there have been other positive contributions from GRAISEA to pave the way towards more concrete actions to mitigate the negative impact of ASEAN economic integration and trade liberalizations in the lives of women and men smallholders in the region. Through GROW, GRAISEA has engaged in the drafting of the Regional Action Plan on the implementation of United Nations Guiding Principles in Business and Human Rights. This was then revised into a Regional Strategy on CSR. GROW built constituencies via CSO networks and mobilized them to participate and provide recommendations to include reference to women and other priorities at international workshops. In Thailand, BHRRC was invited by the Thai Ministry of Justice to be a part of the Experts Advisory Group for the National Action Plan (NAP) drafting process, which was published in 2018. Furthermore, BHRRC and IDEALS have set up a Core Group to develop a shadow NAP, to support lobbying work for the initiation of a NAP process and to prepare for the eventual possibility that the Philippine government will soon initiate this process. In Indonesia, the government decided instead to develop the guidelines of UNGP Business and Human Rights.

Meanwhile, evidence suggests that SEAFish for Justice has developed a lobby note that puts forward four recommendations for ASEAN; (1) to develop a five-year programme that promotes Women’s Economic Empowerment in the fisheries sector; (2) to develop a regional action plan to implement UNGP Business and Human Rights including the fisheries sector; to align it with AICHR’s initiatives to develop a regional strategy on CSR and Human Rights; (3) to encourage ASEAN member states to adopt and implement ILO No. 180 or the Work in Fishing Convention of 2007, which provides protection for workers and fishers in fishing vessels; (4) to ensure the representation of CSOs, especially women’s groups, in ASEAN decision-making processes related to the fisheries sector.

However, GROW’s Year 3 annual report suggests that the plan to digitally launch the lobby note during the ASEAN summit in Manila targeting policymakers and urban young middle-class consumers (i.e. the digital population) was indefinitely postponed since SEAFish, which was supposed to lead it, was still undergoing an organizational transition and had inadequate capacity to support the action during that time. Current progress reports that this lobby note has been publicly promoted but not yet formally presented to ASEAN through SEAFDEC, with whom SEAFish is currently engaged to endorse the lobby note. However, this claim requires further substantiation.

Going forward, there is evidence to suggest that engagement with AMAF has been shifted to engagement with the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC). MTE raised the question whether AMAF needs to be lobbied on integration of gender transformative principles because it has accepted FAO policy recommendations. This poses the question of the relevance of influencing AMAF as a strategic game changer. Unfortunately, the shift to influence ABAC was not followed by efforts to change the indicator that attempted to bring about AMAF’s commitment as part of the key indicators of Result 1.

Meanwhile, GRAISEA’s original proposal suggests that the influencing of several ASEAN bodies was under the assumption that ASEAN advocacy was viable without building momentum in several ASEAN capitals and the careful estimation of the interaction and competing (national) interests of ASEAN member states. In reality, most agendas decided by ASEAN are consensus-based, which means that the majority of countries
take up issues that are in their national interest and considered important to be negotiated with other ASEAN member countries. Secondly, many of the new agendas are still nested within the three pillars (political and security, economic, and socio-cultural) that have been discussed years before it finally ‘harmonized’. This implies that it is critical to position GRAISEA’s design (should an iteration take place) within the spectrum of change processes of influencing ASEAN. Furthermore, it has recently been reported that there was again a shift from engaging AMAF to engaging the ASEAN Economic Community Blue Print for 2025, since women’s economic empowerment is under its purview, although this shift was rather too late as GRAISEA’s termination date was anticipated.

4.1.2 Policy influencing at the national level

At the national level, the achievements of the influencing work were evident in Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines. In Cambodia and the Philippines, compelling evidence from research and consultations have made headway into the regulation/policy processes, namely the Agricultural Land Bill and Environmental Code Bill in Cambodia and policy formulation related to contract farming in land-reform lands in the Philippines (House resolution 919 calling for investigation and industry-wide review of the current Agribusiness Venture Agreements contracts; and House Bill 5085 draft with eight policy recommendations from IDEALS). In Vietnam, there is evidence that the work to develop and influence the use of a gender-sensitive CSR benchmark and Sustainability Index Reporting have led the government to reflect CSR practices in the shrimp national strategy. In addition, the State Bank (SBV) in Vietnam received for its consideration the basic principles of a sustainable agricultural value chain that will open greater opportunities for smallholder farmers to access financing. However, further substantiation is needed to validate this claim, especially to ascertain whether or not other influencing factors affected SBV’s buying in to basic principles of sustainable agricultural value chains in favour of women and men smallholder farmers.

Furthermore, MTE pointed out that NGOF and DPA of Cambodia have successfully consulted the community to identify lobbying positions and have lobbied government to insert CSR clauses into agriculture and environment law. The Oxfam in Cambodia Mid-term Year 3 report has further confirmed that these inputs have been used to improve the seventh draft Law of Agriculture Land being submitted to the council of ministers. However, there is no explicit mention whether gender transformative principles have been included in these revisions. Recent media headlines highlighted that the Ministry of Agriculture announced the suspension of this draft law hours after the new prime minister tore into the proposed law and called on the ministry to drop it.27

Nonetheless, within policy influencing mechanisms, the strategies employed by NGOF and DPA are worth replicating. Despite restrictions on the NGOs’ space, DPA and NGOF maintain close proximity and a constructive relationship with the government. They are the members of the technical working group of coordination between the government and development partners, a channel to contribute to the policy drafting processes, where their recommendations are truly being taken into account. Oxfam in Cambodia’s mid-term year 3 report suggests that the policy content for the ninth version of the Environmental Code, developed by Oxfam in Cambodia and DPA in continuous consultation with the EISEI network members and community focal persons, was released on 25 July 2017. Some 90% of the content submitted by DPA and Oxfam on responsible extractive industries was accepted and integrated into this ninth version of the Code: the EIA law (part of the Environmental Code); the EIA guideline on mining, oil and gas; Guidelines on Public Participation in the EIA Process; as well as the aforementioned controversial Agriculture Land Law by NGOF. The gender equity principle was included in the Guideline on Public Participation in the EIA process in order for gender principles to be mainstreamed in all steps of the EIA process.

4.1.3 Most significant outcome

The collection of evidence from documentation reviews and field work suggests that the most significant outcome of Result 1 could be traced from the national influencing mechanism of Cambodia and Vietnam as it demonstrated a positive result in the changing of policy in favour of women and men smallholder farmers.
4.2 RESULT 2

Small-scale producers are effectively connected or engaged in agri-commercial value chains in equitable partnerships and women are recognized as central economic actors.

Result 2 aims to improve market linkages between women and men smallholders and agri-commercial value chains in equitable partnerships in which women are recognized as central economic actors. Equitable partnership here implies an existence of shared values and equal benefit that both the private sector and women and men smallholders would enjoy. Findings from field work suggest evidence of equitable partnership, as observed in Vietnam (rice programme) and Indonesia (North Kalimantan shrimp).

Result 2 has shown notable progress. Strong evidence of this progress is contributed by the achievement of rice value chain work and, to some extent, shrimp value chain work. There is a clear causal link between the Rice Programme intervention and the increased income of women and men smallholders. This could be attributed to direct engagement with the private sector that opens markets and strengthens the link between them and the women and men small producers. It does imply that the absence of this linkage will diminish the effect upon women and men small producers’ income. There is strong evidence to suggest a huge variance between an intervention that directly links to the private sector and market and an intervention that focuses on other objectives, such as to increase production (evident in the case of the shrimp value chain in South Sumatra, Indonesia, and palm oil in Indonesia). The effect is observable. Direct engagement with the private sector and links to the market have demonstrated increased income (the case of rice value chain programme in Vietnam and Cambodia and the shrimp value chain in Tarakan, Indonesia, and Vietnam) and the absence of it leads to limited outcome (the case of shrimp in Lampung, and palm oil in Sekadau, Indonesia).

Under Result 2, we found some plausible evidence that the combination of GALS/P-SIA application and value chain work (as evident in the case of shrimp value chain in Vietnam) is mutually enforcing. Some evidence suggests a plausible contribution to a gender transformation progress and economic gains. Moreover, GRAISEA have been able to increase knowledge and capacity of 6,264 women and men small-scale producers in four value chains (shrimp, wild catch fisheries, palm oil and rice) to apply sustainable agricultural practices, responsible guidelines and gender-sensitive standards. However, there is also evidence that farmers need more time to shift from their conventional practices into sustainable practices, despite the trial using demo plots (as evident in the case of Pakistan).
4.2.1 Shrimp value chain

There are three kinds of approach in the shrimp value chain, which have evidently brought about varying outcomes corresponding to the combination of technical support provided. First, the approach of the WWF in combining a shrimp cultivation technical approach and environmental conservation with efforts to strengthen the linkage with a processing company that buys certified ASC shrimps product and a link to alternative financing for smallholders. WWF has facilitated shrimp farmers in North Kalimantan throughout the ASC certification process, although in the beginning of GRAISEA, not many farmers were eligible to meet certification requirements. In addition, WWF has trained farmers to combine shrimp cultivation with other products, such as fish and crabs. It is evident that this approach yielded the desired result. Shrimp farmers experienced increased incomes that are not easily affected by shrimp price fluctuations. In fact, shrimp from North Kalimantan has its own niche in the targeted shrimp market. It also indicates the appreciation of its consumers (especially in Japan). Additionally, one of CSR Asia's publications suggests the respective private sector partner has shown high reliance on supply from smallholder farmers and does not own any ponds themselves. This contributed to a stronger bargaining position of shrimp smallholder farmers in North Kalimantan. Moreover, farmers’ awareness of sustainable aquaculture practices (i.e. beginning to plant mangrove in the area) has increased. Strategically, WWF Indonesia has also influenced the government to clarify the land ownership status while linked with WWF Japan to tap into the influential role of shrimp consumers in Japan and educate them. The overall WWF approach in the shrimp value chain in Indonesia is exemplary.

Second, Oxfam in Vietnam, and MCD and ICAFIS’s approach in Soc Trang and in Ca Mau, Vietnam. The documents review suggests that these partner organizations collaborated with the local government to conduct technical training in VietGAP standards to increase shrimp production and quality, gender activities using GALS methodology to improve household gender equality, and GALS participatory Social Impact Assessment to prepare households for shrimp farming. Moreover, MTE reports and Oxfam in Vietnam annual reports suggest that in Soc Trang, ICAFIS and the local cooperative have successfully match-made cooperatives with processors, which has resulted in a trial agreement for cooperatives to sell to a processing company to buy shrimp products, although there are challenges: involvement of and dependence on middlemen, company unresponsiveness and reluctance to collect small volumes. At the end of the programme, however, one processor in Soc Trang province conveyed that they would prioritize buying shrimps from their own farms that are certified and demand only a very high-quality standard of shrimp from contract farmers in order to meet requirements of their export orientation to Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Furthermore, Oxfam in Vietnam’s annual reports suggest that a purchasing contract of BMP products between one of biggest shrimp processing companies in Vietnam and 14/10 cooperatives, enables premium price to increase by 10%–20% if the cooperative is fully compliant with the requirements of the company. It stated that the producers were empowered to analyse and select the best-input suppliers and spoke up to processors for fairer conditions of the farming contracts whereby their total income has been raised due to both premium price and input cost saving. On average, benefit for smallholders has increased by about 10% ($11,600/ha/year). The increased income is also contributed to by the effect of GALS application in combination with the market-linkage effort.

Going forward, FGDs with representative shrimp farmers and representatives of the Ministry of Fishery suggested that the Vietnamese shrimp price at the time of reporting was suffering from plummeting prices due to the elimination of US anti-dumping. Media coverage also stated that this is a combination of dropping prices and word that China is moving to buy more Indian and Ecuadorean shrimp due to their larger size and cheaper price. This truly affects the shrimp farmers’ income and they began to seek alternative livelihoods, such as labour migration, to cope. A representative of the Ministry of Fishery (D-Fish) conveyed that despite high production, it is critical to improve shrimp farming techniques/technology to increase the quality of Vietnamese shrimp. The Secretary General of the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) has expressed a similar view, that in the long run, to increase the value of Vietnamese shrimp in the international market, it must be bred in accordance with international standards, such as those maintained by the Aquaculture Stewardship Council and Best Aquaculture Practices.

On another occasion, an interview with a local shrimp processing company in Soc Trang suggested the desire of the company to learn from tested practices to streamline gender into management and operation.
Moreover, they conveyed that incentives associated with commercial values would be likely to lead their willingness to implement CSR practices.

Third, KIARA support for shrimp farmers in Lampung (South Sumatra). This approach focused on helping shrimp farmers to comply with local good standards in fisheries (CBIB) and shrimp processed food to increase production in combination with strengthening a women shrimp farmers’ organization to join the local shrimp value chain for gender transformation efforts. KIARA’s approach focused on consolidating shrimp farmers to be better organized and to help increase their knowledge. Review of the Indonesia Gender Analysis report and an interview with Oxfam in Indonesia’s team suggest that KIARA initiated the establishment of the Association of Women Fishermen in Indonesia or Persaudaraan Perempuan Nelayan Indonesia (PPNI) as a national organization of women’s fisheries. Furthermore, KIARA facilitated women farmers in different areas of Indonesia so they can learn and strengthen one another through inter alia study visits to learn about shrimp processed food products. This activity has resulted in increased of production; yet, efforts to strengthen market linkage were unobserved. This resulted in the issue of marketing the 28-shrimp processed food they had produced.

Unintended effects of the aforementioned KIARA intervention are the gender transformation progress and effort to restore the sovereignty of local shrimp farmers’ community to regain the ownership of their land. Prior to GRAISEA, women and men farmers had a long history in this issue and constant conflict with the processing company (previously the biggest shrimp processor in the country). Men shrimp farmers were jailed during the conflict and their wives coped by taking over the husband’s role to assume household responsibilities, including shrimp cultivation or labour migration, and did whatever necessary for the family to survive. This has opened the men’s eyes to women’s significant roles within the household. Furthermore, this phenomenon has triggered women’s critical awareness and sense of leadership, thereby increasing their active participation in women’s shrimp organizations (BARETA and PPNI). They began to criticize and question the positioning of the leadership in this organization (known for being a given role rather than a constituencies-mandated role). They shifted the influencing approach to the company and successfully contributed to ending the issue about the ownership of their land. In October 2017, upon unrelenting efforts to engage the company with a ‘soft approach of influencing’, the company finally returned the land ownership. This remarkable journey of women shrimp farmers in South Sumatra is indicative of stronger collective power and advanced progress of their gender transformative journey.

4.2.2 The rice value chain

The effect of the rice value chain programme on increasing knowledge and income: The rice value chain programme has evidently shown a significant result to improve market linkage and thereby increase women and men farmers’ income and knowledge in sustainable agriculture practices within just a year of implementation (increased income in Pakistan is anticipated). This programme engaged the private sector partners directly to improve the market system of rice (and organic rice) in the targeted countries. Document reviews and FGDs with women and rice farmers in Vietnam and Cambodia suggest increased income and improved sustainable rice practices in compliance with SRP standards and organic rice certification. Document reviews and FGDs with women and men farmers in Vietnam also suggest increased knowledge and skill in applying Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP) requirements – a major shift from conventional farming practices into sustainable farming practices. Similarly, women farmers in Preah Vihear have testified to increased knowledge in organic rice cultivation, and awareness in environmental conservation and health safety practices.

Positive results were observed as the private sector partner in Pakistan, Vietnam and Cambodia testified to buying (Vietnam and Cambodia) and will be buying (Pakistan) from the rice farmers at premium price or higher than the market price. An interview with private sector partner’s representative in Vietnam suggests that contract conditions allow both SRP product and non-SRP product with varying degrees of price. When the non-SRP contract farmers pass the minimum residue test, they also receive an additional monetary incentive. Compliance with international standards (Sustainable Rice Production) and requirements is the basis of the contractual arrangement in this business model.
**Challenges in the rice value chain in Vietnam, Pakistan and Cambodia:** Interviews with women and men farmers suggest that climate change and lack of irrigation systems are key challenges for the Cambodian rice value chain in Preah Vihear, whereas in Vietnam, climate change is highlighted as a huge challenge to rice production in the Mekong Delta that could affect 50% of production loss. The Department of Plant Protection in Soc Trang indicated that to change farmers’ mindsets to reduce the use of pesticides or chemical fertilizers is a huge challenge. They observed the existence of an ‘attractive package’ provided by a chemical fertilizer company to lure the farmers in the area. On another occasion, IPSARD (Vietnam) highlighted the low safety compliance of rice production to be an issue in the rice value chain in the country, whereas in Pakistan, key informant interviews and a document review suggest the issue of debt for women farmers requires attention. It is a challenge that could potentially inhibits their increased income, but also perpetuates the vicious circle of poverty, despite GRAISEA’s contribution to improve market linkage.

### 4.2.3 The palm oil value chain

The design of the palm oil value chain intervention in Indonesia sought to address the potential implications of palm oil farmers’ decision to continue or discontinue their contract farming with the plantation and to build their capacity to develop GAP. Any decision has risks and consequences, yet often women’s voices are discounted. Although they play key roles, they remain invisible and are forced to work harder than men in a higher risk environment to ensure that their family will be able survive in the independent farming scheme. GRAISEA’s intention was to ensure that other actors in the palm oil value chain listen to women’s voice. Moreover, the impact of the plantation on community livelihoods is massive, and women, as the providers of food and carers of the family, often have to bear the brunt of the harsh life on the plantation. On another front, RSPO is expected to contribute to the development of fair partnership between companies and smallholders and advocate for countries producing palm oil especially in Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to comply with the RSPO standard.

Three years of GRAISEA implementation saw SPKS successfully train 663 farmers\(^29\) of which 500 were smallholders trained in Good Agricultural Practices. The training evaluation report suggests that the participants were willing to apply the knowledge. Furthermore, MTE highlighted that West Kalimantan smallholders have improved their palm fruit quality following training, which has allowed them to cut out middlemen and sell fruit to mills. Similarly, female smallholders have increased their roles in the palm gardens, which has reduced costs because hired labour is no longer required and women have been more careful with input use and fruit condition than men. Moreover, key informant interviews suggest that SPKS in Labura produced results as progressive as their colleagues in Sekadau (SPKS Sekadau). A Fair Partnership workshop resulted in an agreement between the provincial level parliament representative, PT. DSN, palm oil farmer cooperatives and SPKS to discuss strategic issues in deciding FFB’s price. Yet, further substantiation is needed to suggest if an adequate presence of women was involved, contributed to or was consulted in this discussion.

The influencing component under RSPO work has contributed to the result it promised. SPKS has leveraged from RSPO invitations to attend their consultation meetings. The document review suggests that SPKS and Oxfam representatives have advocated for gender inclusion in the Principles and Criteria to becoming more gender responsive. Moreover, an interview with SPKS suggests that they have made a proposition to RSPO to adjust the ‘definition’ and criteria of ‘smallholder farmer’ within the local and national context. SPKS perceived this adjustment as necessary as it implies access to and distribution of a limited government subsidy (such as chemical and/or organic fertilizer) due to the government of Indonesia’s own ‘definition’ of what constitutes a ‘smallholder farmer’.

Going forward, MTE highlighted a critical condition that remains unchanged, even beyond the closing date of GRAISEA. It suggests that SPKS support for smallholders in North Sumatra does not seem to have been effective so far because the approach is to work through a cooperative, but the cooperative is yet to function. FGDs with SPKS suggest that this was particularly contributed to by the way the local community perceived the value of a cooperative. This point was raised by SPKS as an area that could have been done differently, particularly to deal with the high reliance on successful individuals to lead the cooperative while their availability and commitment is in question. Consequently, a dysfunctional cooperative will hamper palm oil...
farmers’ access to the subsidy mechanism or other local sources of financing that could solve the perpetuating debts, particularly related to the substantial amount of capital they need for replanting. This condition applies for both independent palm oil and palm oil farmers with a contract. The key factor in the perpetuating debts for palm oil farmers with a contract is the cost structure of loan between palm oil farmers with the company that truly burdened them. These conditions make farmers unable to progress in their production, which may affect their livelihood and survival. This observation suggests an absolute contrast between the outlook and increasing trend of production and consumption of palm oil in Indonesia (either for domestic or export orientation), which means a contrast between the high demand of production and the poor ability of palm oil farmers to sustain the production due to their lack of capital and perpetuating debts.

Despite some positive contributions of SPKS and RSPO to GRAISEA’s indicators of success, palm oil farmers seem to have to wait until these positive contributions have a direct or indirect effect on prevailing realities women and men palm oil farmers encounter. This conclusion suggests further thought, if GRAISEA’s design and indicators in the context of the palm oil value chain in Indonesia truly addressed the root cause of the problem, particularly in addressing gender inequality; as it is clear, interviews with SPKS staff suggest women remain invisible due to the patriarchal culture, i.e. land ownership registration is still in favour of men, women and men palm oil farmers under contract remain in perpetual debt, and finally, only two cooperatives functioning within 11 districts covering approximately 48,000 women and men palm oil farmers (the number of total SPKS’ members).

4.2.4 Wild-catch fisheries in Thailand

GRAISEA has shown some positive contributions to women’s empowerment in Thailand in their individual as well as collective empowerment journey, while continuously building the capacity of Fisherfolk Enterprise from incubation stage to gradually reaching the mature stage. During the three-year GRAISEAS programme, Fisherfolk has expanded into five nodes (catchment and processing unit) and the application of Blue Brand standards by these nodes. Strong evidence has been found that Fisherfolk Enterprise has accessed and benefited from a range of alternative financing options, particularly by winning social enterprise competitions, and tapping into government financing as well as a revolving fund. Fisherfolk is expanding the business and embarking on e-commerce (through Facebook and Line) and evidence (Blue Brand evaluation report and Oxfam in Thailand Annual Reports) suggests that this approach is profitable.

Most importantly, GRAISEA has made a difference in the life of women involved in Fisherfolk Enterprise. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions with Fisherfolk Enterprise strongly suggest that they have increased in confidence as their capacity has increased (both men and women have stated similar views). Women reported a growing realization of their own self-esteem and important contribution at household level and to the society. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Fisherfolk Enterprise had helped women smallholder farmers to overcome debt issues, particularly in increasing income – as Gender Analysis (in Thailand) has highlighted.

4.2.5 Change Fusion Global Impactors Network (GIN)

GIN’s objective is to empower women in agriculture to have better livelihoods, whether they are producers in an agricultural supply chain, or leaders of enterprises that aim to empower women in agriculture. Moreover, the mentorship process was designed to help women’s enterprises solve business problems that had prevented them growing from one stage to the next, thus enabling them to achieve a wider scope and deeper impact on women’s empowerment. Change Fusion annual reports and a third-party report on GIN Mentorship Programme evaluation pointed out some significant positive contributions such as:

- A strong reference process to facilitate a result-orientated mentorship process, which was successfully tested in Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan
- A network of more than 100 active pro bono mentors with business expertise, so-called ‘Impactors’ from more than 300 applicants
- A portfolio of 17 projects of women-led or women-benefitted enterprises in the agricultural supply chain (rice, vegetables, cotton, aquaculture) engaged in the GIN process. 15 of these have achieved significant
changes and impact that are a direct result of the intervention. There are also three additional projects that were engaged, but they were not under GRAISEA scope

- A founding partnership of five organizations in Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines that have been actively deploying and promoting the GIN mentorship process in different capacities in five locations.

The Fisherfolk Enterprise witnessed one positive result of the mentorship as they deepened their engagement with the Global Impactors Network (GIN). A document review (independent evaluation report on GIN mentorship and Oxfam in Thailand annual reports) suggests that the mentor recommended Fisherfolk Enterprise to focus on the implementation of the sales strategy and thereby provide practical solutions to strengthen the marketing plan. As a result, the enterprise successfully increased its sales by an average of 30%, a positive increase if we were to compare with a 10%–20% increase in the previous year. Moreover, an interview with a representative of a mentor network in Japan suggests an appreciation of the mentorship model, as they tested the GIN mentorship model in the country.

4.2.6 Women’s economic empowerment and gender transformation progress

By using a ‘gender ladder’ framework, we concluded that GRAISEA’s overall progress in gender transformation varied. It is evident from the evidence we could gather that access to economic opportunities alone does not automatically lead to a reduction of gender inequality within the community. However, the progress of fisherwomen in South Sumatra, Indonesia, and to small extent women leaders of PMUAC Cambodia, has reached the gender transformative stage whereas others are at the early stage of the transformative journey (gender aware to gender responsive). There is also recognition by the representatives of rice processing companies in Vietnam, Cambodia and Pakistan of the crucial role of women in the rice value chain. Detailed findings drawn from reviews of reports and key informant interviews with a small number of women and men smallholder farmers suggest the following progress:

**Personal domain**

Key informant interviews with Fisherfolk Enterprise women and men member representatives in Thailand suggest that as their technical skills improve and they were able to access economic opportunities, women felt increased confidence, self-esteem and confidence to speak in public. In addition, men also came to recognize the important role of women in the value chain. In Cambodia, FGDs with women farmers in Preah Vihear suggest that women’s hesitancy to discuss the division of roles in domestic chores to help tackle women’s double workload has an impact on their participation in the value chain, and similarly a concern that their active roles in the value chain created a double workload. However, women who assumed leadership and important roles in farmers’ associations (of Cambodia) have had their self-perception changed and their confidence increased due to the space and trust given to them to assume the leadership role. There is significant difference between value chain work accompanied by GALS and without. Women experienced a double workload and were not confident to speak about the division of roles with their husbands in countries that were unaccompanied by GALS facilitation (as in the case of Cambodian women farmers). In Indonesia, gender training had built women’s confidence. Moreover, Pakistan has witnessed an increase in women’s confidence and capacity to raise their voices. Women constitute the majority of farmers in the basmati rice value chain in the Muridke district of Punjab.

**Relational domain**

Oxfam in Vietnam annual reports suggest that local facilitators had helped expand GALS tools in the community. It further stated that 120 women in Vietnam reported that they have shared decisions in developing and following-up their households’ gender and collective P-SIA action plan. Men have recognized and asked for women’s technical knowledge in shrimp production, commercial skills in selecting input suppliers, negotiating with other actors and investment. However, gender transformation progress in women farmers in Preah Vihear, Cambodia, remains slow. One FGD member felt inferior and not competent to help her husband, but upon receiving some gender training, she now feels in a position to be able to make
decisions on when to participate in farming and when not to. However, the majority still experience a double workload and are unsure if their husbands would be willing to negotiate role sharing, decision making or listen to their arguments as they felt incompetent to be heard. They also observed the incidence of domestic violence in their surrounding community.

**Environmental domain**

Interviews with the representative of private sector partners (of rice processing companies) suggest recognition of women’s significant role in the rice value chain that is associated with a high quality of rice production in Vietnam and Cambodia. There is significant progress in having gender-sensitive policies or standards in place (gender policies in farmers’ association union in Cambodia and in RSPO principles and criteria), but the potential impact is yet to be witnessed beyond the evaluation-reporting period. Finally, it is evident that women’s economic empowerment is an avenue to reduce women’s poverty and yet, access to economic alone does not automatically lead to a reduction in gender inequality within the community. While GRAISEA strongly addresses economic aspects, there is a question on how to tackle gender inequality so that the gender dynamic between women and men can be transformed. There is some evidence that suggest a strong collective grassroots action to advocate their basic needs and fundamental rights will have an impact on changing policy and in turn will demonstrate greater impact. The success of other Oxfam programmes (We Can Campaign, Raising Her Voice and the gender justice programme in Indonesia) suggests that one influencing factor in successful grassroots advocacy is civic awareness. This reflection points to a need to develop and strengthen civic awareness among women members of the group, so that women’s participation could demonstrate action to exercise women’s rights more than mere efforts to mobilize women. Finally, while the programme is intentionally targeted to benefit women, GRAISEA’s next iteration could consider engaging more men in the community to eliminate women’s workload as well as creating gender value change in the targeted community.

### 4.2.7 Most significant outcome

The most significant outcome of Result 2 could be traced from rice value chain programme (in Vietnam and Cambodia) and shrimp value chain in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, as they demonstrated positive results in increased income of women and men farmers.

**Box 7: Most significant outcome of Result 2**

- Influencing MSIs to consider and adopt gender transformative principles (Rice, Shrimp and Palm Oil Value Chains)
- Introducing and improving sustainable & good agricultural/aquaculture and socially/environmentally responsible practices (All countries)
- Market Linkage initiative through inclusive investment (Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia)
- Improving the function of and capacity building of cooperatives and enterprises (Indonesia, Change Fusion, Pakistan, Cambodia)
- Improved awareness of working conditions of women (Pakistan), provide space for women to assume leadership (Cambodia) and gender training/use of gender tools for women and men
- Influencing the use and adoption of Blue Brand by smallholders fishermen/women (Thailand)
- Effective/equitable partnership and engagement between small scale producers and agro-commercial value chains
- Increased technical capacity in good agricultural practices, organic farming, SBF
- Increased capacity for collective actions
- Improved policies and capacity of women to challenge social norms that impede gender equality (at HH, organization level) and value chain
- Increased farmers’ income. Women are recognized as central economic actors
- Key influencers support issues and take action

**Overall Outcome Trajectory of Result 2**
4.3 RESULT 3

Corporate agribusinesses in South-East Asia and Pakistan have adopted corporate social responsibility policies and plans that support responsible practices in the value chains for women and men small-scale producers, as well as including gender equality and women’s economic empowerment in their core business.

Vietnam, CSR Asia and Cambodia were the key contributors to Result 3. The causal logic of their interventions shows a direct link as compared to Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand. The most significant outcome selected under Result 3 that has shown some positive contributions is that in Vietnam, which specifically aimed at increasing corporate agribusiness adoption of gendered CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Index reporting. Moreover, GRAISEA has made the difference in micro scale, whereby 31 seafood companies in Vietnam have applied gendered CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Reporting of which 13 companies have reported a full compliance to the standards. CSR Asia has reported dissemination of a handful of publications aimed at influencing companies’ practices. They also reported having successfully engaged 39 companies, yet the significance of this engagement is unreported. GRAISEA has also made a difference in successfully engaging six rice companies to improve market linkage with the rice/paddy farmers in Cambodia, Vietnam and Pakistan. The significance of this engagement is outlined throughout this evaluation report.

Assessing the indirect contribution of unrelenting efforts in the Philippines to achieve Result 3 is challenging, as the targeted company remains adamant, despite the aggressive push of banana farmers in Davao and IDEALS for a contract renegotiation with 361 women and men farmers. However, there is evidence of GRAISEA’s positive contribution to contracts between similar companies with other banana producer cooperatives consisting of 161 members. IDEALS’ critical role as the agent of change to push through on various fronts, to engage with the national government, with Oxfam in Japan and with the general public in the Philippines, despite the company’s resistance, is worth highlighting. In response to MTE recommendations to provide technical advice to IDEALS on CSR engagement, including direct company linkage, MTE Management Response’s report highlighted that PMU has provided their input and expertise in the case study for good and bad practices of the banana sector in the Philippines for inclusion under the GRAISEA’s regional publication on Business and Human Rights, which was also presented during the Jakarta BHR regional conference as part of a private sector panel. This, as well as the PS Influencing Workshop in Bangkok at the end of February 2018, supported by GRAISEA advisers, was a good opportunity for IDEALS to showcase its work and engage with PS companies and development partners.

It is also important to note that behind the unfair contracts between the company and banana farmers, there is a business model (the nucleus model) on which the company bases their contracts with banana farmers. This business model is preferable for a risk-averse landowner that shifts all the risks of land ownership and production from themselves solely onto the farmers. This kind of business model assume that awarding the lands and selling inputs to the farmers is more profitable than retaining the ownership of the land. It is evident that banana farmers in Davao were unaware of this and unarmed with such knowledge, an area where fairness should be negotiated. This kind of awareness and knowledge is yet to be considered in IDEALS’ approach to banana farmers in targeted areas in the Philippines.

In Thailand, Oxfam in Thailand annual reports suggest that Fisherfolk Enterprise has learnt that the aim to influence big companies to adopt the Blue Brand standard is not viable. Their own audit process suggested that the Blue Brand standard only focuses on smallholder farmers or, in other words, is unsuitable for big companies. In addition, the Blue Brand standard is not yet in the process of gaining ISEAL approval. While the standard truly benefits smallholder farmers of Fisherfolk Enterprise to get a foothold in alternative (domestic and/or international) markets, it raises the question of relevance behind the effort to influence the big companies to adopt the standard as an objective to pursue throughout GRAISEA’s implementation.

Cambodia has demonstrated unrelenting efforts to engage companies and a wide-range of stakeholders to influence inclusive and responsible business practices. NGOF has engaged the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC) (as Chinese investors’ presence has been booming in Cambodia) and 10 selected
companies in research to share their good practices in CSR. DPA has engaged 12 agribusiness companies, including AMRU Rice, to collaborate more actively in meetings and events to discuss issues on community issues and CSR. Evidence on the result and significance of these engagements has yet to be reported. Moreover, GRAISEA has also contributed to the establishment of a CSR platform in the country and the provision of gender training, steer and direction upon the platform. The representative of the CSR Platform demonstrated remarkable commitment to nurture and sustain the platform. The platform begins to put in place the necessary capacity and conditions for becoming a formal business association. At the time of reporting, the process of registering the platform is on-going. The life of the platform at the time of reporting is dependent upon the budgetary commitment of certain Steering Committee members, including Oxfam in Cambodia and Transparency International. Both agencies have included Responsible Business as one of their country programmes that is budgeted for.

In Myanmar, GRAISEA has enabled the necessary capacity of the local community to be in place to mitigate the impact of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The potential major impact of the SEZ is its detrimental negative effect to the livelihood of local community in Kyauk Phyu. Another important feature of GRAISEA’s contribution in Myanmar is the constructive dialogues of Kyauk Phyu SEZ CSO Alliance (KSCA) representatives with a Chinese think-tank closely related to the central government of China and, secondly, with CITIC, a China state-owned enterprise that has been awarded the contract to develop SEZ Kyauk Phyu by the government of Myanmar.

CSR Asia focused on the think-tank approach of influencing. It has been producing numerous good-quality research products and publications that aim to influence companies’ practices, maintains an exhaustive company database and organizes numerous CSR trainings and Roundtables. Yet, CSR Asia reporting is more output-based (number of participants, publications, forums, etc.) rather than measuring changes as stipulated in Result 3 and Outcome 1–4 statements. While it is good to check think-tank productivity, build KPIs and a network of participants, the collaboration was aiming at systemic change in a three-year period inside the corporate world. How and when do the number participants and publications strike the tipping point towards change in corporate practices? Most importantly, CSR Asia engaged in various multi-stakeholder initiatives as a means to influence corporations, yet little evidence has been provided to document the significance of these engagements and what MSIs have brought to the table to at least kindle the growing interest of the engaged companies to begin or to take the next steps towards their inclusive and sustainable practices journey. Recently, CSR Asia submitted a reflection, done via a survey, on the significance of its activities. However, further substantiation is needed to validate the report.

### 4.3.1 Most significant outcome

The most significant outcome of Result 3 can be traced from the direct influencing of the private sector to use gendered CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Reporting of Oxfam in Vietnam that has successfully resulted in seafood companies adopting gender transformative CSR policies.
4.4 RESULT 4

Financial institutions and investors in agriculture invest responsibly by introducing/developing innovative financing solutions to assist the overcoming of specific investment requirements (investment risks) for women, smallholders and buyers from these smallholders.

Overall, there has been significant progress under Result 4. This is partly due to the fact that Result 4 has highly performing partners. A review of regional partners (ISEA, Change Fusion, IIX) and Oxfam in Thailand proposals and annual reports suggests that they are highly adaptive, innovative and nimble. They continued to perform despite significant challenges. Documentation reviews suggest that IIX has contributed to a number of gains, in which a total of US$1,620,000 has been committed for six enterprises through their efforts. Change Fusion annual reports and key informant interviews suggest that Change Fusion has gradually set itself as regional mentor facilitator in the South-East Asia region as the mentorship programme has been tested and expanded beyond its country of origin, Thailand. Third party evaluation reports of mentorship programme implementation suggest that this programme has benefited 15 enterprises in their respective stages of development.

Furthermore, testimonies of mentors and enterprises on YouTube and third party evaluation reports of GIN mentorship suggest that both mentors and enterprises have benefited from the programme. The GIN mentorship model is in line with ASEAN priorities on MSMEs and the start of the ASEAN Mentorship for Enterprise Network (AMEN) as it will require models like GIN to influence its development. Meanwhile, ISEA has completed the benchmarks that include the partnership scoping as recommended by MTE. Key informant interviews and document reviews suggest that there has been a growing interest from various organizations to apply a gendered BTP WEE benchmark including CENDI (Vietnam) that has committed to pilot the application of the BTP WEE in AVCs in a value chain development project funded by CCFD (a French development agency) involving five value chains that engage women and men small producers among indigenous communities in Vietnam. The GRAISEA Management Response of MTE recommendations report pointed out that ISEA continues to promote the BTPs in AVCs and in their Prose 2 project. GRAISEA is reported to have supported several workshops: one in July 2017 to convert the BTPs into a metric tool or scorecard, another at end of September 2017 and two in March 2018 to target financial institutions and UNESCAP.
Fisherfolk Enterprise has tapped into a philanthropic channel to access ‘grant-type’ financing through enterprise competitions, awards, government, local fishers’ associations and a revolving fund channel. It is also important to note that Fisherfolk Enterprise has the capacity to identify potential financing opportunities it could tap into. With the current development, the Fisherfolk team, in consultation with ATFF as an owner, has decided to only receive grants from investors who are a developmental or non-profit organization, and is not yet ready to take funds from individual investors. Another restriction is the weak financial system of Fisherfolk Enterprise meaning it is unable to manage a high amount of financial resources. For example, the engagement with a venture philanthropist was discontinued, as Fisherfolk Enterprise felt unready to compete due to its weak financial system. These findings suggest increased financial management capacity is a precondition to access wider sources of financing for small enterprises such as Fisherfolk.

In response to the MTE recommendation to draft a Result 4 strategy in influencing investors to invest responsibly, ACN and Oxfam presented 10 key recommendations on addressing the investment gap on MSMEs during the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC) meeting on 27 April 2017, the First ASEAN Inclusive Business Summit on 06 September 2017, and the fourth ASEAN Coordinating Committee on MSMEs meeting on 19 October 2017 in Manila. These led to a positive contribution in attaining ABAC endorsement on the 10 recommendations while the ASEAN CSR Network completed a directory on alternative financing options. However, further substantiation is needed to validate this claim.

Beyond the aforementioned positive contributions, under Result 4 GRAISEA is an effective laboratory for partners to test and pilot its new model of intervention, as is evident in the case of ISEA and Change Fusion. The GRAISEA presence was timely when Change Fusion was looking for financial support to pilot the GIN model. This unintended effect could be an aim of every Oxfam initiative – to foster innovative solutions and community-based innovation. Having said that, under Result 4, the direct beneficiaries of GRAISEA are not only the enterprises, but also the partners themselves. Key informant interviews suggest that the new models that ISEA and Change Fusion developed and tested have proved to strengthen their portfolios and will potentially support these two institutions to eventually become self-sustaining.

Furthermore, document reviews (MTE Report, IIX Annual Reports and proposal, Change Fusion annual reports and proposal; ISEA annual reports and proposal) and key informant interviews suggest a missing opportunity for effective collaboration and synergy between IIX, Change Fusion, ISEA, CSR Asia and Oxfam Country Offices throughout the programme life cycle. A review of regional partners’ proposals suggests that they designed their interventions based on the assumptions that Result 4 is an ecosystem wherein each intervention is mutually enforcing. The IIX original proposal outlined the assumption on synergy between partners under Result 4 and the Oxfam country teams.

It was assumed that country offices could have helped link IIX and Change Fusion with eligible and suitable enterprises to feed their pipeline sources. However, this assumption did not hold true, as key informant interviews suggested varied views. On the one hand, it is perceived that country offices neither had enough resources allocated for this intervention nor had any incentive to provide additional attention to this; and on another, it suggests that there is an issue with the lack of coordination and communication. For example, one country office interviewed wished IIX could have assisted them with the criteria of eligible enterprises to feed the impact investment’s pipeline, while IIX wished country offices would initiate efforts to reach them.

Nevertheless, IIX and Change Fusion remained adaptive and continuously brought about positive contributions. It means that they decided to execute their own criteria to source the pipeline at the risk of engaging slightly irrelevant enterprises (enterprises that do not fall under GRAISEA selected value chains category). Finally, key informant interviews suggest that Result 4 was missing the opportunity to leverage from the CSR Asia network of companies.

4.4.1 Most significant outcome

The most significant outcome of Result 4 can be traced from the result of Oxfam in Thailand and Change Fusion’s work in building the capacity of enterprises through a mentorship programme that enables (and potentially enables) the enterprises to access financing.
Box 9: Most significant outcome of Result 4

Innovative Financing Model is created and used

Space for meaningful engagement between mentors and enterprises is created and used (GIN and Thailand)

Use of gendered benchmark Transformative Tool for investment (ISEA)

Increased access to financing and increased enterprise capacity that enabled access to financing

Adoption of gender transformative tool into financing selection criteria

Financial Institutions and Investors in Agriculture invest responsibly

Overall Outcome Trajectories of Result 4
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS ON STRATEGY EFFECTIVENESS

Box 10: Main conclusions on strategy effectiveness

Is it reasonable to conclude that GRAISEA has the following effective strategies? What are the influencing factors and barriers to the effectiveness of these strategies?

Main findings by programme mechanism:

- **National/regional government policy influencing**: the power politics strategy employed is the key influencing factor in the effectiveness of national influencing mechanism within Cambodian and Viet Nam’s context. The advocacy coalition strategy used to influence ASEAN yielded varying results.

- **Private sector engagement**: direct private sector engagement strategy has demonstrated positive results, whereas the indirect engagement via MSIs strategy results are stalled or paving the way towards achieving results.

- **Farmers’ empowerment**: the strategies within this mechanism are effective and have great potential to bring about value chain work into a scalable impact by organizing and structuring farmers’ organizations in ASEAN and at national level, and by strengthening engagement and broader opportunity with the global value chain to increase their bargaining power.

- **Piloting best practices/new models (GIN model and BTP WEE)**: there is positive evidence that suggests strategies within the piloting best practices or new initiative mechanism are successful strategies in implementing farmers’ market-linkage initiatives. In this context, gender transformative approaches have been a positive innovation by GRAISEA, but the implication for women farmer participants’ time and workloads should be considered. Evidence suggests GRAISEA has proved to be an effective laboratory for the incubation and maturing of these practices and new models.

- **Women’s economic empowerment and diffusion of gender transformative principles**: varied strategies have generated mixed results, with space for improvement to strengthen support of women’s unique journey of empowerment and men’s involvement in supporting gender transformation. Areas for improvement involve sharpening the linkage between regional, national and local strategy, optimising gender analysis, including that of policy implications for the work on value chains to inform and adjust strategy and implementation, building critical and civic awareness of women in the context of access to economic opportunities.

- **Local collective/alternative governance**: evidence suggests mixed accounts of effectiveness and sustainability.

- **Diffusion of GRAISEA’s messages**: evidence suggests a weak communications strategy, lack of clear direction, yet good execution in producing communication products.

The DAC criteria define ‘effectiveness’ as the extent to which the objectives of the development interventions have been achieved. In this evaluation, the assessment of effectiveness attempts to discuss the extent to which the strategies within GRAISEA’s programme mechanisms have helped to generate the desired outcome. Based on the previous chapter’s results, this chapter relies on the premise that the study on strategies within programme mechanisms provides the explanation of how desired results were achieved or not achieved and captures the experiences of the women and men beneficiaries in their response to this programme mechanism. We analysed the ‘effectiveness’ criterion by deploying contribution analysis and process tracing.

The narrative of GRAISEA’s planning documents implies an assumption that effective approaches and strategies are in place to make changes happen, and that these are applied based on the lengthy experience (of partners and Oxfam) working in similar issues, the strategic position and credibility of Oxfam, research, and best practice. It also assumes that Oxfam adheres to an adaptive management strategy whereby space for learning is provided and feedback loops are well functioning to inform strategies and adjustment and to
revisit the operative mechanisms/approaches, especially due to the influencing nature of the programme which is affected by changes in context and priorities of the stakeholders. This chapter challenges the extent to which these assumptions hold true by assessing the strategies that sit within key common programme mechanisms at work within GRAISEA’s various components.

In general, mechanisms are underlying entities, processes, or structures which operate in particular contexts to generate outcomes of interest (Leeuw & Astbury, 2010). While a programme mechanism may have been developed on the basis of someone’s theories, and its effects may be subject to theoretical analysis to identify its nature, it is not in itself a theory – it is something that has real effects upon people’s lives (Porter, 2019). Programme mechanisms are social mechanisms that have been consciously created to make behavioural and attitudinal changes as well as changes to the awareness of the targeted individuals and/or group of people.

5.1 POLICY INFLUENCING (NATIONAL/REGIONAL GOVERNMENT) MECHANISM

Several strategies within the policy influencing mechanism were at work to generate desired outcomes in different contexts/countries throughout GRAISEA’s three-year implementation. The categorization of strategy does not aim to compare which strategy is better than another or to recommend one single strategy that is most effective, instead it helps to understand why the programme mechanism was generating the desired change or not.

1. **Advocacy coalition strategy.** This strategy implementation is observed in influencing ASEAN/GROW, ASEAN CSR Network, SEAfish and CSR Asia influencing work.

2. **Power politics strategy.** This can be observed in NGOF and DPA policy influencing in Cambodia and IPSARD in Vietnam to influence rice production strategy.

3. **Community organizing strategy.** This is observed in the Myanmar approach to prepare the Kyauk Phyu community against the impact of a Chinese investor in their area; KIARA and WWF local advocacy in South Sumatra and WWF Indonesia.

4. **Large leaps strategy.** This strategy is observed in IDEALS approach to the plight of banana farmers in the Philippines.

### 5.1.1 Advocacy coalition strategy

The advocacy coalition strategy’s success fully depends on whether or not the advocacy organization is able to influence sympathetic administration (internal champion) in the office or a strong group of allies with a common goal. In the case of ASEAN influencing under GROW, it was assumed that, firstly, it is possible to engage ASEAN bodies directly (particularly the initially targeted ASEAN body, AMAF). However, key informant interviews suggest that it was difficult to find an internal champion in ASEAN bodies. Moreover, as has been elaborated in the previous chapter and well acknowledged by GRAISEA, the ASEAN tradition of diplomacy requires a series of steps and momentum building, particularly in building constituencies and engaging key institutions and governmental bodies of ASEAN member states. However, evidence suggests momentum building seems to be translated in GRAISEA as a continuum of engaging in meetings and conferences, without direct engagement with ASEAN member states. This lesson was learnt in Year 2. GRAISEA was found to be adaptable when attempting to build momentum by organizing the CSO BHR Caucus as part of a strategy shift. The CSO BHR Caucus is a solidarity and knowledge network, with options for joint works for the CSOs in any windows of opportunity, such as a campaign spike or regional events. The gap might be in the sustaining of the caucus between regional workshops since there is no substantial resource allocated for it in GRAISEA. Moreover, building constituencies also means finding a sympathetic administration of the relevant national government bodies. At this stage, political mapping is
necessary to understand the attitudes and inclination of each member state on the policy issue, and thus to aim for a minimum of three influential member states to buy in to the initiative to effect change.

One interesting extrapolation of findings in this evaluation\(^{38}\) is that little evidence (Myanmar and to some extent the Philippines) suggested strategy shifting that incorporated the change of political landscape in the countries concerned. Leading up to the inception of GRAISEA, Indonesia had just elected a new government with campaign promises that represented a more active and assertive type of governing. In Year 2 of the programme, the Philippines also elected a new government whose style and promises had the same thrust as Indonesia’s. Considering the different style of governing from previous governments and new economic priorities, it seems that little was done to adjust GRAISEA expectations. For instance, a national action plan on UNGP Business and Human Rights in Indonesia is most likely to require a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) as it involves coordination of line ministries, such as Manpower, Agrarian and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency, and other three or four Coordinating Ministries and Coordinating Board of Investment. Yet, with the aspiration of spurring the growth of foreign and domestic investment, the current government has slashed regulations with 13 packages of deregulation and been more careful in producing new regulations. Without changing the expectations (objectives), it is obvious that it would not be any effort to compensate for the changing direction in order to maximize results. The key question here is that given the current institutional arrangements of ASEAN and ASEAN ways of diplomacy, what can be expected from linking regional and national influencing? If we were to bring in some degree of parallelism, is it sensible to explore other avenues outside ASEAN, e.g. Asian Development Bank (ADB), or multinational corporations, to be influenced regionally?

An Oxfam in Indonesia report related to the ‘political change’ actually suggests that in the case of Indonesia, GRAISEA did not conduct proper political mapping on the changing political landscape to understand the present inclination of the Government of Indonesia (GoI). FGDs with the Indonesian team revealed that GRAISEA was unsuccessful in gaining GoI’s attention. According to the FGD in the report, the levels of officials involved are echelon 3 (Sub-directorate) and echelon 2 (Director). While reading the OHK report on NAP, it would be better if an assessment of the viability of the expectations to the nature of Indonesia’s National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) had been conducted.

### 5.1.2 Power politics strategy

In An Giang and Soc Trang provinces, Vietnam, Oxfam in Vietnam engaged IPSARD to partner in the rice value chain programme, and for IPSARD proposed policy recommendations in rice production in Vietnam. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, Oxfam in Cambodia engaged NGOF and DPA who have contributed to the policy change in Environmental Law and Agricultural Law (which has been suspended by the prime minister). These respective partner organizations are positioned, or have positioned themselves, to influence policy by being part of the policy think-tank. NGOF is a member of the 15/19 Technical Working Group, the third layer of aid coordination mechanism for coordinating external resources supported by development partners and NGOs. The TWG was established in 2004 for promoting coordination and dialogue at the sectoral level between government and development partners in Cambodia, whereas IPSARD is a one of the government’s policy think-tanks. One of the key factors leading to the success of both IPSARD and NGOF is the capability to be credible technical partners for the government to propose policy recommendations. Most importantly, both organizations are in a position to reflect citizen’s voice/women and men’s aspirations in their policy recommendations. There is strong evidence to suggest that this approach has been effective.
Influencing the national regulatory framework

Case study: NGOF Cambodia

Although the Cambodian Law on NGOs and Associations (LANGO) restricts civil society movement in the country, NGOF and DPA Cambodia maintain a constructive relationship with the government. They refused to go 'head-to-head' or take a watchdog role to push for changes when taking stance on controversial and sensitive issues that may risk their constructive relationship with the government. NGOF continues to employ 'checks and balances'. This means that NGOF upholds the highest degree of neutrality. While being neutral is imperatively stipulated in LANGO, this stance creates space for NGOF to remain within the Technical Working Group and be seen as credible technical partner.

The power politics strategy is built on the premise that change happens by working directly with those with power to make decisions or influence decision-making. It focuses on incremental policy change rather than a disruptive/seismic one. This promising strategy includes relationship development and communication with those who have influence while the advocacy effort is focused on just a few circles, not many. For change to happen, it is critical to identify who has influence related to the specific policy issue or area being addressed and to develop relationships with them. In this type of influencing, it is critical that the organization be seen as a credible partner or voice to affect the thinking and actions of decision makers or messengers.

To put things into perspective, the Council for the Development of Cambodia/Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CDC/CRDB) developed an aid coordination mechanism for coordinating external resources supported by development partners and NGOs. There are two layers of planning mechanism: national plans and sectoral plans. At the sectoral level, line ministries developed their sectoral plans for guiding their development work. This is in line with the one of the elements of programme-based approaches (PBAs) for sector management in the context of development cooperation.

The technical working group is the third layer of this mechanism, which was established in 2004 for promoting coordination and dialogue at the sectoral level between government and development partners in Cambodia. In this respect, TWG has been used as a platform for the dialogues between both parties to ensure aid and development effectiveness at this level. There are currently 19 TWGs, one of which is the Technical Working Group in Agriculture and Water where NGOF is a permanent member.

TWGs are suggested to have an annual or multi-year work plan to guide the coordination work between the government and development partners to attain the development goals as stated in the sectoral plans.
The above process tracing suggests key factors leading to the uptake of NGOF policy recommendations:

1. NGOF strategic position to take part in 15 out of 19 technical working groups at the ministerial level
2. Commitment to ensure that laws and regulations benefit women and men citizens
3. NGOF positions itself as a credible technical partner by providing strong evidence to support the policy recommendations (power-politics type of influencing).

Mainstream media coverage in Cambodia suggests that Ministry of Agriculture’s approval of NGOF policy recommendations on the draft of the controversial Law of Agricultural Land has been suspended on the new prime minister’s request.

5.1.3 Community organizing strategy

Oxfam in Myanmar (OiM) implementation of GRAISEA takes a unique approach. Embedded in a new democracy that is marred by a very serious inter-ethnic conflict, OiM plays the role of the implementer. The focus is a Special Economic Zone, called Kyauk Phyu, at the southern end of Rakhine State. It is one of many SEZs across Myanmar, spurred by new market openings and a large flow of investments from China, both private and state-owned. Against such a backdrop, OiM reviewed its strategy carefully and has adapted its programme to reflect the changes in political context.

While the change of government has put a halt to SEZ Kyauk Phyu, OiM managed to complete its capacity building of community members. Knowing that traditional training would not work, it innovated in how it approached its programme by using theatre and photo-voice to engage with the people to help them better understand human rights. As a result, the beneficiaries are reported to have increased confidence to ask and raise issues related to the impacts, positive or negative, of the development of SEZ Kyauk Phyu. One important feature of the success of GRAISEA in Myanmar is the constructive dialogues of Kyauk Phyu CSO representatives with a Chinese think-tank closely related to the central government of China and, secondly, with CITIC, a Chinese state-owned enterprise that has been awarded the contract to develop SEZ Kyauk Phyu by the government of Myanmar.

However, it is too early to know whether the constructive dialogues and the capacity building will successfully mitigate the negative impacts of the SEZ. On the one hand, with this kind of political uncertainty, the SEZ development may sit on the shelf for a long time. On another note, this engagement on the SEZ is quite a long way from GRAISEA’s proposed value chain win-win-win approach. There are unidentified value chains that will involve the people in Kyauk Phyu, as the SEZ aims for shipping and cargo, oil and gas pipelines, and maybe textile industry. In the milieu of the proposed SEZ infrastructures and built environment (housing towns, business districts), there are also protected areas intended for ‘green tourism’. Meanwhile, as the SEZ construction is yet to start, the there is still opportunity for a FPIC (Free and Prior Informed Consent) initiative that GRAISEA has provided support for.

5.1.4 Large leaps strategy

In the Philippines, national and local influencing work runs into two worlds apart albeit that local influencing was clearly integrated into the national advocacy targeting of the government of the Philippines. There were three major issues raised by GRAISEA and the related OHK project (that ran in Indonesia as well): (1) adoption of UNGP BHR into National Action Plan, (2) better contract-farming arrangement (including price review) in banana and palm oil value chains, and (3) better regulation related to the protection of the Philippines’ land-reform beneficiaries from negative impacts of investment. The use of case studies in influencing work has been effective to build arguments for change. Its dissemination to different power centres proved to be fruitful. While some factors need to be determined as attributable to the degree of success attained, it is clear that the two channels of reporting (OHK and GROW) suggest influencing work in the Philippines was undertaken by one strong partner (IDEALS) that has been engaging all fronts of influencing and advocacy, from parliament to agencies related to agriculture and land reform, building
commitments with allies for future collaboration, to training on farming management as well as introducing fair and sustainable practices to industrial players and media, etc.

5.1.5 Conclusions on strategy effectiveness

To summarize, within the influencing mechanism, the effectiveness of the power politics strategy employed by Vietnam and Cambodia national influencing work and the community organizing strategy employed by Myanmar strongly contributed to the positive progress of Result 1, whereas the large leaps strategy employed by Philippines is making progress towards the achievement of Result 1.

The power politics strategy employed by NGOF and Oxfam in Vietnam is the key influencing factor in the effectiveness of the national influencing mechanism within the Cambodian and Vietnamese context. An analysis of the strategy within this mechanism explains the success in the Result 1 indicator, ‘Four ASEAN member states have demonstrated commitment to include gender transformative and responsible agribusiness principles in national laws and guidelines for agriculture.’

Meanwhile, the weak advocacy coalition strategy employed by GROW under the regional influencing mechanism within the ASEAN context is the barrier to generating the desired outcome. As a result, this explains the yet to succeed result of the following Result 1 indicators: ‘AMAF (and SME Working Group) has demonstrated commitment to develop and/or improve guidelines and policies on agriculture (especially fisheries and aquaculture) with gender transformative principles included, and support implementation by member states and companies, following consultation with CSOs and small-scale producers’; and ‘At least two ASEAN member states have developed a National Action Plan for the implementation of United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights with gender transformative principles included.’

It is important to note that the advocacy coalition strategy employed to influence ASEAN from various entry points generates varying results. Hence, it holds room for improvement to build constituencies at national level that will support regional influencing.

5.2 PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT MECHANISM

In the GRAISEA context, within the private sector engagement mechanism are two types of strategies: direct and indirect engagement.

5.2.1 Direct engagement strategy

Direct private sector engagement includes, as is evident in the case of the market-linkage initiative (centralized contract-farming business model), development and technical assistance provision to gender-sensitive Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines and Sustainability Index reporting, and engagement with seafood companies in Vietnam to influence CSR adoption.

Strong evidence of the effectiveness of these direct engagements has been elaborated throughout this report. The pathways of these successes are clear and direct as it is obviously seen through the causal link between rice programme interventions and increased income as well as constant and direct engagement with seafood companies to influence CSR practices adoption.

In Vietnam’s case, the keys to private sector engagement are long-term engagement and trust-building with the private sector, provision of practical CSR tools that give space for companies to understand and experience its relative advantage and the element of compatibility between companies’ values and/interest with gender-sensitive CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Index reporting. This experience suggests that many companies lack access to advice and best practice.
To summarize, direct interaction, shared values/interests and a demonstration of a workable model they could themselves experience, are the three key factors a direct engagement could offer.

Box 12: Evidence for the assumption of CSR reporting and process tracing of the private sector

**Evidence for the assumptions on Corporate Social Responsibility reporting in Vietnam**

(The evidence for assumptions presented here is to confirm/disprove the assumption that CSR reporting can be used as a means to influence companies to adopt CSR policies, plans and practices. The source is previous research conducted on CSR reporting in Vietnam.)

CSR reporting made its first appearance during the 1970s mostly in the USA (Mathews, 1997, 482). However, the idea was underdeveloped and simple. The researchers and companies paid more attention to inventing and developing various social accounting models (Khan, Halabi and Samy, 2009, 350). CSR disclosures that are separately produced and published are often referred to as CSR reports, environmental and social (E&S) reports or sustainability reports. CSR reporting claims to be in different patterns, such as the social accounting, social reporting, social disclosure, social auditing and sustainability reporting (Douglas, Doris & Johnson, 2004, 389).

The emergence of the design and implementation of CSR reporting and disclosure is a result of the increase in CSR awareness. There was a shift of CSR reporting into the cornerstone of the CSR movement and the chief support of promoting CSR practices worldwide. In order to reach that stage, CSR reporting was said to bring to companies the triple-benefit combination. First of all, it is unquestionable that CSR disclosure is essential to internal decision-making progress of companies, by giving the managers the opportunity to examine the strong points and drawbacks throughout the whole corporate responsibility spectrum. In turn, the potential of long-term relationships, assets and operations will be ascertained thoroughly. Secondly, CSR reporting and disclosure enables companies to pique the interest of stakeholders, who support socially responsible business and are capable of rewarding it. In this case, CSR reporting and disclosure have a positive influence on external relations management (Waddock & Bodwell, 2004, 26). Last but not least, CSR reporting and disclosure strengthen the stakeholder dialogue by establishing a stakeholder communication platform. The platform exists as a means for stakeholders to understand, track, evaluate and give ideas on how firms interact and maintain the area of stakeholder-related CSR. Hence, fully constituted CSR reporting advances stakeholder-related performance (Nitkin & Brooks, 1998, 1500).


**Influencing CSR Policies and Plans Adoption**

**Case Study: Vietnam**

Desk reviews suggest a growing awareness of CSR in Vietnam. The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs coordinates CSR in Vietnam, while other ministries have responsibility for various individual components of CSR. The country has also passed CSR legislation that is largely in line with international conventions, although enforcement is a challenge. Nonetheless, CSR is most highly visible among multinationals. These companies are increasingly aware that they need CSR if they are to retain their export markets. Multinationals also use CSR to position themselves favourably in the eyes of the Vietnamese government (Netherland Enterprise Agency, 2015). A survey conducted to measure the perception of Vietnamese managers and companies towards the benefits of sustainability report suggests that 76.05% of Vietnamese managers and companies in the survey agree that ‘enhancing the companies’ reputation and demonstrating for the implementation of CSR’ are the most important benefits of sustainability reports. They are followed by the benefit of enhancing the competitive advantage (42.96%) and improving the profitability (40.14%) (VBCSD, 2013).
Process tracing of the private sector engagement mechanism in the case of influencing CSR practices in Vietnam underneath shed light on the key factors leading to CSR adoption:

(1) There is an element of compatibility with values or interests that was well-elaborated through awareness-raising by VCCI.

(2) That Oxfam maintains a long-term positive relationship and constant communication. In this respect, Oxfam positioned itself as a partner to these companies.

(3) Companies could extrapolate the relative advantage of CSR tools while self-assessing and monitoring their own practices.

(4) ‘Trialability’ of CSR tools, that enable the companies to ‘try’ what it means by translating CSR into an organizational process. Gender-sensitive CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Index reporting has made it possible for companies to examine strong points and drawbacks throughout the whole corporate responsibility spectrum, especially providing a clear idea what it means by integrating gender-sensitive CSR practices.

There is an additional plausible explanation to the aforementioned key factors. If we were to compare with the surrounding situation, most seafood companies are export orientated, hence they are increasingly aware of the contribution of CSR compliance to retain their export market.

To summarize, these findings suggest that in a country like Vietnam where there is a strong state presence, the government plays a truly defining role. Secondly, international standards imposed by the export market mean that CSR has a commercial value, and lastly, Oxfam in Vietnam made CSR practices more ‘practical’ by introducing gender CSR Guidelines and Sustainability Index reporting for the companies to experience it.

5.2.2 Indirect engagement

Secondly, GRAISEA employed an indirect engagement strategy by engaging global/regional/national level MSIs. GRAISEA aimed at scaling impact by influencing global Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (i.e. SRP, ASIC, RSPO, etc.) to insert gender transformative principles into the respective international standards (SRP), provisions or principles and criteria (RSPO). It assumed that a handful of large MNCs are highly engaged in these initiatives, that they are open to change, and more likely to make reference to the MSIs’ consensus into their practices. However, there is no evidence yet that suggests the extent to which this assumption holds true. This does not imply that influencing MSIs will yield no result and are unimportant. The point is, until now, we have yet to see a tangible effect of the insertion of gender transformative principles into SRP or ASIC on companies’ practices or an effort to capture this level of change. Perhaps, also, it is too early to expect such a change. More precisely, the result of the indirect private sector engagement to influence companies or to change their practices is inadequately reported (CSR Asia case) or yet to be observed (influencing SRP, ASC, RSPO’s case).
Box 13: Evidence for the assumption of MSI effectiveness

Evidence for assumption 1: Global consensus on MSI effectiveness

Evidence for the assumption presented herein is to confirm or disprove GRAISEA’s assumption that influencing MSIs can be a means to indirectly influence companies for further consideration. The source is previous research conducted on MSI effectiveness.

By all accounts, the number of transnational multi-stakeholder initiatives has skyrocketed over the past two decades. Global governance theorists explain this trend as an attempt to re-regulate an increasingly globalized market that has outgrown the jurisdiction of national laws and outpaced the establishment of international ones. They describe these types of initiatives as examples of ‘networked governance’ that involve novel arrangements between state (i.e., government agencies) and non-state (i.e., multi-national corporations, transnational professional associations, epistemic communities, and international NGOs) actors. They have also suggested that MSIs are intended to address three deficits in global governance: the regulation gap, the participation gap, and the implementation gap. MSIs address the regulation gap by providing opportunities for actors to collectively solve problems. They address the participation gap by including actors who are often unrepresented. Finally, MSIs attempt to address the implementation gap by improving the execution of strategic goals.

The global governance theorists suggest that there is good reason to be optimistic about what multi-stakeholder initiatives can achieve, particularly by facilitating communication and collaboration between government, civil society and corporations. It has the potential to tap into the technical, social and political information necessary to address problems and to facilitate deliberation, consensus building, and compliance with reform commitments. On the other hand, the practitioners, based on a survey of MSIs in a workshop, expressed guarded optimism about the progress MSIs are making towards their goals, but also gave MSIs poor marks for demonstrating impact.


Box 14: Evidence for the assumption on RSPO as one of the multi-stakeholder initiatives

Evidence for assumption 2: The case of RSPO*

The evidence for the assumption presented herein is to confirm or disconfirm GRAISEA’s assumption on influencing of MSIs as a means to indirectly influence companies.

RSPO is the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, an MSI established on April 8, 2004. It aims to transform markets to make sustainable palm oil the norm. As of June 2018, it had almost 4,000 members in 91 countries, comprising 43% ordinary members (of whom 82% are manufacturers and processors and/or traders) and 57% affiliate members (NGOs, INGOs and/or government bodies) and/or supply chain associate members (RSPO Impact Report, 2018). Every year, RSPO publishes its Impact Report that documents significant progress towards achieving its aim, including some important contributions to stop rampant problems in the palm oil industry (Alexandre, et.al (2014)).
Yet the journey towards achieving sustainable palm oil markets faces challenges. The RSPO theory of change narrative document states what RSPO stakeholders’ have to say on the unfilled commitments by members across various segments of the membership. Environmentalists argue that ‘RSPO lacks the power to enforce the rules and guidelines it has set forth, making it ineffectual, although member organizations are supposed to adhere to the principles and criteria set forth by the RSPO’ (Alexandre et al., 2014). They point out that RSPO members have been documented flouting principles and criteria set by the RSPO (see links to case studies below). Moreover, Greenpeace, in its 2018 report, explained: ‘the RSPO has since March 2017 required all members to register at the parent group level, though it has yet to show itself willing to enforce the requirement even in relatively straightforward cases. Its membership rules define a parent group in terms not only of ownership but also of management or operational control. Moreover, some traders and consumer companies have included the principle of group-level responsibility in their sustainability policies as they apply to their own and third party suppliers’ operations. There has been some acknowledgement of this extended sense of corporate responsibility from palm oil companies themselves. Bumitama’s 2015 sustainability policy advised its executive directors to embrace an NDPE policy comparable to its own when investing in palm oil companies on their own account (although as our case study shows, the group has failed to respect its own policy).’


Examples of recent case studies and the RSPO 2018 Impact Report can be found here:

1. https://www.greenpeace.org/international/publication/18455/the-final-countdown-forests-indonesia-palm-oil/
2. https://whatispalmoil.weebly.com/blog/how-sustainable-is-the-rspo#comments

The evidence for the assumption suggests a clear divide between global practitioners (surveyed at a workshop) and global theorists of MSIs on the extent to which MSIs could demonstrate the impact they promise. Additionally, there has also been a growing concern over the burgeoning plethora of sustainability platforms or a phenomenon called ‘platform fatigue’. It suggests that while there are many platforms that offer excellent insight and opportunity for dialogue around best practice, there are also many that are far less useful or relevant to tackle many companies’ lack of advice and knowledge on best practices. Moreover, been an increasing effort to make an impact on tackling global challenges, such as climate change, food insecurity and environmental protection, through multi-stakeholder partnerships between the private sector, local NGOs, and international NGOs.

Nonetheless, the presented case of RSPO above suggests that for better results in engaging MSIs, further assessment is required. Each MSI has its own respective theory of change and is at a different stage of achieving its purpose. This means that consideration of the nature of work and achievements of MSIs should guide all expectations and approaches to any engagement with them. For example, an MSI such as RSPO is operating under the assumptions that it does not work in isolation but with governments and other actors to address structural barriers for smallholders and to ensure consistent enforcement to enable change at scale; hence, the failure of this assumption is likely to delay its ability to achieve its purpose. This implies that a realistic expectation of the effectiveness of influencing MSIs to achieve scalable impact within limited a programme duration should be taken into account; thereby, the intention to place influencing MSIs at the core of the strategy to achieve scalable impact should be further assessed.

Given the possibilities and risks of MSIs, it is worth asking ‘to what extent does the compliance of MSIs’ members can be monitored, and to what extent do corporations actually change their practices as a result of MSI membership?’ since often we define the effectiveness of influencing MSIs by the delivery of ‘outputs’ rather than the ‘outcomes and impact’. To date, both RSPO and the Sustainable Rice Platform Secretariat remain unresponsive to the inquiry to share their perceptions of the significance of Oxfam and partners’ contribution to these initiatives.

Moreover, influencing MSIs such as the Sustainable Rice Platform is undertaken with a rigorous consultation process. Firstly, Oxfam consulted rice/paddy farmers in the area, in the case of Vietnam, to inform about
proposed changes and answer questions while the Sustainable Rice Platform indicators are under review, particularly to include women and men farmers’ aspirations with reference to current farming practices. In parallel, Oxfam representatives made efforts to ensure their strong presence in Sustainable Rice Platform’s landmark events to voice farmers’ aspirations. A similar strategy was also employed by RSPO in an effort to influence RSPO principles and criteria. While claiming to be influencers of various multi-stakeholder dialogues in selected value chains, the big narrative that GRAISEA presented in the documents from the proposal to the reports gives the impression that only Oxfam and partners worked on this. This leads to some questions on alternative plausible explanations to reflect on whether there were other networks to compete with either similar initiatives or to block the initiative. Were there other influencing factors or historical events, such as a changing government landscape or the eruption of a conflict in a given context?

5.2.3 Conclusions on strategy effectiveness

To summarize, direct engagement strategy has demonstrated positive results, whereas indirect engagement strategy results are stalled or paving the way towards achieving results. This provides an explanation as to why and how private sector engagement mechanisms generate mixed results.

Using a multi-stakeholder initiatives strategy to indirectly influence the private sector is yet to bring about solid evidence that suggests positive effects in the lives of women and men smallholder farmers at systemic level. The risks and opportunities inherent in influencing MSIs have to be tackled by a concrete effort to measure the effectiveness of influencing MSIs in terms of outcome and impact, the capacity to assess the Oxfam-specific contribution relative to other actors making similar efforts within the same respective MSIs, as well as other influential factors and assessment on the extent to which the commitment of targeted MSI members can be monitored.

5.3 FARMERS’ EMPOWERMENT MECHANISM

GRAISEA’s strategy is to work with farmers’ organizations (either formal or informal, i.e. grower’s organizations, farmers’ associations, farmers’ groups, or a more mature form, the union of farmers’ associations) to build the collective capacity of women and men farmers as a basis of equitable partnership and stronger bargaining position with the private sector and other institutions (e.g. financial institutions, multi-stakeholder initiatives, government bodies). The farmers’ empowerment mechanism also means to build the consolidated power of women and men smallholders to overcome barriers and risks to their production. An example in Preah Vihear suggests that women and men farmers complement each other’s production gap when one is unable to meet the production target set by the company. They testified that without the associations, they would feel alone and powerless.

Cambodia, Vietnam and Pakistan have their own type of farmers’ organizations. Cambodia has more mature organizations comprising 42 farmers’ organizations under PMUAC/Union of Farmers Associations. The Union has a long historical background prior to GRAISEA. Vietnam has several farmers’ groups, whereas Pakistan only established grower organizations when the rice programme commenced. Shrimp farmers in Vietnam have 22 cooperatives. It is evident that simple organization and direct relationship with the company, as is the case in Pakistan and Vietnam, has no other effects or other issues pertaining to membership fees, transparency and accountability of the associations, management and business plan of the associations, just as in the case of union of farmers’ associations in Cambodia. Yet, complication begins when the number of associations grows and another layer of governance is required.

There is also the indirect suggestion of the majority of reports that these organizations have served their purpose well. Yet, no evidence suggests that any of these organizations has an agreement that provides space for the adequate presence of women and for them to assume leadership. Only PMUAC and farmers’ associations in Cambodia – with GRAISEA’s assistance – have developed gender policy that benefits women farmers and paves the way to improve its services. Moreover, the absence of farmer organizations due to many factors, as demonstrated in palm oil cooperatives in West Kalimantan (Sekadau), Indonesia, suggests an impediment to the ability of palm oil farmers to move forward. Their battle remains in
consolidating and maintaining the cooperative and they are unable to collectively overcome constraints or use the opportunities to strengthen the palm oil value chain in their area. The persistent issue of limited access to financing could have been resolved had the cooperative fully functioned. Nevertheless, when better organized, farmers’ organizations have tremendous potential to bring about value chain work into a scalable impact as it has evidently linked to the private sector, local and national governments, and indirectly, the global value chain.

5.3.1 Conclusions on the effectiveness of the strategy

To summarize, it is evident that the strategy to build farmers’ organizations/groups is contributing to the achievement of Result 2. Most importantly, it has great potential to bring about value chain work into a scalable impact by organizing and structuring farmers’ organizations in ASEAN and at national level to build constituencies and collective and to strengthen negotiation positions with respective governments.

Furthermore, the strategy to strengthen farmers’ engagement and broader opportunities within the global value chain, as is evident in the case of rice value chain in Vietnam and Cambodia and shrimp value chain in Indonesia, will increase their bargaining power. Yet, there is more to be done to support these farmers’ organizations’ capacity on all fronts in pursuit of these purposes, as well as to have a long-term plan or vision in their pathway to increase market links and improve their livelihoods.

5.4 PILOTING BEST PRACTICES/NEW MODELS MECHANISM

In general, GRAISEA aims to pilot new models or best practices in which learning can be documented and used to influence policy change, or in advocacy work. In these analyses, this evaluation will only discuss contract farming models that were observed in some GRAISEA works or (used by companies GRAISEA tried to deal with) and ISEA gendered Benchmark for Transformational Partnership Women Economic Empowerment (BTP WEE). It is worth noting that piloting best practices demands its own monitoring and evaluation to inform whether the pilot will be dropped, replicated or scaled up.

5.4.1 Market-linkage initiative strategy

This strategy has triggered a farmer–private sector partner relationship under various contract-farming models. There are two types of contract farming model across GRAISEA:

1. Centralized model (Outgrower Scheme). This can be observed in Vietnam and Cambodia rice value chains.
2. Informal model. This can be observed in the Pakistan rice value chain and shrimp value chain, North Kalimantan, Indonesia (contract farming under the shrimp value chain in North Kalimantan has been arranged prior to GRAISEA – we do not have adequate evidence to ascertain under which contract farming model the Vietnam shrimp value chain is).

However, reviews of Sustainable Rice Platform websites suggest that the market-linkage initiative is not a unique initiative and has been practised by various actors in some countries in the South-East Asia region (Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia) and Pakistan. The most unique feature of GRAISEA’s intervention is the effort to advance a gender transformative agenda.

Centralized model/Outgrower Scheme

The effectiveness and challenges of a centralized model have been discussed under the rice value chain programme. The key issues of this model in a GRAISEA context are, at the moment, a high reliance upon facilitator organizations’ role to support farmers’ organizations/associations into becoming mature organizations in building the capacity of individual farmers. The role of extension workers has been, to
certain extent, visible in Cambodia, whereas in Vietnam, local governments are active and supportive of farmers on various fronts. However, there is evidence that local government (in Soc Trang, Vietnam) believes that to change unsustainable practices of paddy farmers is a challenge, particularly in reducing dependency on chemical fertilizer. Secondly, it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to investigate the transparency and decision-making process of pricing systems. Yet, pricing systems is the area in which fair trade is mostly violated. Moreover, transparency in this area is also critical to avoid misunderstanding or distrust between farmers/farmers’ organizations and private sector partners, as it was in the case of the Vietnam rice value chain. Our desk review suggests that uncertainty about price levels leads to mistrust and a feeling of exploitation. In addition, the relationship between price and international market standards is often not understood. Appreciation of farmer’s contributions to this laborious work, especially women, should be reflected in the pricing mechanism. Thirdly, this model places the farmers as working closely with the private sector to adapt and to adjust. Hence, it requires farmers to adapt and to catch up with the rhythm and thinking of the private sector by being more business-minded. The long-term plan and effect of transition from subsistence farming into export-orientated farming should be carefully planned and reflect the way farmer’s organizations and farmers are being prepared to undertake this process.

**Box 15: Process tracing of the piloting new initiative/model mechanism – rice programme contract farming model**

**Contract farming business model**

**Case study: rice value chain in Vietnam and Cambodia**

The contract-farming business model of the rice value chain in Vietnam and Cambodia depicts a centralized model of contract farming, a model in which the contracting company provides support to the production of the crop by smallholder farmers, purchases the crop from the farmers, and then processes, packages and markets the product, thereby tightly controlling the quality of the product. Then there is the addition of the facilitator organizations’ role (Oxfam and partners) into the model in building the capacity of individual women and men farmers and the farmers’ organizations. It suggests a certain level of dependency of farmers’ organizations on the facilitator organizations to build their capacity. Moving forward, should the market-led initiative (or GRAISEA) end, these roles will be on the shoulders of the farmers’ associations. In the Cambodian case, the Union Association is aiming to improve its services to its members (aka farmers’ associations) upon GRAISEA’s departure. This is not the case in Vietnam and Pakistan, where farmer organizations are rather small and informal.

In Vietnam, farmers’ organizations are generally large and formal organizations, however in the GRAISEA context, it does not work directly with these organizations but with the Sub-Department of Crops and Plantation Protection at district/community level who have strong expertise in SRP rice cultivation. After GRAISEA ends, this sub-department will continue to support/build capacity for farmers’ groups under their own rice development programme, using government budget.
Process tracing of piloting market linkage initiatives in Cambodia and Vietnam suggested key factors leading to farmers’ increased income:

(1) Selection criteria and the eligibility of women and men farmers are critical. While it appears like a form of discrimination, it helps the model to select only farmers that could withstand the rigorous requirements of an export-oriented market and pass on such characteristics to the neighbouring community. However, this message has to be well communicated to the targeted community for them not to confuse it with discrimination.

(2) Commitment of farmers to continuously attend series of capacity building. Another important key for consideration at this stage is the implication of these activities adding to women farmer participants’ time and burden.

(3) Continuous support of facilitator organizations (Oxfam and partners) in building farmers’ capacity jointly with the private sector partner.

(4) Contract arrangement is critical, particularly in the case of certified-products, such as organic rice in Cambodia.

(5) Equal partnership demands equal capacity. It necessitates farmers’ like-mindedness with private sector partners in organizing and planning their production. The private sector representative pointed out the critical need for farmers to enhance their entrepreneurial skills to catch up with company practices and long-term plan.

To summarize, based on the above observations, key points towards fair conditions for farmers are:

(1) A stage in which selection criteria are set to ensure that potential participants in the centralized model meet minimum standards is critical, as shown in the cases of Cambodia, Vietnam and Pakistan, although practices in these three countries varied. Recommending a single best-practice model of contract farming that suits diverse scenarios will be difficult, if not impossible.

(2) Reflecting upon PMUAC (Union of Farmers’ Associations) case in Cambodia, farmers’ associations and unions of associations should consider and acknowledge different modalities as they deal with multiple companies (private sector partners) now and in the future. Depending on the context (such as Pakistan, Vietnam and Cambodia), centralized models of contract farming have different modalities in terms of the type and number of farmers, their spatial distribution, contract arrangements, delivery of technical support (extension services), potential marketing mechanisms, and quality requirements.
Informal model

The application of this model can be observed in the case of the Pakistan rice value chain and Indonesia (North Kalimantan) shrimp value chain. In Pakistan, there is no formal contractual agreement between the company and the farmers. Price will be offered at the harvest time of the paddy, whereas in Indonesia, the company invests in the farms to ensure their supply chain without contracts. This model normally entails a minimum financial investment by the company. Desk review suggests this model is the most speculative of all types of contract-farming models, with a risk of default by both company and farmer. However, a variation of the informal model, as it is observed in Indonesia (North Kalimantan), suggests that the company puts in a considerable amount of investment while the shrimp farmers retain the ownership of their assets, especially the ponds. Meanwhile, women farmers in Pakistan are anticipating a harvest this year (2018), when their income increase will be assessed.

Critical questions to reflect on overall in contract farming

In what ways do these models encourage transformational partnership that will contribute to the gender transformation progress? In what ways can farmers be better educated to understand the risks and opportunities of these various models? In what ways can a fair contract be pursued – one that farmers are fully aware of and capable of making informed decisions about when signing the contract? Is there a way they could be given a choice of the types of partnership they embark upon?

5.4.2 ISEA – BTP WEE AVC

GRAISEA provided space for ISEA to develop a new practical tool for the adoption and implementation of gendered transformational partnerships in agricultural partnerships, especially to pave the way for financial institutions to invest inclusively and responsibly. ISEA developed the benchmark during the two-year programme duration (or the entire contractual period with GRAISEA) based on case studies of several social enterprises in the region.

The gendered BTP WEE AVCs benchmark comprises six benchmarks or minimum standards for organizations to reflect their organizational/institutional practices against. The underlying principles of the benchmarks necessitate transformational partnership as a pre-condition to sustainable agriculture. It suggests employing a combination of both transactional and transformational partnerships for smallholders to actively participate in the value chain. The benchmark is expected to trigger a growing realization to tackle unequal power relations among different actors, particularly women’s position at all levels. Originally, social enterprise was the targeted audience of this benchmark, yet ISEA annual reports suggest the growing interest of various organizations and companies beyond social enterprises to apply the benchmark.
The strength of this benchmark lies in its uniqueness, alignment to the international standard – for example the Sustainable Rice Platform – and a strong aspiration that ‘combination of transformational partnership and transactional partnership along the value chain will lead into sustainable agriculture’. Transformational partnership is a pre-condition to break through iniquitous issues perpetuating women’s poverty. Through the cases presented, the benchmark gives a strong message that putting ‘transformational partnership’ into practice is viable and realistic.

Going forward, ISEA has begun to convert the benchmarks into scorecards as a starting point for enterprise structures to self-assess and external actors to assess. These have been tailor made, one for AVC and the other for financial institutions. It is reported that there were recent workshops done to validate these with the private sector and get their buy in. However, further substantiation is needed to validate this claim. The wider effects of the benchmark are yet to be observed during the evaluation period.

5.4.3 GIN model – mentorship programme

The GIN Mentorship model was developed and piloted under Result 4. GRAISEA was timely as Change Fusion was looking for financial support to develop a GIN Mentorship model. It specifically targeted start-ups or ‘green’ (young) enterprises that were unsuitable to access impact investment but could access grant-type financing provided by state and non-state actors (foundations, non-profit organizations, etc.). This piloting mechanism has effectively contributed to Result 2 and Result 4.

Drawn from GRAISEA experience, evidence suggests that the strength and sustaining factor of the model lies in the motivational aspects of GIN that draw the commitment of mentors to participate and engage in the mentorship. The fact that they are pro bono mentors is evidence of their high level of commitment and adds up to the relative advantage of GIN Model (i.e. cost effective). Lessons learnt in Vietnam and Indonesia have
helped the GIN Model to evolve and mature. The Vietnam experience suggests that local mentors with a local enterprise relationship will overcome many barriers, such as relevance of mentor feedback and recommendations to the local context and language barriers. The Indonesia experience suggests that organizing local events is another channel to recruit local mentors. These lessons provided evidence that suggest having a country host/intermediary agency helps to expand the network and overcome some shortcomings of the model.

The main idea that mentors are themselves the agents of change is the strength of this model. The GIN model has huge potential to turn a pool of mentors into a pool of champions in corporate agribusiness, if they are systematically screened, clustered and targeted. Moreover, mentor networks could potentially be networks of private sector champions of corporate agribusiness. Japan’s mentorship model is exemplary. The idea to engage mentors who are owners of an enterprise/company that utilizes mentorship as their business expansion strategy is an emerging form of private sector engagement. This is also relevant in the South-East Asia region, home to millions of private/family-owned enterprises. What needs to be improved in this model (in the GRAISEA context) is the strategy to ensure that mentors are at least gender aware or gender responsive in using a gender lens while providing solutions to the enterprises. This is another form of influencing gender transformative principles in enterprises practice.

Box 16: Process tracing of the piloting new initiative/model mechanism – GIN Model (mentorship programme) of Change Fusion

**Building enterprise capacity with the mentorship programme**

**Case study on Change Fusion (Global Impactor Network)**

The GIN mentorship model under Result 4 does not aim to directly contribute to access to financing for enterprises, but to create an enabling environment for enterprises to eventually be able to access financing by improving its technical and institutional capacity required by financial institutions to access their financing sources. However, the pilot GIN mentorship model mechanism has evidently yielded positive result in the success of the establishment and maturity of the model itself and the wider adoption of this model by other organizations in countries in the region. Evidence suggests that the key-influencing factor of this model is direct engagement between mentors and enterprises to remove barriers that inhibit start-ups in reaching the exponential growth required by financial institutions by providing practical solutions and action plans for start-ups to consider and implement – a service that may be costly and require significant investment.

Process tracing of the mentorship programme underneath suggests that key factors leading to increased capacity of the enterprise as an element to enable them access to sources of financing are:

1. Pipeline of eligible enterprise to be supported enables the matching between mentors’ qualification and enterprises’ needs. The suitability element is the first step in embarking on the mentorship.
2. One-on-one mentorship for young enterprises is a unique service and a luxury, given the fact that it is pro bono and the enterprise at this stage is not in the position to afford such a service.
3. Mentorship offers solutions that tackle the root cause of problems hindering the enterprise’s growth. In fact, this is the premise upon which the mentorship is undertaken.
4. There is an action plan that the enterprise needs to implement under the close monitoring of the mentors.
5.4.4 Conclusions on strategy effectiveness

To summarize, there is much positive evidence that suggests piloting market-linkage initiative has been successful in addressing the primary need of farmers for access to, and strong linkages with, the market to increase the income of women and men smallholder farmers, particularly in the rice value chain in Vietnam and Cambodia and shrimp value chain in west Kalimantan, Indonesia. Although there is evidence that suggests market-linkage initiative is not unique to the Sustainable Rice Platform, the effort to advance gender transformative agenda is the most innovative characteristic of GRAISEA’s intervention.

Key factors under contract farming (market-linkage initiative) are the selection criteria and the eligibility of women and men farmers, *inter alia*. While it appears to be a form of discrimination, it helps the model to select only farmers that could withstand rigorous requirements of an export-orientated market and pass on such characteristics to the neighbouring community. However, this message has been well communicated to the targeted community for them not to confuse it with discrimination.

Secondly, it is the commitment of farmers to continuously attend series of capacity building. Other important key information for consideration at this stage is the implication of these activities for women farmer participants’ time and workloads. Furthermore, under this mechanism, evidence suggests GRAISEA has proved to be an effective laboratory for the incubation and maturing of gendered BTP WEE AVCS of ISEA and GIN mentorship model of change fusion.

5.5. WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT MECHANISM

Conceptually, GRAISEA deploys a common women’s economic empowerment framework that rests on the premise of a transformative approach to achieving women’s rights (Rao & Kelleher 4 Dimensions of Change – Gender at Work Framework). It believes that sustainable progress and widespread impact on WEE requires multi-level working simultaneously from individual to national levels of change. It aspires to spearhead both individual and systemic levels of change to remove barriers to women’s rights, particularly in agriculture value chains. The economic sphere in the context of GRAISEA is used as the entry point while also addressing social empowerment to challenge social norms and cultural practices that prevent women’s full participation in economic activities. The approach WEE GRAISEA focused on includes inclusive market systems development that aims to shift power in markets and promote WEE by addressing power imbalances along the value chain and challenging social norms and improving social inclusion.

5.5.1 Women’s economic empowerment mechanism in GRAISEA

There are three domains in which women’s economic empowerment mechanisms were at work to generate desired outcomes. Firstly, in the personal domain, GRAISEA’s strategy focuses on increasing women’s individual knowledge and self-perception, and opens access to increase women’s mobility. Technical capacity building in sustainable agricultural practices (SRP, SRI, rice organic farming), gender training and GALS are examples of GRAISEA’s intervention to empower women in different contexts.

Secondly, in the relational domain, GRAISEA’s strategy focused on opening access to and strengthening women’s collective capacity to achieve common goals/interests together with women’s groups or farmers’ cooperatives, and producers’ groups. Not only that, opportunities were provided for women to assume leadership in Fisherfolk Enterprise (Thailand) Union of Farmers Associations (Cambodia), PPNI and BARETA (Indonesia), etc.

Thirdly, in the environmental domain, GRAISEA’s strategy focused on removing barriers for women’s status in value chain activities by efforts to put gender transformative principles and its applications into the international standards, principles and criteria of sustainable agricultural practices (of SRP, RSPO principles
and criteria), and gendered BTP WEE AVCs benchmarks as well as on CSR guidelines/Sustainability Index reporting and index and gendered P-SIA. This includes the adoption of gender policy by the Union of Farmers Association in Cambodia (PMUAC).

A strategy to diffuse gender transformative principles into policies and practices in GRAISEA targeted international standards of agriculture (SRP, RSPO, ASC), the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and at the local level, the adoption of gender policy into farmers’ unions and farmers’ associations in Cambodia. At the small scale, changing policy took place in Cambodia in the form of key informant interviews with board members, and women leaders and farmers’ associations suggested a certain level of benefit they personally experienced, not only from the fact that this policy exists, but also from the fact it recognized basic women’s rights, such as entitlement to one day’s maternity leave. This mechanism has generated positive outcomes, on the realization of Result 2 indicator ‘number of engaged small-scale producer associations where women have taken up more powerful decision-making organizational roles’ (in farmers’ associations in Cambodia, Fisherfolk Enterprise in Thailand, PPNI and BARETA in Indonesia) and integrate gender transformative measures (favourable conditions, such as maternity leave).

### 5.5.2 Women’s economic empowerment and social norms

Despite the positive results in greater access to economic opportunities that we could observe, strong evidence across countries suggests greater access to economic opportunities does not automatically translate into changing norms in society. For instance, in the case of palm oil value chain in Indonesia, land ownership registration still favours men; women and men palm oil farmers under contract schemes remain in perpetuating debt; and finally, only two cooperatives were functioning across 11 districts covering approximately 48,000 women and men palm oil farmers (the number of total SPKS members).

Cambodian women farmers conveyed that they are experiencing a double workload and feel they lack the skills to negotiate role sharing in domestic chores. We could not establish a firm conclusion on whether women smallholder farmers in Thailand have resolved perpetual debt, as highlighted by the gender analysis, and similarly in Pakistan.

Moreover, the stalled result to influence changing norms in favour of gender equality at the household and systemic level partly contributed to the incoherence between GRAISEA’s design, with prevalent issues perpetuating gender inequality (in agriculture_Selected value chain) in the countries, as it is evident that there is a lack of overall regional gender analysis and strategy.

### 5.5.3 Gender analysis for design, planning and monitoring

A review of gender analyses at country level and the GRAISEA proposal suggest that country-level gender analysis was conducted after the planning/inception or even at the later phase of GRAISEA. For instance, the gender strategy for Myanmar was finalized in May 2017. Despite the existence of recommendations from the household survey in project areas conducted jointly by Oxfam in the Philippines and its partner, IDEALS, an independent final evaluation report of GRAISEA implementation in the country described this mismatch as follows:

‘The gender component of the project was lacking, with no specific activities aimed to promote a gender transformative agenda. Although this objective was clear at the regional project level, there was no coherent strategy on how the overall gender transformation will be carried out and how it will fit in the different value chains. In the project proposal, there were no activities and budget allocation to address and support gender and development and/or women’s economic empowerment. Gender training workshops were only conducted towards the end of the project through budget modification. The gender-related activities appeared to be an afterthought and, as such, barely scratched the surface. A contributory factor to this could be that there was no capacity building on gender programming with the partner implementer during the early part of the project. Moreover, the gender adviser was only onboard on the last two quarters before the project ended.’
The above conclusion and MTE report also suggest the varied capacity of both national and regional partners in advancing a gender transformative agenda as another contributing factor to a mixed result. However, the Management Response to MTE Recommendations document suggests an effort to update and to review ‘gender transformation mapping’ on initiatives and support needs to define support-needs to countries and partners.

Weak evidence is found (at the time of reporting) to suggest the effectiveness or the positive effect of the diffusion of gender transformative (responsive) principles into international standards and principles of sustainable agricultural practices on women smallholders’ lives. Further substantiation is needed to validate the evidence of claim on success to change the principles and criteria of RSPO to be more gender responsive as well as to ensure that the claim that GRAISEA has successfully influenced SRP to recognize gender principles/values can only be attributed to Oxfam and that no other actors or influential factors contributed to this claim.

Additionally, there is also limitation in assessing women’s economic empowerment and the gender transformation progress of GRAISEA, as a result of the fact that the MEL system and reporting do not adequately capture the unique journey of women’s empowerment in different contexts and countries (except that women participated in GALS in Vietnam and to some extent the experience in Indonesia) coupled by time constraints and opportunity to fully understand the perspective of all or the majority of women smallholder farmers involved in Fisherfolk Enterprise, women shrimp farmers in Vietnam, and women palm oil farmers in Indonesia as well as women rice farmers in Vietnam, Cambodia and Pakistan.

5.5.4 Conclusions on strategy effectiveness

To summarize, key strategies within the women’s economic empowerment mechanism hold room for improvement in the area of sharpening the linkage between regional, national and local strategy, optimizing the merit of gender analysis, including analysis of policy implication of gender and value chain at regional and national level to inform and adjust overall strategy and implementation, as well as building critical and civic awareness of women in parallel with a greater opportunity to access to economic opportunities. This mechanism renders a need to strengthen reporting of women’s unique journey of empowerment and men’s involvement in supporting gender transformation efforts.

5.6 LOCAL COLLECTIVE/ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM

Within the local collective governance mechanism, GRAISEA’s strategy is to convene multi-stakeholder initiatives and to establish a multi-stakeholder platform. This section will assess the effectiveness of these strategies.

Establishing or convening multi-stakeholder initiatives was used widely by country programmes and GRAISEA’s implementing partners. It aims to influence the norms and policies in formal spheres (national and regional level) to incorporate gender transformative principles. It is evident that GRAISEA placed multi-stakeholder initiatives and platform at the heart of any component, yet little reflection has been done to understand the extent to which it has brought about intended results.

Convening multi-stakeholder initiatives in the GRAISEA context sometimes means facilitating round-table discussions or multilateral dialogue to create space for negotiations. This strategy was mainly deployed by various influencing work under GROW, ACN and of CSR Asia, and to certain extent, ISEA, whereas examples of establishing multi-stakeholder platform in GRAISEA were found in the establishment of a district-level multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) in Pakistan, Myanmar Kyauk Phyu SEZ CSO Alliance (KSCA – this is an alliance, but functions similar to a platform), and CSR Platform in Cambodia. In these multiple platforms, Oxfam is not only facilitating the platform, but is also the key promoter. Because there is little
evidence provided to substantiate various MSIs, this section will focus on the three platforms Oxfam has facilitated, KSCA Myanmar, MSP Pakistan and CSR Platform Cambodia.

The MSP in Pakistan (under the rice value chain programme) is intended to create space for dialogue between various stakeholders of rice production in Muridke district, Punjab, to discuss hurdles and solutions for women and men farmers whereas KSCA in Myanmar is intended to build collective power of local community of Kyauk Phyu to raise their concerns to anticipate the effect of Chinese investment in their area. CSR Platform in Cambodia was established to create space for dialogue and to influence an inclusive and sustainable business practices agenda into corporations/private sector in Cambodia.

These three newly established MSPs are grappling with building their own constituencies, portfolio and identity. There is evidence to suggest a sustainability plan in two of the platforms upon GRAISEA’s departure: the multi-stakeholder platform in Pakistan and the CSR platform in Cambodia. This latter platform has managed to put in place necessary capacity and conditions to create a foothold in the country by consolidating its business identity and governance structure. Field work in Cambodia found evidence that the platform has triggered the interest of other development actors in the country and also to contribute to the continuation of the platform.

A steering committee has been appointed, in which Oxfam and NGOF are members and Transparency International has budgeted for some activities under its Responsible Business Program. At the time of reporting, the platform is in the process of registering itself as a business association to create value to its members and hopefully trigger their active engagement. KSCA in Myanmar is grappling to sustain its activities upon GRAISEA’s departure because of its full dependence upon GRAISEA’s budget to support its activities. KSCA has made a positive contribution to kick off a dialogue with the targeted Chinese investor (CITIC) and used alliance tracking to monitor the strength of its alliance, yet is currently in the painful process of survival.

The CSR Platform in Cambodia reported that it has facilitated relatively successful conferences in which the government representative conveyed strong support. The MSP in Pakistan has taken steps to ensure that the ownership remains with the stakeholder. The platform took division of roles among stakeholders seriously and discussed future collaboration for policy and practice changes on key issues in the Basmati rice value chain, shared knowledge, modern research and technology support from different actors, i.e. private sectors, research institutes, and the university. It has engaged local agriculture line departments for lobbying on issues in the rice value chain.

These reports are indicative of the success of these platforms to serve its purposes, at least during GRAISEA implementation. Some (MSP Pakistan and CSR Platform Cambodia) are likely to be sustainable upon GRAISEA departure while another (KSCA Myanmar) remains fragile.

Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that these platforms, except MSP Pakistan have put in place standards or terms of reference to ensure the adequate presence of women and women’s voice that takes into account women’s interests during the dialogue, consultation or consensus-building processes. It is also worth noting that the interview with the representative of the CSR platform in Cambodia suggests gender is not one of the focus points of the platform, although Oxfam in Cambodia has conducted gender training for them in response to MTE recommendations.

5.6.1 Conclusions on strategy effectiveness

To summarize, evidence of convening MSIs/MSPs strategies suggest positive results in the case of Pakistan and Myanmar. Some MSIs/MSPs (MSP Pakistan and CSR Platform Cambodia) are likely to be sustainable upon GRAISEA departure while another (KSCA Myanmar) remains fragile. However, we found weak evidence for the convening MSIs strategy in the case of CSR Asia. The effectiveness of this strategy contributes to the achievement of Result 2 for Pakistan’s case, Result 3 for CSR Platform Cambodia and a challenge to the achievement of Result 3 for KSCA Myanmar.
5.7 THE DIFFUSION OF GRAISEA’S MESSAGE MECHANISM

Under GRAISEA’s communications strategy, the intended goal is to document learning efficiently, to enhance knowledge-sharing activities and to increase programme and donor awareness and visibility. This goal reflects a self-serving purpose that prioritizes the dissemination of communication products to an internal (GRAISEA) audience. There is evidence that pointed to the dissemination of communication products in events hosted by GRAISEA or partners to outreach private sectors and wider stakeholders that were present. Similarly, GRAISEA partners appreciated the communication products and had helped disseminate the relevant communication products in some events they attended. Yet, no indication has been found to inform the responses of these stakeholders to the communication products they received.

Nonetheless, the amount of communication products and the lengthy process of producing it deserve appreciation given the short time since this function began to support the programme. Although, it is evident not all partners understand the minimum requirements of SIDA visibility strategy.

Due to a limited communications budget (as this function came in response to MTE’s recommendations), GRAISEA’s communications strategy suffers from insufficient research having been done into different communication methods to render communication function a huge success, such as aggressive, integrative and creative strategies or involving private sector social media and brand-ambassadors; as well as awareness campaigns directed at consumers (despite trial and error at country level) and creative exploitation of social media. GRAISEA’s communications strategy focused mainly on a classic donor-and-development-professionals-orientated visibility strategy. The results of our screening suggest that the highest viewed content, by anecdotal scan in Google, is the video from Oxfam in the Philippines, about 1,500 views. Other videos are below 500 views. SIDA Special Review also conveyed similar findings.

Moreover, the process review highlighted that a large number of knowledge products were produced during the programme, for varied purposes. Approximately 78 different knowledge products were produced (or are planned for completion by the end of the programme) across all four results areas. These range from short videos to more in-depth research. It has not been possible to look at how these have been shared and to determine uptake with intended audiences. This concern applies to all interventions within GRAISEA that use research dissemination as a tool for advocacy and influencing. However, it is also important to note that the communications strategy was only completed in September 2017 as a response to MTE recommendations for the optimum results to be observed.

5.7.1 Conclusions on the effectiveness of the strategy

To summarize, analysis of GRAISEA’s strategy to communicate messages to internal and external stakeholders suggests a weak strategy that is lacking clear direction, yet good execution in producing communication products. The future communications strategy should rise beyond traditional donor-and-development-professionals-orientated visibility strategy.
CHAPTER 6: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE, CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL AND THEMATIC SUPPORT), INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND LEARNING

This chapter presents the main findings related to GRAISEA’s programme governance, capacity building, institutional support and learning. The analysis presented on this section is based on the findings from the process review.

Box 17: Main conclusions on governance structure, capacity building (technical and thematic support), institutional support and effective learning

To what extent have programme governance structure, capacity building (technical and thematic support), institutional support and learning effective to help achieve programme results?

• The implementation structure has been acknowledged and perceived to be overly complex for similar size and type of a programme.

• Programme Steering Committee (PSC) could have played a more active role in guiding and steering the Programme Management Unit (PMU) rather than only an accountability role. The Programme Management Unit, key in holding together the different aspects of the programme, but was vastly understaffed for the number of entities (partners and Oxfam country offices) involved in the programme, and given the expectations from the donor.

• Countries and partners appreciated the support Oxfam provided in brokering links with other organisations or offices in the region; face-to-face advisory support; blended forms of support; and the MEL support provided by the MEL officer. Some of the challenges to provision of capacity building support included the assessment of partner needs, and the amount of advisory time available (with some advisers only having 10% to give to GRAISEA) to allow advisers to really understand the programme, country contexts and partner’s needs.

6.1. IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE

The implementation structure has been acknowledged and perceived to be overly complex for similar size and types of programme in the region. GRAISEA assumed Oxfam affiliates, strong country teams and strong local partners would support the implementation throughout to bring the desired results.

However, it poses a risk when Oxfam constantly undergoes structural challenges and had to adjust to the current development landscape by restructuring the organization. This is particularly crucial when implementing a regional (and flagship) programme of the size and scale of GRAISEA. The SIDA Special Review highlighted this issue for further consideration. On the other hand, this finding suggests that risk is inevitable; it has to be carefully registered, monitored and mitigated.
6.2. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The benefits of the GRAISEA multi-country design, and the management structures needed to implement the programme, were thought through and articulated as part of the design process. Based on experience from implementing GRAISEA, it was felt that the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) could have played a more active role in guiding and steering the Programme Management Unit (PMU) rather than taking only an accountability role.

The PMU was key in holding together the different aspects of the programme, but was vastly understaffed for the number of entities (partners and Oxfam country offices) involved in the programme, and given the expectations from the donor. Staff turnover, both at PMU-level and particularly at country level, challenged implementation. The negative effects of staff turnover were likely more pronounced as the complexity of the GRAISEA programme meant it took considerable time for staff to understand the part of the programme they were implementing as well as the wider programme and results they were contributing to.

6.3. CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL AND THEMATIC)

Varied capacity building support was provided to country-offices and partners from technical advisers (including the gender advisers who formed part of the Gender Overview group) and PMU members. Countries and partners appreciated the support Oxfam provided in brokering links with other organizations or offices in the region, face-to-face advisory support, blended forms of support and the MEL support provided by the MEL officer.

Some of the challenges to provision of capacity building support included the assessment of partner needs, and the amount of advisory time available (with some advisers only having 10% to give to GRAISEA) to allow advisers to really understand the programme, country contexts and partners’ needs. In particular, the GOG seemed to lack the coordination and leadership required to proactively identify support needs and deliver these between the four advisers. While new ideas and learning were shared (through workshops, webinars, sharing between countries), partners and country-offices needed more support in identifying how they could be applied to their activities and context.

6.4. LEARNING MODALITIES

The MEL role focused more on donor accountability rather than learning, and adopted a traditional approach of using quantitative indicators to measure change, which did not allow for changes in quality to be monitored and did not necessarily match the nature of the change GRAISEA was aspiring to. The working groups (WGs) and annual face-to-face (F2F) meetings were the main approaches used to encourage learning across the programme in order to improve programme implementation and results.

Both the working groups (WGs) and face to face meetings (F2Fs) were critical in linking different parts of the programme together (and represented the main opportunity for interaction between the partners and country offices) and for building understanding of the wider programme among those implementing different aspects. It took at least a year for the WGs to find their rhythm and the format of a group call (with weak internet connections, only 1–2 hours of time, and a tendency to focus on progress updates rather than learning) limited what the WGs could achieve.

Greater follow-up between calls would have been beneficial to support partners in applying learning and benefiting from the ideas exchanged. Finally, while learning was identified via the WGs and F2Fs the ambitious work plans meant countries and partners were focused on implementing their activities, which challenged the headspace and time people had to consider how learning could be applied to their context.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation concluded that GRAISEA’s main assumption of a win-win-win proposition holds true when key factors are in place to sustain it, and that there were different levels of achievement for the programme’s four results. The evaluation also translated some elements of GRAISEA’s complexity through the identification of strategies within the key programme mechanisms implemented by partners at country and national levels, and showed how these strategies functioned, or failed, in supporting the achievement of the programme’s results based on the empirical findings.

Strategic and direction setting of GRAISEA 1

The link between the design and plan of the country team and partner with the regional design and plan should be improved. Our findings suggest that while the majority of effort on various fronts and at different levels was able to serve its respective goals well, it does not add up into an integral result and interconnectedness between the different components that are mutually enforcing, and as predicted by the Theory of Change (especially Result 1). It does at a micro scale, but is not generally observable for all the components. If an iteration of GRAISEA is to be implemented, designing a programme that features a seamless connection across the different components should be an aim.

Results and the effectiveness of strategies within multiple programme mechanisms at work to generate the desired results

Result 1: Influencing ASEAN and member states

Despite continuous challenges, GRAISEA has tried various ways to influence ASEAN. But there are more avenues to explore, should an iteration of GRAISEA take place. It is important that a substantial adjustment in strategy should also be reflected in the change of indicators, especially in the case of influencing AMAF. GRAISEA has learnt great lessons in influencing ASEAN, particularly that the nature of ASEAN does not, as was assumed by the original proposal, allow for direct engagement. In response, strategy adjustment has been taken by organizing CSOs BHR Caucus that constitutes national CSOs of countries under GRAISEA to enable their participation in ASEAN influencing, as well as a shift to influence ABAC due to persistent challenges to influence AMAF. The fact that the Result 1 indicator to influence AMAF remains unchanged implies that GRAISEA continues to report on and be accountable to this result. Moreover, evidence shows GRAISEA learnt that building constituencies in some member states and engaging relevant ministers to uptake policy recommendations are key to success in influencing ASEAN. Most importantly, it is critical to position GRAISEA’s design (should an iteration takes place) within the spectrum of change processes of influencing ASEAN.

Result 2: Value chain work and market-linkage initiative

Overall, Result 2 has been successfully achieved. The effect of overall value-chain work demonstrated the relevance of piloting market-linkage initiatives with the smallholder farmers’ primary need to increase income. Yet, some elements of the value-chain work strategy need further strengthening. Despite the positive effects of the market-linkage initiative and Result 2 overall, a centralized model of contract farming needs to be closely monitored. It has virtues, but also risks. Analyses of the effectiveness of the contract farming model and building a farmers’ organizations strategy suggests a need to further develop farmers’ organizations’
capacity to have a long-term plan, particularly a transition from conventional/subsistence farming to export-oriented farming that adheres to sustainable agriculture practices and for individual farmers to acquire entrepreneurial skills.

Result 3: Influencing agribusiness corporations/private sectors

a) Influencing corporations takes time. It requires relationship and trust building. Thus, a three-year programme should be well strategized, such as a need to engage the most strategic allies. There is strong evidence to suggest that private sector outreach strategy should be strengthened to engage with only the most strategic companies or multi-stakeholder initiatives and/or other social movements. The strategy should be informed by a proper assessment of the current state of CSR in South-East Asia, and the market structure and corporate structure of each ASEAN member state.

b) The assumption of the effectiveness of indirectly influencing the private sector through multi-stakeholder initiatives as a key strategy to bring about scalable impact needs to be revisited. Consideration of the nature of work and achievements of MSIs should guide all expectations and approaches to any engagement with them. There is evidence of success in incorporating gender responsive/transformational principles into MSIs standards, principles and policies. While this success has opened the door to advance the gender transformation agenda, there is no evidence to suggest the extent to which these principles and standards have demonstrated impact nor is there any reporting system in place to monitor and evaluate success in influencing MSIs, especially when this is expected to bring about scalable impact. Any strategic decision to allocate resources (should an iteration of GRAISEA take place) may need to take into account this consideration. Moreover, recent trends of global corporations moving towards implementing more innovative models of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships to bring about a concrete impact in achieving inclusive and sustainable business practices need also to be considered.

Result 4: Responsible agribusiness investment and new initiatives

GRAISEA is an effective laboratory for partners to test and pilot new models of intervention, as is evident in the case of ISEA and Change Fusion. The GRAISEA presence was timely for ISEA’s intention to develop a gendered benchmark in transformational partnership as well as for Change Fusion to pilot a GIN model. This unintended effect could be an aim of every Oxfam initiative; to foster innovative solutions and community-based innovation, and is worth continuing.

Women’s economic empowerment and gender equality

a) Access to economic opportunity alone does not automatically lead to gender equality. Bringing about Gender Transformation progress requires the influencing of change at individual/agency level and is a political process that may require a long-term shift in organizational thinking. It is evident that women’s economic empowerment could reduce women’s poverty. However, economic empowerment alone does not automatically lead to a reduction in gender inequality within the targeted community and society. While GRAISEA strongly addresses economic aspects, there is a continuous question about how to tackle gender inequality so that the gender dynamic between women and men can be transformed at all levels. While there is evidence of success in influencing the insertion of gender transformative/responsive principles into some international standards (SRP, ASIC, RSPO), and women’s empowerment at individual and collective level, it is worth exploring how companies in the value chain would benefit from involving women (by influencing their business strategy, for example).

b) There is recognition of women’s valuable contribution in the value chain. This is attributed as a unique contribution of GRAISEA. It is evident that all private sector representatives of the rice value chain programme recognize and conveyed this during the field visit, as they witnessed that women contributed significantly to the high quality of rice/paddy production. This opens an opportunity for women to take a quality control/quality assurance role.

c) Stronger coherence between prevailing realities of women’s inequality in selected value chains in 7 countries with the approach used to affect systemic change could be improved. Findings suggest a degree of incoherency between issues that presents barrier to women’s agency in selected value chain and countries. This is partially contributed to by the lack of gender analyses (at regional level and
Cambodia) or gender analysis only being developed after the inception phase (Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Philippines).

d) Reporting on women’s economic empowerment can be improved by tracking the empowerment journey of women and perception of men in their involvement in the programme and interaction with women.

Communications strategy

A good communications strategy needs to arise from a classic donor-and-development-professionals-orientated visibility strategy and has to be adequately budgeted for. The current communications strategy shortcomings are partially contributed to by the inadequacy of budget to allow space for creativity within plans. While internal communication reached its desired results, efforts to strengthen external communication should be improved.

Governance structure, capacity building for partners and learning modalities

Governance structure

a) The implementation structure has been acknowledged and perceived to be overly complex for a similar size and type of programme.

b) The Programme Steering Committee (PSC) could have played a more active role in guiding and steering the Programme Management Unit (PMU) rather than having only an accountability role.

c) The Programme Management Unit was key in holding together the different aspects of the programme, but was vastly understaffed for the number of entities (partners and Oxfam country offices) involved in the programme, and given the expectations from the donor.

Capacity building for implementing partners

Countries and partners appreciated the support Oxfam provided in brokering links with other organizations or offices in the region: face-to-face advisory support, blended forms of support and the MEL support provided by the MEL officer. Some of the challenges in provision of capacity building support included the assessment of partner needs and the amount of advisory time available (with some advisers only having 10% to give to GRAISEA) to allow advisers to really understand the programme, country contexts and partners’ needs.

Learning modalities

a) The MEL role focused more on donor accountability rather than learning, and adopted a traditional approach of using quantitative indicators to measure change, which did not allow for changes in quality to be monitored and did not necessarily match the nature of the change GRAISEA was aspiring to.

b) While learning was identified via the WG and F2F the ambitious work plans meant countries and partners were focused on implementing their activities, which challenged the headspace and time people had to consider how learning could be applied to their context.

7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations fully acknowledge and serve the main purpose of this final evaluation, to provide points of learning and considerations for further programming. Therefore, we offer some strategic recommendations to stimulate Oxfam’s and partners’ ideas when designing and improving their approaches and strategies in an effort to create scalable impact in the lives of women and men smallholders.

Recommendation to improve strategic and direction setting of GRAISEA 2 or future programming

1. Improve the focus of the programme design
GRAISEA, or future similar initiatives, should focus the theory of change into a more streamlined approach to two or three agriculture value chains that are relevant for South-East Asian consumers, brands (SEA or global), and alignment with national governments priorities. This interconnectedness between the three elements mentioned, is necessary in order to gain public attention and constituencies to the issues. It is highly recommended that at least one of the value chains open to or embrace the proposed ideas of change presented in this report.

2. Use the momentum of the SDGs as a strategic entry point for the overall programming

The momentum of the SDGs could be used as an avenue to engage both the private sector and national governments. For the private sector, SDGs have commercial value, whereas national governments are interested in reporting the progress of SDGs at High Level Panel Forums. Engaging with the SDGs implies, (1) clearly indicating which SDG global indicators each component is contributing to; and (2) aligning the contribution of country level outcomes with SDG national level indicators. The SDGs could potentially attract other donors to also invest in any iteration of GRAISEA.

3. Improve due diligence process to sharpen the strategy

There is a need to invest in better capacity for policy, political and stakeholder mappings. Improvement in these aspects may contribute to sensible and well-rounded programme design and adjustment.

Recommendations to improve results and strategies within key programme mechanisms

4. Influencing ASEAN and its respective member states

Strengthen the strategy within the regional influencing mechanism by exploring other avenues to influence ASEAN such as:

a) Objectives that are related to regulation or a regulatory framework are best treated as part of enabling the environment strategy and should be led by national partners and/or a coalition of national partners at ASEAN level. These objectives may involve real political engagement, not only with government officials, but also with political parties and politicians. Having said that, there should be some consideration of the donor’s visibility, as the partners need to be seen as legitimate national interests. Also note these objectives do not need to be accomplished, as they may face challenges, but they need to be in motion.

b) As public outreach is recommended as part of the change objective, be mindful about using “naming and shaming” advocacy tactic. ASEAN ways of diplomacy and culture do not have room for “naming and shaming” for any single entity, be it any of member state or unscrupulous corporations. Similarly, in most ASEAN member states, this tactic is counterproductive.

c) Explore follow-up fully-fledged learning sessions on engaging the private sector and multi-stakeholder initiatives involving staff from Oxfam offices and partners. Sources should not be limited to GRAISEA, but also from other private sector and MSI engagement across affiliates and countries. This also means that global private sector teams, such as Behind the Brands/Barcodes should be involved. Documented discussions and ideas should inform the next cycle of programming.

d) Identify and explore the possibility to engage with the ASEAN policy think tanks.

5. Value chain and market linkage initiative

Strengthen the existing strategies or explore other strategies to bring scalable impact of value chain work through the following:

a) Future design should build the capacity of farmers’ organizations on all fronts and create space for its participations at systemic level (farmers’ organizations network, policy dialogue/forum, local and national government) and strengthen engagement with global value chain. As the farmers and farmer-value organizations become more mature, the programme’s direction ought to shift from
subistence farming to export-orientated farming that adheres to sustainable agriculture practices and for women and men farmers to build their entrepreneurial skills. Future strategy should clearly indicate long-terms plan, steps of transition from subsistence farming to export-orientated farming and a clear exit strategy. Long-term plans may include enabling farmers’ organizations or unions of farmers’ associations to afford organic certification (Cambodia case) and participate to influence MSIs (similar to SPKS case to participate in RSPO meetings). There is the potential to organize and structure farmers’ organizations in ASEAN at the national level to build constituencies and collective voices at national level, to strengthen negotiation positions with the respective government. Furthermore, it is desirable to strengthen engagement and broader opportunities with the global value chain, as it is evident in the case of the rice value chain in Vietnam and Cambodia and the shrimp value chain in Indonesia that this will increase their bargaining power.

b) Add an element of showcasing the benefit companies experience as a result of women’s involvement. The benefits women experience from increased access to resources and economic opportunity are evident throughout GRAISEA. What about adding an element on how companies in the value chain would be similarly benefitted from involving women? There is a significant amount of evidence that good practices of similar type/initiatives have demonstrated positive impact such as initiatives implemented by Agri-focus in some African countries.

c) Register and monitor contract-farming risks and include it in risk management. The contract farming model has potential for contract default and risks. Several circumstances fall under potential contract default such as farmers failing to deliver inputs/services at the agreed time, a company refusing to accept products, a company arbitrarily raising quality standards, etc. These risks have to be monitored and carefully handled.

d) Explore alternative products or suitable crop rotation to reduce the adverse effects of agricultural risks. Although, this might be out of GRAISEA’s focus, it is worth considering that KIs suggest that smallholders in countries evaluated are entangled in debt that perpetuates poverty. In addition, to mitigate the risks of price volatility, hazards, or any other factor leading to crops failure, findings suggest a potential exploration of producing alternative products or crops rotation. This is evident in the case of shrimp farmers in North Kalimantan, Indonesia. Similarly, an interest in taking this step was raised by women farmers in Cambodia. It is important to consider the most strategic pathways to help farmers overcome perpetuating debts they are facing. This may not be the focus of GRAISEA, but to some extent the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in Indonesia has used this approach in GRAISEA and found it to be successful.

e) Explore the potential to endorse the role of women to take a quality-control role in household production. Evidence suggests recognition of women’s important contribution in rice value chain contributes to higher quality of production. This presents an opportunity to explore the possibility for woman to take a quality control/quality assurance role in each value chain.

f) Critical questions to reflect on contract farming to reshape strategy and approaches: “In what ways these models encourage transformational partnership that will contribute to gender transformation progress? In what ways farmers can be better educated to understand the risk and opportunity of these various models? In what ways can a fair contract be pursued – one where farmers are fully aware and capable of making informed decisions when signing the contract? Is there a way they could be given a choice of the type of partnership they embark upon?”

6. Influencing corporations/the private sector

a) Directly influence private sector business strategy to adopt and adhere to inclusive and sustainable business. This corresponds to Recommendations 2b. The strategy could be informed by understanding the institutional dynamics of corporations in each ASEAN member state and business landscape (consumers). The following questions are suggested to guide private sector engagement strategy: ‘What is the corporate structure and market structure in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam? What is the nature of the present government regime and what is their appetite for inclusive and sustainable business? What is the current state of evolution of CSR in South-East Asia?’

b) Explore some potential innovative approaches, for example engagement for start-ups, young entrepreneurs, and business university students combined with experience and knowledge-
sharing from established brands, like the one in Cambodia, are a good start. Inviting influential think tanks from the investment country of origin, as in Myanmar, is also something that can be replicated in other GRAISEA countries. Building alliances with associations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, or, in the case of Indonesia, the national chapter of UN Global Compact, has certain benefits in facilitating easier acceptance from the business community. In addition, apart from engaging think tanks from the investment country of origin, as was done by GRAISEA in Myanmar, future programmes may want to consider engaging embassies from the countries of origin. This should open more windows of opportunity to convey messages to their respective capitals.

c) Explore models of multi-stakeholder partnerships with the private sector. Considerations on influencing MSIs to bring scalable impact ought to be informed by careful assessment to decide the optimal proportion, and resource allocation, between direct private sector engagement and influencing MSIs focus. GRAISEA should aim to report its effectiveness (at least at the outcome level) and to be reflected in programme indicators. The assessment should answer the following questions: ‘Were there other networks competing with either similar initiatives or blocking the initiative? Were there other influencing factors or historical events, such as a changing government landscape or a conflict-taking place? To what extent can compliance of MSI members be monitored, and to what extent do corporations actually change their practices as a result of MSI membership?’

7. Women’s economic empowerment and gender equality

Strengthen and reshape WEE and the diffusion of gender transformative principles to advance the WEE and gender transformative agenda through:

a) Exploring specific private sector areas to pilot gender-sensitive business strategy in which they could experience the benefit of women’s involvement or recognition of women’s critical contribution in their value chain. This type of programme design has demonstrated impact elsewhere.

b) More engagement with men and women’s organizations to build critical awareness of women. Evidence suggests engagement with men, as evident in GALS application, is highly likely to contribute to success. This element should be continued in another iteration of GRAISEA. To explore regional learning forums to scale up GALS at multi-stakeholder level.

c) When possible, engage in participatory action research approaches for gender analysis to identify and monitor key gender transformative indicators. Gender analysis could be used as a basis for reflection and dialogue with programme stakeholders to identify relevant issues for gender transformation, including any policy implication. This gender analysis should inform design and planning throughout the implementation.

d) More stories of women and men’s supporting of gender transformation efforts to be collected to record their journey of empowerment.

e) Monitor the progress of influencing gender transformative principles/policies at regional level.

8. Responsible agribusiness investment and response to new initiatives

Future programming to continue the next stage of implementation of the new models/initiatives being developed under Result 4 (ISEA gendered benchmark, GIN mentorship model) by taking into account all the learning and feedback as these models/initiatives become more mature models and garner their own constituencies, so that nothing is wasted.

Recommendations to improve the communications strategy

1. The communications strategy to rise beyond a classic donor-and-development-professionals-orientated visibility strategy, through:

a) Exploring public outreach objectives in similar programming. GRAISEA or future similar initiatives ought to put the communications strategy at the heart of the community development initiatives, multi-stakeholder initiatives, individual company engagement, CSOs allies and partners, and as well as government institutions.
b) Improving tangible or communicable positive results that contribute to the national or local government priorities. This will provide some protection in facing a more assertive government and a better position in terms of ‘moral authority’ to appeal for reforms.

c) Strengthening investment in social media capabilities. South-East Asian countries are home to hundreds of millions of social media users. Successful public social media campaigning does build constituency, including crowd-sourcing funding opportunities for Oxfam partners. This capability also involves engaging with celebrities and/or social media influencers on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Specific engagements are also needed with social media accounts of companies/brands and related government ministries.

**Recommendations to improve the governance structure, capacity building model for partners and learning modalities**

1. Governance structure

   a) Review the role of the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) to agree if this group primarily focuses on programme governance or if they should provide a wider programmatic steer.

   b) Consider inviting external stakeholders to be part of the PSC, to enable this group to also act as a reference group for the Programme Management Unit (PMU), capacity support for PMU in donor compliance and finance function, adding coordinator roles for each key value chain as well as gender coordinator, and induction materials for new staff.

   c) Greater capacity support for the PMU and other core coordinating functions. It has already been recognized by the MTE that the PMU needs greater capacity in donor compliance and finance function. In addition, build the MEL capacities with the Learning and Evidence Coordinator (scope to include steer, direction, and oversight of learning as well as monitoring), and a MEL Officer (scope similar to current role, with a focus on compiling data from different partners and on building capacity). The structure of the GEM programme could be a good example of how to incorporate learning capacity into the programme management structure (i.e. existence of a learning advisor and MEL advisor as part of the team).

   d) Add coordinator roles in the PMU for key value chains and gender (assuming in the future GRAISEA focuses on fewer value chains and gender remains a core crosscutting aspect to the programme). The coordinator should also have technical expertise allowing them to take on some of the advisory capacity, but still pulling in additional advisory expertise where needed. This will free up the time of the PM to allow the role to focus on more strategic programmatic issues. In this case, GRAISEA is in itself a good example, as the rice value chain coordinator role brought positive outcomes. Secondly, include a gender coordinator role within the PMU. The coordinator should have technical gender expertise (plus the ability to tap into external resources as needed), as well as the coordination skills needed for the role.

   e) Develop GRAISEA induction materials. This could include for example a video, for new staff who join part-way through the programme, to help them get up to speed as quickly as possible. The My Rights My Voice programme is a good example of how to develop tools to facilitate induction.

2. Capacity building for implementing partners

   Strengthen capacity building by adapting partners’ assessment into their respective capacity. Adapt the partner assessment tool for the programme so that it focuses on the specific skills and knowledge that would be needed to implement GRAISEA (technical as well as management), and assess partners based on these. More specific questions should be used to identify gender capacity (training) needs. The coordinators should work with country focal points and partners during inception to proactively plan the capacity support needed. This is a recommendation that is valid not only for GRAISEA, but for all multi-country programmes.

3. Learning modalities

   a) Consider reorganizing the working groups (WGs) so they focus on a particular value chain, each led by one of the PMU coordinators and with the participation of relevant advisers as needed. Giving the responsibility of leading the WGs to a coordinator should enable more follow-ups between WG meetings.
and more support to countries on how they can apply learning in their context. The coordinator could have responsibility to lead on learning for their WG, supported by the Evidence and Learning Coordinator.

b) **Working Groups to consider if a ‘webinar approach’**, where one topic or example is presented and then discussed in depth, would work best, rather than aiming for all participants to share their learning on each call. Oxfam’s Women in Agriculture knowledge hub can offer guidance and expertise on how best to organize this type of learning call.

c) **Build ‘wiggle room’ into plans** to support with adaptive programming and application of learning. This means having budgets and work plans that allow space for new initiatives to be tried. This is a recommendation that is valid not only for GRAISEA, but for all multi-country programmes.
NOTES

1 Social enterprises are social-mission-driven wealth-creating organizations that have a double or triple bottom line (social, financial, environmental), explicitly have as a principal objective poverty reduction/alleviation or improving the quality of life of specific segments of the poor, and have a distributive enterprise philosophy.

2 There is a need to substantiate a claim that suggests a change in an effort to engender the Principles and Criteria of RSPO as the evidence presented through report is rather anecdotal.

3 The qualifier ‘responsible’ is meant to draw attention to the fact that the company or companies are taking action and can, or should, consider the consequences to potentially and actually affect stakeholders before engaging in the action. The word, in a minimal sense, refers to the universal golden rule ‘to avoid doing harm unto others’, and in a maximal sense, to aspiring to ‘the optimal result for the common good’.

4 GRAISEA Final Evaluation Terms of Reference. Available from the author on request.

5 Social enterprises are social-mission-driven wealth-creating organizations that have a double or triple bottom line (social, financial, environmental), explicitly have as principal objective poverty reduction/ alleviation or improving the quality of life of specific segments of the poor, and have a distributive enterprise philosophy.

6 The qualifier ‘responsible’ is meant to draw attention to the fact that the company or companies are taking action and can, should, consider the consequences to potentially and actually affect stakeholders before engaging in the action. The word, in a minimal sense, refers to the universal golden rule ‘to avoid doing harm unto others’, and in a maximal sense, to aspiring to ‘the optimal result for the common good’.

7 Outcome evidencing is an adaptation of outcome harvesting (Wilson-Grau & Britt, 2012), enriched by concepts from Scriven’s (1976) modus operandi method and systems thinking (in particular from agricultural innovation systems thinking, e.g., Brooks & Leovinsohn, 2011). Outcome evidencing is a participatory, theory-based evaluation approach that seeks to identify outcomes resulting from programme implementation fast enough to influence ongoing programme implementation and rigorously enough to make plausible causal claims to substantiate or challenge the overarching programme theory.

8 Contribution analysis attempts to explore and perhaps demonstrate what Hendricks (1996) calls ‘plausible association’: whether ‘a reasonable person, knowing what has occurred in the program and that the intended outcomes actually occurred, agrees that the program contributed to those outcomes.’

9 Process tracing is commonly defined by its ambition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett 2008a. 2008b; Checkel 2008; George and Bennett 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as ‘a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan 1996:52).

10 Blaikie et al. (2017) Research that is framed within a critical realist research paradigm may be considered as comprising seven phases: (1) Describe the phenomenon and a research problem in context; (2) Describe the problem’s key regularity; (3) State the research question; (4) Critically review literature to construct and describe causal mechanism’s structure, content and dynamics; (5) Construct a causal mechanism; (6) Develop and evaluate evidence to qualify the existence of the proposed causal mechanism; (7) Interpret, report and critique the research.

11 A detailed explanation can be found in Annex 3, Inception Report. Available from the author on request.

12 Ibid.

13 Evidence of result is evidence on the occurrence or not of key results (outputs and immediate, intermediate and final outcomes/impacts) and is a first step for analyzing the contribution the programme made to those results. Additionally, there must be evidence that the programme was implemented as planned. Were the activities that were undertaken and the outputs of these activities, the same as those that were set out in the theory of change?

14 Evidence is also needed to demonstrate that the various assumptions in the theory of change are valid, or at least reasonably so. Are there research findings that support the assumptions? Many interventions in the public and not-for-profit sectors have already been evaluated. Mayne and Rist (2006) discuss the growing importance of synthesizing existing information from evaluations and research. Considering and synthesizing evidence on the assumptions underlying the theory of change will either start to confirm or call into question how programme actions are likely to contribute to the expected results.

15 Evidence of other influencing factors is evidence of other significant factors that may have an influence. Possible sources of information for these are other evaluations, research and commentary. What is needed is some idea of how influential these other factors may be.

16 In this level, the analysis: (1) develops the theory of change, and (2) confirms that the expected outputs were delivered.

17 In this level, analysis starts with minimalist analysis and gathers and builds evidence that (1) the expected results in areas of direct influence of the theory of change were observed, and (2) the programme was influential in bringing about those results, taking other influencing factors into consideration.

18 This level extends the analysis into the more challenging area of indirect influence. It measures the intermediate and final outcomes/impacts (or some of them) and gathers evidence that the assumptions (or some of them) in the theory of change in the areas of indirect influence were borne out.


24 GRAISEA proposal, page 6: ‘This programme has been designed to take full advantage of both Oxfam’s and partners’ experiences in the region, including working with ASEAN (primarily the ASEAN Ministerial meeting on Agriculture and Forestry and various ASEAN working groups) to influence the regional operating environment, as well as Oxfam’s expertise in gender equality and women’s economic empowerment to strengthen the individual and collective capacities of women and men smallholders.’

25 Oxfam defines ‘direct beneficiaries’ as the people for whom the project is being undertaken, who are usually regularly engaged in the project activities AND/OR directly benefit from a product or service.

26 GROW GRAISEA Proposal.


28 The source of data is not sex-disaggregated.

29 Source of data is not sex-disaggregated.


31 The qualifier ‘responsible’ is meant to draw attention to the fact that the company or companies are taking action and can, or should, consider the consequences to potentially and actually affect stakeholders before engaging in the action. The word, in a minimal sense, refers to the universal golden rule ‘to avoid doing harm unto others’, and in a maximal sense, to aspiring to ‘the optimal result for the common good’.


33 Sabatier, Paul A. (1999) Theories of the Policy Process, Westview, Boulder, CO. This strategy believes that policy change happens through coordinated activity among a range of individuals with the same core policy beliefs. This strategy works when there is a sympathetic administration in the office (internal champion) or a strong group of allies with a common goal. It is done through several avenues, by influencing like-minded decision makers to make policy changes, creating an issue intensity, affecting public opinion via social/mass media or using research and information exchange to change perceptions.

34 Wright Mills, C. (2000) The Power Elite, new ed., Oxford University, New York, and Domhoff, G. William, The Power Elite and the State: How policy is made in America, Aldine De Gruyter, New York, 1990. This strategy assumes that change happens by maintaining close proximity and work with decision makers/power to influence decision making. This strategy works well when one or more key allies is in place and that the focus of influencing is on incremental policy change. The strategy is done by relationship and communication building with the decision makers and/or being a credible partner to affect the thinking and action of decision makers.

35 Alinsky, Saul D. (1989) Rules for Radicals: A pragmatic primer for realistic radicals, Vintage, New York, and Biklen, Douglas P., Community Organizing Theory and Practice, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1983. This strategy assumes policy change is made through collective action by members of the community who work on changing problems affecting their lives. This strategy works best when an issue directly affects a distinct group of individuals and that the advocacy organization can and is willing to play a convener or capacity builder role rather than the driver role. The strategy is executed by activities such as training, capacity building, community mobilizing, awareness building, action research, policy analysis, media advocacy, whistle blowing, etc. The advocacy efforts are focused on working with the many and the advocacy organization is not the leader, but helps facilitate collective efforts to achieve social change.

36 Baumgartner, Frank R., and Brian Jones, (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. This strategy assumes that significant changes in policy and institutions can occur when the right conditions are in place, like seismic evolutionary shifts. It works best when the primary goal is large-scale policy change. This is executed by issue framing, mobilizing supporters, media advocacy or issue definition and agenda setting to mobilize new people around an issue.

37 This claim needs further substantiation.

38 Source: FGDs at Oxfam in Indonesia office, Jakarta, 11 June 2018, recording.


42 Ibid.

43 Dowd, Liam (2018). Finalists for the international Responsible Business Awards have been revealed. Published on LinkedIn, 19 June 2018.

44 Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. RSPO’s Roadmap Towards Sustainable Palm Oil, op cit.

45 Source: written conversation with key informant.

46 Van Gent, Rudy (2006). Contract Farming. Presented for the FAO. A model wherein contracting company provides support to the production of the crop by smallholder farmers, purchases the crop from the farmers, and then processes, packages and markets the product, thereby tightly controlling its quality. This model has been used in crops such as tobacco, cotton, paprika, sugarcane, banana, coffee, tea, cocoa and rubber. May involve tens of thousands of farmers and the level of involvement of the contracting company in production may vary.

47 Ibid. It is a model wherein individual entrepreneurs or small companies make simple, informal production contracts with farmers on a seasonal basis. Crops usually require only a minimal amount of processing or packaging for resale to the retail trade or local markets.