Chukua Hatua, Tanzania
Effectiveness Review

Richard D. Smith and Dunstan Kishekya, RDS Consulting LTD

Oxfam GB
Citizen Voice Outcome Indicator

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Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AcT</td>
<td>Accountability in Tanzania Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADLG</td>
<td>Actions for Democracy and Local Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABUIPA</td>
<td>Capacity Building Initiative for Poverty Alleviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi, Party of the Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Chukua Hatua, Take Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>District Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFO</td>
<td>District Forest Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Oxfam Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVIWATA</td>
<td>Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania, a national farmers’ organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFRAC</td>
<td>Natural Forest Resources and Agroforestry Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGONET</td>
<td>Ngorongoro Non-Government Organisation Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALISEP</td>
<td>Pastoralist Livelihoods Support and Empowerment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETS</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Tracking System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Consultative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMISEMI</td>
<td>Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa, Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASAF</td>
<td>Tanzania Social Action Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>Village Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEO</td>
<td>Ward Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................2

Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 2

Table of Contents .................................................................................................................3

1 Executive summary ..............................................................................................................5

2 Introduction ......................................................................................................................9

3 Evaluation approach .........................................................................................................10

  3.1 Process Tracing and Outcome Harvesting ................................................................. 10

  3.2 Sampling .....................................................................................................................13

  3.3 Limitations ..................................................................................................................15

4 Programme description .....................................................................................................16

  4.1 The CH programme ..................................................................................................16

  4.2 Political and legislative context ...............................................................................21

5 Findings ............................................................................................................................22

  5.1 Outcome 1 – Councillors become responsive and aware ........................................... 22

    5.1.1 The outcome and how the programme contributed ............................................ 22

    5.1.2 To what extent did the outcome materialise? .................................................... 23

    5.1.3 How significant was the contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme and the contributions of other actors to this outcome?......................... 27

    5.1.4 How is the outcome significant? ........................................................................ 29

    5.1.5 Negative outcomes ............................................................................................. 30

  5.2 Outcome 2 – Animators mobilise citizens ................................................................. 31

    5.2.1 To what extent did the outcome materialise? .................................................... 33

    5.2.2 How significant was the contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme and the contributions of other actors to this outcome?................................. 35

  5.3 Outcome 3 – District Commissioner supports community forest ownership . 36

    5.3.1 To what extent did the outcome materialise? .................................................... 38

    5.3.2 How significant was the contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme and the contributions of other actors to this outcome?................................. 40
5.3.3 How is the outcome significant? ............................................................... 45

6 Programme learning considerations .......................................................... 46

7 Conclusion.................................................................................................. 48

8 Contribution scores.............................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.

Appendix 1: Lists of key informants ............................................................. 53

Key informants and Focus Group participants, Ngorongoro district .......... 53
Key informants, Shinyanga Rural District ................................................... 54
Key informants, Chukua Hatua programme staff ........................................ 55
1 Executive summary

The Chukua Hatua (CH) programme of Oxfam GB (Oxfam) and its implementing partners is a five-year governance and accountability initiative in Tanzania that works in five regions of the country to influence people and institutions such that:

- citizens, particularly women and youth, assume more responsibility and hold government to account;
- local leaders effectively lobby government on community demands; and
- government institutions are receptive to the demands of citizens.

The programme is being implemented at an opportune time because public and political concern about public accountability and governance issues are at a high level. Set against this is a tradition in which the authority of leaders is little challenged by citizens.

The programme is due to run from April 2010 to March 2015 with financial and learning support from the Accountability in Tanzania Programme (AcT), a governance programme managed by KPMG that is predominantly funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) whose purpose is ‘to increase the responsiveness and accountability of government in Tanzania, through a strengthened civil society’. The outcomes assessed in this mid-term evaluation occurred in the period April 2010–December 2012.

The evaluation reported in this document was undertaken from December 2012–April 2013. Oxfam anticipated that both the process of participating in the evaluation as well as the findings themselves would contribute to the accountability, learning and communication needs of Oxfam, the Oxfam partners who are delivering the programme in Tanzania and Oxfam in general.

In the period being evaluated, the programme has been delivered by Oxfam with the following implementing partners: CABUIPA and ADLG in Shinyanga Region, PALISEP and NGONET in Ngorongoro District, Arusha Region and Kivulini in Shinyanga Region. Oxfam functions in CH a funder, source of technical inputs and facilitator of learning between partners.

The programme’s approach rests on three assumptions:

1. If we build citizens’ awareness and capacity, assist them to overcome fear, and recognise that action is in the interest of their livelihoods, then they will act.
2. If there is increased pressure from citizens, then duty bearers will be increasingly compelled to respond.
3. If we increase capacity of local elected leaders then the proportion of positive responses to citizens will increase.

The programme’s work is guided by descriptions of the behaviour, relationships, policies, activities and actions that the programme ideally wants to see in the individuals and organisations it seeks to influence: politicians, communities, Regional
and District Commissioners, civil servants, civil society organisations, students, media, non-government leaders and teachers.

For the first time in an Oxfam Effectiveness Review, this evaluation uses Process Tracing, a qualitative research approach, with elements of Outcome Harvesting, an approach to monitoring and evaluation inspired by Outcome Mapping that uses the following definition of outcome: a change in the behaviour, relationships, activities, or actions of the people, groups, and organizations with whom a program works directly\(^1\). Specifically, the evaluation required CH actors to describe their outcomes and the contributions of the programme to the outcomes according to the specifications of Outcome Harvesting – that is with sufficient specificity to make them verifiable.

Following the Process Tracing approach, the CH actors selected three outcomes for investigation by the evaluation. The outcomes relate to work of the programme in Shinyanga and Arusha, two of the five regions where it operates, and the work of four of the five implementing partners: CABUIPA, ADLG, PALISEP and NGONET.

**Outcome 1: Councillors becoming responsive and aware** – where CH contributed through its Active Leader strategy involving training and mentoring of councillors in responsibilities and skills.

**Outcome 2: Animators mobilising citizens** – where CH contributed through its Animation strategy involving training, mentoring and ad hoc support of citizen ‘animators’.

**Outcome 3: District Commissioner support for community forest ownership** – to which CH contributed using Animation and Issue Based Campaigning strategies. In total, three of the five CH operational strategies were assessed in this evaluation.

With outcomes thus defined, the evaluators then set out to collect, analyse and interpret data using qualitative methods, in particular informant interviews with citizens, civil servants, elected representatives and civil society organisation representatives. In so doing, the evaluators sought answers to the evaluation questions agreed with Oxfam.

### 1.1 Findings and conclusions

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1 Canadian International Development Research Center
I. Of the three outcomes investigated, we found evidence that each had materialised, in two cases in full, and in the case of the animator mobilisation of citizens, in part. The realisation of tangible outcomes in a relatively short period of time is commendable for an advocacy programme seeking to change entrenched citizen and leader behaviours.

II. We found clear evidence that CH had made a crucial contribution to each outcome such that they would not have occurred without CH, a finding that says as much about the highly effective work of the Oxfam implementing partners that had lead responsibility for work – ADLG, CABUIPA and PALISEP – as it does about Oxfam’s contribution through funding, expertise and facilitating a learning environment for the partner organisations. It is clear that Oxfam has been delivering CH with some very capable partners.

III. In some cases, CH has provided support of a kind that others have also provided, such as animator training. In the case of councillor training, this has taken place elsewhere in Tanzania, but only rarely, and its apparent effectiveness suggests it should, by some means, be extended.

IV. The District Commissioner’s decision to support community forest ownership was the outcome for which there was the strongest evidence.

V. While also fully realised with two or more examples of behaviour change for each of the six councillors, some councillors had clearly changed in response to the Active Leader intervention more than others.

VI. From our evidence, the effectiveness of the Animation strategy will be constrained unless and until the selection criteria of animators includes a standard of education sufficient to be able to articulate, lead and take the initiative when addressing people in positions of authority.

VII. Of the many other factors that had influenced the outcomes we found that none had greater than a moderate or low-level direct influence on the outcome.

VIII. We found many indications that the programme has been highly effective and built on work done previously by CH actors and others, and effective at responding opportunistically to issues, such as community forest ownership demand, that emerge. The opportunistic nature of CH priorities has been a deliberate policy. It is one that has much merit.
1.2 Programme learning considerations

I. **Oxfam and the implementing partners should consider if CH should do anything further to increase the probability of the behaviour changes it has influenced being sustained.** While the changes we evidenced are impressive, we cannot say if they are indicative of lasting transformations in behaviour. At this mid-way point in the CH programme, opportunities remain for testing approaches to measuring and promoting sustainability.

II. **Further consideration should be given by implementing partners and Oxfam to the selection of animators.** Our findings suggest that the selection of animators may not be optimal because a lot (too much?) is being expected of those with little or no education.

III. **Implementing partners and Oxfam should consider the programme’s policy towards the use of traditional accountability systems.** Encouraged to be innovative by the CH training, some councillors and animators have found traditional mechanisms of enforcing citizen accountability and enacting punitive measures, to be highly effective and substantially faster than formal, legal systems.

IV. **Training could usefully be extended or modified to** (a) differentiate training according to educational level/experience of recipients, (b) bring councillors and animators together for joint sessions, (c) empower communities to participate in bottom-up planning, and (d) include local civil servants in training.

V. **Risk management may need greater attention** because (a) of risks to the physical and mental well-being of citizens, councillors and others inspired to take action, (b) risks to the effectiveness and sustainability of CH should those in whom it is seeking to inspire change feel the risks they are taking are too great and that they are unsupported.

VI. **Monitoring, evaluation and learning** may benefit from (a) an assessment that differentiates the contributions of Oxfam and its CH implementing partners, (b) consideration of how to improve the flow of monitoring data from the field, (c) periodic refinement of monitoring data using Outcome Harvesting principles to make the data more precise and thus useful for management decisions, (d) routine articulation in programme materials of the roles of other actors in contributing to outcomes, (e) the generation of baseline data on boundary partner behaviour, where possible, and (f) using future evaluation to test the sustainability of behaviour changes found in this evaluation.
2 Introduction

As per Oxfam Great Britain’s (Oxfam) Global Performance Framework, samples of mature projects are being randomly selected each year and their effectiveness rigorously assessed. The Chukua Hatua (CH), Kiswahili for ‘Take Action’, programme was selected in this way under the citizen voice thematic area.

The Chukua Hatua (CH) programme was created in April 2010 with a £1.6 million, two-year grant from Accountability in Tanzania (AcT), a governance programme managed by KPMG that is predominantly funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID). Phases II and III of the programme have subsequently also been funded by AcT up to March 2015.

In mid-2012 Oxfam’s Programme Performance and Accountability unit identified Chukua Hatua as a mature programme suitable for an Effectiveness Review, an intensive evaluation process, which forms one part of Oxfam’s Global Performance Framework, an organisation-wide undertaking to better capture and communicate the effectiveness of its work. An agreement was reached with the programme team in Tanzania that this would also serve as a mid-term evaluation.

RDS Consulting Ltd was commissioned to undertake this mid-term evaluation during the period December 2012–April 2013. The evaluation is expected to contribute to the accountability, learning and communication needs of Oxfam and its partners who are delivering the programme in Tanzania and Oxfam in general. The outcomes assessed in this Effectiveness Review occurred in the period April 2010–December 2012.

The primary intended users of the evaluation are: the Oxfam Chukua Hatua programme team in the first instance and Oxfam more broadly. The wider audience was identified by the evaluators and Oxfam as including Chukua Hatua programme partners, new or existing co-funders/implementing partners, communities where the programme is or has worked, the AcT programme, KPMG-International Development Advisory Services, DfID and other civil society organisations.

The evaluation team consists of Richard Smith, an international consultant based in London, UK, and Dunstan Kishekya, a consultant based in Arusha, Tanzania. Richard Smith has expertise in the use of Outcome Mapping for evaluation and planning, and experience of policy advocacy and advocacy evaluation. Dunstan Kishekya has experience of accountability as the Executive Director of an NGO. He has expertise as an evaluator, including assessing the contribution of multiple factors to social change results and using interviews to collect data from diverse community and professional sources in the regions that are the focus of this evaluation.

In the period being evaluated, the programme has been delivered by Oxfam in Tanzania with the following implementing partners: CABUIPA and ADLG in Shinyanga Region, PALISEP and NGONET in Ngorongoro District, Arusha Region and Kivulini in Shinyanga Region.
Oxfam and the implementing partners are collectively responsible for delivering the Chukua Hatua programme and as such are the 'change agent' that is the subject of this evaluation.

3 Evaluation approach

3.1 Process Tracing and Outcome Harvesting

Under Oxfam Great Britain’s (OGB) Global Performance Framework (GPF), sufficiently mature projects under six outcome areas are being randomly selected each year and their effectiveness rigorously assessed. These are referred to as Effectiveness Reviews. Effectiveness Reviews carried out under the Citizen Voice and Policy Influencing thematic areas are informed by a research protocol based on Process Tracing, a qualitative research approach used by case study researchers to investigate causal inference.

For the first time, this Effectiveness Review uses Process Tracing with elements of Outcome Harvesting, an approach to monitoring and evaluation inspired by Outcome Mapping that comprises the identification, formulation, analysis, and interpretation of outcomes to answer useable questions. Oxfam chose to use the Outcome Harvesting tool with Process Tracing because of the perceived complementarity of these evaluation approaches and because the programme design and monitoring approach used by CH is based on Outcome Mapping. Specifically, these complementarities include:

1. CH design and monitoring has been inspired by the definition of ‘outcome’ used in the Outcome Mapping methodology developed by the Canadian International Development Research Center: a change in the behaviour, relationships, activities, or actions of the people, groups, and organizations with whom a program works directly. Outcome Harvesting is specifically designed to assess such outcomes.

2. Process Tracing requires outcomes to be precisely expressed. Outcome Harvesting helps achieve this because it requires outcomes and change agent contributions to be precisely formulated such that it is clear who changed in what way, when and where, and how the change agent contributed to each outcome. The outcome and contribution statement must be sufficiently specific to be credible and verifiable. To meet this standard, outcome descriptions need to be SMART:

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2 The Outcome Mapping Learning Community provides a rich collection of resources that describe Outcome Mapping and discuss its uses in the design, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes seeking to influence social change: [http://www.outcomemapping.ca/](http://www.outcomemapping.ca/) (accessed 12.04.13)


Specific: The outcome is formulated in sufficient detail so that a primary intended user without specialized subject or contextual knowledge will be able to understand [it] and how the change agent contributed.

Measurable: The description of the outcome contains objective, verifiable quantitative and qualitative information, independent of who is collecting data...

Achievable: The description establishes a plausible relationship and logical link between the outcome and the change agent's actions that influenced it...

Relevant: The outcome represents a significant step towards the impact that the change agent seeks...

Timely: While the outcome occurred within the time period being monitored or evaluated, the change agent's contribution may have occurred months, or even years, before.

Box 1: Process Tracing steps
As described in Oxfam's Process Tracing protocol, there are eight steps in process tracing. These do not necessarily need to be followed in the order listed as some steps can be undertaken simultaneously or in a different order from that presented:

1. Undertake a process of (re)constructing the intervention's theory of change, in order to clearly define the intervention being evaluated – what is it trying to change (outcomes), how it is working to effect these changes (strategiesstreams of activities) and what assumptions it is making about how it will contribute to these changes (key assumptions).

2. Work with relevant stakeholders to identify up to three intermediate and/or final outcomes considered by stakeholders to be the most significant for the evaluation to focus on (central to the intervention's theory of change, and useful for learningforward planning).

3. Systematically assess and document what was done under the intervention to achieve the selected targeted outcomes.

4. Identify and evidence the extent to which the selected outcomes have actually materialised, as well as any relevant unintended outcomes.

5. Undertake 'process induction' to identify salient plausible causal explanations for the evidenced outcomes.

6. Gather required data and use 'process verification' to assess the extent to which each of the explanations identified in Step 5 are supported or not supported by the available evidence.

7. Write a narrative analytical report to document the above research processes and findings.

8. Summarise aspects of the above narrative analysis by allocating project/campaign 'contribution scores' for each of the targeted and/or associated outcomes. This is not expected to provide a precise measure of contribution, but rather a sense of how much the campaign was likely responsible for observed change(s).
The Process Tracing approach (Box 1) requires evaluators to assess effectiveness through examination of a limited number of ‘targeted outcomes’. The number of outcomes considered is very limited because (a) outcomes are chosen that are as far along the causal pathway as is reasonable for the programme to have influenced at the time of the evaluation, with the expectation that the evaluation will also consider all those interim outcomes along that causal pathway, and (b) a rigorous process is followed for each to thoroughly answer:

- Did the outcome materialise?
- Did it occur as the CH team said it did?
- What other factors have contributed to it?
- How significant was the CH contribution and contribution of others?

Using the eight steps of Process Tracing (Box 1) as a framework, the approach followed can be summarised as follows:

Steps 1–3: Starting with step 2, the evaluators conducted a survey via email to ask those responsible for CH in Oxfam and its implementing partners to identify what they considered to be the most significant outcomes to date. Responses were received from representatives of all implementing partners and all CH programme staff in Oxfam. Concurrently, the evaluators reviewed project documentation provided by Oxfam to inform their facilitation of targeted outcome selection by the programme actors.

Working with Oxfam staff in Dar es Salaam, the evaluators facilitated a process of selecting three ‘targeted outcomes’ from those nominated. Selection considered the following criteria: mix of implementing partner organisations, mix of locations, mix of stakeholders the programme has sought to influence, mix of strategies/activities, relevance to logic model assumptions, relevance to ongoing work, extent to which the outcome has already been described and assessed, and the type and anticipated significance of other factors influencing the outcome. The latter criterion relates to the importance in this evaluation of considering the contributions to the selected outcomes not only of CH, but also of other factors, hence the interest in looking at a range of influencing factors of varying significance.

Next, the evaluators facilitated the formulation of the selected targeted outcomes so they met the criteria of SMART outcome descriptions, that is they each contained a precise description of what the programme claimed to have changed and which of its strategies and activities contributed to the change (Steps 1 & 3).

Steps 4–6 were undertaken concurrently while in the localities where the outcomes occurred, that is in Arusha and Shinyanga regions. Methods used were semi-structured interviews, document review and focus groups. Informants consulted are listed in Appendix 1.
Data from diverse personal and documentary sources – verbatim records of informant interviews; field observations; documents, such as letters and documents of CH implementing partners – were analysed for evidence that the targeted outcomes had materialised and that potential contributing factors had influenced the outcome. To be fully substantiated, claimed outcomes and contributions needed to be confirmed by a triangulation of sources.

Steps 7&8 are contained in this report.

3.2 Sampling

Targeted Outcomes 1 and 2 involved changes of multiple councillors and animators respectively. There were too many of each for all to be assessed with the time and resources available using the required, in-depth, qualitative approach to understanding the outcomes. The evaluation therefore focused on a sample of individuals.

We assessed Outcome 1 using evidence from and about a sample of six councillors of Shinyanga Rural District. These six are among the 34 councillors in the District (out of 35 in total) that received training and mentoring from CABUIPA under CH. The sample size is not sufficient to provide a statistically representative analysis. This was not the intention. The approach used prioritised depth over breadth by using a sample comprised of a mixture of purposefully and randomly selected Councillors as the focus for an in-depth, qualitative assessment of whether behaviour changes had indeed occurred and, if so, whether there was evidence that such changes were influenced by the CH intervention. Three councillors were purposefully selected by CABUIPA and Oxfam as being a good source of behaviour change examples and three councillors were randomly selected by the evaluators (Table 1).

A limitation of the CABUIPA/Oxfam sample is that two councillors selected were elected for the first time in 2010, only months before the start of the CH intervention. For these there was a relatively short period for which there could have been evidence of their behaviour before the CH intervention. For the evaluator’s random selection, our guiding criterion was that the councillors should have served two or more terms. We used this criterion in order to provide a larger evidence base of behaviour changes than if we had chosen councillors that had been elected for the first time in 2010.
Table 1: Councillor sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Number of terms</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Selected by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>3 (2 in un-elected special seat)</td>
<td>Experienced, primary educated</td>
<td>CABUIPA/Oxfam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Primary educated</td>
<td>CABUIPA/Oxfam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Acting Council Chairperson, primary educated</td>
<td>CABUIPA/Oxfam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Experienced, college educated, Chairperson of Council until August 2012</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Veteran, secondary educated</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Experienced, primary educated</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We assessed **Outcome 2** using evidence from and about a sample of six farmer animators of Shinyanga Rural District. As above this was a mixture of three purposively selected animators, and three randomly selected by the evaluators. These six are among 32 farmer animators that have been trained through CH in this District, 19 of whom are men and 13 women (Table 2). Two of the six completed secondary education up to form four and the rest are standard seven leavers. Four were introduced to animation through training delivered by ADLG under CH, while animators 1 and 4, the two men in the sample, also received the ADLG training, but had previously been trained and worked as animators for *Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania* (MVIWATA, a national farmers' organisation; Table 3).

Table 2: Animator sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Community Group</th>
<th>Village, Ward</th>
<th>Selected by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Maendeleo</td>
<td>Ishinabulandi, Samuye</td>
<td>Oxfam/ADLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Wafugaji</td>
<td>Kituli, Tinde</td>
<td>Oxfam/ADLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Masalkulangwa</td>
<td>Pandagichiza, Pandakichiza</td>
<td>Oxfam/ADLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mpenda</td>
<td>Mwamala 'B', Mwamala</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Ushirikiano SACCOS</td>
<td>Mwamala 'B', Mwamala</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Tujikomboe</td>
<td>Shilabela, Pandakichiza</td>
<td>Evaluators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Animator education and experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Animator experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secondary, form 4</td>
<td>Experienced animator, first trained and worked for MVIWATA. Assisted evaluators with information gathering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Secondary, form 4</td>
<td>New animator, trained as an animator for the first time by ALDG under CH programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Std 7</td>
<td>New animator, trained as an animator for the first time by ALDG under CH programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Std 7</td>
<td>Experienced animator, first trained and worked for MVIWATA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Std 7</td>
<td>New animator, trained as an animator for the first time by ALDG under CH programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Std 7</td>
<td>New animator, trained as an animator for the first time by ALDG under CH programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Limitations

Self-selection by CH actors of the three targeted outcomes that were the focus of this evaluation was limiting in two respects. First, the requirement of the Oxfam process-tracing protocol that the programme choose just three outcomes, meant that around ten other outcomes shortlisted as significant by the programme were not assessed in this evaluation. The evaluation examined, therefore, only a proportion of the outcomes that could demonstrate the programme’s effectiveness. Second, the selection is intended to identify examples of the most significant outcomes achieved, where ‘significance’ is primarily defined as the outcome being as far along the causal chain of results as possible while still being specific (SMART) enough to provide the evaluators with a reasonable opportunity of finding evidence to support or refute or qualify the occurrence of the outcome and the CH contribution. Excluded, therefore, is any assessment of the work of the programme that has so far had little or no effect in terms of outcomes influenced, either because it is ineffective or because, as in any social change work, not least in advocacy, outcomes very often occur unpredictably and at some time after the contribution of an intervention. These limitations could have been offset, at least in part, by modifications to the evaluation design developed with Oxfam, but it was agreed that such modifications were not feasible within the time and resources availability without compromising the other qualities of the evaluation, namely the robust investigation of whether outcomes had materialised and which of the multiple causal factors had been significant influences on each outcome.
4 Programme description

4.1 The CH programme

In presenting a description of the Chukua Hatua programme, it is important to note that the design has been continuously evolving since the first, brief project document. The philosophy of the programme, as strongly encouraged by both the funder and Oxfam, is for a continuous cycle of planning, monitoring, reflection, learning and adaptation. Emblematic of this approach are the ‘Learning Events’ that the programme organises twice a year at different venues where programme implementers come together to reflect and refocus the programme, a practice common to all Oxfam programmes. This flexible, opportunistic approach is, in our view, entirely appropriate because accountability and governance programmes need to be responsive to the opportunities and obstacles that the ever-changing context of their work brings.

The programme’s broad aims, as presented in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, are that 1 million citizens are engaged in monitoring of the public services and/or public resource management. Specifically, the programme seeks to influence people and institutions such that:

- citizens, particularly women and youth, assume more responsibility and hold government to account;
- local leaders effectively lobby government on community demands; and
- government institutions are receptive to the demands of citizens.
Figure 1: Chukua Hatua logic model

Chukua Hatua Phase 2: Logic model

Assumptions
1) If we build citizens' awareness and capacity, assist them to overcome fear, and action is in the interest of their livelihoods, then they will act.
2) If there is increased pressure from citizens, then duty bearers will be increasingly compelled to respond.
3) If we increase capacity of local elected leaders then % positive responses will increase.

Components
A Between citizens
B With leaders

Gender power relations - women in leadership; men's attitudes to women
Active Leaders - capacitate elected local leaders
- targeting 1) Behaviour to engage with communities
- 2) Capacity to negotiate upwards and with appointed leaders

Animation
- Continue former animators - selct most active from pilot; explore other TABU groups - producer groups, marketing associations. Pilot animation with tail leaders, teachers (link to education programme). Youth Pilot in Nyorongoro also with traditional leaders, birth attendants and healers. Incorporate best of election promises tracking pilot

Issue-based campaigning
- Lokombo land rights and community forest campaigns
- Opportunistically support local advocacy coming out of the animators work, link to Oxfam National and international campaigning and national networks/coalitions

Activating and creating spaces & networks
A) Research and experiment with existing informal spaces where people meet. 2) Facilitate new issue and geographic based networks between emerging local activists 3) Use and create spaces for constitutional review input.
B) Stimulate village meetings including both animator and active leader works to promote them, using artists and local radio to create awareness on role of VAs 2) Research how and where decisions are taken outside of formal spaces and explore how citizens can penetrate them.

Strategies
- Risk mitigation: Embed negotiation and conflict resolution skills into active leaders and animation work, be responsive, link to national organisations.

Outcomes
1) Citizens become responsible and hold government to account.
2) Local leaders effectively lobby government on community demands.
3) Government institutions are responsive to meet the demands of citizens.
4) Government develop implementation strategies based on civil society inputs in the areas of gender, economic justice and education.

Increased accountability and responsiveness of government to its citizens

Poverty reduction and social justice in Tanzania
4.1.1 Logic model

The strategies, outcomes (short and longer term), goal and vision for the programme are best described in the logic model for Phase II of the programme, reproduced here in Figure 1. The model is presented to provide readers with an overview of the programme so that the results evaluated can be understood in the context of the programme as a whole.

Not included in Figure 1 are the details of inputs and activities undertaken by the programme when delivering its strategies. From the programme documentation, discussions with programme staff in Oxfam and partner organisations and data collected, we understand these as:

Inputs:

- Funding (of the programme in Oxfam and partner organisations, of activities, but very deliberately not of those the programme is working with)
- Mentoring/technical support (of partners to boundary partners, of Oxfam to implementing partners and vice versa).

Activities:

- Training (of boundary partners)
- Lobbying (of local, regional and national government in particular)
- Learning (knowledge sharing between project actors at Learning Events)
- Networking (convening stakeholders, disseminating programme outcomes).

Also not indicated in the already information-rich logic model are those actors that the programme works with directly to realise its outcomes. These are defined as ‘boundary partners’ in Outcome Mapping, the programme design, monitoring and evaluation approach used by Chukua Hatua. It is important to identify these in this report as the changes in behaviour that the programme has sought to influence in such boundary partners define the outcomes that are the subject of this evaluation. The programme seeks to influence the behaviour of the following **boundary partners** to achieve lasting change:

- Politicians
- Community
- Region and District Commissioner
- Civil servants
- Civil Society Organisations
- Students
- Media
- Non-government leaders
- Teachers.

Lastly, a key aspect of the programme’s thinking not represented in the logic model but understood by the evaluators from conversations with Oxfam programme staff, is that the programme has been conceived on the basis that it is one influence among many in a complex landscape of actors and influences that affect citizen and leader attitudes and actions relating to accountability and governance of public resources.
4.1.2 Outcome-oriented design and monitoring of the Chukua Hatua programme

The programme’s work is guided by descriptions of the behaviour, relationships, policies, activities and actions that the programme ideally wants to see in each of its boundary partners. An example of one such description, known as an Outcome Challenge, is presented in Box 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 2: Outcome Challenge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-government (faith, traditional) leaders</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditional and faith leaders monitor political leaders and put the spotlight on misbehaviour and discrepancies. They are involved in continuous dialogue with other leaders, representing the community’s interests and acting as a watchdog. They are both active citizens within their communities and party-politically neutral leaders. Traditional and faith leaders support the role of women in positions of economic and political leadership, and play a pivotal role in changing negative attitudes against women and other marginalised groups. At a local level, faith leaders discuss issues between themselves and develop common stances where possible.

Using a selection of strategies and inputs judged to be appropriate for a given boundary partner at a given time, the programme seeks to contribute to the achievement of each boundary partner's outcome challenge by influencing changes in their behaviour, relationships, policies, activities and actions. As each Outcome Challenge is only likely to be realised, if at all, after a substantial period of programme implementation, Progress Markers are defined and used to monitor changes observed. In the case of Chukua Hatua, Oxfam collects and compiles data on Progress Markers from the diaries and journals of boundary partners and Oxfam staff twice a year. Progress Markers can be thought of as ‘mini outcomes’ i.e. the types of behaviour change that the programme may observe in its boundary partners that can reasonably be understood as progress towards the Outcome Challenge. While not a hierarchy of expected changes that will necessarily be observed, Chukua Hatua as is common in Outcome Mapping, defines three levels of Progress Marker according to the expected likelihood of each change occurring: start to see, like to see, love to see.

The use of Progress Markers to track changes in boundary partners should not be understood as precluding the importance of observing unanticipated outcomes. After all, boundary partners are not under the control of the programme, therefore changes in behaviour related to the Outcome Challenge may or may not have been those anticipated and may or may not be in a positive direction. The Chukua Hatua programme demonstrates it is conscious of this by making space for recording unexpected changes in its monitoring reports.

To provide a sense of the changes the programme has sought to influence and a snapshot of changes it has reported observing, we have extracted examples of Progress Markers and observed changes for some of the boundary partners from the three Outcome Mapping reports (September 2011, March 2012 and October 2012. See Table 4).
Table 4: Examples of Progress Markers and observed changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary partner</th>
<th>Progress marker</th>
<th>Observed changes (summarised from unsubstantiated Oxfam Outcome Mapping reports submitted to AcT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start to see</strong></td>
<td><strong>Like to see</strong></td>
<td><strong>Love to see</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Regularly attending village, ward and/or district level planning and budget meetings.</td>
<td>Work with/pressurise civil servant and appointed officials to make public budgets and expenditure reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>In the wards of Ilola, Mwantine and Ng’walukwa in Shinyanga Rural district councillors have been reported participating actively in villages’ planning and budget meetings.</em></td>
<td><em>In two wards of Ilola and Mwantine in Shinyanga Rural district councillors have been working with a team of civil servants (i.e. WEOs and VEOs) preparing ward budget and expenditure reports.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Community artists spread messages of active citizenship through different art forms, e.g. song, dance, theatre, cartoons.</td>
<td>Community members use popularised versions of laws and policies to understand their entitlements &amp; question leaders and relevant officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Community members in Kishapu district were reported writing songs criticising government, explaining the work of animators.</em></td>
<td><em>A female animator in Kahama district used knowledge from a simplified book on water policy to meet with and demand water for her village.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and District Commissioners</td>
<td>Commissioners are involved in searching for new resources and development opportunities in their locale.</td>
<td>Commissioners allow civil society organisations and communities to organise and carry out activities without obstructing them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The DC for Kishapu district agreed when asked by the district agriculture department to host a meeting of sisal growers.</em></td>
<td><em>In March 2012, NGONET in Ngorongoro had training on climate change adaptation and mitigation, which District Commissioner attended.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Discussing the quality of services and use of resources on education in their schools.</td>
<td>Identifying and supporting issues that concern marginalised groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>In Mhunze primary school in Kishapu district teachers discussed how the quality of teaching has been affected by the delay in disbursement of funds from the district council.</em></td>
<td><em>In Kahama district some teachers have formed students’ clubs that look at issues, such as poverty and HIV/AIDS.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Political and legislative context

The prevailing high public and political profile of accountability and governance issues in Tanzania is a factor that is very likely to have contributed to the work of CH in general. The importance of accountability and governance issues to communities in today’s Tanzania can be traced to the economic difficulties of increasing unemployment of 1990s, which citizens attribute to non-democratic governance as well as to the challenges of drought to farming communities. The democratic processes that brought about multiparty politics in 1992 gave room to opposition political parties that participated in the Presidential and parliamentary elections of 1995. The opposition parties have since pushed for good governance and accountability of leaders including councillors in subsequent elections especially in 2010. The political climate in Shinyanga Rural district, one of the locations where CH works that is subject of this review, is particularly supportive of accountability issues because of the vibrant opposition parties in the area. These parties have been successful at bringing accountability to the attention of community members by linking economic difficulties of increasing unemployment and the challenges of drought to non-democratic government.

The strong drive to hold leaders accountable that is associated with opposition parties is not without complications and potential risks for Chukua Hatua: village leaders and even some community members sometimes identify citizen animators trained by CH as political activists at least initially. CH is perceived by some local leaders as having the hallmark of opposition party activism.

Acts, Government directives and circulars concerning the need for public officials to make financial transactions public provided a necessary framework for the CH programme. Examples include the Local Government Principal Legislation Act No 7 of 1982 and 1994 Government directives and circulars No. 4 for Village Chairperson and No. 451 for Village Executive Officers (VEOs). These provide the mandate for Councillors to make income/expenditure accounts public.

Other factors supportive of CH implementation are the following regulations, systems and funding of the Tanzanian government and state:

- Funding from the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). This was cited by councillors as an important source of funding to address community priorities and recounted examples of how they had been able to help fulfil community needs by securing funding for roads, power tillers, dams, teacher’s houses, toilets, etc.
- Of particular importance in 2012 was the timely delivery of the TAMISEMI (Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa, Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government) guidelines that are necessary for planning and budgeting and without which the ward plans developed with community participation could not be submitted for funding. In previous years late delivery of the guidelines has been a noted obstacle to addressing citizen priorities. The late delivery in 2012 would have been likely to demotivate citizens who had participated in the planning and damaged the Councillors reputation for delivery.

Particular local obstacles to CH implementation are described in relation to particular outcomes in the following section.
5 Findings

5.1 Outcome 1 – Councillors become responsive and aware

5.1.1 The outcome and how the programme contributed

This outcome concerns the change in actions and activities of some councillors in Shinyanga Rural district. The description of the outcome developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators is presented in Box 3.

Box 3: Targeted Outcome* 1

From July 2011 to December 2012 in Shinyanga Rural district of Shinyanga region, some councillors that received Active Leaders training through the Chukua Hatua programme have been more responsive to communities and, through their actions, have demonstrated a better understanding of their roles vis-à-vis the local governance structure by, for example:

a) participating actively in mandated meetings (e.g. ward planning and budget meetings, village planning and budget meetings, village council meetings) where they have provided feedback to village communities on ward and district plans and budgets, responded to questions posed to them and been informed about community priorities and concerns requiring the attention of decision makers at higher levels

b) allowing financial transactions and expenditure under their supervision to be made open to public scrutiny and debate

c) asking VEOs under their supervision to ensure public budget and expenditure reports are prepared and presented to the village communities on a quarterly basis.

* Descriptions developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators.

The description of how CH contributed to this outcome as developed by the Oxfam and CABUIPA with facilitation of the evaluators is presented in Box 4. CABUIPA is contracted by Oxfam as its implementing partner for the Active Leader component of CH.

We gained further insights into the contribution of CH to the outcome from the councillors. When interviewed, the councillors highlighted the following aspects of the CABUIPA training and follow up as those that had been most beneficial to them:

- Greatly improved knowledge of councillor roles in governance, transparency and accountability (Councillors 4, 6).
- Increased appreciation for the need to reach out to citizens in order to learn of concerns and ideas through attendance at village meetings, involving citizens in planning and budgeting and otherwise (Councillors 1, 4, 6).
• Improved capacity to use participatory methods for engaging citizens in ward planning using the Opportunity and Obstacle to Development approach and related skills (Councillors 2, 3, 4, 6).
• Greater understanding of existing mechanisms available to councillors for enforcing village leader and citizen accountability and discipline (Councillor 1).
• Improved awareness and understanding of Acts and regulations mandating regular financial reporting at district and village levels (Councillors 1, 4).
• Greater appreciation of councillor responsibility for mobilising, understanding, recording and representing the views and concerns of women and other disadvantaged groups (Councillors 1, 2, 4, 6).
• New ideas for raising funds to support community needs (Councillor 6).

**Box 4: Contribution of the Chukua Hatua Programme to Outcome 1**

The Active Leader intervention was designed and delivered by David Rwegoshora (Director, CABUIPA), Michael Ikila (Governance Officer, CABUIPA) and Anna Bwana (Programme Manager, Oxfam).

The Active Leader intervention began August 2011 with a one-week classroom training course (Councillor’s Accountability & Oversight Training), followed by a week of field visits. A total of 62 councillors participated in the training, with each ward being represented by at least one councillor. The first event was held for 28 councillors selected from the 21 wards of Kishapu district. The second event was held for 34 councillors (28 elected, 6 ‘preferential’ i.e. appointed) from the 28 wards of Shinyanga rural district.

The Active Leader training included: field visits; reflection on field visits to identify issues; action planning at the district level; presentation of the action plan to the District Executive Director and Council Management Team; ward-level action plan development; and practising of identification of community priority needs. Following the training, all participating councillors also took part in a facilitated self-assessment and received assistance with writing action plans for their wards.

* Description developed by Oxfam and CABUIPA with facilitation by the evaluators.

**5.1.2 To what extent did the outcome materialise?**

To test the extent to which the outcome materialised, we used a sample of six of the 34 councillors trained by CH in the district (Section 3.2). Evidence from numerous informants and a wide range of written sources, as well as from CABUIPA, Oxfam’s implementing partner for this part of the CH programme, confirms this outcome materialised as described.
In one respect the changes were more extensive than described in the outcome: we found clear evidence that all six councillors were now attending and actively participating in village meetings more than they had done before the CH intervention, and each also demonstrated one or more other type of behaviour change. In other respects, the changes are much more limited: examples of the other three types of behaviour change recorded were patchy, with none being demonstrated by all councillors. Even so, each councillor had changed more than one type of behaviour.

Do Oxfam and its partner have a shared understanding of Outcome 1?

CABUIPA, Oxfam’s implementing partner for this outcome, confirmed that they largely agreed with the outcome description with the exception of the following points:

- The first training took place in August 2011, hence the period covered by the outcome should be August 2011–December 2012.
- An added emphasis on the councillors having demonstrated a better understanding of their role vis-à-vis civil servants as well as local government structures.
- Quarterly presentation of budget and expenditure reports by VEOs is required under the Local Government Act 1982.

While useful to enhance our understanding, we did not find that any of the observations of CABUIPA on this outcome altered our understanding of the outcome significantly. We therefore conclude that CABUIPA confirmed that the outcome occurred as stated.

CABUIPA’s substantiation of the outcome is informative because it is the CH actor that has most knowledge of the outcome, hence the public expression in this report of its opinion on the accuracy of the outcome description is, when considered with sources outside of CH, a source of substantiation that the outcome did or did not occur as described by Oxfam.

Types of behaviour change

We recorded four categories of claimed behaviour change (Table 5) and assess each in turn below. While the primary sources of evidence about behaviour changes were the councillors themselves, only behaviours for which we found at least one source of substantiation in addition to the councillors are described. In many cases, more than one substantiation source was identified.

Table 5: Councillor behaviour changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour changes</th>
<th>Councillor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Attendance and active participation at meetings</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Take action to enforce downward (village and citizen) accountability</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Encourage citizens to express concerns and self-organise to address priorities</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Take up community priorities to the highest level, particularly those of women and other marginalised groups</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Attendance and active participation at meetings**

Evidence from VEOs and WEOs confirms that all councillors demonstrated this behaviour change. All councillors reported both attending and participating actively in meetings (village planning and budget meetings) significantly more than before the CH training. Councillors did not generally claim to participate in each quarterly meeting of each of the, typically four, villages in their ward, but claimed attendance ranging from 50–85 per cent. Some councillors reported not having previously attended meetings at all, others said that they now attended and participated much more fully than before the CH training. Evidence of active participation included staying for the duration of meetings and making notes about community needs/priorities. Testimony of the majority of councillors was convincing as (i) they were able to cite details of issues discussed without reference to their notes or meeting reports and (ii) other sources confirmed their attendance and active participation. A minority of councillors struggled to cite current or recent issues discussed, but other sources confirmed they participated more actively in more meetings, showing a greater awareness of their role as representatives of community interests than before the CH training.

**Substantiation sources:** Councillor recall knowledge of community needs discussed at meetings; WEOs (Councillors 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), VEOs (Councillor 2), detailed records in councillor diaries of community priorities and councillor concerns discussed at meetings (Councillor 1, 4, 6).

2. **Take action to enforce downward (village and citizen) accountability**

Two of the six councillors have demonstrated this behaviour change. The two have exercised their authority to enforce downward accountability at the village level (village councils and citizens), using a range of tactics to seek regular expenditure reporting from VEOs.

One approach used by these two councillors has been the use of leadership skills to persuade VEOs to present income and expenditure reports to Ward Development Council meetings on a quarterly basis and to emergency meetings as required. A different strategy has been the use of Sungusungu – traditional security guards/militia – for the enforced collection of ward village revenues (Councillor 1). Punitive measures enforced through the Sungusungu system include restricted interaction with fellow community members and restricted access to social services. Another approach involved the mobilisation of village leaders and committee members to participate in meetings to counter the excuse of poor attendance sometimes used by VEOs when not presenting income/expenditure reports (Councillor 1). For this councillor, the successful use of these informal mechanisms has meant that it has not been necessary to use the formal sanction of reporting non-compliance with regulations to the District Executive Director (DED), a sanction provided in law and reflected in staff regulations.

While so far unsuccessful in ensuring financial reporting by all five VEOs in his ward, Councillor 2 has been using the informal means he learnt on the CH training to try to secure accountability. In his ward, four of the five VEOs are presenting financial reports regularly requiring no action by the councillor. A fifth has so far resisted the efforts of the councillor to enforce financial reporting. The councillor, the only opposition party member on the Council,
cites the ‘Kulindana’ syndrome of the ruling party – a system of protecting comrades – as the obstacle preventing him from exercising what he learnt about accountability in the CH training. The attempts to enforce accountability using informal means demonstrate a new awareness of his role as described in the outcome.

Councillors 3, 4, 5 and 6 demonstrated awareness of their oversight role of village finances, but reported there being no problem with VEO financial reporting, hence there had been no need to take action to ensure accountability at that level.

Substantiation sources: The behaviour described above was confirmed by VEO (Councillor 1); a report of an investigative committee and testimony of other Honorary Councillors (by Councillor 2); WEOs (Councillors 4 and 6), Ward Executive Office records (Councillor 6).

3. Encourage citizens to express concerns and self-organise to address priorities

Written and verbal evidence confirms four of the six councillors demonstrated this change of behaviour after the CH training. Examples recorded were: mobilising women to form groups and all citizens to participate in groups, particularly community banks MAFONGONO SACCOS and Village Community Banks (Councillor 1, 2, 5) and health awareness groups to counter cholera and HIV/AIDS (Councillor 4); encouraging women to participate and voice their priorities and ideas at village meetings (Councillor 4); create additional avenues for community members to express their concerns and ideas: a suggestion box and invitations to elders to participate in Ward Development Committee meetings (Councillor 1).

Substantiation sources: Ward records on noticeboards, written records of the Honorary Councillors’ group visits and meetings and by a woman familiar with four of the groups; observation of the suggestion box in the WEO’s office; records of Ward Development Council meetings confirmed the invitations to elders.

4. Take up community priorities to the highest level, particularly those of women and other marginalised groups

A variety of written and verbal sources confirmed that four of the six councillors demonstrated this behaviour change. Examples recorded: mobilise VEOs to base village plans and budgets on community priorities expressed through the Opportunity and Obstacles Development planning process and oversight to ensure presentation of these plans to the Ward Development Council, the full Council and then TAMISEMI; Councillor 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6); other presentations of community needs to district council and donors for funding (Councillor 1, 2); securing funds for and ensuring construction of a maternity ward, village dispensary, health centre and a mortuary (Councillor 3).

Substantiation sources: WEO, project records and another councillor (Councillor 3); VEOs (Councillor 1, 2); observation of the plan and planning process documents (Councillors 1, 3); Councillors’ planning directive (Councillor 1); and women’s group reports and VEO (Councillor 6).

Kulindana is the Swahili word for ‘protection’, reflecting in its usage here the reluctance to take action against wrongdoing due to belonging in the same group/holding similar views/ideology.
Behaviour or behaviour change

The evidence above describes behaviour changes we were able to substantiate with at least one, and often more than one, source other than the councillors themselves. We consider these behaviour changes as being confirmed. We also consider the fact that all six councillors claimed that their behaviour had changed after the CH training delivered by CABUIPA as notable. We know of no incentive for the councillors to make this claim if it were baseless and therefore conclude that it adds to the substantiation.

On the other hand, some behaviour changes claimed by councillors have not been presented here because although they could be substantiated as behaviours, evidence was lacking that they were changes in behaviour. Confirming if some behaviours represented changes was more problematic than confirming the behaviours themselves because: (i) there is a high rate of turnover of VEOs – a key type of informant because of their close knowledge/frequent interaction with councillors, such that some current incumbents were unable to comment on councillor behaviour three or more years previously, (ii) written records are very often not well kept/easily found, (iii) additional testimony to verify changes could not always be obtained in the time available, (iv) two of the six councillors were elected for the first time in 2010, just a year before the CH intervention and (v) of the absence of CH baseline of data on councillor behaviour.

5.1.3 How significant was the contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme and the contributions of other actors to this outcome?

We found that the CH programme made a crucial contribution to the outcome, such that it would not have occurred otherwise. The other factors identified have also been important influences and we doubt that the CH programme would have had the influence it has had in their absence. But we consider that in the absence of the CH programme, the behaviour changes we found would not have occurred or would certainly not have occurred at the pace and to the extent that they have.

We conclude the CH programme had made a crucial contribution because:

- Documentary sources (CABUIPA training modules, CABUIPA reference materials, village meeting minutes, councillor diaries) and testimony of trainees fully confirms the contribution of Chukua Hatua to Outcome 1 was as described by Oxfam and CABUIPA (Box 4).
- We found strong evidence that the outcome occurred: all councillors assessed have changed behaviour following the CH training and mentoring in at least one way that shows responsiveness to citizen priorities.
- None of the other contributing factors alone or together are sufficient to explain the outcome.
- The verified changes took place despite some challenging external influences that make it difficult for councillors to deliver on citizen priorities and enforce accountability of public officials (political allegiances, late payment by government, paralysis of council).
Five of the six councillors presented numerous examples of how the training and support received from CABUIPA under the CH programme had been an important or very important influence on their behaviour.

Only one negative comment was made about the training, when an experienced councillor being consulted for substantiation of the behaviour of another councillor expressed the view that they had learned nothing new from the training.

All councillors confirmed that the training from CABUIPA was the first such training they had received.

Other contributing factors to the outcome

Using evaluator knowledge of Tanzania together with information gained from informants and through research, we identified a range of other factors that are likely to have contributed to the outcome:

- Traditional accountability systems: elders, Sungusungu and traditional leaders.
- Other organisations: former and ongoing activities of MVIWATA.
- Women’s organisations including Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania.
- Directly relevant training experience of CABUIPA.
- Funding to respond to community demands: TASAF, international NGOs: Save the Children, World Vision, Red Cross, African Medical and Research Foundation, Care International.
- TAMISEMI guidelines, delivered in a timely manner that allowed councillors to follow up on community priorities in the TAMISEMI budget and planning process.

Highly important, particularly in some wards we investigated, is the existing and respected traditional accountability systems including elders, Sungusungu and traditional leaders. The Sungusungu militia/security guard system in particular is seen by some councillors and elders to be an effective means to settle complicated issues of mismanagement of community funds, which are likely otherwise to take long time to address through the formal police system. It is also used to enforce citizen responsibilities for paying levies, etc. With punitive measures, such restriction of social interaction with neighbours and access to public facilities, Sungusungu is not without critics.

It also has the potential to be divisive if seen to be a one-sided instrument of those in power rather than a service for citizens as a whole. We did not, however, identify any negative reactions to the use of Sungusungu in our investigation.

A second factor creating a supportive environment for the outcome is the work of other organisations. The former and ongoing activities of MVIWATA, notably mobilising communities including women into groupings for farm activities, have influenced women positively to willingly and readily come together. Likewise, women’s organisations like Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania⁶, have, through their mobilisation of women, made it acceptable for women to form and be active in groups. International NGOs play a very important role in responding to women/community needs in health, agriculture and education by making funding and other support available. NGOs cited by informants as being active in the District

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⁶ Swahili name for Women’s Organization of the ruling Political Party of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) of Tanzania.
are: Save the Children, World Vision, Red Cross, African Medical and Research Foundation, Care International. We were not, however, able to determine if these NGOs support or undermine the functions of councillors. Where such NGOs consult and work with councillors to identify and respond to citizen priorities, they are likely to be a supportive factor. If NGOs bypass councillors when identifying citizen priorities, then the role of councillors as representatives of citizen interests will be undermined.

A factor particular to this outcome rather than the promotion of governance and accountability in general, is that the training materials used by CABUIPA had previously been used and tested in a pilot training programme of TAMISEMI conducted by SNV in Mvomero District of Morogoro Region and another one in Sengerema District of Mwanza region by CABUIPA before the 2010 election. CABUIPA translated the materials into Swahili for use in the Chukua Hatua training. We assume CABUIPA will have benefited both from the experience of giving similar training before and from testing the training materials. Such pre-testing of the materials cannot be taken for granted and is likely to have made the CH training more effective than it would otherwise have been.

**Contributions in context**

The prevailing high public and political profile of accountability and governance issues in Tanzania is a factor that is very likely to have been a supportive influence on the effectiveness of CH, as are some regulations, systems and funding of the Tanzanian government and state (Section 4.2).

In contrast, several factors were identified that were obstacles to achievement of this outcome. When considered they make the behaviour changes and resulting benefits that we were able to confirm all the more impressive. Most significant, particularly if it continues, is the paralysis of District Council decision-making that has resulted from conflicts between councillors of the ruling party, CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi), with one group supporting the Member of Parliament, the other the former Chair of the Council. As one councillor remarked, if this unanticipated situation continues then it will greatly hinder the success of the CH programme because it will block a key route for councillors to take community needs to a higher level.

We found evidence that partisan behaviour is an obstacle to accountability. For instance, we found an example where ruling party members are protecting a fellow CCM member from receiving the disciplinary measures due for mismanagement of funds, despite the conclusion of investigation that has found him to be guilty. In another example, the only non-CCM councillor reported that he faces delaying tactics from CCM members that make it very difficult to deliver on commitments made to promote citizen priorities, therefore undermining his reputation and jeopardising his re-election chances in 2015. In addition, threats are made to withhold funds due to the ward on the basis of the election of a CUF (Civic United Front) councillor. His testimony was confirmed by a councillor from another ward.

Lastly, some councillors have benefited from only a very limited number of years of education and this constrains their ability to fulfil their functions.

**5.1.4 How is the outcome significant?**

The outcome is significant because councillors play a pivotal role in local governance. Knowing how to build their capacity so that they are better able to play their role is important
for opening up the space for dialogue between citizens and leaders. The outcome is a test of the following CH assumption as articulated in the phase II logic model – *If we increase the capacity and opportunity of local elected leaders to engage with communities and negotiate upwards then we will increase the number of positive accountability responses from duty bearers, including leaders themselves.*

The contribution of the CH programme was important as such training is very rare in Tanzania, even though it is called for under Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government Regulations. The training was the first time the CH programme engaged positively with government, rather than supporting citizens in challenging the authorities.

5.1.5 **Negative outcomes**

While investigating the behaviour changes of councillors, we identified two negative outcomes to which CH potentially contributed. The first outcome is substantiated, the second is not, but we include both here to highlight the risks associated with CH and, importantly, to flag them as issues for investigation should the programme be unaware of them.

**Negative outcome 1:** In December 2012 a councillor was allegedly attacked because of his attempts to enforce disclosure of village budget and expenditure reports. The councillor in question has substantial experience of local and party governance having served as chairperson of a village for 10 years, CCM Chairperson for 10 years and Commander of United CCM Youth for five years. The suspects were the Sayu Village Chairperson and VEO, but the case was dropped due to lack of hard evidence. Sayu is one of two villages where the VEO is resisting presenting financial reports to the public. The councillor’s claim was covered by media reports and substantiated by the report on court.

**Negative outcome 2:** Inspired by CH, councillors have intensified efforts to bolster district council revenue through the collection of legitimate taxes and levies, including on market sales. A proportion of such levies should be distributed to villages. However, one councillor reported grievances in one village because the levy had been increased, but remittances from market levies due from the district have not been made as expected.
5.2 Outcome 2 – Animators mobilise citizens

This outcome concerns the change in actions and activities of animators, particularly women, in Shinyanga Rural District. The description of the outcome developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators is presented in Box 5.

Box 5: Targeted Outcome* 2

From December 2010 to December 2012 in Shinyanga Rural District of Shinyanga Region, animators, particularly women, that have received training, mentoring and ad hoc support through the Chukua Hatua programme, have started to mobilise others to join them in taking action to hold public institutions to account and claim rights and entitlements that were previously denied by, for example:

- monitoring village finances;
- monitoring community resources, such as forests; and
- lobbying leaders to be more responsive on issues of importance to citizens.

* Descriptions developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators.

The description of how CH contributed to this outcome as developed by the Oxfam and ADLG with facilitation of the evaluators is presented in Box 6.

ADLG is contracted by Oxfam as its implementing partner for the animator component of CH in Shinyanga Region. Jimmy Luhende, ADLG, provided the following additional information:

- The animation work in Shinyanga began in December 2010 with consultants Mama Tatu of Morogoro and Jimmy Luhende. ADLG was not involved at that stage.
- Ad hoc support to animators in response to issues has included: translation of contracts into Swahili, training of 12 animators on constitutional revision process, monitoring of constitutional revision process, and advice to communities on what to ask the Prime Minister on his visit.
- Mentoring has included bringing together animators and community members that have been active in holding their leaders to account to reflect on how to take forward animation work, responding to issues, such as the labelling of some animators as ‘watu hatari/vihelehele’.7

We gained further insights into the contribution of the programme to the outcome from some of the animators:

- The ADLG/CH programme introduced a structured approach to recording community actions when monitoring village finances and other community resources that has been instrumental in supporting the provision of evidence in legal and disciplinary actions, as well as tracking progress and deciding on follow up measures. (Animator 1)

7 A term of ridicule that can be translated as ‘those who do things that is not their job/jeopardise other people’s benefits for no advantages to themselves’.
The ADLG/CH programme introduced a structured approach to recording the proceedings of meetings that helps us follow up issues in a systematic matter. (Animator 2)

The ADLG/CH programme has enlightened community members on how to hold leaders accountable for corruption and mismanagement of community resources. (Animator 4)

Box 6: Contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme to Outcome 2*

The animation work in Shinyanga began in December 2010 when 200 or so farmer animators were selected by Oxfam and MVIWATA members from MVIWATA and Oxfam farmer groups across six districts in Shinyanga. Two sets of orientation sessions/trainings followed, alongside regular mentoring and monitoring and ad hoc responses to opportunities, such as the visit of the PM to Shinyanga.

The first training event focused on building a shared understanding of concepts central to Chukua Hatua, such as public resources, participation, leadership, etc. The second training event focused much more on the skills needed for animation, including public expenditure tracking, basic research, influencing meetings and information dissemination. After the training, some animators joined pre-existing groups, others took issues directly to local leaders.

Mentoring has been undertaken by Oxfam’s partner ADLG and involves bringing together small groups of animators and other community members to discuss their issues and the advocacy actions that have either been taken or could be taken. Animators and communities who are seen to be actively holding their leaders accountable on similar issues are brought together during mentoring sessions, thus creating shared learning as well as an opportunity for further capacity-building from ADLG.

In phase II of the Chukua Hatua programme, the work of farmer animators was increasingly integrated with that of active musicians and other animators were brought on board including teachers, students and faith leaders.

* Description developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators.
5.2.1 To what extent did the outcome materialise?

This outcome concerns the demand side of public accountability and access to entitlements. Specifically, it concerns behaviour changes of, and inspired by, those volunteers recruited by CH in Shinyanga Rural District to serve as ‘animators’ who mobilise citizens. We found the outcome was confirmed in part but not in full. For five of the six animators, evidence from a range of written and verbal sources as well as from ADLG, Oxfam’s implementing partner for this part of the CH programme, confirms this outcome occurred as described. We were unable to substantiate claims of the other animator that they had undertaken activities to mobilise citizens to monitor village finances. This animator did not have written records of their work and could neither readily describe the details of their animator activities nor provide us with sources for substantiation.

Does Oxfam and its partner have a shared understanding of the outcome?

ADLG’s substantiation of the outcome description prepared by Oxfam is informative because it is the CH actor that has most knowledge of the outcome. Jimmy Luhende, Director of ADLG, confirmed the outcome description while noting the following:

- Following the initial training of animators, further training has included issue-based training, such as that provided in preparation for the local government by-elections.
- ‘ad hoc’ support has included providing legal support when an animator was jailed.
- Rather than ‘lobbying’, citizens have been mobilised to put pressure on leaders to demonstrate accountability and exercise their functions transparently.

These clarifications, while useful, do not contradict the outcome as described by Oxfam with which we understand ADLG agrees and thereby substantiates.

Types of behaviour change

We recorded three categories of claimed behaviour change (Table 6) and assess each in turn below. The primary sources of evidence about behaviour changes were the animators themselves, however only those behaviours for which we found at least one source of substantiation in addition to the animators are described. In many cases, more than one substantiation source was identified.

Table 6: Animator behaviour changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animator behaviour changes</th>
<th>Animator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Attend community groups to build awareness of citizen rights and how to exercise them</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mobilise and support citizens to take action</td>
<td>y y y y y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Team up with other animators</td>
<td>y y y y y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Attend community groups to build awareness of citizen rights and how to exercise them**

Four of the six animators took actions that they had not taken before the CH intervention to build citizen awareness of rights. They did so by attending existing community groups to share what they had learned in the CH training in order to build awareness of citizen rights and generate interest and enthusiasm to help citizens overcome the fear that many feel when confronting leaders.

**Substantiation sources:** Animator diaries, records, reports (all); reports of village chairperson, records of group secretary and members (Animator 1); village chairperson and a councillor (Animator 2); village meeting records (Animator 3); another animator (Animators 3, 4).

2. **Mobilise and support citizens to take action to monitor village finances and seek redress for officials suspected of abusing their office**

Five of the six animators supported groups to take action. Examples include:

- Demanding village meetings are convened to receive an account of community resource use from the leaders, resulting in identification of the misappropriation of land sale proceedings by the VEO and other leaders. The VEO and village chairperson and three others have now refunded the money and been forced to resign. (Animator 1).
- Group members pushed for and secured village meetings to vote on mismanagement by VEO and village chairperson, this in a village that had no recent history of village meetings holding the VEO to account hence a period of months had passed with cattle rustling, smuggling, illegal fishing and setting of variable school fees. As a result, the village chairperson was charged and convicted for soliciting bribes. (Animator 2).
- Securing responses from VEOs about community needs, unlike in the past. (Animator 3).
- Community members demand village meetings and reports from leaders without fear as in past. (Animator 4).
- Engaging the village chairperson and District Commission to take action against a VEO fabricating charges of wrongdoing against citizens, resulting in the transfer of the VEO to another village. (Animator 4, 5).

**Substantiation sources:** Animator’s diary, reports of village chairperson, records of group secretary and members (Animator 1); the current chairperson of the village meeting minutes, report of the probe committee which was formed by DC (Animator 2); village meeting records (Animator 3); animator reports/records, village meeting records, another animator (Animator 4); village chairperson and another animator (Animator 5).

3. **Team up with other animators to take issues to/pressure leaders**

Four animators reported working with other animators to achieve their objectives. In one case, a team of animators took the issue of the fixing of farm input prices to the District Commissioner for investigation. The DC disbanded the distribution system and set up a team to supervise farm inputs directly, which resulted in the punctual arrival of supplies and
a dramatic price drops of fertiliser and seed to 20–50 per cent of the previous price (Animator 2).

Working with other animators and group members, Animator 3 succeeded in forcing leaders to convene a series of village meetings. Misappropriation of water project funds by the water committee Treasurer was identified. The meetings resolved to dissolve the water committee and forced the Treasurer to refund the money. After the animators consulted with the Ward Executive Officer a water sale agent was appointed and water supply has been without issue since.

Animators 4 and 5, being from the same village, collaborate on mobilising citizens through groups to monitor village finances.

**Substantiation sources:** Confirmation of committee members, record of sales of the farm inputs, current village chairperson, Report of probe committee of DC (Animator 2); written records of another animator, village meeting records (Animator 3); other animators (Animator 4, 5).

### 5.2.2 How significant was the contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme and the contributions of other actors to this outcome?

Documentary sources (ADLG draft reports, training notes of Animators, recording forms, village meeting minutes and records of events) and testimony of trainees confirms the contribution of Chukua Hatua to Outcome 2 was as described by Oxfam (Box 6).

We find the words of Charles Ndugulile, Animator, Mwamala B village, to be a true reflection of the CH contribution: ‘The project has empowered the animators with courage and skills to advocate for proper use of resources for equitable distribution of benefits among members.’

The opportunity the CH programme has given to Ndugulile to serve as an animator also speaks for its contribution in the district: now a CH animator, Ndugulile was for ten years a Village Executive Officer who was intimately aware of the tricks and experienced in frauds that sometimes characterise the office. Today he is actively pursuing abuses of office by VEOs and gave us evidence to support the claims about one such case made by a councillor.

In making its significant contribution to the outcome, the CH programme has built on the foundations laid by others and capitalised on the prevailing high level of public and political concern about public accountability and governance issues. That two of the six animators assessed had previously received animator training and worked as animators under other programmes was evident in the clarity of their presentation of evidence and the confidence with which they described their animation work. Likewise, the use of groups previously set up by MVIWATA has most probably accelerated and amplified the effectiveness of animators. In contrast, the minimal educational level of some animators was evident in their presentation of evidence and seems certain to be a constraint on their effectiveness.

There are strong synergies between CH and the programmes of MVIWATA, NAFRAC (Natural Forest Resources and Agroforestry Centre) and indeed policies of political parties. This is not a criticism. Seeking to overcome fear and achieve the kinds of community activism sought by CH is ambitious, especially without payment or facilitation of animators of
any kind. The absence of such payments sets CH apart from most other development interventions in Tanzania and makes what has been influenced all the more impressive.

**Other contributors to the outcome**

The prevailing high public and political profile of accountability and governance issues in Tanzania has created an environment supportive of this outcome (Section 4.2). In addition, using evaluator knowledge of Tanzania together with information gained from informants and through research, we identified some other factors that are likely to have contributed to the outcome:

- Other organisations: former and ongoing activities of MVIWATA, NAFRAC.
- Traditional accountability systems: elders, Sungusungu and traditional leaders.
- Responsive public officials.

CH has been able to build on the highly related animator work of other organisations. Two organisations have introduced the idea of animation through training and supporting farmer animator groups: MVIWATA and the National Agriculture and Forestry Research Conservation (NAFRAC). Working with existing groups is a key element of the CH animator approach. In addition to the groups of MVIWATA, others formed by the African Inland Church have been supporting farmers since 2005.

Two animators in our assessment had benefited directly from the MVIWATA training and therefore already had knowledge of group dynamics and leadership skills which they could use to promote CH objectives of governance, transparency and accountability. Some CH animators, including Animator 1, have also attended NAFRAC training in which they have learnt of community rights over resources.

In one village, the Sungusungu system of ‘Kutulija or Kutengwa’\(^8\) was seen as a useful means to quickly exercise punitive action against those leaders found by civil procedures to be guilty of mismanagement of resources.

In some examples of animator-supported citizen action, the responsiveness of particular public officials – a councillor, village Chairperson, District Commissioner – was key to resolution of the issue.

**5.3 Outcome 3 – District Commissioner supports community forest ownership**

This outcome is distinct from the two targeted outcomes considered above in two ways: (i) it concerns the change in policy of a single individual: a District Commissioner, and (ii) the location of the outcome is Ngorongoro district of Arusha region. The description of the outcome developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators is presented in Box 7.

\(^8\) ‘Kutulija’ is a Sukuma word and ‘Kutengwa’ a Swahili word, both with the meaning ‘being isolated from community members’.
Box 7: Targeted Outcome* 3

Outcome

From October 2011, the Ngorongoro District Commissioner started supporting four villages in their quest for community ownership of Enguserosambu forest.

Context

In October 2011 the local government sought to bring Enguserosambu forest under government control. The community had managed the forest for centuries, reaping livelihood and spiritual benefits that included livestock pastures, harvest of honey, firewood, water, poles and timber for housing, wood for fire making, medicinal plants, ritual making and attraction of rain. Previously the District Commissioner, Elias Wawa Lali, was not cooperative with councillors on land right issues/community projects in general. But he later learnt that the community was managing Enguserosambu forest well, in contrast to the Loliondo forest, which was under government control and was mismanaged by overexploitation of forest products.

* Outcome developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators.

The description of how CH contributed to this outcome as developed by the Oxfam with facilitation of the evaluators is presented in Box 8.

Box 8: Contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme to Outcome 3*

When the local government officials sought the support of the four village councils for transferring ownership rights of the forest to the government, the communities refused and sought to defend their rights and asked for the support of PALISEP. PALISEP supported the village with a series of meetings at village and ward level and presentation of a petition to the District Consultative Council, the Regional Consultative Council and Ministry Directorate of Forestry and Beekeeping.

PALISEP, as part of its work under the Chukua Hatua programme, succeeded in mobilising a very active response from the community and influenced the DC to be supportive of the wish of the four villages for joint community ownership of the forest.

* Description developed by Oxfam with facilitation by the evaluators.
5.3.1 To what extent did the outcome materialise?

This outcome concerns the change in policy towards a community’s struggle to win ownership rights of a forest by a single, highly influential individual in Ngorongoro Region: the District Commissioner. We found compelling evidence that the outcome as described by Oxfam (Box 7) occurred. Sources of substantiation are diverse. First, there is evidence that the DC’s policy was opposed to the community forest demand: the DC, PALISEP and NGONET sources confirmed that the previous policy of the DC was a reflection of his general hostility towards NGOs active on citizen rights issues. PALISEP and NGONET records indicate the DC explicitly identified CH, remarking that its accountability agenda was not a priority in Ngorongoro.

Second, the change of the DC’s policy was confirmed by various sources, including the DC himself who acknowledged completely changing his policy and remarked on his struggle to convince others to join him in supporting the village demand. The other sources of confirmation are: (a) citizens of two of the four villages seeking community ownership – focus group participants from Naan village and the former Ng‘arwa Village Chair, (b) two animators, (c) the District Forest Officer who also confirmed the change of policy, complaining that the DC’s policy was contrary to technical advice, (d) Oxfam’s implementing partner, PALISEP and (e) a collaborating NGO, NGONET.

For further confirmation, we were able to identify and substantiate four examples that demonstrate implementation of the DC’s changed policy (Table 7).
Table 7: Substantiated examples of the DC’s implementation of his policy of supporting community ownership of Enguserosambu forest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of implementation of the District Commissioner’s policy of supporting the community forest ownership demand</th>
<th>Substantiation sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Participation and active support for community forest ownership in the following District Forums organised specifically to discuss the community forest ownership question: | District Commissioner  
Records of District Natural Resources Committee, District Consultative Committee and District Council  
Village leaders of Ngarwa, Naani and Enguserosambu  
Hon. Councillor for Enguserosambu village  
PALISEP reports |
|  
- The DC used his influence as Chair of the District Consultative Committee May 2012 meeting to influence fellow district officials, despite much resistance, including from forest officials, to join him in endorsing the petition for community forest ownership. This paved the way for the petition to be submitted to the Regional Consultative Committee and Ministry thereafter.  
- The DC argued for support for the community forest ownership petition from the District Natural Resources Committee. |  |
| Participation in presentation of community demands to the Regional Consultative Council (RCC). This was a critical step in securing the RCC decision in favour of the communities. | District Commissioner  
PALISEP and community representatives including Forest Trust members Makaroti Tutayo (the secretary) and Noorkiyengop Mbaima |
| Following up with the Regional Secretary, including via letters and a visit, to overcome his resistance to submitting the RCC meeting minutes to the Director of Division of Forest and Beekeeping. | District Commissioner  
Letters and reports of PALISEP and NGONET |
| Writing to and visiting the Ministry to help move the petition forward, explaining that only the VEO of Enguserosambu, not the other three villages who at that time did not have VEOs, needed to sign the second village meeting minutes requesting community ownership. | District Commissioner  
Copies of letters |
5.3.2 *How significant was the contribution of the Chukua Hatua programme and the contributions of other actors to this outcome?*

We found that the CH programme has undoubtedly made a crucial contribution to the change of policy of the DC described by the outcome, such that the outcome would not have occurred without CH. We therefore find the statement describing the CH contribution to be accurate (Box 8). We also found that other actors, most notably NGONET, but also other NGOs and councillors, had made important contributions to the outcome, both before and during the CH intervention.

**Contributions in context**

To understand the significance of the various influences on the outcome, it is important to note some characteristics of the legal, government and forest regulatory environment shaping the context for those contributing to the outcome.

The prevailing law governing forest management (1998) prescribes a joint government-community approach, but already in 2009 when the District Forest Officer started to seek village approval for joint management of Enguserosambu forest there was strong resistance to the idea, reportedly because of the poor example of joint management in the nearby Loliondo 1 forest. In 2009, PALISEP and NGONET supported village representatives to identify community forest management principles and travel to Dar es Salaam to seek the support of the Director of the Division of Forestry and Beekeeping, Mr Kilahama (sources: former Village Chairperson and current VEO). After the meeting, the Director expressed support for the community forest ownership demand and made an historic visit to the forest, the first of a Division Director to Loliondo. The Director challenged the Regional and District Forest Officer to support community forest management practices and he actually announced for the first time that his position favoured community ownership of Enguserusambu forest. That announcement was communicated in the media, thus paving the way for subsequent lobbying downwards to district officials. We were unable to determine if this high level support influenced the District Commissioner’s decision to change his policy so it aligned with the position taken by the Director. But it is certainly plausible that the Director’s policy directly influenced that of the District Commissioner. Without doubt, the public communication of the Director’s position strengthened the case of those villagers, councillors and NGOs promoting the village ownership claim, and thereby indirectly contributed to the efforts to change the DC’s policy.

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9 When considering the CH contribution, it is important to be precise about which actors were involved, particularly because the main CH actor contributing to this outcome, PALISEP, worked very closely with NGONET. Although PALISEP is a member of NGONET and NGONET is described by CH as an ‘implementing partner’, it receives CH funding for other work on land rights, not for its work on the community forest ownership issue. We therefore concluded that NGONET is not part of the CH work on the community forest issue. PALISEP, in contrast, is provided with financial and technical inputs from Oxfam and is contracted to deliver parts of the CH programme. This said, disentangling what have been PALISEP and NGONET contributions to the outcome has been problematic.
Table 8: Factors contributing to change in policy of the DC in support of community forest ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors cited by the DC as contributing to his change of policy</th>
<th>Contributor(s) (CH / others)</th>
<th>Substantiation of contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The film <em>Our Beloved Forest.</em> ¹⁰</td>
<td>CH role: PALISEP with NGONET arranged for the DC to see the film. Tanzania Natural Resource Forum with Maajabu Films produced the film in collaboration with Environmental Investigation Agency, Community-based Biodiversity Conservation Films and NGONET.</td>
<td>District Commissioner Village representatives Hon. Councillor for Engusersosambu Forest Trust leaders Responsibility for the film is confirmed in its credits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in consultative meetings with NGOs</td>
<td>CH role: PALISEP organised these meetings with NGONET.</td>
<td>District Commissioner PALISEP records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO evidence on the mismanagement of public resources presented to the Public Expenditure Tracking System</td>
<td>CH role: PALISEP provided evidence. NGONET also provided evidence.</td>
<td>District Commissioner PALISEP and NGONET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes of the village meeting decision to seek community ownership presented at a District Council meeting, January 2012.</td>
<td>CH role: PALISEP with NGONET assisted the village leaders with preparing the minutes.</td>
<td>The District Commissioner cited presentation of these minutes as the moment when the ‘burning issue’ of community forest ownership reached his office Hon. Councillor for Engusersosambu Village leaders Animators VEOs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contributors to the outcome

Actors contributing to the outcome can be categorised as follows:

- CH, working with NGONET.
- Communities: villagers in general, community leaders (Village Chairs, VEOs, influential elders (Lawigwanani), men, women and youths (Moran) of the four villages (Engusreosambu, Ng’arwa, Naani and Orkiu), village animators, trustees of the Forest Trust created to oversee community management of the forest.
- NGOs: Tanzania Natural Resource Forum and its partners who produced and disseminated the film *Our Beloved Forest*; PALISEP and NGONET before the CH programme.
- Local and national government: Ward councillors, Director of the Division of Forests and Beekeeping Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.

The contributions of the various actors to the outcome can be understood in two phases: the first, **influences that contributed to the DC to changing his policy**, the second, **influences that created opportunities for the DC to implement his policy**. The influence of CH was the most significant in each phase.

**Phase 1: Contributions that influenced the DC to change his policy**

CH, working with village leaders and NGONET and using a powerful film prepared by other actors, **was the lead influence on the DC’s change of policy** (Table 8). The influence of CH started with the task of rebuilding the relationship between PALISEP and NGONET and the DC. According to the DC, PALISEP and NGONET, the relationship of the DC with these NGOs had become very strained since the forest authorities made their first moves to seek village approval of government control over the forest in 2009. The DC recounted that he considered the NGO leaders were leading rather than supporting villagers in expressing their opposition to requests from forest personnel for village approval of the new management arrangements. The tension between the NGOs and the DC reached a peak when the NGOs helped villagers take legal action against the DC in order to try to prevent the change in forest governance. CH was instrumental in repairing the relationship of PALISEP and NGONET with the DC. Under CH, PALISEP worked with NGONET to successfully organise consultative meetings with the DC in order to rebuild trust.

These same actors succeeded in bringing the DC together with village leaders to see the film *Our Beloved Forest*. The film was, the DC recounted, an important influence on him in particular because of its portrayal of good community management of Engurosambu forest in contrast to poor management of the government controlled Loliondo 1 forest. The District Forest Officer, who has opposed community ownership, also remarked that the film had been very helpful to the villages’ campaign. The main actors behind the making and showing of the film are a mix of Tanzanian and international NGOs and media organisations.

A further important trust-building measure under CH recalled by the DC was the NGO evidence on the mismanagement of public resources presented to the **Public Expenditure Tracking System (PETS)**. Presentation of factual evidence to PETS influenced the DC to have a positive attitude towards PALISEP and NGONET such that the DC easily appreciated PALISEP’s presentation of the community forest ownership petition.
The DC cited his **receipt of the village meeting minutes** rejecting the forest authority’s proposed joint management and claiming instead community ownership of the forest as the moment when he decided to act. Here again PALISEP’s CH work with village leaders was the most significant contribution through the support provided for the preparation of the minutes.

Presentation of the key village minutes to the DC was one point in a process through which **CH supported expression of the villages’ demand** through the necessary formal channels. This support can be summarised as:

- **Sensitisation** by exposing villages to the process the forest authorities were following of seeking village approval for government control of the forest *(Ng’ombe hakuwa mali ya serikali hivyo waliamua kupima ng’ombe chapa yaj amii)*. (Substantiation: Ngarwa and Naan villagers).
- **Animation** to mobilise community members to express their demands through village, district and regional forums. (Substantiation: three Enguserosambu animators).
- **Advice and technical support** to communities through the protracted consultative process, which involved a series of consultative meetings from village level, through ward level (Ward Development Council), District Council, District Consultative Council, Regional Consultative Council to Ministerial level for contacts with Director of Forest & Beekeeping. (Substantiation: District Forest Officer, DFO).
- **Lobbying** the ward councillors to support the community demand. (Substantiation: Hon. Councillor for Enguserosambu).

The significance of the CH support for the expression of demand for community ownership is confirmed by several key sources, including the DC himself:

*Kweli mradi umesaidia sana mchakatohuu.* Translation: ‘Truly, the programme has contributed greatly to support the process of community forest ownership demand.’

This view was confirmed by Samuel Nangilias of NGONET:

*Mradi wa Chukua Hatua umesaidia sanakuwezesha wanajamii kuchukua hatua walizochukua na kufanikisha mchakato wa kudai msitu kuwa chini ya jamii.*
Translation: The Chukua Hatua programme has supported the process of community forest ownership demand and has contributed significantly to the achievement made by December 2012.

And the importance of local, technical support provided through CH was acknowledged by focus-group discussants from Ngarwa village:

‘Previously our community lacked educated youths to support us in the process, now we are proud we have these young men in PALISEP who belong in our village and who know very well the forest issue. Mark Talash the PALISEP Coordinator, for example, originates from the near village and similarly Samuel Nangilias of NGONET is born in the nearby village. With the professional support of their organisations and back up of Oxfam, we believe we will successfully accomplish the community forest ownership process.’
Phase 2: Contributions that created opportunities for the DC to implement his policy

Having a declared policy is one thing, but determining if the DC had ‘started supporting the villages’ requires substantiation of observations that the policy was implemented. This was discussed above and summarised in Table 7. Here we look at the contributions actors other than the DC made to the observable examples of implementation summarised in Table 7. The substantiation sources for contributions are as for the substantiation of the DC’s behaviour in Table 7.

Again we found that the influence of CH was the most significant factor. The programme contributed through PALISEP by organising and/or financing forums, sensitising and mobilising communities, and helping communities articulate their demands through lobbying and formal processes, demands that were credible and clearly expressed such that the DC decided to support them.

The two District forums organised and financed by PALISEP (under the CH programme) and NGONET were critically important for providing the four villages with an opportunity to present their case and show the extent of community support for their demand (Hon. Councillor for Enguserosambu, NGONET, Ministry). The forums would not have taken place without CH. PALISEP, working with NGONET, convinced the DC that they were necessary and provided the CH financial support. Technical preparation and presentation of the village petition at the meetings was supported by PALISEP with NGONET.

The same PALISEP–NGONET partnership financially, through CH, and technically, supported the participation of village representatives at the RCC meeting, participation that allowed them to express their demands directly at the decisive meeting that secured the vital endorsement of the RCC for the community ownership demand. PALISEP contributed to the DC’s follow up to this meeting by regular discussion of the situation and arranging for the RCC secretary and Ministry to visit with the DC.

CH made vital contributions to progress the process of obtaining community ownership of the forest through its sourcing of specialist advice and services:

- Legal advice to guide the formation of the Forest Trust, the body that will guide management of the community forest, formation of which is a requirement.
- Technical expertise to produce the Community Forest Management Plan.
- Technical expertise to formulate forest-management by laws.

These contributions supported the DC’s policy indirectly by enabling its implementation.

A crucial influence supporting the progression of the community forest demand has been the Hon. Councillor for Enguserosambu. Village representatives confirm he has been the one driving other Councillors to support the village petition from the start. He has actively supported the village demand through presentation at the Ward Development Council (which he chaired), District Council and District Consultative Committee. He has also contributed to registration of the Forest Trust and production of Forest Management Plan, both requirements for community ownership. It is clear he has been an ally of the DC. However, we were unable to determine the extent to which he may have influenced the DC’s policy.
5.3.3 How is the outcome significant?

The collective demand of, in this case, four villages over a public resource is highly unusual in Tanzania. The campaign for community ownership may even be unique, although the evaluators have not had the opportunity to confirm this.

Normally issues around the management of forests and other resources are taken at the village level in Tanzania. In this case, the demand for community ownership of the forest initially came from Enguserosambu village. Progress was made with the petition, then the government decided to split the villages into four Enguserosambu, Ngarwa, Naan and Orkiu Juu. Whether this was a deliberate tactic to disrupt the forest ownership petition we cannot say. What is clear is that the split greatly complicated the consideration of the villages’ collective petition by the relevant authorities. The DC’s support was significant for pushing through the collective petition of the four villages in a government system accustomed to considering villages individually.

The clearest opposition to community forest ownership was and continues to be found among forest officials. During his interview for this review, the current District Forest Officer claimed: ‘Some stakeholders the NGOs in particular are maliciously misleading the whole community that government forest control will prohibit access to forest products and restrict their access to forest benefits’. He continued by expressing fear regarding the likely change of forest use from conservation to grazing and agriculture. With community forest, he emphasised, village government can at any time under extreme circumstances of prolonged drought, convert part of the forest into grazing and agriculture since there will be no restrictions from government. This view may or may not be accurate. It is not our function here to pass judgement on these claims, rather our intention is to draw attention to the views of this influential individual as they define part of the context for understanding the significance of, and evidence for, the DC’s policy. What is popularly understood locally, is that some forest officials benefit from illegal sale of forest products and hence stand to lose a potential source of income if a community gains ownership of a forest. There is also a bitter conflict that has produced violent clashes in recent years between the Masai who seek ownership of Enguserosambu forest and the Sonjo, the ethnic group to which the DFO belongs. In this context, the DC’s policy supporting community forest ownership against the wishes of the DFO and other forest authority staff is highly significant. Without the DC’s support, it is reasonable to conclude that the pressure on the community to agree to joint ownership of the forest with the government would have continued.

The DC’s policy change on community forest ownership is, according to PALISEP, NGONET and the DC himself is indicative of his change in behaviour towards NGOs supporting accountability and land rights issues more broadly. The constructive relationship that PALISEP and NGONET have developed with the DC in order to address the forest issue may therefore bring wider changes. For instance, NGONET sees the policy on community forest ownership as a reflection of a change in the government’s view of pastoralists: from destructive to good conservators of the environment among government officials, especially the DC and Director of Forest & Beekeeping.

In sum, the DC’s support has been pivotal to the successful petitioning for community forest ownership by the four villages. Without the DC’s support, the petition of the four villages would not have progressed or would have progressed at a considerably slower pace.
With the DC’s support, up to December 2012 – the end of the period being assessed under this review – the support for community ownership has been granted by all necessary authorities, bar those responsible for gazetting: the District Council, District Natural Resources Committee, Regional Consultative Committee and Director of Division of Forests and Beekeeping of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The granting of community ownership of the forest is almost beyond doubt.\footnote{A letter sent by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism while this report was being written describes the villages’ forest management responsibilities as forest owners. This is another indication that gazetting of the forest, the final step, is inevitable.}

## 6 Programme learning considerations

Rather than recommendations, we here provide recommended points for discussion by CH actors. Decisions on next steps for Oxfam and its CH implementing partners to take will be informed by the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, but equally will be informed by political, legal, public-perception, financial, programmatic, and ethical considerations, which sit beyond this evaluation. In addition, this evaluation has been focused on assessing the effectiveness of CH and the significance of the contributions it and others have made to outcomes. By design, it has not sought to assess the quality of processes used by Oxfam and its implementing partners, including how they have worked together under CH, thus there is a constraint on the scope for identifying areas of learning. However, we expect that the process of considering causal relationships between programme strategies and outcomes, and reaching the evaluation findings and conclusions, will have resulted in some observations that may be of use when considering the future of CH and related programmes.

**Sustainability:** Oxfam and the implementing partners should consider if CH should do anything further to increase the probability of the behaviour changes it has influenced being sustained. CH is unusual and bold in that it does not pay training attendance allowances, reimburse travel or communications costs or pay salaries for those participating in its activities. Instead, to take the case of citizen action, it assumes ‘If we build citizens’ awareness and capacity, assist them to overcome fear, and action is in the interest of their livelihoods, then they will act.’ If it works, the CH approach is highly attractive in terms of sustainability as the behaviour’s inspired by CH should continue after the programme ends. The successes of the programme to date are testament to this approach having, to a significant extent, been working. However, some of our interactions with animators, together with indications that some animators have given up their role because they are attracted by benefits available through other programmes, gives us some uncertainty about whether the model is sustainable. Our uncertainty is based on no more than hints that there may be an issue to be addressed, but is also supported by our judgement that the sustainability of animator work cannot be taken for granted. It cannot be assumed that personal and community benefits coming from animator work are sufficient to sustain animator motivation. Greater recognition for animator efforts could help.
Further consideration should be given by implementing partners and Oxfam to the selection of animators. Our findings suggest that the selection of animators may not be optimal because a lot (too much?) is being expected of those with little or no education. Being able to facilitate, lead, take the initiative and respond with resilience when one person in authority does not yield to your demands, requires people with a reasonable level of education.

Implementing partners and Oxfam should consider the programme's policy towards the use of traditional accountability systems, such as Sungusungu. Encouraged to be innovative by the CH training, some councillors and animators have found traditional mechanisms of enforcing citizen accountability and enacting punitive measures, such as Sungusungu, to be highly effective and with the advantage that it is substantially faster and potentially more reliable than formal, legal systems. CH should decide and communicate if it wishes to encourage, discourage or be neutral on this practice and communicate this position to councillors and animators and other actors influenced by the programme.

Training:

**Active Leader training may be more effective if differentiated according to widely differing educational level/experience of councillors.** Some councillors may benefit from further training, particularly those with a lower educational level and/or less experience as councillors.

**Training/information exchange** that brings together councillors and animators should be considered as a way of furthering the vitally important work of opening up the space for dialogue between citizens and leaders.

**Training that aimed to empower communities to participate effectively in bottom up planning** through the government-promoted Opportunities and Obstacles Development planning approach could be valuable.

**Civil servants, such as VEOs and WEOs, may benefit from training** as councillors have.

Risk management may need greater attention. Recognised in the logic model as a strategy, priorities for risk management include the risk to animators/others inspired by CH. There have been cases of false imprisonment and violence directly linked to activities inspired by CH. Has the response of implementing partners and Oxfam been sufficient to maintain the confidence of those implementing what the programme has inspired? Can implementing partners/Oxfam safeguard those inspired by CH to speak out or take actions on public accountability issues, or provide them with legal support if necessary? Or must those inspired by CH accept a level of risk in what they do in the name of standing up for public accountability?
Monitoring, evaluation and learning may benefit from:

Complementing this evaluation with a broader and differentiated assessment of the nature and effectiveness of Oxfam’s CH work and that of its CH implementing partners. It was agreed early in the evaluation that while desirable in principle, systematically differentiating the contributions of different CH actors would not be the focus for this evaluation. An assessment that is sensitive to a differentiated understanding of the contributions of different CH actors should be informative for programme strategy and learning of both CH and its partners. A more comprehensive Outcome Harvest is one potentially informative approach to achieving this objective as it could tease out the precise contributions of different CH and other actors to outcomes and use CH actors to validate one another’s findings.

Consideration of how to improve information flow from the field that includes the use of simplified data collection tools for boundary partners/implementing partners, including mobile phone tools. Currently there is a strong reliance on the Oxfam M&E/communications officer to collect Progress Marker data in the field, potentially with implications for how representative and complete are the data.

A regular review of monitoring data that includes using Outcome Harvesting principles to create short, SMART, outcome descriptions to more precisely describe all or a sample of observed outcomes would strengthen the potential to use the data for informing management decisions.

Routine description in design documents and monitoring data of the CH contribution strategies and the contribution to outcomes of other factors may assist programme conceptualisation and inform management decisions.

Future evaluations should consider how behaviour changes are sustainable and how they might evolve.

The use of surveys of boundary partner behaviour at the start of a CH intervention would help to provide a baseline for ongoing monitoring and evaluation.

7 Conclusion

CH is an ambitious programme that seeks to mobilise over a million citizens to hold local institutions to account. In its favour is that this is an opportune time with public and political awareness and concern about public accountability and governance issues at a high level. Set against it is a tradition in which the authority of leaders is little challenged by citizens.

The period assessed by this review covers a little more than the first half of the five-year CH programme. Although this is a relatively short timeframe for an advocacy programme to demonstrate results, CH actors struggled with considerable difficulty to limit their selection of targeted outcomes – those they judged to be most significant – to the three required. The difficulty they faced in selecting outcomes is a clear indication that the programme actors consider that there have been a considerable number of notable outcomes that the programme has made important contributions to.
The confidence of CH actors when describing outcomes was largely confirmed by the evidence of the outcomes having materialised as claimed. We also found clear evidence that CH had made a crucial contribution to each outcome such that they would not have occurred without CH, a finding that says as much about the highly effective work of the Oxfam implementing partners that had lead responsibility for work – ADLG, CABUIPA and PALISEP – as it does about Oxfam’s contribution through funding, expertise and facilitating a learning environment for the partner organisations.

Of the three outcomes selected, we found evidence that each had materialised, in two cases in full and in the case of the animator mobilisation of citizens, in part. The District Commissioner’s decision to support community forest ownership was the outcome for which there was the strongest evidence. While also fully realised with two or more examples of behaviour change for each of the six councillors, some councillors had clearly changed in response to the Active Leader intervention more than others. Lastly, from our evidence, the effectiveness of the Animation strategy will be constrained unless and until the selection criteria of animators includes a standard of education sufficient to be able to articulate, lead and take the initiative when addressing people in positions of authority. Some animators we assessed clearly met this criterion, others seemed not to.

A caveat about the councillor outcome is that while the outcome was fully realised, some councillors demonstrated fewer types of behaviour change than others. A significant factor contributing to this mixed picture is that elected councillors have widely differing skills, backgrounds and educational levels and there is no routine training available to introduce new councillors to their responsibilities and equip them with skills for their new roles in public office. The Active Leader training and mentoring provided through CH is the first the councillors have received, and from our evidence it seems that those with lower educational levels could benefit from further support.

The evidence for the CH contribution to each outcome provides examples of the effectiveness of three different CH strategies or combinations of strategies. For the outcome concerning councillors, the contribution was through the Active Leader strategy of training and mentoring of councillors. The outcome concerning animators mobilising citizens is an example where CH used Animation, one of it’s most widely employed strategies. For the outcome about the District Commissioner, Animation and Issue Based Campaigning strategies were used.

We described and investigated many other factors that had influenced the outcomes, but found that none had greater than a moderate or low-level direct influence on the outcome. Some other influences were certainly beneficial to CH and no doubt accelerated its progress, for instance the existence of citizen groups and previous training of some animators by other programmes helped some animators make relatively rapid progress in mobilising citizens and taking issues to local leaders, or in one case, to a District Commissioner for resolution. Notable also were the traditional mechanisms, such as Sungusungu being mobilised as a result of CH encouragement of councillors and animators to be creative in finding ways to enforce accountability. In the case of the outcome about the district councillors’ support for community forest ownership, collaboration with another NGO and CH implementing partner for other work, NGONET, was particularly important.
Lastly, we think it is worth noting is that we generally had a sense that CH – or, more accurately, the work of Oxfam’s partners that is supported through CH – is positively perceived by the majority of councillors, animators and other citizens and leaders we consulted. This is not insignificant as, in contrast to most other ‘development’ interventions in Tanzania and the region in general, there is no benefit, certainly no financial benefit, that any informant receives from CH other than the support for accountability and governance that defines CH purpose.
## 8 Contribution scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Outcome realised in full</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Evidence that intervention made a crucial contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Outcome realised in part &amp; evidence that intervention made a crucial contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Outcome realised in full &amp; evidence that intervention made an important contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Outcome realised in part &amp; evidence that intervention made an important contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Outcome realised in part &amp; evidence that intervention made some contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Outcome realised to small degree &amp; evidence that intervention made an important contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Outcome realised, to any degree, but no evidence that the intervention made any contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Outcome</td>
<td>Score</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Councillors more responsive and aware</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other contributing factors:</strong></td>
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<td>Animator mobilisation</td>
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<td><strong>Other contributing factors:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community forest ownership</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other contributing factors:</strong></td>
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## Appendix 1: Lists of key informants

### Key informants and Focus Group participants, Ngorongoro district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elias Wawa Lali</td>
<td>Ngorongoro District</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon: Kaigili</td>
<td>Enguserosambu ward</td>
<td>Hon. Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masageri Tomboya</td>
<td>District office</td>
<td>Ngorongoro Natural Resource Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamau Kingele</td>
<td>Ngarwa village</td>
<td>Person responsible for water duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa</td>
<td>Ngarwa village</td>
<td>The former village chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleseti Mweni</td>
<td>Ngarwa village</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lekakwi</td>
<td>Ngarwa village</td>
<td>The current chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Oloishuro Kiloviti</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Member of Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kipuker</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Village Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ole Partkiswah</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Member of Village Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narikungera Tinge</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemputwai olopuru</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanare Tinge</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orasirasi Kishureni</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soroswa Kilort</td>
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<td>Ngaampa Tingi</td>
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<td>Shiinga Meree</td>
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<td>Focus Group Discussant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kele Tinge</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koisikir Sitoi</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
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<td>Mpelok Siangw</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amos Loporu</td>
<td>Naan Village</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edward Uka</td>
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<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lengumo Parmiria</td>
<td>Enguserosambu Village</td>
<td>Traditional leader (Lagwanani)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Parminia</td>
<td>Enguserosambu Village</td>
<td>Animator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Uka</td>
<td>Enguserosambu Village</td>
<td>Animator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simile Morinde</td>
<td>Enguserosambu Village</td>
<td>Animator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makaroti Tutayo</td>
<td>Orkiu village</td>
<td>Secretary to trustee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oloserian Kenja</td>
<td>Orkiu village</td>
<td>VEO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamakia Kumari</td>
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<td>Moringe Sirmey</td>
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<td>Kilanga Tutayo</td>
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<td>Sunde Tutayo</td>
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<td>Noorkiyeng'o - Mbaima</td>
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<td>Sunde Tutayo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nayanoi Melita</td>
<td>Orkiu village</td>
<td>Member of Trust</td>
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### Key informants, Shinyanga Rural District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Location/Ward</th>
<th>Position/role in CH</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perpetua G. Masesa</td>
<td>Mwantini</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosthenes Ngassa</td>
<td>Mwalukwa</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo F. Mayiku</td>
<td>Lyamidati</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abed Alabry</td>
<td>Usanda</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amosi M. Malugu</td>
<td>Ilola</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Shotto</td>
<td>Nsalala</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngh’onge Mkwabi</td>
<td>Pandagichiza</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiyingi S Kyungi</td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>DED – Shy Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Chacha Kisangure</td>
<td>Shinyanga Rural</td>
<td>DCDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwakabana Ambitise</td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>DPLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Ndugulile</td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>MVIWATA – Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurwa Charles</td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>MVIWATA – Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Shayo</td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>MVIWATA – Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmnuel Mahona</td>
<td>Ilola ward</td>
<td>WEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kimwaga and Jackson Luhuhu</td>
<td>Mwantini ward</td>
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<td>Machoke M. Mleba</td>
<td>Nsalala ward</td>
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<td>Nzagabulu Budaga</td>
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<td>Pauline Michael</td>
<td>Shilabela</td>
<td>Animator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucas Machibya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph Malula</td>
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<td>Saidi Ogigo</td>
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<td>Ester Pembelage</td>
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# Key informants, Chukua Hatua programme staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lisa Marie Faye</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
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<td>Anna Bwana</td>
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