GOVERNANCE IN ETHIOPIA

Impact evaluation of the African Climate Change and Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) project

Effectiveness Review Series 2016/17

Photo: Women watering crops in Ethiopia. Credit: ACCRA consortium

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• Male and female farmers from Chiro and Akaki woredas in Oromia region for their enthusiastic and inspiring stories of practice and livelihood changes.

ACCRA Ethiopia External Impact Evaluation Team
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<tr>
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACCRA</td>
<td>African Climate Change and Resilience Alliance</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Climate change adaptation</td>
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<td>CCF-E</td>
<td>Climate Change Forum Ethiopia</td>
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<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
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<td>CRGE</td>
<td>Climate Resilient Green Economy</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Climate Smart Initiative</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<td>DRM&amp;A</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Mitigation &amp; Adaptation</td>
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<td>DRMFSS</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Authority</td>
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<td>FTI</td>
<td>Fast Track Investments</td>
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<td>GCF</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GGGI</td>
<td>Global Green Growth Institute</td>
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<td>GoE</td>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>GRAD</td>
<td>Graduation with Resilience to Achieve Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>GTP</td>
<td>Growth and Transformation Plan</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>ILRI</td>
<td>International Livestock Research Institute</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Local adaptive capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment and Forest</td>
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<td>MEFCC</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change</td>
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<td>MoA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<td>MoA&amp;NR</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
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<td>MoFEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>MoFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<td>MoT</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDRMC</td>
<td>National Disaster Risk Management Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NMA</td>
<td>National Meteorological Agency</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OGB</td>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>Programme Partnership Arrangement</td>
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<td>PRIME</td>
<td>Pastoralist Resilience Improvement Through Market Expansion</td>
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<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme</td>
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<td>SLMP</td>
<td>Sustainable Land Management Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of the impact evaluation of the project ‘African Climate Change and Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) in Ethiopia (phase 2)’, which ran from 1 November 2011 to 31 December 2016 as part of the Oxfam GB’s global CHASE Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA4) portfolio. The project was implemented by Oxfam GB (OGB) (Ethiopia), the lead partner of ACCRA in Ethiopia. The evaluation is part of Oxfam GB’s Effectiveness Review series.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

With a total budget of £872,537, the main goal of this project was to promote local adaptive capacity development through advising governance changes at a system level. This goal built on the findings of research conducted in phase 1 of the ACCRA programme, which highlighted that change at a system level is required because the necessary changes to the practice of adaptive capacity development are not actionable by any single organisation or individual acting alone. The adaptation required by development actors is transformational. Ultimately, it was expected that this project would contribute to the greater participation and support of local communities in kebele- and woreda-level decision-making processes, enabling more locally adaptive decision-making in a country that is heavily impacted by climate change.

ACCRA Ethiopia was conceived in 2009, the same year as the ACCRA international consortium. ACCRA Ethiopia comprises four locally based partners: Oxfam Great Britain (OGB; the country lead partner), CARE International, Save the Children, and World Vision. In addition, one of the UK-based partners of the ACCRA international consortium – the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) – has contributed to the work of ACCRA Ethiopia in both phase 1 and phase 2. These consortium partners comprise like-minded organisations, whose combined experience and social capital contribute to the ACCRA programme in Ethiopia. In addition, all four partners also made extensive contributions to development, and in some cases climate related work, outside the ACCRA programme.

According to the ToR the following objectives were agreed for ACCRA phase 2, to be facilitated in each of its three focal countries, including in Ethiopia:

1. Incorporate community-driven adaptive capacity initiatives into local government planning, drawing on the ACCRA phase 1 research results and the Local Adaptive Capacity Framework (LAC), including by capacity building at local (woreda) level.

2. Advise and inform governance processes and policy decisions so they are community-driven, participative, gender-sensitive and enhance adaptive capacity including through research, stakeholder engagement and capacity building.

3. Enhance the capacity of civil society networks through capacity building to support community-driven adaptation planning processes.

4. Support a wider process of learning within the consortium partner organisations and beyond, promoting learning, including through the production and communication of training materials, research outcomes and learning aimed at improving the policy and practice of the participating non-government and government agencies, and their regional and global networks (including the consortium).
EVALUATION DESIGN

As per OGB’s Global Performance Framework, a sample of sufficiently mature projects is randomly selected each year for a rigorous evaluation as part of its Effectiveness Review series. In 2015/16, ACCRA Ethiopia was one of the three projects selected in this way under the ‘Policy Influencing/Advising and Citizen Voice’ (Governance) thematic area.

This review investigates a set of concrete outcomes selected and agreed between ACCRA Ethiopia and the ACCRA International Programme (the labelling of these outcomes reflects their positioning in a (re)constructed theory of change, rather than simply as outcomes 1, 2, 3, etc.). The review also investigates elements within each outcome, labelled 2a, 2b, etc.

Outcome 2: Adaptive capacity building and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach.

Outcome 3: Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity mainstreamed within the Fast Track Investments (FTIs), Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) policies of the Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources (MoA&NR).

Systemic outcome 2: Communities’ voices, priorities and agency taken into account in CRGE planning, reflecting a gender-sensitive and people-centred approach.³

1.1 FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Short commentary</th>
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<tr>
<td>2a. Adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks mainstreamed into national DRR guidelines, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>While the contributions of a diverse mix of government and non-government actors were all necessary to the realisation of the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines (2014/16), thereby shaping a broader systemic approach, the contribution of the ACCRA was of particular significance given its articulation of adaptive capacity within a community-focused and participatory framing, derived from the LAC framework.</td>
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<td>2b. Changes in governance relationships both supporting and reflecting mainstreaming of adaptive capacity thinking into national DRR guidelines and local DRR planning.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The process of strengthening the collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC appears to have been both systemic and nuanced, with several actors, including the World Food Programme and Save the Children (independently from ACCRA) playing a role. Nonetheless, ACCRA appears to have played a key role in brokering a joint understanding between the MEFCC minister and the DRMFSS of the value of collaborating, focusing this on the value of mainstreaming CRGE and DRR together into woreda Annual Development Plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 (Overview). Adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DRR governance is a multifaceted system and there have been several initiatives seeking to mainstream local adaptive capacity thinking and practices within this system. For example, outside the ACCRA consortium, CARE has played a lead role within the PSNP CSI initiative. However, even</td>
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more decentralised and participatory approach.

if ACCRA’s contribution hasn’t been unique, looking across these several initiatives it can be concluded that it has been both significant and necessary, as demonstrated in the evaluation of the two elements above.

3a. Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, mainstreamed within the Fast Track Investments (FTI) of the Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources (MoA&NR).

We found strong evidence that ACCRA made a significant contribution to shaping a FTI programme within MoA, which began to enable a process of adaptive capacity development that was also people-centred and gender-sensitive. Principally, this contribution came through leading on the preceding local CRGE planning pilot and then inputting the resulting guidelines, experience and findings into the shaping of MoA’s FTI proposals. ACCRA’s contribution at the launch workshops for the 27 FTI woreda level processes also appears to have been influential.

3b. Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, are referenced within the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) of the MoA&NR.

The final version of the GTP II includes some requirements for gender-sensitive approaches, but references to local adaptive capacity building are much weaker and more tangential. While the mainstreaming of local CRGE approaches within the MoA’s GTP II could therefore have been more substantial, ACCRA earned a privileged role alongside government to evaluate and strengthen the integration of CRGE in this highly significant strategic context.

3c. Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, are reflected in the Green Climate Fund (GCF) proposal of the MoA&NR.

There is some evidence for the strengthening of climate-informed, woreda-based integrated planning and budgeting systems being included in the GCF proposal. And there is some evidence that ACCRA made a relevant contribution to this proposal, but it appears that stronger contributions came from Oxfam America, Echnoserve, and perhaps also GGGI.

3 (Overview). Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, mainstreamed within the FTI, GTP II and GCF policies of the MoA&NR.

While ACCRA made a significant contribution to at least one, and perhaps two of the elements of this outcome, it is important to see these as nested within a broader, systemic change story, involving many other actors, in both enabling and contributing roles. For the mainstreaming work within the FTI programme, these include not only ministry officials at various levels of governance, but also Echnoserve, CCF-E and possibly also GGGI and ILRI. Other ongoing work within the MoA&NR, including on SLMP and on the CSI project for PSNP, may also have indirectly shaped the thinking and practices of MoA&NR, regional and even woreda officials working on the FTI.

The SLM and CSI/PSNP programmes can also be seen as part of a wider process of systemic change in CRGE governance systems, again contributing towards the strengthening of local adaptive capacities.
Outcome 2: Adaptive capacity building and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach.

ACCRA’s phase 2 strategy in Ethiopia was built on the core assumption that in order to advise government, it would need first to be accepted as a trusted adviser, and that in order to do this, it would need to build long-term partnerships with key government ministries. This in turn led to an approach that focused on specific government programmes – in this case the programme of the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) to integrate disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate adaptation – and on building a relationship with government counterparts by offering to help address specific gaps in these programmes that were related to adaptive capacity and governance. Using this approach ACCRA succeeded in developing a long term, 5-year partnership with the DRMFSS – which later became the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) – enabling it to work through several phases of influencing, advice and capacity building, focusing on a range of governance issues.

Based on the information collected from interviews and from the documents reviewed, we found strong evidence that adaptive capacity thinking/frameworks have been mainstreamed into DRR governance, in terms of policy, tools and local practices. Supporting these changes, we also found changes in governance relationships, including changes both in horizontal (e.g. collaboration between ministries, and between government and NGOs) and vertical relationships (i.e. between different levels of governance). While recognising that all these elements together comprise the full systemic nature of DRR governance outcome 2, for practical reasons we chose to focus on two of these elements – the national Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines, and collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MEFCC) on joint CRGE/DRR planning.

Regarding the first of these elements, we found that while the contributions of a diverse mix of government and non-government actors were all necessary to the realisation of the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines, the contribution of ACCRA was of particular significance given its articulation of adaptive capacity within a community-focused and participatory framing, derived from the LAC framework. It appears that the success of ACCRA in this context was due partly to the close match between the broad policy framework of the DRMFSS and the objectives of ACCRA, and partly because ACCRA was trusted by the DRMFSS to be able to develop an appropriate and effective response, based on the new thinking on adaptive capacity highlighted in its phase 1 research. This meant that ACCRA was able to move quickly and to make a leading methodological contribution to the development of step 2 within the woreda DRM/A planning guidelines – disaster risk analysis – introducing an adaptive capacity assessment approach structured directly around each of the five categories of
the LAC Framework – which in turn requires a community-focused, participatory approach. And while ACCRA worked collaboratively with Bahir Dar University to develop this methodological framework, and on its testing in two pilot woredas, the significance of the ACCRA contribution clearly lies in the way it was able to base this framework on the LAC framework.

Regarding the process of strengthening the collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC, this appears to have been both systemic and nuanced, with several actors, including the World Food Programme and Save the Children (independently from ACCRA), playing a role. Nonetheless, ACCRA appears to have played a key role in brokering a joint understanding between the MEFCC minister and the DRMFSS of the value of collaborating, focusing this on the value of mainstreaming CRGE and DRR together into woreda Annual Development Plans.

In summary, while DRR governance is a multifaceted system, and within it we found evidence of several initiatives seeking to mainstream local adaptive capacity thinking and practices into this system, our analysis of the evidence points to the significance of ACCRA’s contribution, as demonstrated in the two elements we evaluated. ACCRA’s contribution is not unique and distinct, in that other actors have also made significant contributions, for example CARE in its lead role within the Climate Smart Initiative (CSI) of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). It can nonetheless be argued that ACCRA’s contribution was highly significant and necessary, and that without ACCRA’s contribution, the observed outcomes would most likely not have materialised in the way they did.

Outcome 3: Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, mainstreamed within the FTIs, GTP II and GCF policies of the MoA&NR.

Outcome 3 was aligned with a second area of activity where significant developments in the governance of adaptive capacity took place during ACCRA phase 2, namely the government of Ethiopia’s (GoE) cross-cutting Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) initiative. CRGE was championed by a CRGE Facility comprising the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) – subsequently upgraded to a ministry (MEF, later renamed MEFCC) – and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED, later renamed MoFEC), with CRGE strategies developed across a number of ministries. Outcome 3 is associated with the development of CRGE governance within the Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources (MoA&NR) and focuses on three elements within this – the mainstreaming of local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, within the Fast Track Investments (FTIs) programme, the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) proposal of the MoA&NR.

This evaluation found strong evidence that the FTI programme within the MoA&NR began to enable a process of adaptive capacity development that was also people-centred and gender-sensitive, and that associated with this, ACCRA made a significant contribution. Principally this contribution came through ACCRA leading on the preceding local CRGE planning pilot and then inputting the resulting guidelines, experience and findings into the shaping of MoA’s FTI proposals. There was also evidence that ACCRA’s contribution at the launch workshops for the ensuing 27 FTI woreda-level processes was influential.

Secondly, there was evidence that ACCRA positioned itself well to support the MoA&NR’s ability to mainstream local CRGE approaches within the ministry’s GTP II, with ACCRA earning a privileged role alongside government to evaluate and strengthen the integration of CRGE in this highly significant strategic context. At the same time, while the final version of the GTP II includes some requirements for gender-sensitive approaches, references to local adaptive capacity building are much weaker and more tangential, suggesting the limits of ACCRA’s advisory position.
Thirdly, there is clear evidence that the MoA&NR’s GCF proposal included some references to climate-informed, woreda-based integrated planning and budgeting systems, but these were somewhat insubstantial. Furthermore, although ACCRA may have also played a relevant role, it appears that these references were introduced primarily by Oxfam America, Echnoserve, and perhaps also GGGI Ethiopia. The reason for this is that the weight that these three organisations had in this process was stronger than ACCRA’s, although for different reasons in each case. For example, Echnoserve already played a lead role in writing the MoA&NR’s GCF proposal, while GGGI Ethiopia had played a substantial role in helping to shape the MoA&NR agenda for several years.

Finally, it is noted within the evaluation of outcome 3 that while ACCRA made a significant contribution to at least one, and perhaps two of the elements of this outcome, it is important to see these as nested within a broader, systemic change story, involving many other actors, in both enabling and contributing roles. For the mainstreaming work within the MoA&NR’s FTI programme these include not only ministry officials at various levels of governance, but also Echnoserve, the Climate Change Forum of Ethiopia (CCF-E) and possibly also the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). Other ongoing work within the MoA&NR, including on the Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP) and on the CSI project for the PSNP, and again led by other actors, may also have indirectly shaped the thinking and practices of the MoA&NR, regional and even woreda officials working on the FTI.

Finally, taking an even broader perspective, the SLM and CSI/PSNP programmes can also be seen as part of a wider process of systemic change in the MoA&NR’s CRGE governance systems, which contributes to the strengthening of local adaptive capacities.

Systemic outcome 2: Communities’ voices, priorities and agency taken into account in CRGE planning, reflecting a gender-sensitive and people-centred approach.

Given the resource-intensive nature of the investigation of outcomes 2 and 3, this broader systemic outcome – based on outcomes across programmes under several ministries – was not investigated separately. However, there is extensive discussion of the systemic nature of governance transformations in Ethiopia, including this and broader systemic impacts, both under outcomes 2 and 3, and in the final section of the report (section 8) on ‘programme learning considerations’.

1.2 PROGRAMME LEARNING CONSIDERATIONS

After careful analysis of the available evidence, and subsequent reflection on the findings, the following programme learning considerations emerge. These are intended to provide a basis for further discussion and reflection, and inform current and future programming.

• A unique INGO/alliance role in Ethiopia. ACCRA Ethiopia has carved out a key niche for itself in Ethiopia’s CRGE landscape – it has developed a relatively unique role as a ‘trusted adviser’ embedded in three core ministries (MEFCC, MoA&NR and NDRMC). This role enables ACCRA to be recognised alongside other trusted advisers with a considerably larger funding/technical base – principally GGGI but also some of the large donor programmes (e.g. World Food Programme; World Bank; UNDP) which include embedded advisers. It is unique in Ethiopia for an INGO/alliance to play such a role.
• **ACCRA’s core niche in the resilience landscape.** Within Ethiopia’s unique CRGE landscape ACCRA’s core niche revolves around the CR (resilience) theme in particular, with a special focus on adaptive capacity (drawing on the five dimensions set out in the LAC framework), but ACCRA is also seen as able to bridge CR, GE and economic development and some of the trade-offs involved.
  
  o ACCRA has been able to differentiate itself from ‘trusted adviser’ organisations with a larger funding base, such as GGGI, by building key relationships with ministries where GGGI has less influence/been less successful (MoA&NR, NDRMC) and by focusing on different issues from GGGI within MEFCC (where the GGGI focus is on forestry). GGGI is stronger on traditional research-based advice, whereas ACCRA’s strength lies in its unique combination of strategies.

• **Building trust with government departments.** Trust by these government departments in ACCRA is based on the mix of technical competence, thought leadership, soft skills (especially ‘bridging’ skills), responsiveness (understanding of ministry ‘gaps’) and long-term relationship building/commitment that ACCRA is able to offer.

• **ACCRA’s innovative approaches.**
  
  o ACCRA has been able to pioneer a more participatory, gender-sensitive approach to CRGE/adaptive capacity governance within each of its focal ministries (MEFCC, MoA&NR and NDRMC) and this is reflected in a number of these ministries’ pilots, programmes, guidelines and policies. ACCRA’s contribution to these outcomes has, in several cases, been significant, when viewed alongside the contribution of other actors.

  o ACCRA has made a key contribution in the area of governance, recognising both the systemic nature of governance relationships (involving both horizontal and vertical coordination) and their impact on local adaptive capacity, where there is a significant need for governance relationships to become more flexible and more enabling. ACCRA has proven its unique ability as a ‘systemic intermediary’ in transforming governance relationships, for example, successfully building bridges between its three focal ministries where in the past there has been poor coordination (e.g. between MEFCC and NDRMC). This has led to more joined-up programmes on the ground (e.g. mainstreaming DRR into woreda annual development plans).

  o At a local level, these governance transformations are reflected most clearly in the local CRGE planning approach pioneered by ACCRA through the woreda CRGE pilots (2012–2014) and then upscaled through the Fast Track Initiatives of the MoA&NR in 27 woredas (2014–2016). These achievements have highlighted the benefits both of improved departmental collaboration within woreda administration and more genuinely participatory planning and implementation through engagement with (gender-sensitive) community priorities and empowerment.

• **ACCRA’s broader contributions.**

  o **In Ethiopia.** These pilot examples represent a step forward from the participatory culture of previous (and ongoing) large-scale programmes, such as the SLM and PSNP programmes of MoA&NR. They offer to the GoE, if it can successfully navigate through its current democratic crisis, a potential future trajectory for local development pathways that are more context-specific, demonstrate higher community ownership, and are potentially more innovative, as well as strengthening local adaptive capacity and building resilience into local rural livelihoods.

  o **Supporting the GoE.** Part of the strength of the ACCRA ‘brand’ for its government partners is that ACCRA is a coalition of INGOs (rather than Oxfam on its own), enabling broader learning between ministries and INGOs through the ACCRA steering committee. Funding limits within ACCRA phase 2 meant, however, that the other INGO partners played a limited role; this could be addressed in a future phase of ACCRA if the role and contribution of other partners was strengthened. For example, drawing on CARE’s expertise in the area of adaptive capacity development (as exemplified not only through its leadership of the PSNP CSI, but also in other programmes, such as GRAD and
PRIME® could lead to a strengthening of CARE’s offering, and other partners could also add value based on their different strengths, analysis and positioning within Ethiopia’s CRGE landscape.

- In Oxfam. Ethiopia’s ACCRA programme represents a new kind of investment for Oxfam Ethiopia. It combines traditional Oxfam priorities (focus on the poor, participatory approaches, gender, policy influencing) with new themes and approaches (governance transformation, a sophisticated analysis/approach to adaptive capacity, and multiple strategies combining policy advice, soft influencing, capacity building, action researching and research).

- **Options for future development.** The political capital, trust and advice embedded in ACCRA (through the key ministries of MEFCC, MoA&NR and NDRMC), and the convening power of systemic intermediation which this can access, highlight the value of continuing investment in this coalition and brand. Options for future development should be carefully weighed in the light of this evaluation, taking into account of the following set of interrelated considerations:
  - The opportunity for further development of the core ACCRA themes and approaches (governance, adaptive capacity, mix of strategies) within Oxfam Ethiopia, ‘mainstreaming’ these into other Oxfam Ethiopia programmes
  - The value of further development/expansion/ and/or transformation of the ACCRA Ethiopia INGO alliance, through careful consideration of the current and evolving landscape of the GoE’s GTP II, and strategic analysis of the value added by each consortium partner
  - The ongoing contribution of ACCRA Ethiopia to any future international ACCRA programme and alliance, recognising the added value that this brings in terms of south–south partnership and learning, and south–north partnership, learning and funding opportunities.

These learning considerations point to the richness of insights that can be gleaned from careful analysis and reflection on an innovative programme of this nature.
2 INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of the impact review of the project ‘African Climate Change and Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) in Ethiopia (phase 2)’, which ran from 1 November 2011 to 31 December 2016 as part of the Oxfam GB’s global CHASE Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA4) portfolio. The project was implemented by Oxfam GB (OGB) (Ethiopia), the lead partner of ACCRA in Ethiopia.

Each year, as part of its Global Performance Framework, OGB selects a random sample of sufficiently mature projects for a rigorous effectiveness review. Twelve projects are selected each year – three from each of four thematic areas.\(^\text{10}\) For 2015/16, ACCRA was one of the three projects selected from a total of 45 projects conducted under the governance thematic area to date.

With a total budget of £872,537, the main goal of ACCRA Ethiopia phase 2 was to promote local adaptive capacity development through advising governance changes at a system level. This goal built on the findings of research conducted in phase 1 of the ACCRA programme, which highlighted that change at a system level is required because the necessary changes to the practice of adaptive capacity development are not actionable by any single organisation or individual acting alone. The adaptation required by development actors is transformational. Ultimately, it was expected that this project would contribute to the greater participation and influence of local communities in kebele- and woreda-level decision-making processes, enabling more locally adaptive decision making in a country that is heavily impacted by climate change.

This report will assess the project’s effectiveness in supporting three outcomes selected and agreed between ACCRA Ethiopia and the ACCRA International Programme. This analysis is shaped primarily by a predefined protocol, Process Tracing, a qualitative research method that is particularly useful in inferring causal relationships. The targeted outcomes are as follows. Note that the outcomes are labelled as shown in the order shown in the (re)constructed theory of change in section 5.2, rather than simply as outcomes 1, 2, 3.

**Outcome 2**: Adaptive capacity building and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach.

**Outcome 3**: Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, mainstreamed within the Fast Track Investments (FTIs), Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) policies of the Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources (MoA&NR).

**Systemic Outcome 2**: Communities’ voices, priorities and agency taken into account in CRGE planning, reflecting a gender-sensitive and people-centred approach.
3 EVALUATION DESIGN

The design of this impact evaluation was part of a wider evaluation process covering the ACCRA phase 2 programme in Uganda and Mozambique, as well as Ethiopia. This wider evaluation process was designed to answer a number of evaluation questions, including ‘understanding the story of change’ of ACCRA phase 2 at both international and country levels.

“We want [to use] stories as evidence, helping us to see and understand trajectories of change. In particular, how can we capture the governance system change approach to adaptive capacity development and resilience building?”

Helen Jeans, Head of Agriculture and Natural Resources Unit, Oxfam GB, 2013–present

The scope of these (combined) evaluations focuses on ACCRA’s aim to ‘transform governance systems in order for them to support adaptive capacity development, and also become more gender-sensitive and people centred’,12 with the overall aim ‘to learn more about what ACCRA has achieved, the effectiveness of its partnership model, and what ACCRA needs to keep and needs to change to achieve its next level of ambition’.13

“It is important for us to ask hard questions of ourselves. Where did we add value? How confident can we be of our achievements? What can we do differently in future?”

Margaret Barthaihi, ACCRA International Coordinator, 2015–present

This impact evaluation is set within this broader evaluation process and seeks to ‘tell the story’ of ACCRA Ethiopia phase 2 while also responding to the requirements and focus of Oxfam GB’s Effectiveness Review process. For the latter, key evaluation issues include the following:15

‘… credible evidence which helps us to cast light on whether our assumptions held, is ACCRA working (or not) in the way we expected, can we understand the mechanisms that underpinned this programme? I am very excited to learn more about this.’

Marta Arranz, Senior Adviser, PMEL-Influencing, Oxfam GB, 2015–present

‘It is important that we ask what evidence would we expect to find if change happened in the ways we predicted, and did we see it? ACCRA has been working in complex situations, and we want to try to understand how change happened; not simply validate our Theory of Change. What outcomes/impacts have actually materialised? Is there evidence that we contributed? and what can we learn about the significance of our contribution?’

Claire Hutchings, Head of Programme Quality, Oxfam GB, 2014–present

The methodology introduced here draws on the Oxfam GB process tracing protocol, but seeks to adapt this as appropriate given:

• the focus on processes of governance transformation, a new and expanded focus from previous traditions of policy advocacy within Oxfam GB;

• the complexity of the ACCRA programme design and its implementation;16

• an interest by Oxfam GB through this evaluation to experiment with a multi-method approach, which draws on process tracing, but also on systemic approaches to evaluation, including learning history.17

Overall, this impact evaluation focuses on three key questions:

• What evidence is there for the intended transformation (of governance systems in Ethiopia in order for them to support climate adaptive capacity development, and also become more gender-sensitive and people centred)?

• What evidence is there for a contribution to this transformation, if any, by ACCRA?
• How significant is this contribution, compared with other possible contributing factors?

3.1 PROCESS TRACING

Process tracing is a methodology that has been adopted by OGB’s Global Performance Framework since 2012 to support impact evaluations under the Policy Advising and Citizen’s Voice thematic area.18 Process tracing is a qualitative method that seeks to evaluate impact through establishing confidence in how and why an intervention worked and for whom.19 A distinctive feature of process tracing is that it draws on a generative framework20 to provide a detailed description of a causal mechanism that led to a specific effect, and by doing so demonstrate the causal relation.21 Guidance was developed by OGB in 2013 to set out their process tracing approach.22

As set out in the OGB guidance, in process tracing the purpose of the evaluation is not simply to focus in on only one explanation for an observed outcome-level change. Rather, the approach is more nuanced and should accomplish three things: 1) shortlist one or more evidenced explanations for the outcome in question; 2) rule out alternative, competing explanations incompatible with the evidence; and 3) if more than one explanation is supported by the evidence, estimate the level of advisory each has had on bringing about the change in question.23

While not intended to be a mechanical sequence of linear steps of how the research exercise should proceed, the following eight steps form the core of the OGB process tracing protocol.

1. Undertake a process of (re)constructing the intervention’s theory of change, in order to clearly define the intervention being evaluated – what is it trying to change (outcomes), how is it working to effect these changes (strategies/streams of activities) and what assumptions is it making about how it will contribute to these changes (key assumptions).
2. Work with relevant stakeholders to identify up to three intermediate and/or final outcomes considered by stakeholders to be the most significant for the evaluation to focus on (central to the intervention’s theory of change, and useful for learning/forward planning).
3. Systematically assess and document what was done under the intervention to achieve the selected targeted outcomes.
4. Identify and evidence the extent to which the selected outcomes have actually materialised, as well as any relevant unintended outcomes.
5. Undertake ‘process induction’ to identify salient plausible causal explanations for the evidenced outcomes.
6. Gather required data and use ‘process verification’ to assess the extent to which each of the explanations identified in Step 5 are supported or not supported by the available evidence.
7. Write a narrative analytical report to document the above research processes and findings.
8. Summarise aspects of the above narrative analysis by allocating project/campaign ‘contribution scores’ for each of the targeted and/or associated outcomes.

Strengths of the process tracing approach are that it offers a rigorous approach to assessing causal change, and the potential for examining causality in programmes where attribution is difficult, by providing evidence on how and why an intervention led to change.24 However there are limitations to this approach that must also be taken into account, in that there is less under the control of the evaluator, resulting in a process which is more unpredictable and context dependant. As a result, in spite of best efforts by the evaluation team, results might still be inconclusive if the evidence collected cannot fully support a causal sequence. To thoroughly test alternative hypotheses, the evaluator needs to have access to a range of stakeholders and to published and unpublished material.25
3.2 SUPPORTING METHODOLOGIES

Given the complexity of the ACCRA programme design and its implementation, and the interest by Oxfam GB through this evaluation to experiment with a multi-method approach, the process tracing approach was complemented by drawing also on systemic approaches to evaluation, including learning history.

3.2.1 Systemic approaches to evaluation

‘ACCRA is difficult to think about. It is very complex. It has many different parts. But when you think about it, you learn a lot. You see how it fits together, how it touches many parts.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator (previously ACCRA Technical Adviser), 2012

Recognising the complexity of the ACCRA project in Ethiopia, in particular given its focus on the transformation of governance relationships, and the many interdependencies, uncertainties and potential conflicts involved, a second methodology we bring to this evaluation draws on systemic thinking and practice. While systems thinking is relatively new to the field of evaluation, it offers a way of thinking about the world that is well suited for complex situations, as it encourages a focus on the dynamic inter-relationships between components that make up a complex situation; on the different perspectives and framings that different stakeholders bring to that situation; and on the different ways in which the situation is boundaryed, including through the different values brought by different stakeholders. In this evaluation we have drawn on systems thinking to alert us to the dynamic nature of inter-relationships addressed in the theory of change, and to the different perspectives, framings and values applied by different stakeholders to the ACCRA process.

Linked to this systems perspective, we drew on a recent framework developed by Adinda Van Hemelrijk and Irene Guijt to help shape the evaluation design. This framework enables exploration of the trade-offs between rigour, inclusiveness, and feasibility and is useful because it focuses on the impact evaluation of complex programmes. We drew on this framework in the evaluation design to help us to find an appropriate balance between ensuring ownership of the evaluation methodology, and value for money of design options (rigour and inclusiveness vs. feasibility); and degree and diversity of participation in sense-making (inclusiveness vs. rigour and feasibility).

Systems thinking also draws our attention to the different types of learning that can be generated in an evaluation. In simple situations the main focus of learning is on the relationship between cause and effect – are actors doing things right, and if not, how can they improve on what they are currently doing? In complicated situations, an evaluation can help to focus learning not only on whether actors are doing things right, but also on whether they are doing the right things given the contexts in which they are operating. This kind of ‘double loop’ learning draws attention to different perspectives on and framings of a situation, encouraging actors to question their original purpose and goals.

Evaluation for complex situations enables reflection on the learning approaches taken within an intervention and to explore what is working about these learning practices and how actors might want to progress these in future. This type of ‘learning about learning’ is sometimes called ‘triple loop learning’. In this evaluation the focus was on (re)constructing ACCRA Ethiopia’s Theory of Change as a means to support triple loop learning among the ACCRA Ethiopia and international teams.

Finally, systems thinking and practice focus on emergence (both analysing emergent patterns and seeking evidence to explain them). In an evaluation context, this is particularly relevant to complexity as it can alert us to the following:
• Emergent short- and long-term outcomes of an intervention.
• Emergent organisations or institutional arrangements working together in flexible ways, alongside specific organisations with formalised requirements.
• Ongoing adaptation to emerging conditions – an intervention that is itself adaptive and responsive.
• An intervention that works in ways which are only evident in retrospect – for example because there is an emergent relationship between effort and results, or because there are unintended outcomes which cannot be anticipated, but only identified and addressed as they emerge, or in retrospect.  

This evaluation drew on systemic perspectives on learning and emergence in seeking to understand causality and contribution, in opening up opportunities for triple-loop learning, and in creating space for adaptation and emergence within the evaluation process itself.

3.3.2 Learning history

Learning history is an action research approach to learning, with a focus on finding out ‘what it was really like’ for people involved in an initiative or programme. The idea is that we learn best from the messy on-the-ground realities, and by getting below the surface and into some of the more hidden aspects of what makes particular initiatives more successful than others.

The output is typically a written learning history that tells the story by drawing on direct quotes from those involved and combining these perspectives with reflections, analysis and questions from a researcher. Rather than being narrated as a cleaned-up account or well-honed case study, which can often come across as de-contextualised and rather dry, learning history instead offers an engaging approach to learning that is generally enjoyable and thought-provoking for those involved.

‘A good story and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds. Both can be used as a means for convincing another, yet what they convince is fundamentally different: arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness.’

Jerome Bruner, 1988

A learning history is also a systemic process in that it engages a range of stakeholder voices, bringing different perspectives on the delivery of a programme. By reflecting and sense making to learn from their experience, a learning history has the benefit of generating learning amongst these programme stakeholders, as well as for other audiences. The different insights and perspectives are brought together into a story told through multiple narratives, with illustrations and reflections on strategies, noticeable results, tensions and complexities, what happened and why. These narratives are intended not only to engage the audience, but also to stimulate a personal response from the reader/listener. This can be particularly useful in learning about complex endeavours, where it is the finer details of human endeavour that make the difference between something being remembered and taken up and something that is easily forgotten.

In this evaluation, we drew on some of these principles of the learning history approach to embed multiple and diverse reflections from the full range of stakeholders interviewed into our process tracing analysis, thereby seeking to interweave story and analysis, and multiple voices with primary lines of evidence, in an effort to match the systemic nature of the situation we were evaluating.
3.3 EVALUATION PROCESS AND ASSOCIATED METHODS

The evaluation took place between 31 August and 23 December 2016 and comprised four main stages: scoping; field work; analysis, synthesis and report writing; and sharing of evaluation findings, feedback and collective learning in ACCRA.

The **scoping** stage included Skype calls with the ACCRA country coordinator, the international ACCRA coordinator and the Oxfam team in the UK as the lead international partner, followed by an inception meeting in the UK. This resulted in the production, review and approval of an inception report, which guided the subsequent evaluation focus – on both learning and accountability – and processes. The primary audiences of the evaluation were identified as: (a) the inclusive ACCRA team (comprising the programme steering committee, the programme level team and the ACCRA Ethiopia team); (b) the Oxfam evaluation team; and (c) the broader international peer community of Oxfam GB.

The **field work** stage primarily comprised: key informant interviews, evaluation meetings and workshops, and document analysis, undertaken during two field trips to Ethiopia, the first from 20–23 September 2016 and the second from 7–18 November. Key informant interviewees were identified at different levels and interviews held with them to obtain ACCRA programme information, experiences and perspectives according to the respective roles of the individuals. Selection of interviewees was guided by the Van Hemelrijk–Guijt framework and designed to ensure both breadth (inclusiveness) of voices as well as depth (rigour) around key change processes, within an overall envelope of time, resources and availability (feasibility). The first field visit concentrated on the breadth of voices whereas in the second field visit selection was shaped by a focus on outcomes 2 and 3 and systemic outcome 2, and the need for more in-depth probing into particular issues. The full list of key informants is given in Appendix 1. Three evaluation workshops were also held, the first with the ACCRA Ethiopia team, the second with members of government (federal, provincial and woreda-level), CSOs and the ACCRA team, and the third in the Yabdo Shembako kebele, Chiro woreda. During the second workshop, group-based work was used to ensure that each participant's voice was heard while the plenary session and subsequent discussions provided some of the necessary cross-checking of statements, as well as highlighting differences in experience and perspective.

Document analysis formed an important part of the evaluation resources and was used to reveal and reconstruct the ACCRA Ethiopia theory of change, as well as triangulate with findings from the evaluation workshops and interviews. In addition, documents from ACCRA, its government partners and international stakeholders provided an important context for the evaluation, especially given its systemic thrust. Beyond these kinds of documents, we drew on a variety of documents that provided the necessary conceptual and theoretical framing. We also drew on earlier analysis and documents that we gathered in 2015 for learning history work commissioned by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) Ethiopia and DFID Ethiopia. The full list of documents reviewed is at Appendix 2. The data-generation process was punctuated by regular reflection meetings within the external evaluation team, and between this team and the client.

Consistent with the objective of ACCRA to use evaluations as learning processes and products, the final stage of the evaluation focused on sharing evaluation findings (including learning considerations) and recommendations to stimulate further learning within ACCRA. The process comprised sharing the draft Ethiopia impact evaluation with ACCRA consortium partners at country and international levels and presenting them during a learning workshop held in London on 15 December 2016. This culminated in the finalisation of this report.
3.4 VALIDITY OF FINDINGS

We ensured validity of evaluation findings by *triangulating* through employing a range of data generation *methods* and *sources*: document analysis, in-depth interviews, sense-making meetings with ACCRA consortium partners and staff, workshop meetings with ACCRA Ethiopia stakeholders, and an international feedback and learning workshop. Secondly, we used *inductive and abductive analyses* to make sense of data drawing on several theories and concepts that enable working with complexity in learning oriented evaluations. *Data interpretation* was also theory-informed and drew on the experiences of the evaluators using *retroductive analysis*. Potential biases in analysis were managed and curtailed through the use of feedback processes that involved country stakeholders and international ACCRA Consortium partners in the UK. Finally, we enhanced the validity of our findings through holding an *inception meeting* with the client to develop a common understanding of the assignment and establishing and utilising a *client-evaluators’ reflection and feedback platform* through which we shared progress, methodological reflections and made changes that grew out of field-based experiences.

One particular issue of external validity that arose in the course of the evaluation concerned the selection of local case studies to enable comparison of Fast Track Investment (FTI) initiatives in a number of different woredas relevant to the contribution analysis of outcome 3 (section 7). Broadly, we were keen to compare:

- FTI woredas where ACCRA had previously supported a pilot local CRGE planning process, resulting in local CRGE investment plans (4 out of 27 woredas);
- FTI woredas that were new to the local CRGE planning process, and where ACCRA had less direct involvement (23 out of 27 woredas).

We took a number of issues into consideration (e.g. time spent on local case studies vs time spent on other interviews relevant to outcome 3; time spent on evaluating outcome 3 vs time spent on evaluating outcome 2) in selecting the number of case studies for evaluation. Guided also by the Van Hemelrijck–Guijt framework, we selected two case studies, one from each of the above categories (Chiro woreda in Oromia province in the first category and Akaki woreda in Oromia province in the second category). The selected woredas were chosen on a highly pragmatic basis (geographical proximity to Addis, and hence less travel time). We were also influenced by the arguments of Woolcock (2013) in support of our choice of a smaller number of in-depth local case studies to support our work on process tracing and drawing out of causal inferences. While we were aware of the differences in weighting that this choice represented (¼ of woredas falling into the first category, compared to 1/23rd of woredas falling into the second category) this didn’t bias the analysis as we were simply comparing one example of each category.

3.5 A CULTURALLY AND POLITICALLY APPROPRIATE AND EMERGENT APPROACH

Rather than discussing what are often referred to as the ‘limitations’ of a study, we prefer to conclude this section on the evaluation design with a more appreciative reflection on the need to work ethically with complex cultural and political realities, and on the emergent features of design that flow from this.

Culturally, our experience was that building relationships was key to this evaluation, and this takes time and trust. It meant, for example, that we could not quickly map the ACCRA causal story and competing hypotheses, and then select relevant sources of evidence (stakeholders...
and documents who can provide that evidence), as these often only emerge slowly. Instead, our approach was as much about taking time to develop particular relationships (especially with the ACCRA team); to work through extended relational capital (e.g. through the ACCRA team’s networks) and, where possible, draw on earlier relational capital (e.g. working with previously established networks, for example within DFID and GGGI) as it was about trying to quickly generate an appropriate broad and diverse sample of stakeholders to interview and documents to review.

It was also vital that we worked creatively within current political realities. This included the fact that the Ethiopian government had placed the country in a state of emergency throughout much of the period of the evaluation, leading, for example, to the replacement of many ministerial positions at federal and regional levels. This in turn meant that there were potentially significant sensitivities around questions pertaining to the ‘transformation of governance systems in Ethiopia in order for them to support climate adaptive capacity development…’ This in turn raised ethical and systemic issues (‘whose evaluation is this?’) around the fact the evaluation is necessarily politically situated in an Ethiopian context, as well as addressing learning and accountability priorities under OGB’s Global Performance Framework. The need for this kind of political sensibility is recognised within OGB process tracing protocol. 37

Finally, the fact that there were so many unknowns in the early stages of the evaluation – and even until quite late on in the evaluation process – with new insights and understanding constantly emerging, required us to combine a linear/planned approach with an emergent approach to design. In particular, this required us to working iteratively and emergently across all eight steps of OGB’s process tracing approach, rather than purely sequentially.
4 THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE IN ETHIOPIA

With over 80 million inhabitants, Ethiopia is the second most populous country and the fifth-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ethiopian economy has experienced strong economic growth in recent years, with real GDP growth at, or near, double-digit levels since 2003/04, which surpasses most other countries in Africa.

That said, the country still has a low HDI, ranking 174 out of 187 countries. Furthermore, Ethiopia lies at the heart of an unstable region that has experienced almost continuous conflict and environmental shocks in recent decades. Despite recent progress, Ethiopia remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with around 25 million people still living in extreme poverty. External shocks, including climate change and fluctuating commodity prices, threaten growth.

Ethiopia is among the countries considered to be most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Centre for Global Development, 2010), with climate change a significant threat to Ethiopia’s development. Changing patterns and intensities of rainfall and increasing temperatures have and will continue to have consequences for all Ethiopians, but especially for the more than 70 million poor people (80% of the population) whose survival depends on rain-fed agriculture (farming and/or pastoralism). Moreover, women in both agricultural and pastoral communities are more significantly affected due to their specific responsibilities. Low levels of investment in natural resource management, agriculture and rural infrastructure and services exacerbate vulnerability.

Given these significant challenges caused by climate change and vulnerability in Ethiopia, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has taken a proactive stance, launching its Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) vision at the Durban COP17 climate talks in November 2011. The CRGE vision, which was conceived and strongly championed by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in its early years, was ambitious: to place low-carbon and climate-resilient development at the heart of Ethiopia’s plans for transformational and inclusive economic growth. From Meles and others around him, came a vision of how Ethiopia might grow and escape poverty over the next 40 years. The CRGE vision was also one of leapfrogging the traditional paths of development followed by many developed nations, and of attracting substantial foreign investment in the process.

The CRGE vision and strategy were developed by more than 50 experts from more than 20 leading institutions within the Ethiopian Government. Many donor organisations, including DFID, the Norwegian Embassy, the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), UNDP, and the World Bank, also made a contribution. While the CRGE initiative is government led, since 2011 the private sector and civil society organisations have become increasingly involved in its implementation.

Against this background, ACCRA Ethiopia’s goal for phase 2 was to ensure that vulnerable communities in Ethiopia are more resilient and able to adapt to climate change. Historically, women and communities have not been able to participate in decision-making processes. At the national level, there is less attention and funding directed towards proactive efforts to reduce vulnerability to climate hazards, variability and change. This is compounded by a lack of evidence about how best to enhance the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities.

During phase 2, ACCRA Ethiopia has sought to achieve its goal in such a way as to be responsive to the particular national context, that is, by working closely with government and by
using demand-driven capacity-building through training and ongoing support to begin to change the way individuals think about CCA, DRR and working with one another. It thus seeks to enhance national ownership and to employ collaborative solutions. To this end it has produced nationally relevant, evidence-based research and rolled out co-produced capacity-building in partnership with the Ethiopian government. It has provided policy support in response to in-country opportunities and needs, but with the overall purpose of supporting pro-poor and participatory planning processes, thus enabling communities to better exercise their agency through access to information and to national policy frameworks.
5 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

5.1 PROJECT DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES

With a total budget of £872,537, the main goal of ACCRA Ethiopia phase 2 was to promote local adaptive capacity development through advising governance changes at a system level. This goal built on the findings of research conducted in phase 1 of the ACCRA programme, which highlighted that change at a system level is required because the necessary changes to the practice of adaptive capacity development are not actionable by any single organisation or individual acting alone. The adaptation required by development actors is transformational. Ultimately, it was expected that this project would contribute to the greater participation and influence of local communities in kebele- and woreda-level decision-making processes, enabling more locally adaptive decision making in a country that is heavily impacted by climate change.

According to the ToR the following objectives were agreed for ACCRA phase 2, to be facilitated in each of its three focal countries, including in Ethiopia:

1. Incorporate community-driven adaptive capacity initiatives into local government planning, drawing on the ACCRA phase 1 research results and the Local Adaptive Capacity Framework (LAC), including by capacity building at local (woreda) level.

2. Advise and inform governance processes and policy decisions so they are community-driven, participative, gender-sensitive and enhance adaptive capacity including through research, stakeholder engagement and capacity building.

3. Enhance the capacity of civil society networks through capacity building to support community-driven adaptation planning processes.

4. Support a wider process of learning within the consortium partner organisations and beyond, promoting learning, including through the production and communication of training materials, research outcomes and learning aimed at improving the policy and practice of the participating non-government and government agencies, and their regional and global networks (including the consortium).

5.2 THEORY OF CHANGE FOR ACCRA ETHIOPIA PHASE 2

5.2.1 Reconstructing the ACCRA Ethiopia ToC

Figure 1 is an attempt to reconstruct the ToC for ACCRA Ethiopia. This reconstruction was undertaken in the light of our first field visit and drew on analysis of data collected during this visit. In developing this reconstruction, we were cognisant that:

- the ToC was dynamic rather than static, and had evolved over time;
- there was never any single understanding of the ToC in use in Ethiopia, but rather, there were multiple implicit ToCs reflecting the understandings and assumptions of multiple stakeholders from within the ACCRA international programme, ACCRA Ethiopia, Oxfam GB and Oxfam Ethiopia. In part this reflects the fact that between late 2011 and 2016 there were four coordinators for ACCRA Ethiopia, and two ACCRA ‘champions’ in Oxfam GB.
• This in turn raises questions about how best to ‘narrate’ such a reconstructed ToC, as there is no standard form to use.

In reconstructing the ToC in Figure 1 we included the following elements:43

• A description of the system it is seeking to change or transform (shown in Figure 1 as ‘The situation in 2011’).

• A vision or goal of what effective transformation would look like (shown in Figure 1 as the ‘Systemic impact’ and ‘Systemic outcomes’).

• Two complementary streams of activity aiming to contribute to this impact and supporting outcomes – shown in Figure 1 as ‘Institutional change processes’ and ‘Strategies’ or ‘Cross-cutting change processes’.

• Key assumptions underpinning the ToC.

• A simplified diagram of how these different elements relate to one another.
In a climate changing world, there is an established progression in Ethiopia towards genuine multi-actor limited participation of local communities in decision-making and lack of recognition of farmer or pastoralist-led innovation. Local adaptive capacity was constrained by base of vulnerable local communities. Inadequate attention was given to strengthening institutional arrangements in order to sustain activities or tackle inequality. There was relatively poor understanding of adaptive capacity in Ethiopia. Government and NGO interventions were focused primarily on building the asset responding to gaps and opportunities in GoE thinking, strategies and priorities, and carefully selecting and investing in key partnerships.

Assumptions: (i) Climate change justice is possible and can be realised through developing the decision-making capacities of duty-bearers on the one hand and the knowledge and agency of the rights-holders on the other and creating spaces for continued engagement; (ii) Developing community adaptive capacities should combine the inclusion of community voices in governing and accountability instruments with context-specific and contextualised evidence, flexible-forward looking planning and collective action across sectors and scales; (iii) Tackling complex problems of climate change requires alliancing of government and civil society, without conflating their respective mandates and roles; (iv) Joined-up action research, capacity development, partnership development and policy influence is more effective than using any one of these approaches in isolation when transforming climate-related governance systems; (v) Effective partnering with the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) requires identifying and responding to gaps and opportunities in GoE thinking, strategies and priorities, and carefully selecting and investing in key partnerships.

Situation in 2011: There was relatively poor understanding of adaptive capacity in Ethiopia. Government and NGO interventions were focused primarily on building the asset base of vulnerable local communities. Inadequate attention was given to strengthening institutional arrangements in order to sustain activities or tackle inequality. There was limited participation of local communities in decision-making and lack of recognition of farmer or pastoralist-led innovation. Local adaptive capacity was constrained by top-down governance arrangements, weak coordination between government departments, and/or low levels of collaboration between government and NGOs.
Note that in contrast to many ToCs, Figure 1 highlights systemic impact and systemic outcomes (which could be seen as ‘meta-outcomes’), in addition to the outcomes supported by specific institutional change processes. This is because systemic change is a key design assumption of the ToC.

We address each of these in further detail below.

5.2.2 ACCRA’s analysis of the situation prior to transformation, and the goal and outcomes of the transformation

ACCRA’s analysis of the situation prior to transformation drew primarily on the ACCRA phase 1 research in Ethiopia, as well as the findings of the wider ACCRA phase 1 research. Framing this phase 1 research, ACCRA developed the Local Adaptive Capacity Framework to understand not just what a system has that enables it to adapt (i.e. its asset base), but also what a system does that enables it to adapt (i.e. working with institutions and entitlements, knowledge and information, innovation, and flexible and forward-looking decision-making and governance).

The phase 1 research in Ethiopia, conducted in three kebeles in three different regions, focused on the roles both of ACCRA partners (Oxfam GB, Save the Children and CARE) and of government. The main findings were that the biggest contribution of development interventions to adaptive capacity was on the asset base, probably because both government and donor-led programmes in Ethiopia tend to be designed around the delivery of tangible, easily monitored activities involving the provision of hardware. The research also highlighted that while some contributions were made around the area of institutions and entitlements, inadequate attention was given to the need to strengthen institutional arrangements in order to sustain activities or tackle inequality. Contributions to the three remaining dimensions of adaptive capacity were much weaker. For example, the research found that current practice is marked by limited participation in decision-making and the perception by decision makers that they know what farmers and pastoralists need. Consistent with this, government and NGO interventions tended to assume that the introduction of new technologies would promote innovative behaviour, rather than enabling farmer or pastoralist-led innovation.

Major conclusions of the ACCRA phase 1 research (drawing on research in Uganda and Mozambique as well as Ethiopia) included the following:

All development interventions need an agency lens (e.g., they need to be thought of not simply as delivering a given infrastructure or technology), but as vehicles for expanding people’s range of choices.

The five characteristics of adaptive capacity are not standalones, from which one or more can be selected for attention, they shape and depend on each other. Taking adaptive capacity on board means understanding these dimensions of people’s and communities’ lives, and designing and implementing interventions in ways that enhance the way in which assets, institutions, innovation, knowledge flows and decision-making contribute to increased agency, and more informed decision-making for the long term.

There is value in focusing on autonomous innovation as an entry point for an adaptive capacity perspective. Planning and intervention design should use people’s own ability and practice of experimentation and innovation as an entry point. This involves understanding how people are currently experimenting and innovating in response to different pressures, and understanding the constraints to innovation and the uptake of new ideas.
Linked to the above, government and development partners must commit to real participation, and encourage communities to experiment and make their own informed decisions.

Perhaps most important, however, is that change at a system level is required because the changes needed to build adaptive capacity are not actionable by any single organisation or individual acting alone. Constraints on innovation and on flexible and forward-looking decision-making at community level are often related to constraints imposed by district, regional and national governments, including the imposition of siloed approaches through a lack of horizontal coordination at higher levels of governance.

These conclusions inform the goal of ACCRA Ethiopia for phase 2 (systemic impact and systemic outcomes), as well as some of the strategies and assumptions underpinning the ToC. While apparently prioritising one of the five LAC dimensions over the others – flexible and forward looking decision making and governance – the (re)constructed ACCRA Ethiopia ToC also highlights the systemic nature of the phase 2 intervention (consistent with conclusion 5), as shown in the three systemic outcomes associated with governance transformation, as well as the importance of stronger participation and more equitable (gender-sensitive) approaches (consistent with conclusions 1, 3 and 4).

5.2.3 ‘Institutional change processes’

The ToC highlights two complementary streams of activity that together contribute to the systemic outcomes and systemic impact of phase 2 – ‘institutional change processes’ and ‘cross-cutting change processes’ (also known in OGB as ‘strategies’). During our first field visit to Ethiopia we identified six institutional change processes, of which four are shown in Figure 149:

1. An institutional change process bringing together the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)50/MEFCC; the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoA&NR); the DRMFSS/NDRMC; and the National Meteorological Agency (NMA) with the four CSO alliance partners; and associated with outcome 1 (‘a valued, responsive and multi-actor collective learning and planning governance space for federal ministries and CSOs involved CRGE issues’).

2. An institutional change process focusing on the DRMFSS/NDRMC and (from 2013) coordination with the MEFCC, and associated with outcome 2 (‘adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a more participatory and decentralised approach’).

3. An institutional change process focusing initially on the EPA (2012–014) and then on the MoA&NR (2014–2016), and associated with outcome 3 (‘local CRGE planning practices that are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity mainstreamed within the FTI, GTP II and GCF policies of the MoA&NR’).

4. An institutional change process focusing on the MEFCC, and associated with outcome 4 (‘national CRGE mainstreaming (into PSNP and GTP-2 for all sectors) and regional CRGE capacity building strengthened’).

5.2.4 ‘Cross-cutting change processes’

The ToC also highlights four ‘cross-cutting change processes’ (‘strategies’).

1. Policy advising through being accepted by GoE as trusted advisers, and through long term partnering.

2. ‘Systemic intermediation’, by strengthening and realigning vertical and horizontal governance relationships.

3. A responsive and flexible approach to capacity building.

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5.2.5 Key assumptions

The key assumptions guiding the ToC are partly drawn from the ACCRA international programme, and partly from the ACCRA Ethiopia approach. The assumptions drawn from the international programme, and applying to all three country programmes, were as follows:\textsuperscript{31}

- Climate-change justice is possible and can be realised through developing the decision-making capacities of duty-bearers on one hand and the knowledge and agency of the right-holders on the other and creating spaces for continued engagement.
- Developing community adaptive capacities should combine the inclusion of community voices in governing and accountability instruments with context-specific and contextualised evidence, flexible forward-looking planning and collective action across sectors and scales.
- Tackling complex problems of climate change requires alliancing of government and civil society, without conflating their respective mandates and roles.
- Joined-up action research, capacity development, partnership development and policy advice is more effective than using any one of these approaches in isolation when transforming climate-related governance systems.

Key assumptions specific to the ACCRA Ethiopia programme were as follows:

- Given the political status of NGOs in Ethiopia, it is important for ACCRA Ethiopia to build a trusted partner relationship with the Government of Ethiopia (GoE).
- Selection of key GoE partnerships should be made on the basis of (a) strategic significance and (b) opportunity/prior relationship.
- Effective partnering with the GoE requires identifying and responding to gaps and opportunities in GoE thinking, strategies and priorities.

5.3 TARGETED OUTCOMES

Selection of outcomes to be targeted in the evaluation is a key step (2) in the process tracing approach. As highlighted in the OGB guidance, the outcomes selected should be central to the intervention’s ToC, and useful for learning and forward planning. A joint Skype meeting was held with Oxfam Ethiopia and OGB on 31 October to make this selection. A key issue considered in making the selection was: Do we want the evaluation to be deep or broad, recognising that while depth enables better process tracing, breadth can offer more insight into processes of transforming governance? The resulting discussion led to the selection of the following three outcomes:

**Outcome 2**: Adaptive capacity building and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach.

**Outcome 3**: Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender-sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, mainstreamed within the Fast Track Investments (FTIs), Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) policies of the Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources (MoA&NR).

**Systemic outcome 2**: Communities’ voices, priorities and agency taken into account in CRGE planning, reflecting a gender-sensitive and people-centred approach.\textsuperscript{32}
6  OUTCOME 2

Outcome 2: Adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance (national DRR guidelines and local DRR planning), supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach

Supporting the mainstreaming of adaptive capacity thinking into DRR governance was the first of several institutional change processes developed by ACCRA phase 2, reflecting not only relationships built during phase 1, but also recognition of a key technical relationship between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Achieving this mainstreaming within the DRR governance system has been a core objective of ACCRA Ethiopia over the last five years.

6.1 MATERIALISATION OF OUTCOME 2

Based on the information collected from interviews during the two field visits and from the documents reviewed, there is strong evidence that adaptive capacity thinking/frameworks have been mainstreamed into DRR governance, both in terms of policy (national woreda disaster risk mitigation/adaptation guidelines); tools (e.g. national Woreda Disaster Risk Profiling (WDRP) database; testing of an Area-Specific Multi-Hazard Multi-Sector Early-Warning System); and local practices (development of woreda level pilots and plans). Associated with these changes in policy, tools and practices are changes in governance relationships, including changes in horizontal (collaboration between NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning) and vertical relationships (evidence of improved participation in some woredas), as well as between sectors (new, long-term partnerships between government and CSOs). While recognising that all these elements together comprise the full systemic nature of DRR governance outcome 2, for practical reasons we focus here on two of these elements – the national Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines and collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning. These elements were selected for two reasons: (a) they were consistent with two of the four cross-cutting change processes (‘strategies’) set out in Figure 1: (S1) policy advice; and (S2) systemic intermediation – strengthening of horizontal governance relationships; and (b) they had strong resonance for key Oxfam stakeholders within the Ethiopia impact evaluation who were consulted on this selection.

(A) The federal guideline, Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines, was approved in 2013 and published in April 2014, with a second edition in 2016. A simple reading of the text confirms the expression of an adaptive capacity-based approach, drawing both on relevant thinking and through the development of a framework. In terms of thinking, informants highlighted text which, while not specifically using the term ‘adaptive capacity’, discusses the bridging of disaster risk mitigation and adaptation approaches, and more strongly, the articulation of a set of planning principles (Appendix 3a), including the principle of bottom-up planning (Appendix 3b), which support a more decentralised and participatory approach. Furthermore, while no specific reference is made at this stage of the guidance to the LAC Framework, these two sets of principles align with several of those in the LAC framework, including the role of knowledge and information, of institutions, and of flexible and forward-looking decision-making and governance.

Following these principles, the framework that is set out to guide the planning process (Figure 2) is much more explicit in its discussion and application of adaptive capacity thinking, and furthermore draws explicitly on the LAC Framework. Specifically, the second step of the framework, disaster risk analysis (Figure 2), requires the collection and analysis of information regarding existing and required adaptive capacities of communities, as well as information about all important hazards that have the potential to become a disaster, and vulnerability...
factors. Adaptive capacity assessment in this case is structured directly around each of the five categories of the LAC Framework.

‘One part of risk reduction is to develop adaptive capacity for society. So the framework is helpful to develop disaster risk mitigation and adaptation plan at woreda level. After that the sector bureaus also mainstream DRR plans into their annual plan.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

Figure 2: The five steps of the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Process

(B) The second dimension of DRR governance (outcome 2) that we analyse in this section – illustrating the horizontal dimension of DRR governance relationships – is the collaboration between the MEFCC and the DRMFSS/NDRMC on joint CRGE/DRR planning and mainstreaming, especially at woreda level. To understand the context of this collaboration, it is necessary to provide a little more background on ‘mainstreaming’ – the final step in the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Process as shown in Figure 2.

The idea behind mainstreaming at woreda level is that rather than develop a separate, parallel planning process focusing on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, this should be ‘integrated into the main woreda development planning process in order to increase the sustainability and impact of interventions in every sector, especially in the most vulnerable communities.’

‘As the new Ethiopian policies reflect, there is a shift in perspective from the view of disaster as an unavoidable or unpredictable phenomenon that will be faced by emergency specialist[s], to an increasing understanding of disaster as complex development issue. Development plans do not necessarily reduce vulnerability to possible hazards, instead they can create or enhance vulnerable factors. That’s why it is very important this mainstreaming process serves to ensure that sectorial development plans and policies take into account the purposes of prevention, mitigation and preparedness efforts and create the environment to create and enhance adaptive capacities in the communities and societies. The planning results of this methodology shall be mainstreamed/ integrated in the development sectorial planning mechanisms and followed up with similar current mechanisms. Mainstreaming and follow up is an absolutely necessary step, in order not to become the results in one more document in the shelves.’

Ensuring effective mainstreaming should be the joint responsibility of the MEFCC and the NDRMC. Based on our discussions with informants, we found strong evidence of (improving) collaboration between the MEFCC and the DRMFSS/NDRMC in the context of joint CRGE/DRR
Two main pieces of evidence are relevant here. Firstly, in 2015 the MEFCC and the DRMFSS began to explore the benefits of more closely linking DRM and CCA practice. This subsequently led to a joint workshop held in May 2016, which brought together the MEFCC and the NDRMC to discuss mainstreaming of CRGE and DRR into woreda Annual Development Plans (ADPs). Secondly, and reflecting this, several of our informants further pointed to the work that is currently proceeding on the ground, where mainstreaming has to date been completed for ADPs in 19 woredas – 14 in Tigray and five in the Somali region.

‘We are going to woredas – it is good to work together with the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change [MEFCC] – most of the problems are with climate hazards, thus we suggested it – Manesh Agrawal from ACCRA started the communication to establish the relations, then – most of the time we invite them [MEFCC] to support us.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

6.2 SALIENT CAUSAL STORIES

In this section, we identify and describe the possible interventions that may have contributed to the mainstreaming of local adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks into DRR governance, but make no judgement on the weight of this contribution. Of these we focus especially on the participation and role played by ACCRA, the object of this review.

Before narrating the causal stories, it should be noted that in contrast to impact evaluations that focus specifically on a policy outcome and the different possible causal pathways that contribute to this, the focus in this evaluation is on governance outcomes, which in turn are embedded within complex governance dynamics rather than simpler pathways. What this means, in effect, is that different possible interventions should not be seen as separate causal pathways, but rather, as embedded, interdependently, within the same systemic governance system.

It should also be noted that while, for the sake of making the process tracing methodology tractable, we make a distinction between an outcome and the processes that might have led up to it. In reality, when considering something as complex as a governance system, we can never say that we have arrived at a particular ‘outcome’ of that governance system; rather, what is perhaps of greater interest are the dynamics of that governance system, and the ways, extent to which, and reasons why that system is travelling in a particular direction. For this reason, it can be argued that the causal stories are of interest as much for the insight they afford into the dynamics of this governance system, as for the insight they provide into relative contribution of elements, interventions and actors within these dynamics.

Whereas for practical reasons we chose to select two elements of outcome 2 as the focus for the contribution analysis, through the causal stories we are able to draw out a richer picture of the progressive development of the DRR-Adaptive Capacity governance system, referring to many more elements of this dynamic system than in the previous section.

6.2.1 The ACCRA causal story

To help narrate the ACCRA causal story we start by referring back to the ACCRA Ethiopia Theory of Change (see Section 5.2), which highlights that ACCRA combined two approaches in seeking to transform governance systems in Ethiopia – firstly, institutional change processes, which were, secondly, supported by a number of strategies (cross-cutting change processes). As shown in Figure 1, the institutional change process most relevant to outcome 2 focused on partnership development with the DRMFSS/NDRC, although other institutional change processes (working with the ACCRA steering committee; and partnership development with the MEFCC) also contributed. Supporting these were four core strategies, which we describe first.
Strategy 1: Policy advising through being accepted as trusted advisers and long-term partners.

The first strategy of ACCRA in Ethiopia was built on the core assumption that in order to advise government, it would need first to be accepted as a trusted adviser, and that in order to do this, it would need to build long-term partnerships with key government ministries. This assumption was shaped by ACCRA Ethiopia’s experience in phase 1, through which it developed the ‘power analysis’ that ‘government agencies make decisions without clear channels for civil society or others to advise. The Civil Society Law significantly constrains the space for NGO efforts to advise government in public spaces. However, there are opportunities for ACCRA to advise government action invited spaces. Building ownership of ACCRA within government was therefore essential.’

This in turn led to an approach that focused on specific government programmes – in this case the programme of the DRMFSS to integrate DRR and climate adaptation – and on building a relationship with government counterparts by offering to help address specific gaps in these programmes that were related to adaptive capacity and governance.

‘In 2010, the existence of the new DRM policy offered the biggest opportunity for ACCRA to advise federal government by working collaboratively with the DRMFSS. I proposed to work with them [the DRMFSS] to develop practical lessons in raising awareness of the policy and piloting its implementation. My hope was that ACCRA could use disaster risk management planning as an entry point to integrate greater participation, particularly of women and communities into the planning process.’

Kirsty Wilson, ACCRA Phase 1 Coordinator, 2009–February 2012

Building trust required developing a relationship in which DRMFSS took the lead, while ACCRA provided support where requested and when necessary, and maintained low public visibility in the process (for example, avoiding branding). As trust with DRMFSS developed, this strategy was further reinforced through the secondment of staff, in the form of ‘policy support’.

‘First we had Charlotte [Stemmer] with us and also Medhin [Feseha]; since Yirgalem [Mohammed] joined ACCRA [in May 2010] he has been embedded with us full time; also Tesfaye Ararsa. Even Manesh [Agrawal] when he was ACCRA coordinator [July 2014–June 2016] spent 2–3 days a week embedded with us.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

As a result of this strategy, ACCRA succeeded in developing a long-term, five-year partnership with DRMCC/NDRMC, enabling it to work through several phases of support, advice and capacity building, focusing on a range of policy, guidance and practice issues (see below). Several informants highlighted that the key factor in ensuring the sustainability of this relationship was maintaining trust, particularly in the face of staff changes in the ACCRA team.

‘I am focal person for contingency and DRR planning the whole period. ACCRA is a good organisation. They have good staff who fill our gap. And they made a lot with one staff. For us ACCRA is the main ones to help our thinking. They don’t give us money but thinking! They fill our gap and we become strong.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

Strategy 2: Systemic intermediation – seeking to strengthen and/or realign vertical and horizontal connections within the DRR governance system.

A central assumption of ACCRA Ethiopia’s ToC was that rather than directly supporting vulnerable people’s ability to adapt to climate change, it was better to work at the level of federal policy change, building on, while also seeking to transform, existing governance structures and systems through policy change. But this work to advise policy change involved more than simply building long-term relationships with government partners – it also involved directly...
intervening in existing governance systems, by seeking to strengthen and/or transform vertical and horizontal relationships within these systems.

In the case of ACCRA's work with the DRMFSS, examples include the following:

- Encouraging greater gender-sensitivity and responsiveness to local knowledge and priorities by woreda officials, and encouraging alignment with this approach at regional and federal level (vertical realignment) – for example through training of trainers.
- Working to build (horizontal) collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning – a long-term process of intermediation.

**Strategy 3: A responsive and flexible approach to capacity building.**

ACCRA started phase 2 with the idea of offering an ‘ACCRA training package’. However, this approach shifted rapidly to something much more responsive: ‘The flexibility in the funding allowed us to sit down with government and local partners in-country and take the time to analyse collectively the needs in country and critically to co-design the activities.’

This in turn led to ACCRA working with the DRMFSS using a more flexible approach to capacity building. This drew on a range of different approaches, which included: training of trainers; learning by doing/piloting (see action research and learning – below); building understanding of government officials through ‘trusted advice’ (learning through subtle advising rather than training); learning through planning and acting together; and building relational capacity through mediating and strengthening relationships between different government ministries, and between different levels of governance.

Targeted training did, nevertheless, come to play a key role in this institutional pathway, with the training designed to carefully reflect the guidance and planning processes it was supporting:

‘After the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines were agreed, training of trainer (ToT) workshops were organised in six regions – the whole process lasted almost a year. These were 6-day workshops, where we essentially took people through the whole planning process – we would convene 50–60 people at a time. After I joined ACCRA in May 2013 I facilitated the ToT workshops in Oromia, Tigray, Amhara, Afar, SNNPR and Somali regions. Since the ToT we have done scaling up of planning in almost 88 woredas in seven regions – Oromia, Tigray, Amhara, Somali, Afar, SNNPR and Benishangul Gumuz.’

Yirgalem Mohammed, Project Officer, ACCRA (May 2013)

**Strategy 4: Action researching and learning.**

A final strategy employed by ACCRA Ethiopia was to support policy influencing, capacity building and systemic intermediation through an ‘action researching and learning’ approach. Action learning combines ongoing and interrelated learning processes whose value to governance systems resides in involving policy makers at different stages, which not only develops capacity, but also increases process and outcome co-ownership. Another important attribute of the approach lies in combining bottom-up, horizontal and top-down learning approaches. In its work with the DRMFSS, ACCRA’s main action learning activities have been:

- Contextualised capacity needs identification – for example using the Woreda Disaster Risk Profiling (WDRP) tool – and development of strategies to address these. Use of the WDRP tool requires woreda officials to draw on and learn from local indigenous knowledge at kebele and community level.
- Knowledge generation through collaborative research, use of evidence to design effective CCA solutions and learning from experiences of testing, implementing and case studies.
- Knowledge sharing through training workshops using the Train the Trainer (ToT) approach to create a multiplier effect.
Action researching is also an iterative process, which starts out with an identified need and then seeks to address this by learning from experiences of testing, implementing, and case studies, supplemented by insights from other relevant research. In the case of ACCRA’s work with the DRMFSS, five (overlapping) cycles or phases of action researching can be traced. These five phases together comprise the main institutional change process leading to outcome 2. Each phase begins by responding to a ‘gap’ or need identified by the DRMFSS, and/or by exploiting opportunities associated with this gap.


This first phase covers the period from DRMFSS’s acceptance of ACCRA’s offer to provide policy support in 2011, to the publication of the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines in July 2014. At the outset, the DRMFSS was considering how to design, roll-out and scale-up an innovative approach to woreda disaster risk reduction planning – known as the disaster risk mitigation/adaptation and contingency planning (DRM/A & CP) approach – which sought to change Ethiopia’s reactive approach towards emergencies and find new ways of managing risk. In line with new and emerging policy, this model was to be explicitly based on decentralised and participatory approaches, to include significant input from local governmental experts, community representatives and local civil society organisations.

As recounted above, Kirsty Wilson, the first ACCRA Ethiopia Coordinator, took advantage of this opportunity by offering to support DRMFSS in developing an innovative approach to woreda disaster risk reduction planning, and specifically, to help them incorporate new thinking on adaptive capacity that was coming out of the ACCRA phase 1 research.

Having agreed a memorandum of understanding, the collaboration between the DRMFSS and ACCRA developed rapidly. Throughout 2012 ACCRA made a significant intellectual as well as practical contribution to the development of the Woreda DRM/A Planning Guidelines, working closely with the Bahir Dar University to ensure that the WDRP approach took proper account of adaptive capacity, and providing technical support and facilitation to the piloting of these guidelines in Wuchale and Ewa woredas in Oromia and Afar regions respectively (2012). This piloting approach exemplified ACCRA’s action researching approach, one of learning by doing, as well as drawing on the LAC framework and related learning that had been undertaken in phase 1. These pilot woredas were the first to have plans in place that integrated gender, CCA, and DRR, and built on future scenarios related to climate change and possible resulting hazards. The guidelines were completed in September 2012, although not published until July 2014, when ACCRA also provided technical and financial support to the translation of the guidelines into three local languages (Amharic, Oromifa and Tigrigna).

Phase 2 (2012–2014) Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning: Training of trainers and beginning to take to scale (outscale)

As noted above, as soon as the guidelines were completed, a major programme of ToT workshops was organised across seven of Ethiopia’s regions, with ACCRA taking a lead facilitation role and working closely with woreda staff to teach them how to use the guidelines.

With over 350 trainers trained, the DRMFSS were then in a strong position immediately to begin outscaling of the DRM/A planning process. This outscaling work started in late 2013 and, funded by the World Bank, eventually covered 88 woredas in five regions – Tigray, Amhara, Somali, Afar and SNNPR. As a result, ACCRA’s participatory and gender-sensitive approach, and its use of evidence from pilot projects to factor in adaptive capacity, were integrated into the roll-out of this national DRR planning process.
Phase 3 (2014–2016) Upscaling the principles of Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning

A third cycle of action learning was initiated in August 2014, when the MoA&NR invited ACCRA to contribute its thinking, and its experience with the woreda disaster risk mitigation/adaptation planning process, to help consider how relevant principles could be upscaled/mainstreamed into the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The PSNP is a major initiative already managed by the MoA&NR, which provides small, but predictable, transfers of cash or food to millions of vulnerable people in Ethiopia, to help them become more food secure.71

The broader context of these discussions was PSNP’s Climate Smart Initiative (CSI), launched in July 2013 and designed to help understand how the PSNP might help those supported by the PSNP to better cope with a variable and changing climate.72 The CSI was led by CARE Ethiopia and focused on building climate resilience in 24 of the 319 woredas where PSNP works. This work involved piloting approaches to enhancing the flow of climate information, and improving local-level planning and community ownership, as well as environmental management, vulnerability targeting and asset-building activities.

‘The CSI itself was partially a result of ACCRA’s early research on adaptive capacity in the PSNP and it was on a field visit with the DFID adviser to discuss our research findings that the CSI concept was born. We were looking for a more tangible link to action for the planning process – however, I do not know how similar the planning work on CSI is to the other planning work and how joined up those two conversations are.’

Kirsty Wilson, ACCRA phase 1 coordinator (2009–February 2012); international consultant, LTSI (March 2012–ongoing)

From September 2014, an additional element was added to the CSI programme. This involved experimenting with the development of DRM/A & CP approaches in 11 of the CSI woredas. Findings were then pulled together through two regional-level lesson-learning workshops in June 2015.

‘We were trying to innovate it. But that trial failed. At the end of the day we were supposed to introduce this new system at the local level, but it was not happening. Only testing testing testing but didn’t make any changes. It was a very short programme – 9 months only. It was too complex.’


Throughout this process, all those involved – experts from DRMFSS, regional DPPBs, woreda line offices and kebele DAs; I/NGOs representatives, the CSI project team and the ACCRA project team – thoroughly reviewed the existing Woreda Early Warning (EW) system and DRM/A & CP process, and came up with various recommendations to improve the current PSNP process and practices. Unfortunately, we were not able to verify these recommendations or trace their uptake.73

A second upscaling pathway within the DRMFSS/NDRMC is currently being explored by ACCRA through the Disaster Risk Management Strategic Programme and Investment Framework (SPIF).74 In principle DRMFSS/NDRMC have asked ACCRA to design a road map for institutional strengthening – the so-called ‘pillar 4’ of the SPIF. ACCRA have suggested that this work should include consideration of how to mainstream DRM into all relevant government programmes and policies. However, as a result of the DRMFSS restructuring, discussions are currently on hold.


In November 2015 ACCRA began providing technical and financial support to the NDRMC and NMA towards development and testing of an Area-Specific Multi-Hazard Multi-Sector Early-
Warning System (EWS) as envisaged in Ethiopia’s new DRM policy and strategy. The EWS will contribute to improved emergency preparedness, timeliness and quality of risk information and response actions by community, government (local to federal) and NGOs in a coordinated manner.

‘When Manesh is here, we discuss with him the gaps, how to implement at the ground. The major gap is to activate the contingency plan – we need early warning triggers. At woreda level the early-warning system is very weak. So we prepare a proposal with Manesh (ACCRA) – the Early Warning/Early Action project – they will work to develop a framework with five threshold levels – and then test it in six pilot woredas – they have already started this work.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

As the EWS project is developing it is reaching out to a number of different sectors – the MoA on livestock/crop disease, the Ministry of Water on flooding, and the Ministry of Health:

‘EW is an input for contingency planning and also a link with adaptation planning. When you monitor a system you identify the causes of a disaster. So that we can address the root causes or minimise the risk by adaptation measures. And we need to develop the system for each ministry, helping them to develop a clear list of indicators and a clear list of early actions so that they respond accordingly.’

Tesfaye Ararsa, ACCRA EW-EA Project Manager, July 2015–November 2016

The EWS project is still work in progress. While the final guidelines won’t be completed until 2017, early outputs include an inventory of EW practices in the country collected and endorsed by NDRMC, and an area-specific multi-hazard system already completed for two ministries (health; and pastoral affairs), each with five threshold levels (from ‘normal’ through ‘warning’ to ‘emergency’), currently waiting endorsement.

Phase 5 (2012–2016) Facilitating collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and the MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning

As noted above (Section 6.1), a key dimension of (horizontal) DRR governance that we analyse in this section is the collaboration between the MEFCC and the DRMFSS/NDRMC on joint CRGE/DRR planning. In Section 6.1 we provided evidence for improving collaboration between the MEFCC and the DRMFSS/NDRMC, as reflected in a joint workshop held in May 2016, and in the recent piloting work on mainstreaming CRGE and DRR practices into woreda ADPs.

And yet in 2011, at the start of ACCRA phase 2, there were political tensions between these two ministries (then represented by the DRMFSS and the EPA), as to who would lead on climate change planning. This leadership issue was eventually resolved in favour of MEF in 2013, when the CRGE Facility was created to lead on climate resilience (CR) and green economy (GE) issues across government.

Initially, these tensions meant, for example, that the EPA and the DRMFSS didn’t collaborate on the development, piloting and early implementation of the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines. Furthermore, throughout 2012 the tensions were reflected in the EPA failing to attend the ACCRA Steering Committee, a situation that changed once the CRGE direction and the EPA’s upgrade to MEF became clear in late 2013.

Since 2013 bridges have been built and in 2015 the MEFCC and the DRMFSS began to explore the benefits of more closely linking DRM and CCA practice. This subsequently led to a joint workshop held in May 2016, which brought together the MEFCC and the NDRMC to discuss mainstreaming of CRGE and DRR into woreda ADPs. According to several of those we interviewed, ACCRA played a key role – through its skills in inter-mediation – in bringing these two ministries into constructive dialogue.
'Actually the first breakthrough came when I persuaded Ato Kare [State Minister at MEFCC] to send one of his staff to the PSNP CSI workshop [in June 2015]. I had already raised the issue a couple of times in the [ACCRA] advisory board. But I wasn’t really successful. So I decided to approach the two ministers separately. It’s about diplomacy – using two different logics. Ato Kare is most interested in CRGE mainstreaming. So I told him – look, NDRMC are planning 19 woreda workshops [focusing on mainstreaming DRR into woreda ADPs]. They have the money. Do you want to do the same process again? Or you can send your two experts to a workshop, to contribute to the DRMFSS process. Then for 15,000 birr you can reach 19 woredas. Then he called the commissioner of the DRMFSS. It was a month-long process. With the commissioner I said – how can we include the climate change aspect? There is a CRGE strategy which you people aren’t aware of that much. You don’t need to do anything. Just allocate a half-day to these experts from the MEFCC. Then for the other 4.5 days those CRGE experts will be part of the discussion and can chip in.’

Manish Agrawal, ACCRA Ethiopia Coordinator, July 2014–June 2016

6.3.2 Other possible causal stories

The issue of DRR has a high profile in Ethiopia – one only has to consider the impact of the recent El Niño event and its contribution to the 2015–2016 drought in Ethiopia to appreciate this. As a result there is a rich diversity of actors involved in DRR activities in Ethiopia – as illustrated by a recent SPIF meeting which, according to one informant, was attended by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, the Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Bank (WB), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), the African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (ADB), CCDRA, the African Center for Disaster Risk Management, Addis Ababa University (ACDRM) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) as well as the NDRMC and members of the ACCRA alliance. This diversity of actors suggest that there could be a number of alternative causal explanations for transformations in DRR governance which support a more decentralised and participatory approach to adaptive capacity development in Ethiopia, each underpinned by different constellations of actors.

Here we focus specifically on alternative causal explanations for the two elements of outcome 2, which we have chosen to focus on in this evaluation – (A) the development of national Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines and (B) a growing collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR piloting and planning. Based on our conversations with informants and our review of potentially relevant documents, we consider the three most salient alternative explanations that came up through the investigation.

The first is that a completely separate actor to ACCRA – the World Food Programme (WFP) – has played a significant role in shaping both elements of outcome 2. The second is that (while ACCRA might have played a contributing role) the primary contribution to shaping these two elements of outcome 2 has come from one of the other members of the ACCRA alliance in Ethiopia (Save the Children, World Vision or CARE), having a distinct support beyond or outside the alliance. Our third hypothesis is more systemic, and proposes that no single actor played a leading role in shaping the two elements of outcome 2 under investigation, but rather that these were shaped through a combination of actors, potentially including ACCRA, the WFP, and other members of the ACCRA consortium, as well as a range of other actors.

Alternative hypothesis (i): The World Food Programme plays a leading role

Our reason for focusing on the WFP, whose role was mentioned to us by the NDRMC, is that it makes a major contribution to the humanitarian response in Ethiopia, channeling significant funds for this purpose and currently investing approximately $28m per month through five major
humanitarian programmes. Furthermore, not only is it a major partner in the PSNP, but also through its Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) unit, it plays a methodology and tool development role, thereby contributing to the development of ‘early warning tools to strengthen Ethiopia’s fight against food insecurity and assist the government’s shift towards proactive disaster risk management’. It might therefore reasonably be expected to have made a leading contribution to the changes in DRR governance under investigation.

‘The World Food Programme is a big funding organisation for us. For example, they are currently helping us develop risk profiles for almost 200 woredas.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

We did, in fact, find evidence of a contribution by the WFP to both elements of outcome 2 under investigation. Certainly, the WFP played a key role throughout the development of the national Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines. Firstly, through the secondment of a member of staff into the DRMFSS, the WFP provided direct support through supervision and coordination of the guideline development process. Secondly, the document itself was designed, written and coordinated by a consultant directly contracted by the WFP.

The WFP was also involved in contributing to the growing collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR piloting and planning, as described here by the ACCRA coordinator:

‘The World Food Programme worked closely with the DRMFSS. I myself had regular contact with the WFP. They were very involved in the work to mainstream DRR into the woreda annual development plans. On the one hand we were dealing directly with the minister, but it was also important to engage with the WFP as they are the one to lead and engage with the minister. So we had parallel and simultaneous discussion with the WFP people – they were the ones who finalised the ToR.’

Manish Agrawal, ACCRA Ethiopia Coordinator, July 2014–June 2016

(Although not the focus of this section, it is also worth noting that the WFP made a strong pitch for the Area-Specific Multi-Hazard Multi-Sector Early-Warning System initiative. However, because their proposal didn’t specifically address the gaps identified by government, the work was given to ACCRA).

Alternative hypothesis (ii): Other members of the ACCRA consortium play a leading role independently of ACCRA

Save the Children, World Vision and CARE each make a significant contribution to INGO activity in Ethiopia – this is one of the reasons they were selected for the ACCRA consortium in the first place. Moreover, each has a strong profile in the DRR and/or CCA sector. Save the Children is considered one of the champions of DRR, working both to create stronger community-based solutions and to couple this with advice on a national level; World Vision contributes to the wellbeing of vulnerable children through DRR and emergency response, and climate resilient sustainable development; while the work of CARE International includes building the adaptive capacities of the poor and vulnerable in response to current and projected climate risks, including a strong focus on gender (working specifically with pastoralist girls, chronically food-insecure rural women, and poor young girls living in cities and on the outskirts of urban areas). As we have already noted, CARE Ethiopia led the CSI initiative that focused on building climate resilience in 24 of the 319 woredas where PSNP works. So it is entirely plausible that any of these three organisations might have played a leading role – distinct from and outside the ACCRA alliance – in shaping the two elements of outcome 2 under investigation.

While we were unable to find any evidence of the direct involvement (and independently of any indirect contribution through the ACCRA Steering Committee) of Save the Children, World Vision and CARE in the development of the national Woreda Disaster Risk Management Guidelines.
Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines, we did find evidence that Save the Children took an independent and active role in helping to strengthen the relationship between DRMFSS and MEFCC, as well contributing to the pilot work on mainstreaming DRR into woreda ADPs.

Alternative hypothesis (iii): Systemic contribution by a combination of actors

Under this more systemic hypothesis, we looked for evidence that a wider grouping of actors had been involved in shaping the two elements of outcome 2 under investigation.

In terms of the development of the national Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines, we found that, while led and coordinated by the DRMFSS, a number of other actors besides ACCRA did indeed contribute to the development of the guidelines. We have already noted the contribution of the WFP. But we also found that Bahir Dar University had worked closely with ACCRA both during the development of the methodology that underpins the guidelines, and on the pilot exercises carried out in Wuchale (Oromia) and Ewa (Afar) woredas during July and August of 2012. And, perhaps not surprisingly, the staff of Wuchale and Ewa woredas, and of the DPPC of Oromia, and DPPB of Afar, also contributed to the process supporting the pilot exercises.

In terms of the strengthening collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning and piloting, there were again other actors besides ACCRA who made a contribution. Here the main contribution we identified was by Save the Children (see above).

6.3 CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS FOR OUTCOME 2

In this section, we undertake a contribution analysis, comparing the evidence underpinning the ACCRA causal story and the three alternative hypotheses, to try to ascertain which story is best supported by the evidence, thereby helping us to understand the relative contributions of the different actors involved to the two elements of outcome 2 under investigation. On the basis of the information gathered for this evaluation, we have concluded that alternative hypothesis (iii) – a story of systemic contribution by a combination of actors – is most strongly supported by the evidence, and that within this, ACCRA makes a strong and, for both elements, leading contribution (i.e. the ACCRA causal story nested within a systemic change story is the hypothesis most strongly supported by the evidence).

Contribution analysis for element 1: Adaptive capacity thinking mainstreamed into the national woreda disaster risk mitigation/adaptation guidelines, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach

We found strong evidence that ACCRA took a leading role and made a critical contribution to this first element of outcome 2. At the same time, it was clear that a number of other actors (principally the DRMFSS itself, Bahir Dar University, the WFP, and the staff of Wuchale and Ewa woredas, and Oromia DPPC and Afar DPPB), also made a contribution. What is of interest is therefore how these contributions were interrelated, whether they were complementary, collaborative or competitive, and in what senses can we regard some as more significant than others.

The role of the DRMFSS was to set an enabling framework – clearly specifying that, consistent with its SPIF, it was seeking to find new ways of managing risk that were ‘to be explicitly based on decentralised and participatory approaches, to include significant local input from local governmental experts, community representatives and local civil society organisations’. This framing of ‘decentralised and participatory approaches’ is clearly significant in the terms of outcome 2.
ACCRA was able to make a significant contribution in response, partly because of the close match of goals, and partly because it was trusted by the DRMFSS to be able to develop an appropriate and effective response, based on the new thinking on adaptive capacity highlighted in its phase 1 research. This meant that ACCRA was able to move quickly and to make a leading methodological contribution to the development of step (2) of the woreda DRM/A planning process – disaster risk analysis – introducing an adaptive capacity assessment approach structured directly around each of the five categories of the LAC Framework – which in turn requires a community-focused, participatory approach. And while ACCRA worked collaboratively with Bahir Dar University to develop this methodological framework, and on its testing in the two pilot woredas, the significance of the ACCRA contribution clearly lies in the way it was able to base this framework on the LAC framework.

By contrast, the contribution of the WFP to the development of the guidelines appears to have been complementary to that of ACCRA, focusing less on the technical framing of adaptive capacity and its operationalisation through the disaster risk analysis, and more on the coordination of the guideline development, including authoring of the document itself.

‘The World Food Programme is a big funding organisation for us…ACCRA is different…ACCRA are the main ones to help our thinking.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission

‘In my time, ACCRA pushed the WFP to think beyond the production of disaster risk profiles – we wanted to encourage them to think about how to use this analysis to do something practical. This was the initial impetus behind the training on woreda DRM planning – I think it is worth noting that at the time ACCRA arrived in DRMFSS everyone was pretty obsessed with producing the profiles, but no one thought about how they could be used. Offering to fund the completion of one of the profiles was an important part of our early negotiations with the DRMFSS.

‘So I think WFP and their activities were a necessary but ultimately insufficient condition for all that has been achieved. But I think without WFP, ACCRA would also not have done what it did – so both players were needed and played complementary roles.’

Kirsty Wilson, ACCRA phase 1 coordinator (2009–February 2012); international consultant, LTSI (March 2012–ongoing)

Finally, while the staff of Wuchale and Ewa woredas, and of Oromia DPPC and Afar DPPB, also made a contribution, this was to support the testing of the methodology developed by ACCRA with the support of Bahir Dar University, rather than to co-design it.

In conclusion, we find that while the contributions of DRMFSS, Bahir Dar University, the WFP and the staff of Wuchale and Ewa woredas, and of Oromia DPPC and Afar DPPB, were all necessary to the realisation of this first element of outcome 2, and thus shaped a broader systemic approach, the contribution of the ACCRA was of particular significance within this because of its focus on adaptive capacity, and its articulation within a community-focused and participatory framing, derived from the LAC framework. However, due to time and resource constraints, one of the limitations of this evaluation is that we were unable to determine how this participatory approach worked/is working in practice, either in the original two pilots in 2012, or more recently, in the ongoing pilot work on mainstreaming DRR into woreda ADPs (2016).

**Contribution analysis for element 2: A strengthening collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning and piloting**

The process of strengthening the collaboration between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC appears to have been nuanced, with several actors playing a role, which is why we find that the evidence best supports alternative hypothesis (iii) – a systemic contribution. Certainly, as described above, the WFP appears to have played a role as they were close to the director of the DRMFSS. Save the Children, too, appear to have played a role:
‘Save the Children are considered one of the champions on DRR – especially on the ACCRA consortium. They already do a lot around DRR mainstreaming at woreda level in existing projects. So we talked about this at the ACCRA steering committee and this helped DRMFSS to understand how they might mainstream DRR into the woreda annual development plans. Then NDRMC asked ACCRA for help on this, and as a result, we developed a separate guideline on DRR mainstreaming into woreda ADPs. While the acknowledgement went to ACCRA – the email was widely circulated – it was more Save the Children’s work, but I was the broker.’

Manish Agrawal, ACCRA Ethiopia Coordinator, July 2014–June 2016

In the quote above, the former ACCRA coordinator is perhaps being modest, but he illustrates well the systemic nature of the soft advisory process, in this case also highlighting the contribution of the ACCRA steering committee – although we were unable to triangulate this finding. But it is in his earlier quote (see above: ‘Actually the first breakthrough came…’) that we really gain insight into the key role played by ACCRA in brokering a joint understanding between the MEFCC minister and the DRMFSS of collaborating. Others in ACCRA offer additional insight into this brokering process, which began as early as 2013.

‘Brokering the conversation between Ato Kare [minister of MEFCC] and the DRMFSS is an important achievement for ACCRA – but actually we started working on this from late 2013. Certainly we raised this on the [ACCRA] steering committee around that time, once the transition from EPA to MEF had taken place, and MEF were back in the steering committee with the DRMFSS also attending.’

Mulugeta Worku, SCIP Project Coordinator, September 2012–May 2014

This story illustrates the effectiveness of many of ACCRA’s strategies – investing in long-term relationships with key ministries, being accepted as trusted advisers, identifying gaps (opportunities) in ministry priorities and pursuing them through action learning cycles, and playing a skilful brokering role. ACCRA were persistent in seeking to build bridges between the DRMFSS/NDRMC and MEFCC, and now this appears to be paying off, not only through the joint meeting between the two ministries that took place in May 2016, but also through the joint planning and piloting that has developed as a result. And while this evaluation has not been able to dig down into the ways in which adaptive capacity is being framed in this ongoing pilot work on mainstreaming DRR into woreda ADPs, or to determine the extent of community participation within this process, this work appears to comprise another significant element in ACCRA’s contribution to changes in DRR governance.

Contribution analysis for outcome 2: Adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks mainstreamed into DRR governance, supporting a more decentralised and participatory approach

In the introduction to section 6.2 we made the point that in evaluating the impact of ACCRA work on governance outcomes, what we would ideally wish to assess are the dynamics of that governance system – that is, the extent to which and reasons why that system is travelling in a particular direction – and that in order to understand this, ideally we would want to look across the many elements that go to make up that system, rather than for pragmatic reasons simplifying our focus on just two of those elements, as we have done above. These many elements include (as we listed in the introduction to Section 1 – Materialisation of outcome 2): policy (e.g. national Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Guidelines); tools (e.g. national Woreda Disaster Risk Profiling (WDRP) database; testing of an Area-Specific Multi-Hazard Multi-Sector Early-Warning System); and local practices (e.g. development of woreda-level pilots and plans); as well changes in governance relationships, including changes in horizontal relationships (e.g. collaboration between NDRMC and MEFCC on joint CRGE/DRR planning).

We finish therefore by briefly considering what it might mean to broaden our lens to the reality of these multiple elements working together to make up the DRR governance system and its dynamics. In this final reflection, we ask: how might it have changed our understanding – and
the contribution analysis – had we chosen also to consider the element of the PSNP CSI programme (see discussion of phase 3 above) which tested an approach to the development of DRM/A approaches in 11 of the PSNP woredas?

While we haven’t investigated this in detail, what immediately becomes clear is that through its lead role in the CSI initiative, CARE in Ethiopia also made a significant contribution to improving local-level planning and community ownership from a ‘climate smart’ perspective, including enhancing the flow of climate information, working in 24 of the PSNP woredas, and subsequently factoring in DRR perspectives in its work with 11 of these woredas. Moreover, in supporting this work on adaptive capacity building, it drew on its own CVCA tool and not on the LAC Framework, despite being familiar with the LAC framework as a member of the ACCRA steering committee. As a result, a number of models and experiences of adaptive capacity building in the context of DRR currently exist in Ethiopia, with one set of experiences residing in the two original pilot woredas (Wuchale and Ewa) supported by ACCRA, another set residing in the 11 PSNP woredas where CARE led on the CSI/DRR piloting work, and perhaps another set again in the 19 woredas where CRGE and DRR thinking is currently being mainstreamed into woreda ADPs.

In terms of contribution analysis, what this highlights is that as we lift the lens from a tractable analysis of two elements of governance, to a more complex analysis of multiple elements, so our perspective also shifts to a more systemic picture (alternative hypothesis iii) in which other actors (in this case CARE – see alternative hypothesis ii) play a significant role alongside ACCRA.

Notwithstanding this, we end this section by reflecting that from the perspective of the NDRMC, the contribution of ACCRA remains highly valued and therefore effective:

‘When I look to the future, I hope that our partnership with ACCRA will continue. NDRMC is a new structure. Staff will go to a new department. In the future more staff will become strong. We will need ACCRA support to train these staff. We need $650 per woreda to develop a plan. We have only developed 88 woreda risk profiles to date. We have a big gap because of funds. There is much work for us to do.’

Government Official, National Disaster Risk Management Commission
7 OUTCOME 3

Outcome 3: Local CRGE planning practices, which are gender sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity, mainstreamed within the Fast Track Investments (FTIs), Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Supporting the mainstreaming of people-centred adaptive capacity thinking into the policies and practices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoA&NR) was a second institutional change focus of ACCRA. It is of particular significance in the phase 2 work of ACCRA Ethiopia as it was positioned to contribute to the CRGE initiative, the central resilience/CCA initiative of the GoE. In working with CRGE, ACCRA Ethiopia also sought to introduce a new, decentralised and participatory perspective, thus staying aligned with its overall goal and the LAC framework from which it was derived.

7.1 MATERIALISATION OF OUTCOME 3

As with outcome 2, which focused on the mainstreaming of adaptive capacity thinking into DRR governance, there is an extensive evidence base to show that over the past five years, adaptive capacity thinking and frameworks have been mainstreamed into the governance of agricultural and rural livelihoods practices in Ethiopia. However, rather than define outcome 3 in terms of agricultural and rural livelihoods governance, as in outcome 2, for outcome 3 we drew a narrower boundary and focused on three elements of this broader governance picture – MoA&NR’s CRGE Fast Track FTIs, and its GTP II and GCF policies. These reflect the three main elements of CRGE governance within the MoA&NR that ACCRA claims to have advised and enable a more focused enquiry. We consider below the evidence for the materialisation of each of these elements.

(A) The CRGE Fast Track Investments were funded by DFID and the Austrian Development Agency and coordinated by the GoE’s CRGE unit, with MoFED taking the lead role. In January 2014 proposals were invited from across the six ministries leading on CRGE at the time, with 23 FTIs eventually selected in May and MoUs agreed with sectors in July. From the announcement of the FTI process to the submission of proposals, most ministries had one month or less to develop proposals that met the requirements of the FTI process. Submitted proposals were reviewed by MEF, MoFED and the National Planning Commission and shared with the CRGE Advisory Committee. Proposals were assessed as part of a week-long proposal assessment workshop, and reviewed against a set of evaluation criteria and their alignment with government policies and objectives.

Within the Ministry of Agriculture, the CRGE Unit coordinated the FTI process and used existing CRGE Strategies (GE and CR) and the Livestock Investment Plan as the basis for their proposals. Four separate but coherent proposals were submitted that contributed to an overall strategic proposal.

‘So, what we did is, we decided to pilot the CRGE strategy, as it is very huge, and it requires a step-by-step approach. We involved all regions, in essence, but within the regions we selected some fast track woredas or districts. And within the woredas, together with the regions and woredas, we selected 27 watersheds. Therefore, the broader boundary of the fast track investment is the woreda, but as woredas mostly are vast, within the woredas there are selected watersheds where the CRGE measures can be comprehensively piloted.’

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA&NR, 2012–2015
‘Even from the beginning the planning was focusing on climate vulnerable kebeles, so now the watersheds of those kebeles benefit through natural resource protection; rehabilitation; agricultural production increased.’

Usain Mume, Delegated office head, Agriculture office, Chiro woreda

We were able to gather extensive evidence to demonstrate that the MoA FTIs reflected an adaptive capacity approach, and that this was both people-centred and gender-sensitive. As highlighted in the final report of MoA’s FTI, the ‘agricultural fast track pilot project’ was successful in all its main output areas:

- Increased productivity of crops and coffee for 4,575 households (HH) through a range of soil fertility, crop management, water harvesting and improved irrigation practices.
- Increased productivity of livestock for 1,840 HH through climate smart agriculture (CSA) practices that also contribute to greenhouse gas emission reductions.
- Rehabilitation of degraded lands and conservation of productive lands through integrated natural resources management involving the participation of 4,780 HH.
- Resilience of farmers and pastoralists strengthened in 1,023 HH through a range of activities including rainwater harvesting, improving small scale irrigation, diversified vegetable production, and supply of drought resistant seeds.
- Improved capacity of national, regional and woreda level institutions involved in agricultural sector CRGE implementation through thematic trainings on climate change impacts and CSA practices for 50 regional, 370 woreda experts and 81 kebele level development agents.

‘Once we had selected Bilbilo as the fast track kebele, we went through discussion with the community. We identified the priority issues and the households to be involved. Then we started the actual activity on the ground: micro-basin construction, field site terracing, construction of gabions, soil and water conservation in general. And we distributed chickens to 90 HH, sheep to 250 HH, cows to 6 HH and 52 beehives.’

Ato Wagari, Head of Natural Resources Department, Akaki woreda

Most of the above bullet points are relevant to adaptive capacity development – the last three in particular. What also comes across in the report are the ways in which the project succeeded in innovating:

‘There were ups and downs. Especially shaping the project – as it involved an innovative way. We had many projects in the sector already – but our approach was to make harmony in all types of intervention – for CRGE you need to integrate – so you get the best resilience. So the components of the proposal were – in a selected village think about watershed management, co-productivity and efficiency, DRM, livestock management, and of course resilience. We drew best practices from the different components, making synergies across these, as part of the bigger ecosystem.’

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA&NR, 2012–2015

Others felt that the FTIs could have been more innovative:

‘The FTI was not designed to catalyse innovation. A desire to minimise delivery risk and fund activities in line with existing strategies limited the number of genuinely ‘new’ interventions funded via the FTI process in some sectors.’

LTS Review of the FTI process

What we heard from woreda officials suggested, however, a genuine governance shift (and innovation) towards better horizontal integration within woredas:

‘When the fast track came – we limited to only one kebele in the woreda. Within the kebele, the natural resource expert implemented what he planned; the agronomist implemented his plans; every sector implemented what they put on their plan. This is one
achievement. [In the past] we have seen many interventions on natural resource, agriculture, but what makes the FTI different from the others is that there is a coordination between the sectors – during planning, during implementation. For example, there is a livestock agency, there is the natural resource – if one gives an input, the other supports in another way, so that they are integrated together.’

Ahmed Mume, Livestock Development core process owner, and Daniel Worhu, Extension Officer, Agriculture office, Chiro woreda

‘Before this project every sector was running individually to implement its own roles and responsibilities. But now we are integrating between livestock, natural resources, irrigation and crop production because we understand that one sector is having an impact on the other, so we are working together.’

Ato Temesgen, Deputy Head, Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda

Ownership of the process by regional staff was also strong:

‘One of the strengths of the MoA FTI was that it was a coherent, strategic and time-efficient programme, with regional staff who participated in the [training] workshop having strong ownership of the programme.’

LTS Review of the FTI process

Of particular interest in the context of this evaluation are the ways in which the planning and implementation processes under the FTI succeeded in becoming more people-centred and gender-sensitive:

‘Some activities take time – e.g. healing degraded land, planting trees. Others you can see more quickly, e.g., the availability of water in interventions increased. For me the biggest achievement is how the thinking of stakeholders – especially the communities – has changed. They were the most expert in water resources availability – how they can integrate and how they can make resilient activities, so by the end the farmers were equally explaining what FTI is. Some of the farmers have been dramatically successful in improving their livelihoods and mitigating drought. But we have to be cautious, this is a very early finding – we would have to continue for another 5 years to see the effect.’

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA&NR, 2012–2015

Several of our key informants highlighted how the FTI experimented with a more participatory approach to community engagement. Thus, FTI project plans were prepared ‘based on the local context of the community by focusing on the needs, capacity and their perspectives which had a significant role for the beneficiaries to prioritise, decide and engage in livelihood improvement intervention based on their interest.’

‘Actually the programme is more participatory. The community dealt in every aspect – planning, implementation, evaluation. In pastoral areas we used elders as means of entry – to prioritise the problems – in highland areas we used the authorised leaders. We also have extension workers. We use them mostly so they participate in implementing and evaluating the whole programmes.’

Mustafa Abu, Senior MRV Expert, CRGE unit, MoA&NR

‘When we are planning we are meeting with the leaders of households. We can communicate what the problem of the community or kebele – we can discuss and prioritise their problems – then their sense of ownership. There are four sectors here – NR, crops, livestock, irrigation – so we put the plan but we need approval from the community. So the draft investment proposal is taken to the local community and they discuss on the issues – is this your problem; they prioritise; once they reach a consensus we start the plan.’

Endale Minda, Natural Resources core process owner, Chiro woreda
But this wasn’t simply about woreda officials offering lists of options to community members and asking them to prioritise. Issues that weren’t on these lists but were raised by the community were also discussed and prioritised:

‘If the discussion reflects the problem of the community, it is inserted in the plan. When the previous plan didn’t include pump for irrigation – when we discuss with the communities they say we need irrigation – how to bring water to the field. Once the committee was established – they made request to the woreda: it was included in the plan and implemented. Another example is shortage of animal fodder; this wasn’t in our plan at the start. And another is no cash crops – so we applied improved hens; beekeeping; goat fattening. There is a problem of cash. They are searching for income generating activities. They need to diversify.’
Ahmed Mume, Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro woreda

‘I was one of the planners to lead the discussion with the community. We started by asking them the big problems. The major one they raised was water. We identified the problems and then with the community voice we prioritised the issues. Some of the proposal issues – e.g. irrigation – weren’t relevant for that local area; the community rejected that one; they preferred drinking water and pond for livestock. So we inserted this issue in the plan.’
Merga Ayele, Agronomist, Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda

In terms of gender, too, there were innovations in the FTIs:

‘In the planning we tried to segregate youth and women from the men – the discussion was in terms of women and youth – mostly the beehives were distributed for the youths. For women they participate and they all agreed on the priority of water provision [drinking water] in the kebele. In addition there was training provided for the women – on horticulture – garden vegetable production, even the seeds. And we provided 200 fuel-efficient stoves for the women.’
Merga Ayele, Agronomist, Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda

‘There is the development group at the community level which is based on gender segregated activities – those groups bring on board their interests. Some requested for goats, other for hens. Based on their interest we added their issue. Now the women are benefited from this activity – from one hen they can earn 250 birr.’
Usman Mume, Delegated office head, and Daniel Worku, Extension Officer, Agriculture Office, Chiro woreda

We would however need further evidence beyond gender disaggregated group discussion to argue conclusively for a gender-sensitive planning process.

(B) Mainstreaming within MoA’s GTP II. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) is a five-year plan developed by the GoE’s National Planning Commission (NPC) to guide Ethiopia’s development. The first GTP was produced in 2010 and the second in 2015. The GTP process is an ‘in-house’ activity of the GoE, which involves extensive consultation with regional states and federal ministries

For those involved in CRGE, throughout 2014–2015 there was much interest in how the underlying thinking and strategic frameworks of CRGE could be integrated into the GTP II, as highlighted in the following comments (drawn from an earlier review) from those within the GoE:

‘We developed our GTP II in 2015. Integrating CRGE into this GTP II was a landmark, because every economic or social activity will take care of the environment. This is a big milestone for me.’
Ato Mehari Wondmagegn, MEFCC
‘The second GTP is more ambitious than before. So, with that ambitious plan we are pushing to those areas which have not got a chance in the first GTP. We are to expand them and we are also trying to scale-up from the previous GTP.’

Ato Wondimu, Minister for Energy, MoWIE

‘The green growth is accepted all over [by] the people, especially the rural people. Because the community are now accepting this green growth they are changing. Rehabilitating...it is very significant...there is significant rehabilitation in restoration of our ecosystem...for me the community are [already] aware of our green growth.’

Ghirmawit Haile, Director, MEFCC

Reflecting this local level focus, there are significant opportunities within GTP II to communicate CRGE more widely:

‘GTP-I was extremely well communicated in any woreda you go to, everyone knows what GTP is, even people in villages know what GTP is, so it's doable. There is an extensive network of staff all the way down to the woreda, even to the village level, even in the village level they go down to the farmer, they have one farmer to five, kind of one model farmer to five and if they want to spread messages they're very effective and so I think it's harnessing that more.’

Charlotte Stemmer, ACCRA Coordinator (2012–2014)

The responsibility for ensuring the mainstreaming of CRGE into GTP II lay with the MEFCC:

‘First we developed a guidelines/checklist for CRGE mainstreaming in GTP II. This was approved by the council of ministers and sent to the National Planning Commission [NPC], who disseminated it to federal sector offices. We also conducted an awareness creation programme at federal, region and woreda level, plus training for sectoral offices at all levels.

‘After that we did the evaluation of the draft GTP IIIs. We prepared a methodology to evaluate. We identified CRGE issues that had been missed and needed to be included in all the draft GTP-IIIs and then discussed and agreed these with MoFEC. Finally, the NPC organised a workshop where we presented the document in the presence of 12 sector ministers. They jointly evaluated. They raised some minor questions. Then they agree to submit incorporating the comments proposed by us. They agree to submit final document to the NPC.’

Habtamu Demboba, Environmental Economist, MEFCC

Clearly, an extensive process was undertaken to ensure effective integration of CRGE into GTP II, under the overall purview of the CRGE inter-ministerial umbrella committee – chaired by the prime minister. For this evaluation, our primary interest is to establish the extent to which the GTP II plan that was finally submitted by the MoA references the value of local CRGE planning practices, which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred. One of the limitations in assessing this element of outcome 3 is that we were given limited access to the relevant documents. Specifically, while we were shown the analysis of the early version of MoA's GTP II proposal undertaken by the small evaluation team within MEFCC, this analysis is in Amharic and a translation of the conclusions of this analysis was only produced as this report was being finalised (see Box 1 below). Furthermore, we have not been provided with access to the final version of the GTP II proposal, which would have demonstrated the extent to which the changes recommended by the evaluation team were adopted in practice. We were however given access to a summary document of the full GTP II.96
Box 1: Analysis of the proposals by the MEFCC evaluation team for revisions of MoA’s draft GTP II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue of interest in this evaluation</th>
<th>In what ways was this issue addressed in the draft?</th>
<th>What gaps did the MEFCC evaluation highlight and what recommendations did they make?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The need for local planning/investment processes that enable</td>
<td>One reference to adaptation but no mention of local adaptation approaches or of adaptive capacity (although the phrase ‘enhancing disaster preparedness capacity’ is used).</td>
<td>No recommendation on this issue, beyond a broad recommendation to ‘conduct capacity building’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The need for local adaptive capacity processes to be people centred</td>
<td>No reference to local, participatory or people-centred approaches.</td>
<td>No recommendation on this issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The need for local adaptive capacity processes to be gender sensitive</td>
<td>No reference to the need for gender-sensitive approaches.</td>
<td>Several recommendations made on gender, although in the context of farming methods rather than local adaptation/adaptive capacity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our main source of evidence has therefore been to rely on statements from those within MEFCC’s GTP II evaluation team, including one individual from ACCRA who was invited to participate in this team (see Section 7.2 below). Drawing on this evidence, the following statements indicate that the MoA’s GTP II document does reference the value of (local) CRGE planning practices which are enabling of adaptive capacity, are people-centred, and are gender-sensitive. Nonetheless, this evidence would benefit from stronger triangulation:

‘Relatively the MoA did better than other sectors. They understood better and there were already some adaptation elements and some mitigation elements in their draft GTP II before we evaluated it. The MoA already had its own CRGE strategy, and this was important for shaping their draft GTP II proposal. In terms of objectives, they didn’t mention CRGE, and in the strategy, they missed the mitigation part, but at the end, they incorporated most of the points we submitted.’

Habtamu Demboba, Environmental Economist, MEFCC

‘When MEFCC prepared the guideline [for CRGE mainstreaming in GTP II], we discussed with them how the guideline could include the flexible and forward looking decision making approach set out in the LAC framework – how to inform the planners, how to consider the uncertainties. We also recommended inclusion of gender aspects. But the final version of the guidelines has not yet been released. Maybe once reviewed by the National Planning Commission, the LAC framework will be endorsed. I know that Ghirmawit [Haile, Director, MEFCC] is keen.’

Dejene Biru, CRGE Technical Adviser (Nov 2012–August 2016), Acting ACCRA Coordinator (September 2016–present)

Finally, to what extent are the criteria of interest to us in this evaluation reflected in the summary document (policy matrix) of the full GTP II? A rapid analysis of this document reveals the following:

- In its introduction, the scope and coverage of the policy matrix includes explicit reference to Ethiopia’s CRGE Strategy.
- From a MoA perspective, the policy matrix includes tables which cover both Agricultural Development and Rural Transformation – with the designated lead agency as MoANR.
Many of the MoA objectives and outputs include a local level focus, although only one output refers specifically to increased resilience (‘strengthened capacity as a result of the climate resilient green economy strategy’). Nonetheless, several other outputs (e.g. ‘ensured household level food security’) are closely linked to increased resilience.

One output within Table 2 takes account of gender (‘increased crop productivity of female headed households’). Elsewhere, the policy matrix includes a full section on ‘women and children development’ (Table 19), whose objectives include: ‘increase economic benefit for women’; ‘increase women’s decision-making’; and ‘increase women’s participation in building good governance, democratisation and development’.

The policy matrix also includes reference to the overall goal of ‘democratic system building’, including ‘strengthening the federal system by deepening citizens’ participation and democratic culture’.

(C) Mainstreaming within the Green Climate Fund proposal. Early in 2015 the GoE through its CRGE Facility began the process of applying for accreditation under the Green Climate Fund; this accreditation was eventually granted to MoFEC in March 2016. In parallel with this process, MoFEC invited the six ministries leading on CRGE, which include the MoA, to develop proposals to the GCF. However, the evidence that we have been able to assemble to date is limited in how much it reveals the extent to which the MoA’s GCF proposal reflected the value of local CRGE planning practices, which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred. Specifically, we have not been able to access either drafts of the proposal, the final proposal, or the revised proposal that was combined with elements of the Forestry and Water proposals and submitted to the GCF in South Korea.

What we have been able to establish, however, is the following:

- The MoA proposal drew on the work of the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, a collaboration between the World Food programme (WFP) and Oxfam America (OA) that works with the PSNP in Ethiopia to enable vulnerable rural households to increase their food and income security in the face of increasing climate risks.
- The R4 initiative applies an integrated risk management strategy that combines four components: improved resource management through asset creation (risk reduction), insurance (risk transfer), livelihoods diversification and microcredit (prudent risk taking) and savings (risk reserves), thus reflecting the value of local CRGE planning practices which are enabling of adaptive capacity.
- The approach is also people-centred, in that farmers contribute their labour to risk-reduction activities identified through participatory assessment and planning.
- A further component of the MoA’s GCF proposal drew on good early warning – early-action practices being developed through the DRMFSS’s Area-Specific, Multi-Hazard, Multi-Sector Early-Warning System (see outcome 2).

While we have not been able to access MoA’s proposal, a further piece of evidence was offered by a respondent to the evaluation:

‘There is a section related to woreda-level planning in the late draft version [of MoA’s proposal]. In this draft it is noted that: “this activity aims to address institutional deficiencies relating to climate-informed planning and budgeting through establishing and/or strengthening Woreda-based integrated planning and budgeting systems (e.g. institutionalise guidelines and manuals) and supporting effective roll-out of MRV practices (e.g. mainstreaming manuals).”

Anonymous
7.2 SALIENT CAUSAL STORIES

In this section, we identify and describe the possible interventions that may have contributed to the mainstreaming of approaches to local CRGE planning which are gender sensitive, people-centred and enabling of adaptive capacity within the MoA’s FTIs, GTP II and GCF) policies. At this stage, however, we make no judgements on the weight of different contributions. As for outcome 2, we focus especially on the participation and role played by ACCRA, the object of this review.

Whereas for practical reasons we chose to select three elements of outcome 3 as the focus for the contribution analysis, through the causal stories we are able to draw out a richer picture of the progressive development of adaptive capacity work within the MoA, referring to many more elements of this dynamic system than in the previous section.

7.2.1 The ACCRA causal story

As in the contribution analysis for outcome 2, we trace the ACCRA causal story by focusing first on ACCRA’s cross-cutting change processes (strategies) and then on the main institutional change process that contributed to outcome 3.

Strategy 1: Policy influencing through being accepted as trusted advisers and long-term partners.

As noted under outcome 2, this first strategy of ACCRA in Ethiopia was built on the core assumption that in order to advise government, it would need first to be accepted as a trusted adviser, and that in order to do this, it would need to build long-term partnerships with key government ministries. For outcome 3, the primary institutional change process that shaped this outcome was a little different from that shaping outcome 2, in that in this case the pathway started by building a relationship with the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA, precursor of the MEFCC)\textsuperscript{105}, the government agency tasked with championing the CRGE initiative during this period,\textsuperscript{106} and then later switched to the MoA&NR, as significant opportunities for CRGE development opened up within this ministry.

Initial development of this institutional change process took almost a year from the start of ACCRA phase 2. While ACCRA Ethiopia had already established a relationship with the MoA in phase 1, it was necessary to build a new relationship with the EPA. This work was championed by Charlotte Stemmer, who, supported by the ACCRA Ethiopia steering committee, led on the negotiation of an MoU with the EPA to develop a local CRGE pilot.

‘One of the strengths of ACCRA is that they are very focused – they know what they are good at. They work with only a few sectors, but they do something that is useful. This gives them comparative advantage, and they avoid duplication with others. MoFEC encourages all partners to avoid duplication.’

Government Official, MoFEC

This MoU was further strengthened by the recruitment of staff who had good ties with the EPA.

‘My relationship with MEFCC goes back a long way – to the days when it was the EPA and I was with the Oromia Land and Environmental protection Bureau, where I led the regional team to develop the regional Programme of Adaption to Climate Change (July–Sept 2011). This was even while the EPA was beginning work on CRGE. I knew the people leading the EPA in those days – Dr Tewoldeberihan G/Egzabeher and Ato Dessalegn Mesfin.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator
At the end of the local CRGE pilot, which ran from November 2012 to March 2014, an agreement was reached with the MoA to draw on the guidelines, relationships, investment plans, insights, and learning developed through this pilot and apply these in the context of MoA’s FTI programme. Running back through ACCRA’s work with the DRMFSS on DRR/CCA mainstreaming, and the relationship built with the MoA during ACCRA phase 1, it was in some ways relatively easy to progress the work of the pilot through a new ministry.

At the same time, with the official announcement of the new MEF in March 2014, which transferred the powers of the EPA to a new ministry, but also took the responsibility for forestry away from the MoA and relocated this within the MEF, ACCRA’s engagement with the MoA was put under strain, certainly for the remainder of 2014. As a result, rebuilding a solid relationship with the MoA took some time:

‘It can feel really difficult to be seconded to a government organisation. You need to fit their system. Ahmed had a hard time. Before I joined, MoA wrote a letter – we don’t want to work with ACCRA. We had undertaken the evaluation of the local CRGE pilot without telling MoA, so they shut down the evaluation. And Oxfam doesn’t want to give money – only time and expertise. That is why there can be confusion between the MoA and ACCRA. Logically I agree with Oxfam but you need to convince the ministry.’

‘A big challenge is that the Ministry doesn’t feel they have gaps. So you talk to them and ask them how it works. Then you bring in your question. I prepared ten issues. Then I played around and convinced [them using two of these]. Honestly speaking they have a huge gap technically. Especially in adaptation frameworks. And in preparing project frameworks. They have very rich knowledge but they don’t know how to apply it.’

Yosef Welderufael, CRGE Technical Adviser, August 2015–November 2016

As with the DRMFSS, secondment of staff to the MoA, in the form of ‘policy support’, has proved to be an important way of building and maintaining trust, and has resulted in the development of a good, sustainable – and indeed unique – relationship with the MoA during phase 2:

‘I spend 2 days per week at the Ministry of Agriculture. This is our MoU. But it depends – if they need me I go every day. We need to fit to their system. On other 3 days I support the ACCRA team – the work we can’t bring to one sector. And it is building resilience into the agenda of Oxfam.’

Yosef Welderufael, CRGE Technical Adviser, August 2015–November 2016

‘The secondment approach is very useful for us, giving us well-qualified and high level people. ACCRA really work with us as a team – it is good for both organisations to create a link and trust. We are careful with whom we accept as secondees – we don’t accept all requests.’

Government Official, MoFEC

But there are some who caution that there is a fine line between acting as ‘trusted advisers, and getting drawn into too much routine work:

‘ACCRA is a pioneer of the embedded approach – first with DRMFSS and MoA, later with MEFCC. It is not easy, but they make it work. It is because they are good communicators. Instead of criticising the gaps in the government, they are trying their best to fill the gaps.’

‘But a balance is needed, or you get drawn into routine work. Maintaining your leadership role [as a trusted adviser] means focusing on things government staff can’t do, and then mentoring their staff rather than doing it all yourself.’

Gebru Jember, GGGI Adviser, MEFCC
Strategy 2: Systemic intermediation – seeking to strengthen and/or realign vertical and horizontal connections within the way that the MoA works on CRGE governance issues

For outcome 2 we saw how ACCRA’s work to advise policy change involved more than simply building long-term relationships with government partners – it also involved directly intervening in existing governance systems, by seeking to strengthen and/or transform vertical and horizontal relationships within these systems.

This was also a key feature of ACCRA’s approach in its work with the EPA/MEF and the MoA on mainstreaming an approach, building adaptive capacity through local, gender sensitive and people-centred CRGE planning. Examples include the following:

- Encouraging greater gender-sensitivity and responsiveness to local knowledge and priorities by woreda officials, and encouraging alignment with this approach at regional and federal level (vertical realignment) – for example through training of trainers.
- Encouraging (horizontal) collaboration, especially at woreda level, between different ministries in working with communities to build local adaptive capacity.

Strategy 3: A responsive and flexible approach to capacity building.

As with outcome 2, ACCRA adopted a responsive and flexible approach to capacity building in working with the EPA/MEF and then with the MoA in shaping its contribution to outcome 3. This drew on a range of different approaches including: training of trainers; learning by doing/piloting (see action research and learning – below); building understanding of government officials through ‘trusted advice’ (learning through subtle advising rather than training); learning through planning and acting together; and building relational capacity through mediating and strengthening relationships between different government ministries, and between different levels of governance.

Carefully designed and targeted training nevertheless played a key role in this institutional pathway:

“At the beginning [of the local CRGE pilot] the ACCRA adviser gave us training on climate change and how to adapt. But at that time we didn’t believe it was true. But then we realised that there is inconsistency with rainfall. Traditionally the farming period is from April to June. But sometimes it is being diverted from this. Either late or early onset of the rains. So it is obvious that climate is changing in the woreda. Based on the training, the work on the ground is justifiable by the community. There is a big change for the community.”

Ahmed Mume, Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro woreda

Strategy 4: Action researching and learning.

A final strategy employed by ACCRA Ethiopia was to support policy influencing, capacity building and systemic intermediation through an ‘action researching and learning’ approach. In the way it approaches its work on local adaptive capacity mainstreaming within CRGE planning processes and policies, there is appreciation by the GoE of ACCRA’s action learning approach:

“Ethiopia is very diverse in its agro-ecology, socio-economic situations and vulnerability to climate related issues. Implementation for such a diversified situation is quite difficult for us – government by itself cannot give solutions for all parts of the country. ACCRA helps us through a learning-by-doing sort of capacity building.”

Government Official, MoA&NR

Action researching is also an iterative process, which starts out with an identified need and then seeks to address this by learning from experiences of testing, implementing, and case studies, supplemented by insights from other relevant research. In the case of ACCRA’s institutional change process towards outcome 3, five (overlapping) cycles or phases of action researching...
can be traced. These five phases together comprise the main institutional change process leading to outcome 3. Each phase begins by responding to a ‘gap’ or need identified by the unfolding CRGE initiative, and/or by exploiting opportunities associated with this gap.

**Phase 1 (2012–2014) Negotiation and implementation of the national pilot on local CRGE planning**

As recounted above, the first phase of ACCRA’s work on local CRGE planning practices began by negotiating with the EPA to undertake a ‘local CRGE pilot’ process. This negotiation was supported by the ACCRA Ethiopia steering committee and resulted in the agreement in October 2012 of an MoU with the EPA to develop a pilot project on local CRGE planning. This MoU was further strengthened by the agreement of additional funding, awarded through DFID’s Strategic Climate Investments Programme (SCIP), to support the CRGE pilot. Initially the agreement was to conduct a national pilot on local level CRGE planning, focusing on four woredas in two regions, and leading to the agreement of CRGE investment plans (Nov 2012–March 2014), and then to implement these investment plans through a second phase of SCIP funding. In practice, however, only the first phase of SCIP-funded work took place. A diagram of this piloting work, including key events, processes and outputs, is shown in Figure 3 below:
Key events, processes and outputs included:

- selection by the EPA of Oromia and Somali as the pilot regions (Nov 2012), followed by the selection of Chiro and Midhega Tola woredas in Oromia region, and Awbere and Hadigala woredas in Somali region; establishment of a woreda task force and woreda launch workshops;
- development and then validation of woreda CRGE planning guidelines, drawing on a capacity assessment undertaken at regional and woreda levels (March to August 2013);
- capacity building and training undertaken at regional, zonal and woreda levels, drawing on these guidelines, and involving experts, community representatives, academia, and private sector actors;
- development of woreda investment plans for priority sectors (Sept 2013 to Feb 2014), followed by ‘validation of these investment plans through a series of workshops held at woreda, regional and federal levels (March 2014), with the plans then submitted to sector line ministries.

In technical terms, these investment plans prioritised a mix of activities primarily related to strengthening climate resilience, those primarily related to enhancing the green economy, and those related to both CR and GE. Differences in investment plans across the four woredas reflected differences in agro-climatic conditions, and in what was prioritised within the communities. Equally significant, however, in terms of local adaptive capacity strengthening, were the process innovations introduced through these woreda CRGE investment planning processes (see Box 2).

**Box 2: What was different about the woreda CRGE investment planning process developed through the CRGE pilot?**

- Bottom up as well as top down – woreda CRGE investment plans reflected local climate vulnerabilities and development priorities (i.e. pro-poor) as well as priorities of the CRGE vision and strategies (i.e. pillars and priority sectors of the national CRGE strategy contextualised to local conditions)
- Multiple sectors, issues, and levels – Participatory and inclusive planning process enabled engagement of multiple sectors as well inputs from woreda, regional and federal levels
- Integration of knowledges – Planning drew on both scientific and local knowledge
- Gender sensitive – Integration of gender considerations into the planning process and investment plans
- Capacity building – stakeholders involved in the planning process acquired new knowledge and skills through a mix of training, dialogue and knowledge-sharing (e.g. through case studies and evaluation reports)
- Plans prioritised a mix of GE and CR solutions – but fell short of a focus on ‘flexible and forward looking decision making’
- The integrated planning process identified cross-cutting initiatives that could lead to significant synergies and efficiencies being generated at woreda level

Ahmed Said, who joined ACCRA at the same time as Dejene Biru and led the local CRGE planning process in the Somali region, reflects on his experience of the pilot:

‘In Somali region we established two woreda committees as well as a regional level committee. The woreda teams were from the agriculture bureau, water, disasters, health, education, women affairs, all these sectors were among the committees, led by the district administrator. ACCRA’s role was as a facilitator, and to provide technical back-stopping. We provided a 5-day training at the regional level to the woreda teams before
they were involved in the planning, which started in late 2013. Two trainings based on the guidelines we had produced.

‘It was a long process. It wasn’t easy. The process was multi-sectoral. About 6 months. Technically it was new; the concept of climate change was new to the experts. Although we had provided the training, the gap between the day of training and the day they started planning was long. So we were obliged to provide backstopping again. It took us our energy. The lesson is to provide training just before they start planning.’


In our conversations with woreda staff and community members in Chiro woreda, a number gave examples of how gender considerations had been integrated into the planning process and investment plans:

‘We gave a training for the community, a mix of men and women. What are the causes or the effects that makes women vulnerable to climate change – we listed those, even for the men – and what are the adaptive capacities to climate change? Then we discussed how we can address this problem. At home, how can women survive? We discussed in the presence of men – the women requested this. If it is suitable for you, you can support us in constructing this hen’s houses or goats. Based on that we bring…’

Ahmed Mume, Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro woreda

‘During planning we involved community representatives including gender representatives. In some issues the problem of women can be overlooked. They were able to raise women-related issues – e.g. Midhega Tola one lady says we are walking more than 25 km to fetch water – then they prioritise water. If that lady hadn’t been in planning team we wouldn’t have heard that. We shared this experience more widely to help illustrate gender sensitivity.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator

The testimonies of women involved in implementing these investment plans provide evidence of the gender-sensitive changes that resulted:

‘The difference is the participation of women in the CRGE. Before women’s participation was less. CRGE trained us how to save using energy saving stoves, how to reduce the pressure on the forest – with a small amount of fuel wood we can prepare more foods. And we are the ones who are leading to take care of the chickens – we sell the eggs ton by ton – one ton is for one lady, one ton is for the next one – for saving and income generating purpose. Even I learned how to make bee keeping and I can make the material for the beehive. Now we are sharing the experience we get to our neighbours, to give them the chances and privileges in the future.’

Amintu Amadu (woman), Yabdo Shembako kebele, Chiro woreda
Phase 2 (2014–2016) Contributing to the MoA’s Fast Track Investment programme

As already noted, the process of gearing up for the FTIs and producing proposals was extremely rapid, with most ministries being given one month of less for this purpose (see Section 2A on ‘materialisation of outcome 3’). Against this background, MoA performed well, developing a coherent proposal that was accepted without revision, and in the longer term, producing a ‘coherent, strategic and time-efficient programme’.112

To help gear up rapidly for the development of proposals, the MoA set up a technical committee. Charlotte Stemmer, who was seconded to the MoA at that time, suggested that Mulugeta Worku (ACCRA coordinator of the SCIP project) should join this committee:

‘Agriculture FTI was the first proposal of its kind. We didn’t know how to prepare a very well-polished proposal, but with the help of the technical committee – a team of some 11 or 12 persons – we were able to do a good job. The committee included the [MoA’s] CRGE unit, which I was coordinating at the time, and several directors from the ministry – natural resources [where the CRGE unit was housed], livestock and fishery, soil, extension agriculture, disaster risk, and food security. In addition, ACCRA, Echnoserve and the Climate Change Forum (CCF-E) were invited to join us.’

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA, 2012–2015

It appears that the ACCRA steering committee also played an important role in ensuring that ACCRA was invited to sit on MoA’s FTI technical committee:

‘The ACCRA steering committee played an important role, providing buy-in from senior staff in government, which in turn facilitated ACCRA’s day-to-day activities and provided strategic oversight for ACCRA in Ethiopia. For example, the decision for the ACCRA coordinator to be more involved in the MoA CRGE Unit, and to contribute to the development of the Climate Resilience (CR) strategy for the MoA, was fostered within the steering committee.’

Charlotte Stemmer, ACCRA Ethiopia Coordinator, 2012–2014

As a result, ACCRA was able to make a significant contribution to the development of the proposal:

‘The structure of the guidelines developed through the local CRGE pilot (from Aug 2013) was used to shape the overall FTI proposal – particularly in developing five of the six outcome areas.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator

‘The Ministry requested its partners to support proposal development. ACCRA provided technical support to develop activity strands to be implemented by MoA, which included one for crop producing areas and one for pastoral regions. Echnoserve and CCF-E also wrote two further proposals in which they were the lead implementers. The details of the proposal and menu of climate-smart activities were communicated to Regional Bureaus. These bureaus then selected the target woredas and the climate smart activities which would be suitable for implementation in their woreda.’
Some woredas had already undergone participatory CRGE planning supported by ACCRA. The implementation budget was divided between regions based on population.’

LTS Review of the FTI process

Although ACCRA’s role in the FTI was of a lighter touch than in the pilots, it nevertheless made a significant contribution, not only to the development of the proposals, but also in helping to frame the FTI approach through a series of validation and launch workshops:

‘In August [2014] Manesh and I attended all three launch workshops involving the 27 selected FTI woredas – this was done in 3 clusters. I presented on ACCRA’s experience of working on the local CRGE pilots and on the lessons learned. I shared the need to communicate with local communities. After the launch workshops each woreda selected its FTI kebele and then applied this approach. All matched a top down approach to bottom up priorities.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator

As noted by Dejene Biru, one of ACCRA’s contributions at these workshops was clarification of how to manage the governance dynamic between top down and bottom up priorities:

‘We shared how to proceed, how to contextualise into the woreda level – e.g. in the proposal there is an outcome on irrigation – but there are woredas with no river and groundwater – so this proposal wouldn’t hold for those woredas – at the woreda level they need to change the outcomes on the proposal – e.g. Midhega Tola – there is no river within 25km. So we discussed how to work with the communities to localise the approach – drawing on the experience of the pilot task force and especially how coordination between federal, provincial and woredas was managed.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator

This dynamic played out in interesting ways in the Somali region, highlighting a tension between CRGE planning and implementation:

‘The selection of the two woredas in the Somali region was strongly contested. The regional bureau wanted to drop both of the CRGE pilot woredas and give 2 new woredas a chance. But Awbare woreda successfully argued that they should be kept as an FTI woreda because they needed further support to move from investment planning to implementation. The region potentially didn’t understand the logic of moving from planning to implementation.’

Dejene Biru, Acting ACCRA Coordinator

The three woredas that were selected to take forward the investment plans developed through the local CRGE planning pilot continued to apply what they had learned from ACCRA and others during the pilot stage:

‘There are several outcomes of the FTI. Degraded lands are now rehabilitated and starting to give services for the community, such as fodder, and an improved groundwater level. Soil erosion and floods are stopped. And the community is able to plant different vegetables and fruits on their homesteads, like mango and papaya.

‘But for us an important outcome has been to develop our skill in terms of planning. In the pilot, ACCRA was leading the training and planning in CRGE; in the fast track ACCRA’s involvement was limited. So when FTI started we applied what we had gained from ACCRA, with the financial support from the MoA.’

Endale Minda, Natural Resources core process owner, and Ahmed Mume, Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro woreda

While familiar to the three FTI woredas who had previously been involved in the local CRGE planning pilot, the material presented by ACCRA at the launch workshops was
also valued by some of the ‘new’ FTI woredas, as evidenced by our interviews with woreda officials from Akaki:

‘As well as their presentation at the launch workshop ACCRA shared the local CRGE planning guidelines. From the guidelines we used mostly the methodology – how to go with the plan, stepwise – how to participate the community – identification of problems by the community and prioritise main issues – we referred to the steps and methodologies. Plus we were referred to investment plans of those four woredas in the ACCRA pilot.’

Merga Ayele, Agronomist, Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda

Phase 3 (2014–2015) Inputting to the MoA’s GTP II and Green Climate Fund proposal

A third cycle of action learning started in late 2014, while the FTI programme was getting under way. In spite of tensions with the MoA, ACCRA kept lines open with the ministry, and in November 2014 MoA asked for ACCRA’s support in helping to shape its GTP II, a task that was initially allocated to Ahmed Said. Ahmed’s contribution was to ensure that MoA’s draft GTP II adequately reflected CRGE issues, including some of the activities in the FTI proposal:

‘ACCRA helps us develop our capacity for doing bigger projects in climate change and accessing international resources. For example, to develop our Green Climate Fund proposal, they helped us with the baseline data collection and analysis. This is the kind of ‘software’ that ACCRA offers.’

Anonymous

Subsequently, Dejene Biru was invited to join the small GTP II evaluation team set up by MEFCC to assess consistency with CRGE. Given that the GTP II development process was not open to scrutiny outside government, ACCRA’s role here was privileged. Throughout this process Dejene worked alongside three staff from MEFCC, one from MoFEC, and a consultant to MoFEC from Addis Ababa University. As already noted:

‘When MEFCC prepared the guideline [for CRGE mainstreaming in GTP II], we discussed with them how the guideline could include the flexible and forward looking decision making approach set out in the LAC framework – how to inform the planners, how to consider the uncertainties. We also recommended inclusion of gender aspects.’

Dejene Biru, CRGE Technical adviser (Nov 2012–August 2016), Acting ACCRA Coordinator (September 2016–present)

Also around this time (early 2015), ACCRA was invited by MEFCC to make a presentation on the Green Climate Fund, to help orient the six ministries leading on CRGE. Subsequently MEFCC invited each of these ministries to develop a proposal for potential submission to the GCF, and set up a central coordination forum to review these. Again, ACCRA was invited to participate in the forum, alongside GGGI, CDKN and the six ministries.

ACCRA also provided technical advice specifically to support the development of the MoA’s GCF proposal. Initially this was provided by Ahmed Said, and then after he left, by Yosef Welderufael, who was embedded in MoA for two days per week. With Manesh Agrawal, Yosef made the links to the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, and facilitated a meeting between the CRGE Unit in the MoA and Oxfam America. ACCRA also suggested to the MoA that their GCF proposal could incorporate aspects of the work being undertaken through the Early Warning – Early Action project, upscaling it from the six woredas where it was being piloted.

Phase 4 (2015–2016) Further piloting work for the MoA, as part of a second phase of FTI

The arrival of Yosef in the ACCRA team made a significant contribution towards restoring the relationship between ACCRA and the MoA, which had become strained during 2014 and faced continuing uncertainties while Ahmed Said was briefly embedded with the MoA in early 2015. Manesh Agrawal, who was ACCRA coordinator at the time, was called upon to manoeuvre skilfully:
'We took decision to revive the partnership [with the MoA]. We tried to see what are the areas where we can add value – we picked up three or four. I prepared a ToR and said to them – what do you think? How to convince them this is for their benefit not ours? Then we managed to recruit Yosef – they needed a technical person – that is what they liked – they didn’t want a strategic coordinator. Before I left I had a meeting with the director and he said they were very happy with Yosef.'

Manish Agrawal, ACCRA Coordinator, July 2014–June 2016

The outcome is a new series of relatively short (one-year) pilot projects:

‘The first will develop climate information services in Tigray. The second will provide training for extension workers to build adaptive capacity for communities. We have good training at federal and regional levels but not down to the community level – this will begin to provide this. And the third is to assess gender issues. Women are hit hardest by climate change issues, so unless we include gender then building local adaptive capacity will not be fulfilled.’

Anonymous

Yosef describes this fourth phase of work with the MoA as a ‘second phase of FTI’:

‘When I joined ACCRA I immediately started reviewing project implementation of FTI. I saw a number of gaps – introducing a simple evaluation framework; providing missing climate information; and providing training in local adaptive capacity. We have also designed a ToR to mainstream gender issues in the FTI. All these are linked to the use of the LAC framework.’

Yosef Welderufael, CRGE Technical Adviser, August 2015–November 2016

In this second phase of the FTI, work has expanded to an additional eight woredas:

‘Participants at the final FTI workshop [in March 2016] appreciated the programme – but were sceptical as to whether it could be scaled. Since I left the CRGE unit, MoA are trying to expand the FTI approach in more woredas – but the best way would be to consolidate and move gradually – there should have been resource allocated to scaling up existing activities. I don’t know the fate of these woredas – whether the proposal was accepted or allocated extra money.’

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA, 2012–2015

A central contribution of ACCRA in this new FTI work is on mainstreaming climate information services, which they are piloting in one woreda in Tigray province. The training for extension workers at woreda level is also linked to building adaptive capacity.

Phase 5 (2014–present) National Capacity Development Programme (NCDP)

A final strand of ACCRA’s work with the MoA focuses on the National Capacity Development Programme for CRGE. While much of this work has been developed through ACCRA’s relationship with the MEFCC, ACCRA’s role in this work is now focusing on the MoA.

The idea of the NCDP was first discussed in late 2014, responding to recognition that a very ambitious capacity building programme would be needed if Ethiopia’s development trajectory was to transition from low to middle income status in a way that was underpinned by CRGE principles. Funding soon followed from DFID and Norway, and a National Task Force was created to begin to shape the programme.

From the outset, ACCRA took an active role in the Task Force, feeding into the development of a capacity building framework and the initial capacity assessment coordinated by GGGI, particularly from a gender perspective.
In 2016, a key decision was taken for the NCDP to be rolled out in a decentralised way at the federal level, with responsibility given to ministries rather than the process being managed by MEFCC. In this context, Oxfam Hong Kong recently came forward with an offer to invest in MoA’s NCDP, which means that ACCRA will be one of the team to facilitate NCDP for the MoA.

### 7.2.2 Other possible causal stories

For outcome 2 we developed three alternative causal stories, the first two (as for ACCRA’s story) centred around particular actors, while the third was a more systemic story. For outcome 3 the evidence again pointed to two alternative causal stories centred around particular actors, and a third, more systemic story.

The first alternative hypothesis is that the private sector actor Echnoserve played a significant role in shaping all three elements of outcome 3. The second is that GGGI Ethiopia, given its unique position within CRGE developments in Ethiopia, played a significant role. Our third hypothesis is more systemic, and proposes that no single actor played a leading role in shaping the three elements of outcome 3 under investigation, but rather that these were shaped through a combination of actors, potentially including ACCRA, Echnoserve, GGGI and many others.

**Alternative hypothesis (i): Echnoserve makes a significant contribution**

Our primary reason for focusing on Echnoserve Consulting is that it played a significant cross-cutting role in MoA’s FTI programme and a lead role in writing MoA’s GCF proposal. However, we have not been able to establish whether or not it played a role in shaping the MoA’s GTP II proposal.

On its website, Echnoserve describes itself as ‘a local sustainable development, environmental and energy consulting firm with over seven years of experience working in climate change issues including vulnerability and adaptation, policy analysis, baseline development, as well as monitoring and evaluation.’ Its clients and partners include a range of ministries in the GoE (EPA/MEF, MoA, MoWIE), as well as a number of donors (DFID Ethiopia, GGGI Ethiopia, UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank). This source of evidence suggests that Echnoserve offers expertise in the areas of vulnerability and adaptation, although we have not specifically analysed its approach in these areas. We also know that Echnoserve has undertaken a number of pieces of work for the MoA, including recent work on training for woreda extension workers (phase 4, above), and on developing a costed proposal for the NCDP (phase 5, above).

We were not able to interview Echnoserve for this evaluation, so our main sources of evidence are from the statements of others, and from relevant reports. In its contribution to the MoA’s FTI, Echnoserve led on one of the four work packages, concerned with ‘technical assistance and capacity building on M&E, MRV and long term investment plan for agricultural sector CRGE fast track initiatives’. In terms of Echnoserve’s contribution to local CRGE planning practices which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred within this FTI programme – the focus of this evaluation – we found a number of potentially relevant claims in the final report of this FTI, as shown in Box 3.
Box 3: Deliverables and achievements by Echnoserve in MoA’s FTI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverable</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training provided</td>
<td>Regional staff were trained jointly with Federal CRGE coordination unit in various thematic areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability assessment guideline</td>
<td>This guideline aimed to provide broader understanding on how to conduct community and household vulnerability assessment. The adaptation option could be developed into practical implementation plan at regional and woreda level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot word baseline study report</td>
<td>This report presents benchmark information on CRGE pilot watershed about socio-economic characteristics of the people, vulnerability situation, GHG emission and other relevant data, which are useful later to provide a comparison for assessing the net effect of future performance of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woreda-wide long-term investment plan</td>
<td>This document offers the type of investment needed for farmers, pastoral and agro-pastoralist own and communal lands, which are useful for reduction of GHG through CSA intervention and reducing vulnerability to better combat the impact of climate change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of Echnoserve’s contribution to the MoA’s GCF proposal, we were unable to establish the extent to which (i) the MoA’s GCF proposal reflected the value of local CRGE planning practices, which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred; and (ii) Echnoserve’s contribution served to reinforce or subtract from these themes.

**Alternative hypothesis (ii): GGGI Ethiopia plays a significant role**

GGGI Ethiopia is an organisation that has played a substantial role in shaping the CRGE agenda in Ethiopia. In a review undertaken in 2015, the lead author of this current evaluation report showed how GGGI Ethiopia has played a strategic and formative role from the outset of the CRGE initiative (2011 onwards), and continues to be seen as a ‘trusted adviser’ by several government ministries, while receiving strong financial support from DFID and the Norwegian embassy in particular. The current ‘capability statement’ on GGGI’s website lists the following CRGE activities among its achievements in Ethiopia:

- CRGE Facility Capitalisation: GGGI facilitated the development, approval and disbursement of over $20 million of Fast Track Investments through the CRGE Facility, which has led to further resource mobilisation.
- Climate Resilience Strategies: GGGI supported the development of the GoE’s Climate Resilience Strategies for Agriculture, Forest, Water, Irrigation and Energy.
- GGGI inputs on mainstreaming climate resilient and green economy principles have been incorporated into Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan II (2015–2020).
- GGGI’s advisers have supported the GoE in identifying priorities areas in the agriculture, forestry, energy and industry sectors for Green Climate Fund project proposal development.
- GGGI has helped improve planning systems and economic and development indicators at macro and sector levels.
- GGGI developed the New Climate Economy (NCE) Ethiopia urbanisation and NCE growth study.
- GGGI supported the GoE in developing private sector engagement strategy for the CRGE Facility.
- GGGI assisted in the establishment of the Environment and Climate Research Center.
- GGGI is leading the National Capacity Development Programme for CRGE implementation.

The first four of these are of particular interest in the context of this evaluation. In terms of the FTI, GGGI is credited as playing a major role in developing the FTI approach, and Sertse Sebuh at the MoA also mentioned to us their contribution specifically in the context of his own ministry’s FTI:
'GGGI was also a driver in the process, especially in designing the CRGE strategy for agriculture.'

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA, 2012–2015

However, we were unable to find any evidence that GGGI made a specific contribution in terms of promoting the value of local CRGE planning practices within the FTI, which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred. The only exception to this we found was in the CRGE Fast Track Investment Process Appraisal Criteria (February 2014), to which we understand GGGI contributed. These appraisal criteria include one on co-benefits, which are defined as 'The impacts of the project on wider economic, social or environmental vulnerability. For example, on poverty reduction, accelerating growth, or improving the status of women.'

In terms of GGGI’s contribution to MoA’s GTP II, the 2015 review for GGGI established that, like ACCRA, GGGI had been given a privileged role as one of a very small number of outside organisations invited to advise on GTP II development:

‘I was asked to help MEFCC to develop some guidance for sectors on integration, which seemed to go well and was tremendously well received by Ministers across government…but it felt like a missed opportunity to take a more explicitly economic approach that spoke to political priorities. It comes down to a question of whether we are trying to find a new way of ‘doing climate’ or a new way of ‘doing economic growth’. I feel like I failed to communicate that and have that conversation with MEF Ministers – I can’t work out why, but it’s part of learning to understand how to work with them as a trusted adviser.’

Dan Yeo, GGGI Adviser (MoWIE), June 2013–December 2015

Finally, GGGI’s advisers were also involved in supporting the GoE in identifying priority areas in the agriculture, forestry, energy and industry sectors for Green Climate Fund project proposal development (see above).

‘On GCF development there was a GGGI consultant was working with the MoA. GGGI have a high profile here – significant advice, money, and technical expertise.’

Manish Agrawal, ACCRA Ethiopia Coordinator, July 2014–June 2016

However, as under alternative hypothesis 1, we were unable to establish the extent to which (i) the MoA’s GCF proposal reflected the value of local CRGE planning practices which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred; and (ii) GGGI’s contribution (in this case through Echnoserve) served to reinforce or subtract from these themes.

Alternative hypothesis (iii): Systemic contribution by a combination of actors

Under this more systemic hypothesis, we looked for evidence that a wider grouping of actors had been involved in shaping the three elements of outcome 3 under investigation.

For the broader CRGE story within Ethiopia, it is clear that an extensive network of organisations has been involved. These cluster around the two ministries leading for the CRGE Facility – MEFCC and MoFEC – as well as the National Planning Commission and the other main ministries involved to date in mainstreaming CRGE – MoA, Mol, MoT, MoUDHC and MoWIE (with other ministries now coming on stream). Around these ministries, key players involved from early on in the CRGE process include DFID, the Norwegian Embassy, the World Bank, UNEP, GGGI, ACCRA and CDKN:

‘I was struck by this in August 2011 actually. I was astonished at the people round the table that Praveen had managed to convene, the government, speaking really frankly and openly, EPA, Dessalegne and his deputy, who was also really good, who’s since left, various donors, NGOs, Kirsty from Oxfam, and McKinsey. It was really a room full of interested individuals, who all had something to offer, who were all thinking really...
energetically about, ‘How can we make this work?’ That was exciting. I hadn’t really seen that before.’
Donor Representative, Oct 2013–Feb 2016

As highlighted in the learning history review for GGGI, it is also clear how there was a great deal of collaborative and complementary thinking, action and initiative undertaken through this network – something more akin to knowledge and action ‘co-production’ (as in the quote above), in which attribution of individual contribution begins to lose its meaning.

In terms of the ways in which these actors might have contributed systemically to the shaping of MoA’s FTI, such that these reflected local CRGE planning practices, which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred, we can begin to see this wider network in play beyond the individual roles of ACCRA, Echnoserve and GGGI explored above. While we haven’t undertaken an analysis of the many crisscrossing supports potentially involved, the learning history undertaken for GGI does evidence many particular instances when significant conversations have taken place, either between individuals, or between groups of actors, which have subsequently been reflected in relevant shifts of understanding, values, behaviours or relationships.  

In this sense, the participatory and gender-sensitive assessments of adaptive capacity that took place in the MoA’s 27 FTI woredas – although perhaps to varying degrees of effectiveness – are likely to have reflected interactions between federal, provincial, and woreda officials, and communities, who in turn have been convinced through a wide range of pathways involving not only ACCRA, Echnoserve and GGGI individually, but also multiple conversations between these, and probably also involving other actors whose role we have not been able to research here, such as the World Bank, UNEP and a number of universities.

To illustrate this, we can use the example of ‘participatory assessment’ in local planning processes. This is not an invention of the local CRGE planning/CRGE FTI process, but is already found in significant long-term programmes managed by the MoA, of which the PSNP and the Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP) are two prominent examples, both supported by the World Bank.

‘We have a community-based participatory watershed guideline – it has its own process to identify the priority of the community. The community watershed planning team is there; the same in SLM. We started in 2005 when the guideline was produced.’
Ato Aklilu, Infrastructure Technical Adviser, PSNP, MoA&NR

‘The model of the SLMP is shared responsibility: finance plus government plus the community. You have to involve the local community, build a sense of ownership. And technology needs to interact with local knowledge to make sure it is relevant to local conditions. Top down we involve the national and regional experts. But in close consultation with the community – it is 90% bottom up.’
Government Official, MoA&NR

It is likely that as a result of these two programmes, experiences of participatory assessment will already have shaped the thinking of federal, provincial and woreda officials before the FTI process, although what is interesting about the MoA’s FTI initiative is the ways in which it experimented with taking local participation ‘to the next level’, as well as bringing in the new dimension of adaptive capacity (which ACCRA would argue is necessarily participatory).

Furthermore, as we have already established through the outcome 2 process tracing, further experiments in people-centred adaptive capacity building were taking place in parallel with the FTI through PSNP’s Climate Smart Initiative, which was led by CARE Ethiopia.
The first output of the CSI for PSNP is the revised guideline for watershed development. When the guideline was first prepared in 2005, there was not an idea of climate change. Now in the new guideline we must take into account the environmental social management framework (ESM).

Haile Michael Ayele, Watershed Case Team Coordinator, PSNP, MoA&NR

It is likely that this, too, will have prompted some cross-programmatic learning, particularly at federal level (i.e. within the MoA&NR), but perhaps also at provincial, and even at woreda level.

A similar set of arguments could be developed for the ways in which a wider set of actors might have contributed systemically to the MoA’s GTP II policy and GCF proposal reflecting the value of local CRGE planning practices, which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred. In the case of the former, we consider this a less likely hypothesis as we know that the process for shaping the GTP II policy was strictly controlled by government, and restricted almost entirely to government actors, whereas the process for shaping the GCF proposal was more permissive.

7.3 CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS FOR OUTCOME 3

In this section, we undertake a contribution analysis, comparing the evidence underpinning the ACCRA causal story and the three alternative hypotheses, to try to ascertain which story is best supported by the evidence, thereby helping us to understand the relative contributions of the different actors involved to the three elements of outcome 3 under investigation. On the basis of the information gathered for this evaluation, we will conclude that alternative hypothesis (iii) – a story of systemic contribution by a combination of actors – is most strongly supported by the evidence for two of the elements under review (FTI and GCF policy), and that within this, ACCRA makes a strong and significant contribution (i.e. the ACCRA causal story nested within a systemic change story is the hypothesis most strongly supported by the evidence). However, for the other element under review (shaping of GTP-II) we will conclude that a smaller group of actors was primarily responsible for promoting the value of local CRGE planning practices that are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred, and that within this, ACCRA made a leading contribution.

Contribution analysis for element 1: MoA Fast Track Investments reflect local CRGE planning practices which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred.

We found strong evidence that ACCRA made a significant contribution to this first element of outcome 3. It did this in several ways – principally by leading on the preceding local CRGE planning pilot and then inputting the resulting guidelines, experience and findings into the shaping of MoA’s FTI proposals. ACCRA’s contribution at the launch workshops for the 27 FTI woreda-level processes was also significant, with the local CRGE planning guidelines and experiences being made available to the 500+ regional, woreda- and kebele-level officials involved.

An important piece of evidence for this evaluation comes from a comparison of the two kebeles we visited – Yabdo Shembako kebele in Chiro woreda, and Bilbilo kebele in Akaki woreda. While the first of these two kebeles/woredas had been involved in the local CRGE planning pilot, and therefore already had experience of a CRGE investment planning approach as well as CRGE investment plans ready to implement through the FTI process, the second of these two kebeles/woredas was new to this way of thinking and working, and therefore had to produce investment plans from scratch and then implement these.
Our interviews with both the woreda officials and communities involved indicate more similarities in approach and outcome in Yabdo Shembako (Box 4) and Bilbilo (Box 5) than differences. These similarities can be seen both in ways of working – improved coordination between woreda officials, improved collaboration between woreda officials and community members, improved coordination within the community, and a more gender-sensitive approach (i.e. new relational capacity) – and in key outcome areas, such as rehabilitation of degraded lands, and resilience-building activities, such as rainwater harvesting, improvements in small scale irrigation, protected chickens for egg production for market, diversified vegetable production in home gardens, and improved seed for maize, beans and lentils.

### Box 4: Reflections from community members in Yabdo Shembako kebele (Chiro woreda)

‘There was a collaboration between agriculture office and our community before. But the difference now is that we work together as a community, in every aspect, and they coach us and we implement in a coordinated way. I believe that the success of this project is due to the coordination in the community, and between the community and the ministry.’

Community member (male)

‘The difference is the participation of women in the CRGE. Before women’s participation was less. Even we are now sharing the experience we get to our neighbours, to give them the chances and privileges in the future.’

Amintu Amadu (female)

‘Before women were dependent on men – waiting on the support of men. Now I myself can work different works, even how to plant potatoes, how to make…’

Community member (female)

‘Even we have benefited from chickens – we are the members who take care of the chickens – when the chickens lay eggs we sell ton by ton – 1 ton is for 1 lady, 1 ton is for the next one. We organise together and we contribute eggs and we supply for the market. For every member we can support our livelihoods day to day and make some savings.’

Amintu Amadu (female) and Aisha Ame (female)

‘There was high land degradation and heavy flood from mountain area, even the floods affected people downstream. Even the streams dried. We planted vegetation on the mountain side, on the trace line, and we are expecting different benefits from that.’

Mohammed Omareh (male)
Box 5: Reflections from community members and woreda officials on the FTI in Bilbilo kebele (Akaki woreda)

‘This mountain was degraded highly because of people’s activities, they cut forests and trees; it became very bare land and dusty. There was no grass on the mountain. We organised as women for rehabilitating the mountain. We planted some trees. Now there is terracing work on side of the mountain – it prevents runoff which affects our home down the stream.’

Shito Sida (male) and Aselefu Sega (female)

‘The runoff from the top of the mountain covers our farmland and our crop production is lost. Now since we did conservation work on the mountain, there is reduced runoff and we get good product. Fortunately this year the rain came on time and it is a good product. Even we are benefiting by harvesting the fodder for the cattle. Gives us sufficient milk from the cows.’

Kasa Shiferaw (male)

‘We benefited from vegetables, because at end of September, the crops we have in store have been finished. By diversifying the income source, we can take these vegetables to market and buy substitutes.

‘There is a change among the community. Before this project every individual work at his own work and when he is free he goes to nearby market and maybe drink and spend money. For this we organised and planned together – we have some laws – we spent our time on working together on this project – we saved our money and learned how to work together – this helped us to change.’

Sintayehu Zewudu (male)

‘There is discussion even in the house – with husband and wife on the role of the work. There was a little bit share of responsibilities before. Now we discuss and agree what is responsibilities of men and women in the house. The discussion increased after the project.’

Aselefu Sega (female)

‘The coordination is started from the decision makers – all the office heads of these sectors (NR, livestock, crops, irrigation) they discussed on the issues and they agreed upon the issues. Then this was transferred to the technical team, drawn from those sectors. Technical team thoroughly discusses the issues. When we go down to the community level we discussed with the communities what is the problem – because it is the community who participate on actual work on the ground. Once we agreed then we can start. So there is good coordination between the sectors, and good participation with the community.’

Tashoomaa Damee, Head of Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda

These similarities in approach and outcomes could be interpreted in two ways. One is that ACCRA had little influence on the FTI approach and outcomes, given the relatively minor inputs it made to the process compared with other actors, particularly the woreda officials and community members. The other interpretation is that ACCRA had a significant influence, alongside the MoA’s CRGE unit, woreda officials, community members and others, an influence that shaped the approach and outcomes both directly in the case of the Yabdo Shembako (Chiro) FTI, and indirectly in the case of the Bilbilo (Akaki) FTI, where the positive outcomes can be attributed to the effectiveness of knowledge transfer from the local CRGE pilot process through the guidelines, experiences and recommendations shared by ACCRA at the MoA’s FTI launch workshops. The evidence we gathered supports this second interpretation over the first:

‘Three people from the woreda – Adisul, Merga and one other – were trained on CRGE and the FTI project. It was in Awasa during the launch of the fast track. Dejene [from ACCRA] shared the experience from Midhega Tola [one of the local CRGE planning pilot woredas] – how to plan the participation of the community. The investment plan done by
Midhega Tola. Then these three came back and gave a one-day briefing to all 21 officers in the woreda office.

Ato Waqil, Head of NR Department, Akaki woreda

‘The idea of integrated investment planning came from the ACCRA pilots. So in our FTI was used the investment planning and we used the methodologies that ACCRA had developed. So by the end of the FTI each woreda had prepared an investment plan.

‘ACCRA was a vanguard alliance – even before CRGE strategy – I was associated with them, especially in the first phase of ACCRA – it has been a moderator – published many documents – created many platforms – it was very instrumental what CC is, what are expected to be climate friendly, and the main elements of resilience. So it was instrumental in knowledge management.’

Government Official, CRGE Unit, MoA, 2012–2015

‘The ACCRA staff sit with us one or two days a week – we work very closely with them. What is special about ACCRA is that we have an MoU agreement with them (signed twice over the past 4+ years). We don’t have such an agreement with any other NGOs.’

Anonymous

Beyond these contributions by ACCRA, many other organisations were involved in contributing to an FTI approach that was enabling of adaptive capacity, greater community participation, and gender sensitivity. Clearly, officials from the CRGE Facility (MEFCC and MoFED) and the NPC, with the support of DFID and GGGI, framed the overall approach to the FTI, with MoA CRGE unit officials leading on FTI proposal development within their ministry, with support from an FTI Committee which included Echnoserve and CCF-E as well as ACCRA. There is some evidence also that Echnoserve contributed to the vulnerability assessment guideline used in the FTI process as well as providing training support.

And beyond these actors, we have already noted how the MoA CRGE Strategy (facilitated by GGGI), the Livestock Investment Plan (facilitated by ILRI) and other ongoing work within the MoA, including on SLM and on the CSI project for PSNP, may have indirectly persuaded the thinking of MoA officials working on the FTI, as well as some provincial and woreda-level officials. For these reasons, we conclude that for this first element of outcome 3, the ACCRA causal story nested within a systemic change story is the hypothesis most strongly supported by the evidence.

Contribution analysis for element 2: Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) policy for the MoA references the value of local CRGE planning practices which are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred.

Outside of government, a much smaller group of actors was involved in shaping the GTP II policy for the MoA. Here the evidence for the contribution of ACCRA was much stronger, with only two other organisations outside government – GGGI and Addis Ababa University – making a contribution. And of these organisations, ACCRA played a primary role in supporting MEFCC to review the MoA draft GTP II and recommend improvements from a CRGE perspective.

Alongside this, however, there is weaker evidence that ACCRA (or indeed anyone within the small MEFCC evaluation group) was able to shape the wording of the MoA’s GTP II policy in ways that referenced the value of local CRGE planning practices that are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred. Here, the main area of advice seemed to have been on gender-sensitive approaches, whereas any references to local adaptive capacity, or participatory approaches, were much weaker.

Contribution analysis for element 3: Green Climate Fund (GCF) proposal of the MoA reflected the value of local CRGE planning practices that are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred.
We found limited evidence of the materialisation of this element of outcome 3 – that is, of the extent to which the MoA’s GCF proposal reflected the value of local CRGE planning practices that are enabling of adaptive capacity, gender sensitive and people-centred. While we were unable to review the MoA’s GCF proposal, and therefore to assess the advising claims of ACCRA in this regard, we did find some tangential evidence that the proposal included people-centred approaches to managing climate risk.

Undoubtedly, ACCRA did make a contribution in the development of this proposal, as noted below. However, stronger contributions probably came from Oxfam America and Echnoserve. GGGI may also have played a significant role.

‘As we start to think about the development of bigger projects for the agricultural sector that include a CCA component – e.g. for the Green Climate Fund – ACCRA adds to our capacity.’

Anonymous
8 CONCLUSIONS AND LEARNING CONSIDERATIONS

The GoE’s CRGE initiative and phase 2 of ACCRA in Ethiopia started at roughly the same time, with CRGE being launched at the Durban COP in November 2011. This has created significant opportunities for ACCRA to engage with and advise the unfolding trajectory of CRGE. Two key areas of engagement have been around mainstreaming CRGE principles and practices into DRR, and more broadly into local (woreda) level planning, particularly under the aegis of the MoA&NR. This impact evaluation has sought to trace the trajectory of changing policies and practices in these two areas, and accompanying governance changes at a system level.

Given the systemic contribution of governance to adaptive capacity, this evaluation has focused on changes in both horizontal and vertical coordination in the context of climate resilience planning. We have identified some significant developments in both these dimensions. Specifically, we have found evidence of improvements in horizontal coordination at both federal (improving collaboration between the MEFCC and the DRMFSS/NDRMC on joint CRGE/DRR planning and mainstreaming), woreda (more integrative and coordinated approaches to planning through the FTI), and kebele (more coordinated approaches to planning and implementation in the context of the FTI) levels. Improved vertical coordination, with woreda officials enabling a more participatory and gender-sensitive CRGE planning approach with communities in the context of MoA&NR’s FTI, was also identified. While it is too early to say how sustainable these shifts in coordination might be, they have significant implications for joined-up investment planning at kebele level, and thus for enabling rather than constraining local innovation supporting both responsive and anticipatory adaptations.

These system-level innovations in turn reflect new levels of horizontal coordination nationally between ministries and key development actors (e.g. DFID, UNDP, the Norwegian Embassy, World Bank, and WFP, but also GGGI, ACCRA, and Echnoserve). The collaborations that have developed between government and smaller actors, such as GGGI and ACCRA are a particular innovation for Ethiopia in horizontal governance supporting climate resilience, with both GGGI and ACCRA playing skilful roles as systemic intermediaries. In the case of ACCRA, these innovations reflect a core strategy of investing in long-term relationships with a small number of key government ministries. These have led to a consistent, stable relationship with the DRMFSS/NDRMA, a progressive relationship with the EPA/MEFCC, and a dynamic, but sustained relationship with the MoA&NR.

The evaluation has also highlighted how these changes in governance relationships reflect and are reflected in the development of new policies, guidelines and programmes that to varying degrees include an adaptive capacity-based approach, and/or support a more decentralised, bottom up and gender sensitive approach. Examples include the local CRGE planning guidelines (2014), the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning Guidelines (2014/16), and to a lesser extent, the MoA&NR’s GTP II and GCF proposal. The evaluation has also identified examples of these guidelines being translated into increasing local adaptive capacity on the ground, at least in the short term within the MoA&NR’s 27 FTI woredas, although the sustainability of these developments remains to be demonstrated.
WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCRA’S CONTRIBUTION?

In the context of these developments, what was the significance of ACCRA’s contribution? Certainly, in the development of guidelines on local CRGE planning (2014) and on Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning (2014/16) the evaluation has demonstrated a significant contribution by ACCRA, based on its focus on adaptive capacity, and its articulation within a community-focused and participatory framing, derived from the LAC framework. In other areas of policy development, including both MoA&NR’s GTP II and its GCF proposal, ACCRA’s contribution was less significant, either because it was less successful in securing a focus on local adaptive capacity building (GTP II), or because the contributions of others appeared to have been stronger (GCF).

One of the challenges of this evaluation has been to identify the significance of ACCRA’s contribution not as a single, isolated actor, but as an actor working within a complex and often collaborative network, in which interventions are interdependent, and we cannot always tease out cause and effect. Within this view, what is important is how systemic change happens, even as we are also required to observe changes taking place across a complex governance system rather than simply within particular policies.

This has meant, on the one hand, that we have sought to understand ACCRA’s contribution as a member of more extensive networks of collaboration, and to tease out where ACCRA has made a unique contribution even when many other actors have been involved. Certainly, the developments helping to build local adaptive capacity through the MoA&NR’s FTI programme should be seen in terms of a broader, systemic change story, involving many actors, in both enabling and contributing roles. Besides ACCRA, these include not only ministry officials at various levels of governance, and the communities themselves, but also Echnoserve, CCF-E and possibly also GGGI and ILRI. The evaluation has also highlighted that even within a single ministry, such as the MoA, there may be other, parallel initiatives underway that are also shaping local adaptive capacity, both in terms of how this is understood, and how this is enacted. Examples of such initiatives include the SLMP and the CSI project for PSNP, with other actors, such as CARE (outside the ACCRA alliance) leading on innovations in this context.

The importance of the systemic intermediary role played by ACCRA

On the other hand, our findings from this evaluation lead us to suggest that perhaps the core significance of ACCRA’s contribution in Ethiopia has been in taking the relatively unique role of a systemic intermediary, that is, as an actor who is able to bring together other actors at a systems level, bridging either across ministries, or across sectors (government, private, NGO), or across levels of governance, thereby effecting changes in governance practices and dynamics that are vital to local adaptive capacity. This is illustrated in different ways by elements both of outcome 2 and of outcome 3. In the first example, we have seen how ACCRA appears to have played a key role in brokering a joint understanding between the MEFCC minister and the DRMFSS of the value of collaborating, focusing this on the value of mainstreaming CRGE and DRR together into woreda Annual Development Plans. This brokering didn’t happen just by chance, but rather reflected several years of relationship building with both ministries.

The second example focuses on ACCRA’s contribution at the series of three FTI launch workshops hosted by the MoA&NR. While not responsible for bringing together the 500+ regional, woreda and kebele level officials involved, through these workshops ACCRA was able to make a critical contribution to the framing of governance practices for the FTI investment
processes, with messages of improved coordination both within woredas and between woredas and kebeles. These messages were based not only on the guidelines previously developed through the local CRGE pilot, but also on experience and observation, and it was this that appeared to have hit a chord with the audience, leading ACCRA to be considered a ‘trusted adviser’ not just by federal government, but also by regional, woreda- and kebele-level officials.

The significance of such moments for ACCRA lies not just in their advice of governance trajectories towards better enabling local adaptive capacity, but also in the strategies pursued by ACCRA which enabled them to be in a position to play such a role. Specifically, it is through the combination of the three other strategies – being seen as long term partners and trusted advisers by key ministries; taking a responsive and flexible approach to capacity building; and through iterative cycles of action learning and action researching – that ACCRA has been more able to position itself to be effective in such moments. Thus it was ACCRA’s persistence in seeking to build bridges between the DRMFS/NDRMC and MEFCC that now appears to be yielding the fruits of collaboration between the two ministries, and ACCRA’s investment in previous cycles of action researching through the local CRGE pilot – as well as the work on the Woreda DRM/A Planning Guidelines – and the ability to move in some cases opportunistically from one cycle to the next, that enabled ACCRA officials to be ‘in the right place at the right time’ to offer key framings of new governance practices (although not using those words) at the FTI launch workshops.

LEARNING CONSIDERATIONS

After careful analysis of the available evidence, and subsequent reflection on the findings, the following programme learning considerations emerge. These are intended to provide a basis for further discussion and reflection, and inform current and future programming.

• Reflection 1: A unique INGO/alliance role in Ethiopia. ACCRA Ethiopia has carved out a key niche for itself in Ethiopia’s CRGE landscape – it has developed a relatively unique role as a ‘trusted adviser’ embedded in three core ministries (MEFCC, MoA&NR and NDRMC). This role enables ACCRA to be recognised alongside other trusted advisers with a considerably larger funding/technical base – principally GGGI but also some of the large donor programmes (e.g. World Food Programme; World Bank; UNDP) which include embedded advisers. It is unique in Ethiopia for an INGO/alliance to play such a role.

• Reflection 2: ACCRA’s core niche in the resilience landscape. Within Ethiopia’s unique CRGE landscape ACCRA’s core niche revolves around the CR (resilience) theme in particular, with a special focus on adaptive capacity (drawing on the five dimensions set out in the LAC framework), but ACCRA is also seen as able to bridge CR, GE and economic development and some of the trade-offs involved.
  o ACCRA has been able to differentiate itself from ‘trusted adviser’ organisations with a larger funding base, such as GGGI, by building key relationships with ministries where GGGI has less influence/been less successful (MoA&NR, NDRMC) and by focusing on different issues from GGGI within MEFCC (where the GGGI focus is on forestry). GGGI is stronger on traditional research-based advice, whereas ACCRA’s strength lies in its unique combination of strategies.

• Reflection 3: Building trust with government departments. Trust by these government departments in ACCRA is based on the mix of technical competence, thought leadership, soft skills (especially ‘bridging’ skills), responsiveness (understanding of ministry ‘gaps’) and long-term relationship building/commitment that ACCRA is able to offer.

• Reflection 4: ACCRA’s innovative approaches.
  o ACCRA has been able to pioneer a more participatory, gender-sensitive approach to CRGE/adaptive capacity governance within each of its focal ministries (MEFCC, MoA&NR and NDRMC) and this is reflected in a number of these ministries’ pilots,
programmes, guidelines and policies. ACCRA’s contribution to these outcomes has, in several cases, been significant, when viewed alongside the contribution of other actors.

- ACCRA has made a key contribution in the area of governance, recognising both the systemic nature of governance relationships (involving both horizontal and vertical coordination) and their impact on local adaptive capacity, where there is a significant need for governance relationships to become more flexible and more enabling. ACCRA has proven its unique ability as a ‘systemic intermediary’ in transforming governance relationships, for example, successfully building bridges between its three focal ministries where in the past there has been poor coordination (e.g. between MEFCC and NDRMC). This has led to more joined-up programmes on the ground (e.g. mainstreaming DRR into woreda annual development plans).

- At a local level, these governance transformations are reflected most clearly in the local CRGE planning approach pioneered by ACCRA through the woreda CRGE pilots (2012–2014) and then upscaled through the Fast Track Initiatives of the MoA&NR in 27 woredas (2014–2016). These achievements have highlighted the benefits both of improved departmental collaboration within woreda administration and more genuinely participatory planning and implementation through engagement with (gender-sensitive) community priorities and empowerment.

**Reflection 5: ACCRA’s broader contributions.**

- In Ethiopia. These pilot examples represent a step forward from the participatory culture of previous (and ongoing) large-scale programmes, such as the SLM and PSNP programmes of MoA&NR. They offer to the GoE, if it can successfully navigate through its current democratic crisis, a potential future trajectory for local development pathways that are more context-specific, demonstrate higher community ownership, and are potentially more innovative, as well as strengthening local adaptive capacity and building resilience into local rural livelihoods.

- Supporting the GoE. Part of the strength of the ACCRA ‘brand’ for its government partners is that ACCRA is a coalition of INGOs (rather than Oxfam on its own), enabling broader learning between ministries and INGOs through the ACCRA steering committee. Funding limits within ACCRA phase 2 meant, however, that the other INGO partners played a limited role; this could be addressed in a future phase of ACCRA if the role and contribution of other partners was strengthened. For example, drawing on CARE’s expertise in the area of adaptive capacity development (as exemplified not only through its leadership of the PSNP CSI, but also in other programmes, such as GRAD and PRIME) could lead to a strengthening of CARE’s offering, and other partners could also add value based on their different strengths, analysis and positioning within Ethiopia’s CRGE landscape.

- In Oxfam. Ethiopia’s ACCRA programme represents a new kind of investment for Oxfam Ethiopia. It combines traditional Oxfam priorities (focus on the poor, participatory approaches, gender, policy influencing) with new themes and approaches (governance transformation, a sophisticated analysis/approach to adaptive capacity, and multiple strategies combining policy advice, soft influencing, capacity building, action researching and research)

**Reflection 6: Options for future development.** The political capital, trust and advice embedded in ACCRA (through the key ministries of MEFCC, MoA&NR and NDRMC), and the convening power of systemic intermediation which this can access, highlight the value of continuing investment in this coalition and brand. Options for future development should be carefully weighed in the light of this evaluation, taking into account of the following set of interrelated considerations:

- The opportunity for further development of the core ACCRA themes and approaches (governance, adaptive capacity, mix of strategies) within Oxfam Ethiopia, ‘mainstreaming’ these into other Oxfam Ethiopia programmes
- The value of further development/expansion/ and/or transformation of the ACCRA Ethiopia INGO alliance, through careful consideration of the current and evolving landscape of the GoE’s GTP II, and strategic analysis of the value added by each consortium partner.

- The ongoing contribution of ACCRA Ethiopia to any future international ACCRA programme and alliance, recognising the added value that this brings in terms of south–south partnership and learning, and south–north partnership, learning and funding opportunities.

These learning considerations point to the richness of insights that can be gleaned from careful analysis and reflection on an innovative programme of this nature.
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

Interviewed in the wider context of the ACCRA Ethiopia programme

Staff from ACCRA who attended an initial team workshop:
1. Dejene Biru, CRGE Technical Adviser, Acting ACCRA Coordinator
2. Yirgalem Mohammed, ACCRA Project Officer
3. Tesfaye Ararsa, EW-EA Project Manager
4. Mulugeta Worku, SCIP Project Coordinator (Sept 2012–May 2014)
5. Yosef Welderufael, CRGE Technical Adviser (August 2015–November 2016)

Individuals attending a stakeholder workshop:

National government ministries and departments involved in the ACCRA programme
6. Birhanu Assefa – CRGE Coordinator, MoA&NR
7. Zenit Ahmed – Senior Expert, NDRMC (National Disaster Risk Management Commission)
8. Kahsay Hagos – MEFCC

Regional government officers who worked with ACCRA:
10. Mohammed Ibrahim – Adviser to the Bureau (ex-deputy bureau head), Oromia RLEPB
11. Dereje Ejigu – CRGE focal person, Oromia RLEPB

Woreda level government officers who worked with ACCRA:
13. Ahmed Mume – Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro district
15. Abraham Umer – CRGE focal person, Midhega Tola district
16. Kalid Ahmed – Oromia, Midhega Tola district

Local and national CSO and Research representatives who have participated in the programme:
17. Satish Kumar – Director, HoAREC
18. Meskir Tesfaye – Coordinator, CCC-E (Consortium for Climate Change Ethiopia)
19. Nigus Mesale – ACCRA focal person – Save the Children

Other actors interviewed:
20. Ato Zerihun – MoFEC
21. Ato Tefera Tadesse – Natural Resources Director – MoA&NR
22. Ato Kare – State Minister – MEFCC
23. Wezero Grmawit Haile – Adviser to the State Minister, MEFCC
24. Gebru Jember – GGGI
25. Ato Miserket – CCC-E
Interviewed in the context of outcome 2

Staff from ACCRA interviewed:
1. Dejene Biru, CRGE Technical Adviser, Acting ACCRA Coordinator
2. Yirgalem Mohammed, ACCRA Project Officer
3. Tesfaye Ararsa, EW-EA Project Manager
4. Mulugeta Worku, SCIP Project Coordinator
5. Nigus Mesale, ACCRA focal person, Save the Children – workshop

Other actors interviewed:
6. Zinet Ahmed, Senior Expert, NDRMC
7. Yimer Asefa, Climatologist, NMA – workshop
8. Dereje Ejigu, CRGE focal person, Oromia RLEPB – workshop
9. Kirsty Wilson, ACCRA Coordinator (phase 1); consultant with LTSI

Interviewed in the context of outcome 3

Staff from ACCRA interviewed:
1. Dejene Biru, CRGE Technical Adviser, Acting ACCRA Coordinator
2. Mulugeta Worku, SCIP Project Coordinator
5. Yosef Welderufael, CRGE Technical Adviser, August 2015–November 2016
7. Kirsty Wilson, ACCRA Coordinator (2009 – 2012); consultant with LTSI (2012–present)

Other actors interviewed:

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
8. Tefera Tadesse, Natural Resources Director, MoA&NR
9. Mustafa Abu, Senior MRV Expert, CRGE unit, MoA&NR
10. Sertse Sebuh, former Coordinator of the CRGE Unit, currently Livestock Development Unit, MoA&NR
11. Ato Aklilu, Infrastructure Technical Adviser, PSNP, MoA&NR
12. Halie Ayela, Watershed Case Team Coordinator, PSNP, MoA&NR
13. Ato Habtamu, Focal person for the SLMP, MoA&NR

Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change
14. Nurmeded Jemal, Director of climate change planning and mainstreaming, MEFCC
15. Habtamu Demboba, Environmental Economist, MEFCC

Midhega Tola woreda (Oromia province)
16. Abrahim Umer, CRGE focal person, Midhega Tola district – workshop only
17. Kalid Ahmed, Midhega Tola district – workshop only
**Chiro woreda (Oromia)**

18. Endale Minda, Natural Resources core process owner, Chiro woreda
19. Ahmed Mume, Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro woreda
20. Daniel Worhu, Extension Officer, Agriculture Office, Chiro woreda
21. Usain Mume, Delegated office head, Agriculture Office, Chiro woreda
22. Abdulafiz Ibrahim, NRM Expert, Agriculture Office, Chiro woreda – workshop only

**Yabdo Shembako kebele (Chiro woreda)**

24–32. Approximately 40 men and 25 women assembled for the meeting in this kebele on 15 November. Those who spoke during the meeting included Amintu Amadu and Aisha Ame from among the women, and Lishan, Ahmed Abdush, Mohammed Omareh, Sani Abdullah, Mohammed Asane, Abrahim Adam, and Jamal Adem from among the men. Several other women and men spoke whose names we didn’t record, and there were others we spoke to later while touring their village.

**Akaki woreda (Oromia)**

33. Ato Wagari il, Head of NR Department, Akaki woreda
34. Ato Temesqe, Deputy Head, Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda
35. Tashoomaa Damee, Head of Agriculture Office, Akaki woreda
36. Merga Ayele, Agronomist, Agriculture office, Akaki woreda

**Bilbilo kebele (Akaki woreda)**

37. Sinatao Zaudu, Chairperson for the development team
38. Shito Sida, Chairperson for youth, Burka village
39. Aselefu Sega, women’s representative
40. Casa Safar, member of the development team, farmer.
APPENDIX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED


ACCRA (2014c) Climate-resilient green economy planning at woreda level. ACCRA Ethiopia Policy brief, September 2014.


DRMFSS (2011) Disaster Risk Management Strategic Programme and Investment Framework (SPIF), Addis Ababa: MoA&RD


Oxfam GB (2014b) Internal Learning Case Study: How change (begins to) happen. Oxford: Oxfam GB.


APPENDIX 3: PLANNING PRINCIPLES IN THE WOREDA DRM&A PLANNING GUIDELINES

(a): Planning principles set out in the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation and Adaptation Planning Guideline that are relevant to the development of local adaptive capacity.132

- **Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning must include participation from all stakeholders.** Effective planning ensures that the community is represented and involved in the planning process. Disasters and climate change affect all of society, and therefore Risk Mitigation and adaptation solutions must involve all sectors.

- **Women have unique needs in disaster situations and specific vulnerabilities against disaster risk.** Men and women may have different understandings and experience in coping with risks. Women participation is very important during the planning process.

- **Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning must be community-based and include local knowledge.** Natural disasters and climate change effects frequently vary significantly between micro-regions. Hence, local knowledge (indigenous knowledge) must be integrated with scientific evidences in order to design and implement effective disaster-risk management and climate change adaptation strategies. In other words, the role of community should be considered key for disaster risk management and climate change adaptation strategies to be successful. It will also help to decentralise the RM&CCA processes.

- **Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation planning should be practical and realistic.** Apart of creating awareness and knowledge among the participants, this methodology should really improve the impact of the development plans reducing the risk disaster and improving the adaptation to the climate change.

- **Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning should be simple and easy to do.** RM&CCA planning should not be a complex task undertaken only by specialists; rather, all staff – and indeed community representatives – should be able to participate.

- **Disaster Risk Mitigation/Adaptation Planning allocates possible resources to accomplish those tasks identified, and it establishes accountability.** Decision-makers must ensure that they provide planners with clearly established priorities and feasible resources; additionally, participants should be held accountable for effective planning and execution.

(b): Principles of bottom-up planning set out in the Woreda Disaster Risk Mitigation and Adaptation Planning Guideline.133

Bottom-up planning is an approach where plans are developed at the lowest level. The Risk Mitigation and Adaptation will follow the bottom-up planning. Firstly, when the information collected from the Woreda Disaster Risk Profile comes from households and key informants from the community, and secondly, when both kebele representatives and sectorial offices identify and prioritise strategies and actions to mitigate disaster risk and to adapt to the climate change in the woreda. Bottom-up planning has the following characteristics:

- **Communities have experiences, skills and resources at hand to solve some of their problems.**

- **Bottom-up planning helps to reduce the gap persisted between real community needs/demands and the availability of resources to meet the community needs.**
• Bottom-up planning empowers the community members giving ownership in the development process instead of giving individual responsibilities for development to experts or outsiders or agencies from outside.

• Bottom-up planning helps the community to have more presence in the resources allocation decisions, e.g. resources always held outside the kebele.

• Community-based processes help in building confidence, pride in being able to make a difference, and enhanced capabilities to pursue DRM and CCA measures.

• Bottom-up planning should anticipate the possible problems of decentralisation in regard to how to bring together high-level strategic thinking and local level context in a way that ensures the optimisation of outcomes. It is generally understood that decentralisation has several risks: elite capture (local elites capturing the benefits); revenue minimisation (low capacity and unwillingness to mobilise local resources); weak administrative and management systems (absence of effective and efficient administrative and management systems); corruption (political influence and risk for corruption); lack of effective participation (no automatic increase in participation); and, poor human resource base (staff unwilling to move to remote areas, and poorly trained or motivated).

• Outsiders can bring new knowledge, resources and skills to a community BUT communities should be the ones to determine whether it adds value for them.
NOTES

1 Oxfam’s total portfolio in Ethiopia covers improving production and food security; building resilience; humanitarian preparedness and response; and gender equality. Building adaptive capacity (resilience) is therefore one of several components of its work in Ethiopia and not all its resilience building work was funded through ACCRA. The same is true for the other partners, for example Save the Children, which also undertook work in building adaptive capacity that was not funded through ACCRA.

2 The other two participating countries were Uganda and Mozambique. While Oxfam GB was the lead partner in Ethiopia, World Vision was the lead partner in Uganda, and Save the Children in Mozambique.

3 In the end, given the intensive nature of the investigation of outcomes 2 and 3, this systemic outcome was not investigated separately. However, there is extensive discussion of the systemic nature of governance transformations in Ethiopia, including this and broader systemic impacts, both under outcomes 2 and 3, and in the final section of the report on ‘programme learning considerations’.

4 The Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) had a leadership and coordinating capacity within the Early Warning Directorate of the MoA to implement DRM activities. In 2016, the DRMFSS became an independent government agency – the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC).

5 National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), a member of the ACCRA Steering Committee. Was previously the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS).

6 See methodology – given limitations in time and budget and the need therefore to focus on specific elements of the bigger systemic picture. We therefore chose to focus on two contributing elements to outcome 2 that (a) were consistent with two of the four cross-cutting change processes set out in Figure 1: (S1) policy advice; and (S2) systemic intermediation – strengthening of horizontal governance relationships; and (b) had strong resonance for key Oxfam stakeholders within the Ethiopia impact evaluation.

7 CRGE (Climate Resilient Green Economy) is the cross-government initiative on Ethiopia designed to underpin a transformational social and economic development trajectory, which is also climate resilient and low carbon.

8 ACCRA’s main institutional change processes with MEFCC were not the focus of this evaluation, but are summarised in an earlier (internal) report from this evaluation on ACCRA’s work in Ethiopia.

9 USAID Ethiopia/Graduation with Resilience to Achieve Sustainable Development (GRAD); Pastoralist Resilience Improvement Through Market Expansion (PRIME).

10 The thematic areas are: Resilience, Women’s Empowerment, Livelihoods, and Policy Influencing and Citizen Voice.


12 Inception report, page 16.


16 Inception report, page 17.

17 Inception report sections 5.2–5.5.


21 Through a fine-grained explanation of what happens between a cause and an effect, generative mechanisms help to explain ‘why’ a certain effect occurred.


23 Oxfam GB (2013) op.cit.
28 **Rigour** refers to the quality of thought put into the methodological design and conduct of every step in the evaluation – including sampling, triangulation of methods, facilitation of processes, data collation, cross-validation and causal analysis.
29 **Inclusiveness** involves meaningful engagement of stakeholders with diverse perspectives, which has an intrinsic empowering value while also enhancing credibility of the evaluation through triangulation and cross-validation of evidence.
30 **Feasibility** concerns the budget and capacity needed to meet expectations of rigour and inclusiveness and to enhance learning.
37 Step 4 of the OGB process tracing protocol highlights that: ‘The evaluators must be sensitive to the risk that questioning external campaign targets and/or contacts may jeopardise the effectiveness of this and/or future campaigns, and work with relevant stakeholders to manage this risk. In all cases, the ability to effectively campaign takes precedence over the data needs of the evaluation. Where external stakeholders are not approached for this reason, it will be necessary to document and explain why certain targets and/or contacts were not approached, and provide a qualitative assessment of the impact that not being able to speak to these external stakeholders has had on the robustness of findings.’
39 Section 2 of the inception report narrated a dynamic theory of change for the ACCRA programme as a whole, primarily through the voices of the ACCRA international programme.
40 Kirsty Wilson (to February 2012); Charlotte Stemmer (April 2012–June 2014); Manish Agrawal (July 2014–June 2016); and Dejene Biru (Acting Coordinator from July 2016).
41 Saskia Daggett (February 2012–December 2015) and Margaret Barhihai (December 2015–present).
42 Chris Anderson (2012/13) and Helen Jeans (from December 2013).
43 The OGB protocol for step 1 suggests that this should include: ‘What is [the intervention] trying to change (outcomes), how is it working to effect these changes (strategiesstreams of activities) and what assumptions is it making about how it will contribute to these changes (key assumptions).’ This is in alignment with recent reviews of ToC (e.g. Vogel, 2012; Hivos, 2016) which highlight the five components that make up a ToC: the current situation which the intervention seeks to change; the long-term vision or goal of the intervention; its main change pathways or lines of intervention; the key assumptions that underpin the change process; and a summary diagram that enables the whole process to be easily understood.
44 For step 1, the OGB protocol highlights that ‘it is important to identify the most recent outcomes that were (or are) being pursued, and actual blocks of activities or strategies rather than focusing on what was initially
planned. Given this, discussions should be held with relevant project/campaign stakeholders to verify, augment or make explicit the ‘official’ outcomes the intervention sought or are seeking to change.’


47 Levine, S., Ludi, E. and Jones, L. (2011) op.cit.

48 Levine, S., Ludi, E. and Jones, L. (2011) op.cit.

49 The two other institutional change processes – (5) ‘MEFCC environmental policy and strategy shaped by technical input from climate change CSOs’; and (6) ‘CSO alliance and collaboration on climate change strengthened’ – were more tangential to the two outcomes selected for the process tracing study. For this reason, these two institutional change processes do not appear in this version of the reconstructed Ethiopia ToC, although they do appear in a subsequent version (see Mukute M, Colvin J, Baloi A (2017) Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance: Phase 2 Synthesis Evaluation. Oxford: Oxfam GB, June 2017, p.37).

50 The EPA was upgraded to a ministry in mid-2013 (initially the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF), subsequently renamed the MEFCC.


52 In the end, given the intensive nature of the investigation of outcomes 2 and 3, this systemic outcome was not investigated separately. However, there is extensive discussion of the systemic nature of governance transformations in Ethiopia, including this and broader systemic impacts, both under outcomes 2 and 3, and in the final section of the report on ‘programme learning considerations’.

53 See methodology – given limitations in time and budget and the need, therefore, to focus on specific elements of the bigger systemic picture. See also endnote 6.


55 This second edition included reference to the CRGE strategy and reflected emerging collaborative thinking between DRMFSS and MEFCC.


57 This information is then stored in the national Woreda Disaster Risk Profiling (WDRP) database.

58 DRMFSS (2014/16) op.cit., pp. 31–33; 69–70.


60 DRMFSS (2014/16) op.cit., p.15.

61 DRMFSS (2014/16) op.cit., p. 38 (emphasis in the original).

62 The section below (on the ACCRA change story) recounts previous tensions between the (then) EPA and the DRMFSS, how bridges were subsequently (re)built between the two organisations, and how collaboration was strengthened as a result. In this section, we focus only on the outcome.


68 Kirsty Wilson, ACCRA phase 1 coordinator, also noted that: ‘ACCRA did quite a lot to support the early development of the DRM-SPIF through consideration of how to link to DRR with climate change mainstreaming processes, and how to factor in community development processes. If ACCRA had not been there, it is likely that this document might not have included these two things, which would have meant a
weaker foundation for closer integration [between DRR and CCA] later.’ Source: Kirsty Wilson, personal communication, 29 November 2016.


70 Publication was delayed until funding could be found. Eventually this came from the World Bank.

71 The PSNP was initiated in 2005 and is now in its fourth phase. Supported by DFID, the World Bank and other donors, PSNP works in 319 woredas across 8 regions, providing small but predictable transfers of cash or food to approx. 15 million vulnerable people in Ethiopia. Most recipients receive transfers as wages for work on environmental and community projects that help rehabilitate natural resources and build resilience to climate change impacts. See e.g.: Cook, R. and Phillips, R. (2016) Fighting chronic food insecurity. London: DFID.

72 The Climate Smart Initiative (CSI) was funded by DFID from July 2013 to September 2015 under its £20m Climate High Level Investment Programme (CHIP). CSI was designed to strengthen two important food security programmes in Ethiopia – the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and the Household Asset Building Program (HABP) – and to think through how these programmes might evolve after their end-dates.

73 We received the following documents, which may provide relevant evidence, only after the evaluation was completed: ACCRA, Ministry of Agriculture, and World Bank (2015a) Report on Regional Level Lesson Learning Workshop on CSI PSNP Project Implementation. Climate Smart Initiative, Public Safety Net Programme, June 2015; ACCRA, Ministry of Agriculture, and World Bank (2015b) Key Recommendations: Improving Disaster Risk Mitigation//Adaptation Planning and Contingency Planning Process. Climate Smart Initiative, Public Safety Net Programme, July 2015.

74 DRMFSS (2011) op.cit.


76 In 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was upgraded to form the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF).

77 The CRGE Facility brought together the technical expertise and responsibilities of the MEF with the financial expertise and responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED, now MoFEC).

78 Interview with Lea Doumenjou (ACCRA Learning Adviser).


83 Seven projects in Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF); 3 projects in the Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction (MUDHCo); 5 projects in the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy (MoWIE); 4 projects in the MoA; 2 projects in the Ministry of Transport (MoT); and 2 projects in the Ministry of Industry (MoI).


The four proposals were: (1) Piloting CRGE strategy measures through agriculture sector climate proof and low carbon agriculture investments in 8 regions; (2) piloting in Afar and Somali regions; (3) piloting in the Rift Valley Ecosystem; and (4) technical assistance and capacity building on M&E, MRV and long-term investment plan for Agriculture Sector CRGE Fast Track Investments. (1) & (2) were led by the MoA; (3) & (4) by executing entities – CCC-E for (3) and Echnoserve for (4).

The FTI project provided approximately US$150k funding for each of the 27 targeted watersheds over an 18-month period from July 2014–March 2016.


According to Ahmed Mume (Livestock Development core process owner, Chiro woreda), the criteria for selecting the kebele were (i) the vulnerability of the kebele to climate change; and (ii) the degradability of that kebele – which means that the landscape itself was very eroded and very vulnerable.


Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2016) op.cit., p. 25.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2010) Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11–2014/15. Volume 1. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. The goals of this first GTP included: doubling the size of the economy, with projected GDP per capita of US$698 by 2015 (best-case scenario); doubling agricultural production to ensure food security for the first time; power generation capacity to increase from 2,000MW to 8,000MW; construction of 2,395 kilometres of railway line; achievement of Millennium Development Goals. ‘Environment and climate change’ was a cross-cutting sector in the first GTP, and was supported by list of 22 environment and climate change targets.


The precise wording of the gap identified is as follows: ‘The document doesn’t indicate that the sector has planned to conduct capacity building and advisory services in relation with the CRGE strategy implementation.’

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2014a) op.cit.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2016b) op.cit.

Includes 27 objectives and 48 outputs.

Includes 5 objectives and 9 outputs.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2016b) op.cit., page 5.

As an Accredited Entity to the GCF, MOFEC will be able to access up to USD 50 million in financing for adaptation and mitigation interventions under Ethiopia’s CRGE strategy.

The EPA was upgraded to the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF) in mid-2013. In 2015 MEF was renamed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MEFCC).

A ‘CRGE Facility’ was established in August 2012, to be managed jointly by the EPA and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED). Within the CRGE Facility EPA (and subsequently the MEF) was given the role of technical lead ministry, with MoFED (subsequently renamed MoFEC) as the financial lead ministry (responsible for managing climate-related donor funding, such as the Adaptation Fund, Climate Investment Fund and Green Climate Fund).

With a primary focus on increasing resilience of households to impacts of drought; increasing resilience of households to flood-related shocks; increased productivity of crops; and enhanced transformation of pastoral households to agro-pastoralism.

With a primary focus on increased productivity of livestock; improved access to green energy technologies.

With a primary focus on increased coverage of woodlands/forests; increased coverage of perennial vegetation.


Wilson, K. and Adler, R. (2014) op.cit. p.3.

Subsequently GGGI commissioned Echnoserve to develop a costed proposal for the NCDP, which was finalised in January 2016.

Source: Kirsty Wilson, personal communication, 5 December 2016.

http://www.echnoserve.com/about%20us.html

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2014e) Technical assistance and capacity building on M&E, MRV and long term investment plan for selected agricultural sector CRGE fast track project woredas. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Agriculture in partnership with Echnoserve, April 2014. The project budget for this work was $USD 539,340.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2016a) op.cit. pp. 2–22.


GGGI currently has embedded advisers in MEFCC, MoFEC, MoI, MoA and PMO. It previously had an adviser embedded in MoWIE. There are plans to expand embedded support to the NPC, urban sectors and selected regional governments. Source: Robert Mukizwa, personal communication, 7 December 2016.


Gearty, Colvin (2015) op.cit. p.86.


This consultant was from Echnoserve.


However, Dejene Biru reported to us that at the final FTI review workshop in March 2016, there were informal comments from the NR Director (MoA&NR) that, overall, the three CRGE pilot woredas had performed better than the others. We were unable to obtain a copy of this workshop report.

ACCRA’s main institutional change processes with MEFCC were not the focus of this evaluation, but are summarised in an earlier (internal) report from this evaluation on ACCRA’s work in Ethiopia.

USAIID Ethiopia/Graduation with Resilience to Achieve Sustainable Development (GRAD); Pastoralist Resilience Improvement Through Market Expansion (PRIME).

Source: DRMFSS (2014) op.cit., pp. 21–22 (text reduced from the original).

Source: DRMFSS (2014) op.cit., pp. 22–23 (original text in full).
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