



Evaluation of Mali Food Insecurity Response December 2011 – August 2012

Project Effectiveness Review

Using Oxfam's Global Performance Indicator Tool



Oxfam GB
April, 2013

Evaluator's Note

This evaluation was commissioned in September 2012 and therefore focuses on the first nine months of the Mali Food Security response (December 2011 to August 2012).

It is recognised by the evaluator that the programme continued to scale-up and evolve significantly beyond this period. It is therefore strongly recommended that Oxfam conduct/commission a second, complementary evaluation using the HIT methodology to cover the period of September 2012 to March 2013.

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1 Background

1.1 The disaster and response

Oxfam's humanitarian response to food insecurity in Mali in 2011/12 started less than one year after the end of its previous humanitarian response to food insecurity in several of the same regions of the country. Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists had not recovered sufficiently from the impact of the 2010 drought and food price hikes on their livelihoods and wellbeing when they were faced with another crisis in the making: inadequate and erratic rains, poor harvests and pasture, rising food prices and weak terms of trade for livestock sales.

Contrary to FEWSNET forecasts of stable conditions and relative food security throughout the third quarter of 2011 and into 2012, the looming crisis was highlighted by the Malian government from as early as October 2011. By December 2011, when its early warning system indicated that 1,699,467 people could be at risk of facing a Crisis level of food insecurity, the Mali government called a national emergency and requested international assistance.

At the same time, Oxfam staff and partners in long-term development and disaster risk reduction programmes also began to report¹ (sitrep 17 Dec) a situation of marked food insecurity, based on their ongoing monitoring and recent Household Economy Analysis (HEA) results. Consequently they started to carry out needs assessments, plan a scale-up of assistance, and to seek funding to implement it.

Oxfam designed a three-stage strategy² for a programme including both EFSL and WASH interventions, in the regions of Gao and Kayes (see Figure 1). The programme, which was designed to be delivered with partners, consisted of:

- **Phase 1 (January to April/May 2012)**, including information provision on de-stocking and de-worming, Cash for Work, and unconditional cash transfers for the poorest households, with the purpose of avoiding the depletion of the livelihoods assets of the very poor and poor families.
- **Phase 2 (April to July 2012 in pastoral areas; May to September 2012 in agro-pastoral areas)**, for the lean period, including cash transfers, food distribution, improved water access, and hygiene kits, aiming at increasing access to food and preventing malnutrition.
- **Phase 3 (September to December 2012)**, including seed distribution, livelihoods grants and Cash for Work, to support an early recovery of the most vulnerable families and build resilience to future shocks and stresses.

The Mali programme was framed within Oxfam's wider Sahel food crisis response (including Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Zambia), which was classified by Oxfam HCGG as a regional Category 2 Emergency.

In Mali, the response aimed initially to meet the needs of 96,000 people³, and was later extended to 350,000⁴. Oxfam began implementation in February 2012, by which time many other international organisations were also scaling up.

See Figure 1 for further details of the location and scope of Oxfam's response.

¹Sitrep 17 December 2011

² Proposal to SIDA, February 2012

³Sitrep 17 December 2011

⁴Sitrep 14 Feb 2012

Oxfam's response in Gao and Kayes was barely underway when socio-political conditions in the country deteriorated significantly. A military coup in March 2012 replaced the weakened government with a military junta, which subsequently proved unable to counter rebels in the northern Mali (cercles of Gao, Tomboctou, Tessalit and Kidal), allowing the latter to trigger a major refugee and internal displacement crisis.⁵

Oxfam, along with other international agencies, was forced to withdraw international staff from Gao and to suspend programme activities between March 22nd and April 13th. It re-started food voucher distribution activities in May/June as a pilot project using a remote programming model (based on experiences in insecure conditions in Somalia) with partner organisation, Tassaght. It also responded to the changing circumstances by carrying out needs assessments in areas where IDPs were arriving, such as Mopti, but concluded that needs were largely met by other agencies.

Early interventions by Oxfam and other agencies, combined with the effects of the conflict, proved insufficient to prevent a major food security crisis. By mid-2012, estimates indicated that around 30 per cent of the population - 4.6 million people - were at risk of food insecurity and more than 175,000 children suffered from Severe Acute Malnutrition.⁶

Oxfam's humanitarian programme is ongoing. This evaluation, in line with other Humanitarian Effectiveness evaluations⁷ focuses on programme quality during start-up and phases 1 and 2, i.e. from December 2011 to August 2012, while recognising the linkages with phase 3 and subsequent interventions.

Box 1: Extracts from early warning communications and assessments, 2010-2012

FEWSNET Outlook July – December 2011: Markets are sufficiently stocked with grain...The seasonal increase in grain prices will be moderate (2 to 3 percent); price levels will be lower or generally near the nominal five-year average. Following two years of good pastoral conditions in 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 (predicted), the households affected by the 2009-2010 pastoral crisis will start to emerge from stress and begin to regain part of their livelihoods. Weather forecasts are predicting normal to excessive levels of precipitation between July and September in the Sahel, including Mali.

Joint note on Food Security and humanitarian implications in West Africa and in the Sahel PAM/WFP, December 2011: Food prices have risen 93% in comparison with the past 5 years.


May 2012, FEWSNET Special Report: Immediate, additional emergency response above current levels is required to protect human lives and livelihoods. *Assuming that the current security/political context persists with no major outbreaks of open conflict and limited humanitarian assistance, the severity of food insecurity is not expected to reach IPC 2.0 Phase 4 levels.* However, a number of factors could significantly change this analysis, including: resumption of conflict, poor June-September rainfall, additional major disruptions to humanitarian assistance, or locust or other pest attacks.

⁵Source: Sitrep 7

⁶ <http://www.unocha.org/ocha2012-13/mali>

⁷ Using the Humanitarian Indicator Tool, as described in Section 1.2

Figure 1: Locations of Oxfam's programme



1.2 Evaluative methodology

This evaluation uses a methodology designed to enable Oxfam GB to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from Oxfam GB that meets established standards for excellence.

The methodology is based on a Humanitarian Indicator Tool consisting of 12 quality standards with associated benchmarks, and a scoring system (see Annex 2). It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence where available, to be collected and analysed against these benchmarks. A score is generated for the programme's results against each standard, and as a cumulative total.

To evaluate the Mali response, the methodology comprised of the following steps:

- Presentation of methodology and process to Mali CD and nominated representatives.
- Identification and provision of relevant documentation.
- Initial analysis of documentation and identification of gaps.
- Correspondence with staff to obtain supplementary information.
- Assessment of all evidence against the benchmarks.
- Submission of draft report to the Mali team and Regional MEAL Advisor for review.
- Final analysis and completion of evaluative report.

1.3 Structure of report

A quantitative summary of the results of the evaluation is provided in Section 2. A fuller explanation of the rating for Oxfam's performance against each standard is provided in Section 3.

2 Summary of results

2.1 Quantitative result by standard

The quantitative rating given for each standard and the cumulative rating for the response are provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Quantitative ratings for the Mali Food Insecurity Response, using the Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

Standard	Level of achievement	Rating
1. Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours of pre-defined trigger, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days	<i>Partially met</i>	2/6
2. Coverage uses 10% of affected population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count	<i>Partially met</i>	2/6
3. Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards	<i>Partially met</i>	2/6
4. MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators	<i>Partially met</i>	1/3
5. Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs	<i>Almost met</i>	2/3
6. Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle	<i>Fully met</i>	3/3
7. Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive	-	-
8. Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys and vulnerable groups ⁸	<i>Partially met</i>	2/3
9. Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned	<i>Partially met</i>	1/3
10. Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field	<i>Fully met</i>	3/3
11. Country programme has an integrated approach including reducing and managing risk through existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future	<i>Partially met</i>	1/3
12. Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming	<i>Not met</i>	0/3
Final rating Equivalent to 45%		19/42

⁸ Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples

3 Details

3.1 Introduction

In this section of the report, the data collected from documented and verbal sources are analysed against the benchmarks for the quality standards, and justification of the rating for Oxfam's performance against each standard is provided. The data sources are provided in footnotes, together with other explanatory information.

3.2 Analysis using standards and benchmarks

3.2.1 Quality Standard One: Timeliness

Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours of pre-defined trigger, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days

Oxfam affiliates in Mali produced an OI contingency plan in 2009. In it, drought and conflict are identified as possible hazards with the potential to cause disasters, and staff responsibilities for rapid responses are described, but the plan does not include any information about early warning systems or triggers for assessments of slow onset disasters. This aspect of the plan was, therefore, of little use during the 2011-2012 response to food insecurity.

Nevertheless, Oxfam did have other measures in place to detect the emerging slow-onset crisis. Following the information produced by Système d'Alerte Précoce (SAP) in October 2012, Oxfam carried out an assessment in Gao in November and December 2012, for which staff and partners collected data on food and income sources, harvests, market prices, food stocks and coping mechanisms⁹. Oxfam was able to compare the results with those of a Household Economy Analysis (HEA) which it had carried out in 2009 with Save the Children, and to identify the need for an intervention to prevent the deterioration of food security and livelihoods.

By December 17th, the Oxfam office in Mali had produced a concept note identifying 209,490 people as potential beneficiaries in Gao, submitted a preliminary proposal to ECHO to provide food security inputs to 21,288 people, and produced the first internal situation report to generate an organisational scale-up to the deteriorating situation. At this stage Oxfam set a tentative goal of reaching 96,000 people.

It is not clear when the first request for funding from the Catastrophe Fund was made, but funds were not released until the end of February¹⁰.

The months of January and February 2012 were dedicated to:

- Further assessments and analysis: An assessment team was sent to Western Sahel (Kayes) at the end of January. It concluded 'presently, affected populations have exhausted their coping mechanisms. Considering the bad food situation in Kayes area and the inability of affected populations to cope until the end of April, it is strongly recommended to undertake urgent interventions in terms of food distributions, rehabilitation of water sources, and assistance to resume agricultural

⁹Source: Oxfam Programme Proposal to DfID; Oxfam Final Report to ECHO,

¹⁰Source: Sitrep 29 February 2012

and livestock activities.¹¹

- Monitoring the deteriorating security situation.¹²
- Fundraising: Proposals submitted to ECHO (308,000 euros approved by January 31st); SIDA (350,000 GBP approved by January 31st), State of Jersey (30,000 GBP approved by January 31st), DFID (348,450 GBP approved by 12th February); and SIDA (350 USD, approved in March).
- Recruitment: 2 EFSL experts were recruited by 31st January, but the overall HR plan was still under preparation, including requests for HSPs, on February 14th. Several key posts remained vacant until March or April 2012¹³.
- Defining targeting criteria and setting up beneficiary selection mechanisms
- Providing training on cash transfer programming for staff and partners
- Signing programme implementation agreements with partners (MOUs in place by 31st January, contracts for ECHO and SIDA agreed by 29th February)
- Setting up programme logistics (Kayes office set up by 29th February, following the assessment)
- Building agreement on advocacy: By February 17th Oxfam had signed off its own advocacy strategy and contributed to the development of the national multi-agency advocacy strategy.

Oxfam's first humanitarian aid – in the form of unconditional cash grants in Temera and Taboye, and animal health activities in Bourem, in Gao region - was provided on 9th March.¹⁴ Oxfam's first assistance in Kayes was provided in April¹⁵.

Given the above, it is considered that Oxfam partially met the benchmark for timeliness. Although it was well-connected to early warning systems and did react quickly to early signs of the emerging food insecurity crisis, it was not able to deliver humanitarian aid until 3 months later, when the number of food insecure Malians had risen to over 1.8 million¹⁶. Unfortunately, the security situation then deteriorated significantly and Oxfam was obliged to suspend and minimize its operations in Gao, and to re-focus its activities in more accessible areas (Kayes).

3.2.2 Quality Standard Two: Coverage

Coverage uses 10% of affected population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count

In December 2012, when Oxfam began to plan its response, the SAP early warning system of the Malian government released figures indicating that, on a national scale, 1,699,467 people were at risk of severe food insecurity. At this very early stage Oxfam's initial plan was to build a response that could meet the needs of 96,000 people (12,000 households), from the very poor and poor households (as identified by the HEA). The response would begin in Gao, which was among the regions most affected, and would include other areas that Oxfam planned to assess.

In February 2012, the Early Warning System of the Malian Government issued a report indicating that 1.84 million people were at risk of severe food insecurity, and a further 1.13 million were at risk of moderate food insecurity. Around this time, Oxfam adjusted its target number of beneficiaries, under pressure from the region, to 20% of the number of people

¹¹Source : Evaluation Situation Alimentaire Sahel Occidental, February 2012

¹² First mentioned in Sitrep 31st January; then in all subsequent sitreps

¹³ Source: RTE report

¹⁴Sources: Rapport d'activités du projet ECHO, Gao, Avril 2012; Sitrep 14 March, 2012

¹⁵Source: Sitrep 29 April 2012.

¹⁶ Source: SAP, reported in Sitrep 12 February 2012

affected across Mali, i.e. 368,000 people (46,000 households). This feasibility of this decision is questionable, given that the programme had only reached 1,210 beneficiaries to date.

By May 2012 the Malian government estimated that 4.6 million people were food insecure as a result of the evolving food crisis and the impact of conflict in the North. While there is likely to be some overlap between the categories of people affected, at the same time the Technical Committee classified the whole of Northern Mali in Phase 4 of the IPC classification (Extreme Food Insecurity), with some pockets of the North passing to phase 5 by June if conditions remained unchanged). It may therefore be assumed that the situation had deteriorated significantly on a national scale.

From May onwards Oxfam's coverage began to increase significantly (see Table 2). At the end of August 2012, Oxfam's response had reached 96,000, i.e. 25% of its ambitious target.

The Real Time Evaluation (RTE) signals the slow and difficult recruitment of French-speaking staff as the main cause for the delay and low coverage of the response. It is likely that this problem was exacerbated by the need for French-speaking managers, WASH and food security technical staff across the Sahel, as Oxfam was simultaneously trying to scale up its humanitarian responses in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Gambia. However, as the RTE also states, there appears to have been insufficient institutional learning on this aspect from the previous food insecurity emergency response – also regional - just 12 months previously.

The RTE also highlights the complex security situation, which led to a withdrawal of staff and an interruption of programme activities just at the time Oxfam was scaling up in Gao, and the need to adopt a remote programming model, which was a new experience for most staff and Oxfam's partner organisation, Tassaght.

Finally, it points the finger at the lack of internal preparedness on Oxfam's part, as evidenced by the out-dated contingency plan that lacked measures for responding rapidly to slow onset disasters.

In light of the above, it is considered that Oxfam partially met benchmark for coverage.

Table 2: Monthly beneficiary numbers, December 2011 to August 2012

Month (last day of)	Target number of beneficiaries	Number of beneficiaries reached
December	209,000	0
January	c96,000	0
February	c368,000	0
March	300-350,000	10,182 ¹⁷
April	300-350,000	Programme suspended due to insecurity
May	300-350,000	38,000 ¹⁸
June	300-350,000	48,568 ¹⁹
July	300-350,000	Not reported
August	200,000	96,358 ²⁰

3.2.3 Quality Standard Three: Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards

At the start of the response Oxfam stated in several key documents its intention to apply Sphere standards. For example:

- ✓ The Mali Strategic Plan, dated February 2012, mentions the need for refresher training in Sphere for staff and partners.
- ✓ The MEAL regional strategy proposes common indicators for EFSL and WASH interventions across all countries, which should be adapted to the circumstances and appropriate Sphere indicator.
- ✓ The DfID proposal states that Oxfam will ensure all actions conform to the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Sphere).

The extent to which Oxfam followed this plan is not clear. A key staff member²¹ interviewed for this evaluation confirmed that Sphere standards and their associated indicators relating to food transfers were used to design and monitor these components of the programme, but it appears that they were not referred to explicitly as no reference to them was made in:

- SIDA, ECHO and Unicef food insecurity response proposals (2011-12)
- Sitreps (December 2011 to July 2012)
- The Logical Framework (February 2012)
- The Advocacy strategy (June 2012)

In the absence of further evidence, it is considered that Oxfam partially measured the technical aspects of the programme against Sphere standards, but that this practice was not consistent or clear to all staff.

¹⁷Source: Rapport d'activités ECHO, Gao, Avril 2012. Number of reported beneficiaries (1,697) multiplied by 6 to include all members of beneficiary households.

¹⁸Source: RTE

¹⁹Source: Sitrep 8th July 2012

²⁰Source: Sitrep 20, September 2012

²¹ Source: Benoit Poirier, Humanitarian Programme Manager, Mali

3.2.4 Quality Standard Four: MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators

Mali’s MEAL strategy is based on the use of ‘Common Indicators’ for both EFSL and WASH interventions, meaning that they were common to all of Oxfam’s responses to food insecurity across the Sahel countries in 2012. They were intended to be adapted to become SMART and gender-sensitive within the context of each programme’s location, timeframe and coverage; in Mali they were to generate, among others, the following documents:

- ✓ Baselines on dietary diversity, food availability and coping mechanisms²²
- ✓ Beneficiary data collection spreadsheet²³
- ✓ Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) formats
- ✓ Endline report to DfID, March-August 2012

Unfortunately, the Mali MEAL strategy was not produced until late May 2012. The first MEAL tools were circulated to the Mali team in June, and the MEAL framework began to be used consistently from July/August 2012. This delay is partially explained by the rapidly deteriorating security situation, in which the priority was to deliver aid in an increasingly hostile environment, and to maintain staff security. Insufficient human resources at programme management and technical coordinator levels are also likely to be a contributing factor.

During the first month of implementation (March) of Sida and ECHO projects in Gao, and prior to the programme’s suspension, the Oxfam team in Mali used a basic set of indicators at output and outcome levels (See Figure 2 below) to measure the baseline and results in Gao, although security issues prevented the team from carrying out several monitoring activities. These indicators were neither SMART nor gender-sensitive.

Figure 2: Sample objective and Indicators

Project Objective	Measurable Indicator
Reduce the depletion of the productive assets of the pastoralist households in Bourem circle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2,000 households in the communes of Temera , Bourem and Taboye have received support • Positive changes in beneficiaries coping strategies compared with baselines/initial food security assessment

In order to resume activities in Gao, a remote monitoring plan was designed (based on lessons from Somalia), as recommended in the RTE. This plan²⁴ was implemented from June 2012, simultaneously to the implementation of the remote programming pilot project. Despite multiple logistical difficulties it worked adequately, largely due to the local contacts, reputation and acceptance of Oxfam’s partner - Tassaght.

By the time the programme focus shifted to Kayes, Oxfam had recruited a MEAL specialist for the Mali programme, and the overarching strategy and tools were produced relatively

²² Source: Baseline OFDA, 4-8 August 2012

²³ Dated 17 September 2012

²⁴ Gao pilot remote monitoring model

promptly, as explained above. As shown in Figure 3 below, they were SMART and included a specific gender-sensitive indicator.

Figure 3: Sample indicators, post roll-out of MEAL Strategy

- 100% des ménages bénéficiaires mangent au moins 2 repas par jour pendant la durée du projet
- 90% des ménages affirment être satisfaits de la modalité de transfert monétaire contre formation et du processus de distribution.
- 90% des ménages affirment être satisfaits de la modalité de transfert monétaire contre formation et du processus de distribution.
- 70 % des femmes des ménages bénéficiaires rapportent avoir contribué aux décisions de dépense du ménage pendant la durée du projet.

Based on these mixed results in challenging circumstances, it is considered that Oxfam **partially met** the standard for MEAL.

3.2.5 Quality Standard Five: Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs.

In Gao Oxfam used the results of a recent HEA, combined with participatory appraisal techniques in programme areas during October and November of 2011, to design an intervention that would be relevant to the context and people's needs.

From January to March 2012 Oxfam staff, together with the staff of Tassaght (the partner organisation) carried out preparatory activities, including the setting up of community-level project management and targeting committees, prior to the first distributions of cash grants and animal health activities in Gao.²⁵ These committees, which were composed of men and women (usually community leaders), were responsible for triangulating the results of the HEA with their knowledge of their own communities in order to select beneficiary households that would meet the criteria for becoming beneficiaries of food vouchers and other components of the programme.

The project management and targeting committees appear to have been largely successful, although in some cases may have neglected to consult men and women separately, or to find ways to consult and involve vulnerable groups²⁶. Nevertheless, their participation proved very important in the following weeks when Oxfam staff had to withdraw from the area and use remote programming and monitoring systems that relied more heavily on local participation.

Despite the stated intention in proposals to donors, complaints committees were not set up in Gao before the temporary withdrawal of the team. The first specific efforts to generate inputs and feedback from beneficiaries were in June/July, during the pilot remote management project, in which special posters were created and disseminated to advertise a hotline for feedback and complaints. The same telephone numbers were also printed on the

²⁵Reported in Sitreps

²⁶Source: RTE

reverse of food vouchers, for accountability to beneficiaries as well as a fraud prevention measure in the context of political insecurity. It appears, however, that the hotline was not used. While acknowledging Oxfam's good intentions in replicating an accountability mechanism that had worked well elsewhere, its appropriateness in this context must be questioned.

In Kayes, Oxfam undertook an HEA exercise using a highly participatory methodology to define the needs and requirements of the response. Following that, a roving assessment team was created, to consult with potential beneficiaries in all locations about the most appropriate form of assistance Oxfam could provide in WASH and EFSL.²⁷

When the programme started up in Kayes, Oxfam was better prepared to set up accountability mechanisms than it had been in Gao. Staff and partner staff were trained using specific resources²⁸ developed for the programme, and a toolkit including a format for registering complaints²⁹ and a database for managing them was created.³⁰ Guidance for the formation, composition and capacity building of complaints committees was also drawn up and circulated around this time. A specific accountability assessment/monitoring visit was carried out by Oxfam and Stop Sahel staff to verify that key measures were in place prior to the start-up of new projects.

By Phase 2 of the programme, accountability systems were starting to function, with feedback and complaints focusing – as is to be expected - on targeting issues. Oxfam currently deals with complaints using the toolkit, and holds meetings bi-weekly meetings to address issues of concern.³¹

In light of the mainly positive results described above, it is considered that Oxfam **almost met** the benchmark for accountability.

3.2.6 Quality Standard Six: Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle

Oxfam worked with the following three partners in its response, one of which operated in Gao, and two of which operated in Kayes:

Tassaght

This organisation is a longstanding partner for several INGO's development and humanitarian interventions in Gao. Established in 1985, Tassaght has worked with Oxfam, SCF and SNV and has experience in food security, gender and education. Oxfam was already engaged in a DRR-type programme with Tassaght in Gao when the food security situation started to deteriorate. The organisations undertook a joint situation assessment and designed a response together, on the basis of which Oxfam presented proposals to donors.³²

Oxfam and Tassaght signed a new MoU for the ECHO project by 29th February, and Tassaght began to implement animal health activities, cash transfers and cash for work in Gao in March. The organisations worked side by side in programme implementation, with

²⁷Source : Rapport Roving Team Région de Kayes, Cercles de Kayes et Yelimane, Juin-Juillet 2012

²⁸Accountability pack, not dated

²⁹Dated 8th June

³⁰5th July

³¹Source: email correspondence between field staff and MEAL coordinator, September 2012 AgaïssatouMaïga Chargée de Suivi Evaluation & Apprentissage

³²Source: Sitrep Dec 17

Tassaght being directly responsible for community relations and training of community representatives for programme delivery³³

After Oxfam's international staff were forced to withdraw from the area for security reasons, Oxfam and Tassaght agreed to assume a remote programming model.³⁴ As such, Tassaght became the principal actor in implementation and monitoring, under Oxfam's supervision by telephone and periodic meetings. This partnership was considered positive and effective by both Oxfam and Tassaght staff.³⁵

Stop Sahel

A longstanding partner of Oxfam Novib, Stop Sahel was the main partner for Oxfam's response in Kayes. It initiated the assessment process in Kayes as early as December 2011³⁶, allowing Oxfam staff to focus on preparing for scale-up in Gao. Stop Sahel continued to assess the situation and modify the project design, for which it was largely responsible, in February and March 2012,

Once the project was underway, Stop Sahel's principal role was community mobilisation and support for the selection of beneficiaries. As Stop Sahel had abundant experience in the region but little experience of humanitarian work, implementation took longer than planned³⁷, but its staff's capacities were strengthened through training in humanitarian principles, gender and accountability.

Stop Sahel actively shared responsibility with Oxfam for monitoring and evaluating the project. For example, in June 2012 staff of Stop Sahel participated in a field trip in Kayes to assess implementation of accountability measures and agree on recommendations for improvements.

ADR (Association d'Appui au Développement Rural)

This partnership began in September 2012, beyond the scope of this evaluation.

On the basis of these results, it is considered that Oxfam **fully met** the standard for partner engagement.

3.2.7 Quality Standard Seven: Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive

Oxfam was not able to provide guidelines for safe-programming or criteria for conflict sensitivity for this evaluation.³⁸ It was decided, therefore, to exclude this standard from the key questions and final score.

³³Source: ECHO proposal

³⁴Remote programming Pilot, Gao

³⁵Source: Projet pilote de Gao, Rapport de l'atelier d'apprentissage, 27-28 juin 2012

³⁶Source: Sitrep 17 December 2011

³⁷Oxfam report to OFDA, July 31 2012

³⁸Requested by the evaluator in correspondence with the MEAL team, Oxford, in October 2012

3.2.8 Quality Standard Eight: Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys and vulnerable groups³⁹

Vulnerable groups

The Mali programme based its targeting methodology⁴⁰ on the results of the Household Economy Analyses carried out in Gao in 2009, and in Kayes in 2012. As and when it was secured, funding was directed towards meeting the food needs of a proportion of the groups assessed as 'poor' and 'very poor'.

At the community level, targeting committees were tasked with identifying the households that also met one or more of the following criteria

- Limited access to arable land/small herds
- No alternative income-generating assets
- Limited labour
- A high number of children
- At least one member has already migrated
- Not receiving remittances
- Woman-headed and child-headed households.

In addition, two specific efforts were made to include minority communities known to be particularly vulnerable:

- In Gaothe, the team identified and included a community with a high proportion of returnees from Libya, many of whom held few productive assets and were considered to have weaker social networks to support them through periods of stress.⁴¹
- The roving assessment team that conducted assessments between June and July in Kayes recommended that future targeting in Kayes should include Peulh and Maure communities which did not receive financial support from family members who had migrated elsewhere to find work⁴².

Also, although Oxfam decided not to work directly in Mopti, where the majority of IDPs from the north were congregating, the programme in Kayes included some IDPs arriving in the region if they met the vulnerability criteria.

The only identifiable weaknesses in the programme's strategy to address the needs of vulnerable groups are:

- The lack of engagement by the team with people with disabilities⁴³ and the absence of this group from the targeting criteria.
- The lack of information about HIV prevalence in the area and the absence of guidance on HIV mainstreaming.

³⁹ Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples

⁴⁰Source: Sitrep December 17, 2011

⁴¹ Source: Sida proposal

⁴² Source: RTE

⁴³ Source: RTE

Gender

Oxfam made several notable efforts to promote gender equity and meet differentiated gender needs in the Gao programme. For example:

- It facilitated women's and men's representation in the project management, targeting and accountability committees.
- It followed recognised good practice in cash transfer programming by distributing cash and vouchers to adult female household representatives, both as a means to promote gender equity and to increase the likelihood of funds being used for household food security needs.
- In post-distribution monitoring⁴⁴, the team conducted interviews with women to ascertain how cash was used, and the extent of control women exerted over its use. When these conversations indicated that in many cases the cash had been handed over to the husbands of female beneficiaries, Oxfam took steps to address this through public awareness-raising sessions on gender equity and the practical benefits of women receiving and controlling the aid provided.⁴⁵
- The programme was designed to include distributions of different hygiene kits to women, girls and boys (although this activity was not implemented due to the lack of availability of kit contents in the area).
- Oxfam facilitated fair access to income opportunities in community projects/CFW.

In Kayes, Oxfam continued to seek to promote gender equity and meet differentiated gender needs. For example:

- The Roving Assessment team recommended supporting women's groups with seeds and training on sowing techniques. This was followed up and implemented in July.
- When the Oxfam MEAL Officer also noted that women were under-represented in the accountability committees, she recommended more women to be recruited into these positions and provided practical guidance on how to do so.⁴⁶

Unfortunately, sex-disaggregated data collected in monitoring processes was not analysed sufficiently and often not presented in external and internal reports⁴⁷, which gives implies that gender implications and considerations were not fully understood by some staff.

On the basis of these results it is considered that Oxfam **almost met** the standard for vulnerable groups and gender.

⁴⁴ Sources: RTE and remote monitoring results

⁴⁵Source: Graham Mackay Trip Report, Aug 2012

⁴⁶Sources: Agaissatou Maiga, PO MEAL Oxfam, Mamadou SANGARE, Superviseur Stop Sahel

⁴⁷ Source: Sian Gender Report September 2012

3.2.9 Quality Standard Nine: Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned

Oxfam Mali was quick to obtain food security information from partners, its own monitoring systems and the official Systeme d'Alerte Precoce, and was able to interpret it using the HEAs it had recently undertaken. However, its contingency plan was incomplete and out of date, and the country programme did not have agreements in place with partners that would have permitted a faster reaction. Furthermore, despite being in a country with frequent food security crises and emergency responses, the country team had not been trained in cash programming, which would likely be a key component of most emergency responses.

In addition, the West Africa region lacked mechanisms to attract/recruit sufficient French-speaking staff for all of the responses in francophone countries

On the basis of these mixed results, Oxfam is considered to have partially met the standard for having preparedness measures in place.

3.2.10 Quality Standard Ten: Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field

Oxfam's regional and global advocacy team responded rapidly to the needs of the crisis in Mali and the wider Sahel region. From 27th January, when the first blog post appeared⁴⁸, Oxfam positioned itself as an international actor with a direct presence and a close knowledge of the affected region.

By 14th February Oxfam had drawn up its own advocacy strategy and make a significant contribution to the strategy of the Working Group on Food Security of the Forum des ONGs Internationales au Mali (FONGIM)⁴⁹.

Following this, Oxfam drew up terms of reference for an HSP advocacy coordinator deployment to boost its capacity for delivering its strategy⁵⁰. Its press release of 29th March was the first of several⁵¹ calling for greater humanitarian assistance and improved humanitarian access to address the complex situation of food crisis and insecurity, as evidenced by its own staff and those of partners whose programming intentions were being thwarted by outbreaks of violence and an underwhelming response by the international community.

Sudden political changes were accommodated by Oxfam's advocacy and media team, with rapid releases such as the reactive line on the UNSC president's statement on potential sanctions (see Box 2) in Mali, which resulted in coverage within Africa⁵² and globally. Its content is directly related to Oxfam's overall programme strategy and situation reports.

⁴⁸ <http://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blog/12-01-27-hunger-calls-africas-sahel-region>

⁴⁹ Source: Sitrep 14th February

⁵⁰ 26th March 2012

⁵¹ Source: Sitrep 24th April

⁵² Mali: Oxfam Warns Sanctions Could Be a Tipping Point As Civilians Face a Triple Food, Security and Political Crisis 5 APRIL 2012 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201204060098.html>

Box 2. Extract from Oxfam media release, March 2012

"Everything should be done to ensure that the border closures do not impact on humanitarian supplies, but also fuel and any other goods required to maintain programs. Any limits on banking must also not prevent ordinary Malians from being able to receive vital remittances from overseas, or prevent aid agencies from being able to provide cash programs for populations who otherwise risk going hungry"

Over following months Oxfam continued to adjust its advocacy strategy to meet current priorities, namely humanitarian assistance and protection. The overall objective of advocacy on Mali was to *"ensure secure appropriate assistance and protection for all populations declared to be in need, including those affected by the food crisis, the conflict in the North and those forced to flee within and outside the country."*

It is also worth highlighting that Oxfam coordinated its advocacy with other organizations present in the Sahel region. A Joint Agency Issue Briefing was issued by Oxfam, ROPPA, RBM, APSS, POSCAO and WILDAF in 31 May 2012 entitled 'Food Crisis in the Sahel: Five steps to break the hunger cycle in 2012'. Focusing on the key issues emerging from Oxfam's sitreps from all affected countries including Mali, as well as knowledge of the underlying issues, the briefing called on donors, governments in the region, regional bodies, NGOs and UN agencies to:

- Close the funding gap, to ensure programmes are in place to respond to the peak of the crisis;
- Ensure assistance targets the most vulnerable people, including those affected by conflict in Mali;
- Keep regional markets open to help make food is available and affordable;
- Strengthen leadership and coordination to ensure an effective response;
- Invest in the long term to build resilience and break the hunger cycle.

Among Oxfam's advocacy achievements are⁵³:

- Contributing to the establishment of a commonly owned Humanitarian Charter among organisations in Northern Mali.
- Shaping of the overall UN discourse on Mali by inputting language into the UN Secretary General's speech at the UN GA warning of caution in any military action, and into the UN SC resolution 2085 on Mali.
- Directly influencing the AU's strategy on Mali by inputting privately *before* it was sent to members of the Mali support group.

Based on the evidence noted above, it is considered that Oxfam fully met the standard for connecting advocacy with experience and priorities from the field.

3.2.11 Quality Standard 11: Country programme has an integrated approach including reducing and managing risk through existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future

⁵³ Source: Benoit Poirier

As a result of the chronic problem food insecurity in the Sahel region (including Mali), Oxfam in Mali has experience of implementing humanitarian programmes. In 2009 and 2010 Oxfam delivered EFSL programmes consisting of cash transfers, cash for work, food and fodder distributions and schools canteens, and WASH programmes consisting of water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion, followed by post-emergency projects/rehabilitation activities. During these programmes Oxfam strengthened the emergency preparedness and disaster response capacities of its implementing partners in Gao, both on-the-job technical support and specific training events.

Building on these recent experiences the country programme started to integrate some resilience-oriented actions and projects in 2011, such as:

- A livelihoods and governance programme for pastoral communities in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, including the launch of a regional pastoral network – Bilital Maroobé Network (RBM).
- A pilot social protection project involving predictable cash transfers for very poor households.
- Household economy analyses (HEA) and a cost of diet survey in both the agro-pastoral and pastoral zones in Gao to provide a better understanding of household's livelihoods strategies and food practices.
- A water and sanitation programme focusing on schools, to provide clean water, safe excreta disposal facilities and support the development of good hygiene practices.
- In Kayes, various Oxfam affiliates had been working with STOP Sahel for several years, including investment in institutional strengthening.

These measures contributed to Oxfam's rapid detection of the growing food insecurity, and underpinned the programme design process in Gao. They also provided Oxfam with a selection of implementing partners and some staff with appropriate skills. If more funding had been secured in the early stages of the crisis, general security conditions had not deteriorated so quickly, and Oxfam had been able to scale up adequately in HR terms (see below), it might have been able to mitigate the effects of the food crisis in some communes in Gao. Of course, to prevent a food crisis from developing, similar disaster risk reduction investments and early interventions would be required of other INGO, UN and government actors on a national grand scale.

In a post-visit report⁵⁴, Oxfam's deputy humanitarian director comments: *Given we can expect more emergencies in the future we need to think about how we can be in a better position to respond more quickly and with greater quality. Clearly if we had a team in place, already knew the most vulnerable in the community, already had relations with partners and banks and local government things would be a lot easier. In addition if we had spent time building up the resilience of the most vulnerable communities our emergency work would not be so required. These are part of a larger discussion going on as part of the Sahel programme and Kayes acts as a good example of what we could be doing on a longer term. There is one large donor contract by the Belgian government that is for 18 months and its goal is to build in resilience. This is an exciting opportunity.*

Based on these results, Oxfam is considered to have undertaken some useful resilience-building activities and put some important foundations in place for building an integrated programme and local resilience in the future, thereby **partially meeting** this standard.

⁵⁴Source: Graham MacKay, Visit Report, August 2012.

3.2.12 Quality Standard 12: Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming

Although assessments began as early as November 2011, the first sitrep was produced in December 2011 date, and the first phase of programme activities was due to start in January, the first time that human resources is raised in situation reports is on the 31st January, when it was reported that 2 EFSL experts had been hired and recruitment was due to start for a humanitarian programme manager. Given the scale of the proposed programme at this stage (350,000), this appears to be a significant under-estimation of imminent HR needs, despite Oxfam's assurance in a donor proposal that Operational HR capacities are already in place (both international and national: Programme manager, EFSL Team Leader, PHE and PHP officers, Advocacy officer, Humanitarian Preparedness and Response coordinator, complete Business support staffs) but have to be completed and reinforced in case of scale up.⁵⁵

By Feb 14 it was reported in the sitrep that an HR plan for the scale up (including requests for HSPs) was under preparation. Progress in actually recruiting staff appears to have been slower than hoped, as by 6th July *'human resources issues'* are reported in sitrep as being *'a big constraint to scale up'*. In a report to OFDA⁵⁶, Oxfam explains: *'staff recruitment for the overall programme (including the DFID funded project) has been very difficult and lengthy, both for national and international staff, despite posts having been advertised externally. For instance, the candidate for the Humanitarian Programme Coordinator post in Kayes pulled out because of the political events in the country and it took 3 months to recruit a base manager for Kayes, because of the uncertainty of the political situation. It has been extremely difficult to find candidates with the required level of technical skill or experience for national posts, despite widening the recruitment process to Bamako'*.

The RTE notes *'Au niveau RH, les délais de recrutement – y compris la prise des décisions sur les besoins de personnels et les difficultés dans le recrutement de staff expatrié francophone, ont été des contraintes majeures pendant les 3 premiers mois du projet. Plusieurs postes clés sont restés longtemps vacants ce qui a surement eu un effet sur la rapidité, parmi eux le PM Kayes, Coordinateur WASH (qui est couvert pour le moment par le WASH régional, ce qui n'est pas une solution durable) et le Funding Coordinateur.'*

Also, even when staff were recruited, induction procedures were not adequate. In May⁵⁷, the PM and HR in-country were focusing on producing clear ToR and objectives. The RTE notes *'l'induction du staff nouveau à Oxfam est aussi à améliorer si l'on veut atteindre l'intégration rapide par les personnes recrutées des valeurs d'Oxfam et des exigences de qualité associées à nos réponses.'*

In light of the above, it is considered that Oxfam **did not meet** the standard for appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality.

⁵⁵Source: Sida proposal Feb 2012-11-07

⁵⁶Source: OFDA report 31 June Kayes

⁵⁷Source: Sitrep May 8

Annex I - Sources of Data

Internal Reports

1. Sitreps 1-17
2. GAO Project in Mali as at 30th May 2012, Oxfam GB
3. Rapport formation comites de gestion, Kayes, (n.d)
4. Rapport Roving Team, Région de Kayes, Cercles de Kayes et Yelimane, Juin-Juillet 2012
5. Profil de Moyens d'Existence: Mali, Zone mil-élevage transhumant: Cercle de Diema 2012, Oxfam and Save the Children (n.d.)
6. Mali OG Updates as of October 2012
7. Tableau de Collectes de donnees et beneficiaires, 17 Septembre 2012
8. Situation De La Reponse Dans La Region De Gao, Janvier 2012

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1. Evaluation de la Situation alimentaire dans les Cercles de Kayes et de Yélimané, Région de Kayes, dans le Sahel Occidental, République du Mali. Nkusi, J., Kouame, A. Fevrier 2012
2. Analyse des Scénarios Mali 2011-12 Six Zones de Moyen d'Existence Evaluées Suivant l'Approche Analyse de l'Economie des Ménages (AEM) Février 2012, King, A., Food Economy Group (FEG) (n.d.)
3. Rapport d'Evaluation Rapide à Mopti (n.d.)
4. Situation Des Deplaces Et Familles D'accueil A Mopti Suite Aux Evenements Du Nord Mali, CARE, Oxfam, CRS, FONGIM, 19-24/04/201
5. Profil HEA Zones de Moyens d'Existence: Sorgho-Elevage Transhumant et Migration, Cercle de Yelimane, Region de Kayes, Save the Children & Oxfam, March 2012
6. Projet d'équipe interorganisations d'évaluation rapide Eau, assainissement et hygiène, CARE ICRC Oxfam (n.d.)

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1. Logic Model for P00826 - Emergency Response to Mali Food and Security Crises, 1st September 2012
2. Joint Oxfam Response Strategy 2012 Sahel Food Crisis, 22nd February 2012, Rigamonti, F. Oxfam GB
3. P00826, Gender strategy, P00826 (n.d.)
4. PIP information: Emergency Response to Mali Food and Security Crisis (copied from OPAL at 14:23 22/10/2012)
5. Stratégie régionale MEAL-Réponse Sahel 2012, May 2012 (n.d.)
6. Logframe Mali (n.d.)

Monitoring, Accountability, Evaluation and Learning

1. MEAL Au MALI Pour La Réponse Humanitaire 2012, Rapport De Mission, 17-21 Septembre 2012
2. C. Gaignebet, Regional OI Hum MEAL Coordinator
3. Rapport De L'évaluation En Temps Réel De La Réponse d'Oxfam Au Mali, Mai 2012, Dennis, C., Lukelo, A.
4. Plan MEAL Projects Kayes (n.d)
5. Stratégie MEAL - Provisoire Pour Le Programme d'Oxfam A Kayes Au Mali (n.d.)
6. (Draft 1) 28 Mai Au 13 Juillet 2012, Fils- Aimé, C., Oxfam GB- Mali
7. PV Reunion Communautaire Mars 11, 2012

8. MEAL Data Plan, September To December 2012
9. Questionnaire Baseline OFDA (n.d.)
10. PDMA1 Questionnaire, Dutch, Kayes (n.d.)
11. Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM N° 1) Juin 2012
12. Questionnaire Ménage Bénéficiaire Des Bons D'achat (Échantillon Aléatoire De Ménages) (n.d.) Affiche, Comite De Redevabilite, Cercle De Bourem, 28th September 2012
13. Base De Donnees, Feedback Et Plaintes (n.d.)
14. Les Mécanismes De Création Des Comités De Plainte Dans Les Villages Ciblés Par Les Projets d'Oxfam A Kayes (n.d.)
15. La Redevabilite Chez Oxfam : Dimensions (n.d.)
16. Formulaire D'enregistrement Des Plaintes (n.d.)
17. Module De Formation A l'Intention De Comite Villageois De Redevabilite (n.d.)
18. Dispositif De Suivi Du Projet Pilote A Gao (n.d.)
19. Cadre de Suivi, Evaluation, Apprentissage et Redevabilite ("MEAL") (n.d.)
20. D'Oxfam GB au Mali, August 2012
21. Liste D'indicateurs Communs Pour Les Secteurs Techniques EFSL Et WASH Dans La Réponse Humanitaire Sahel (n.d.)
22. Réponse Intégrée A La Crise De Sécurité Alimentaire Dans Les Communautés Vulnérables De Kayes, Au Mali, Proposition Détaillée Soumise À l'Assistance Humanitaire Internationale De l'Agence Canadienne De Développement International (n.d.)
23. OFDA Oxfam International Proposal : Support to food insecure households to meet their essential needs through market systems in Kayes Region, Mali, 2012. (n.d.)

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1. Plan De Contingence Oxfam International Au Mali, Novembre 2009

Advocacy

2. Press Release Mali Conflict and Food Insecurity, 29.03.2012
3. Advocacy strategy on the Mali crisis (n.d.)
4. Proposals To Donors On Strategic Priorities For Engagement In Mali, FONGIM, 11 July 2012
5. Briefing to Valerie Amos, United Nations Under-Secretary-General For Humanitarian Affairs And Emergency Relief Coordinator Humanitarian Situation in Mali – Implications for UN Engagement, 20 August 2012
6. Oxfam Lobby Brief – The Malian Refugee and IDP Crisis July 2012

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1. Oxfam International Concept Note (n.d.)
2. Sahel Food Security Emergency Response 2012: Mali, Niger (n.d.)
3. DFID Proposal Final Response to and recovery from 2012 Sahel Food and Nutrition crisis in Mali and Niger (n.d.)
4. DFID 3 Proposal resubmission 16.08.2012 Accord Entre Le Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM) et Oxfam GB
5. Isle of Man Grant Application for West Africa Food Crisis (n.d.)
6. ECHO Single Form 01/02/2012
7. Application for Funding to Comité Interministériel d'Aide Alimentaire (n.d.)

Donor Reports

1. Proposition OGB Distributions Generales de Vivres et Blanket Feeding (n.d.)
2. Proposition de Projet a Unicef Réponse d'urgence en Eau, Assainissement et Hygiène pour les personnes vulnérables les plus affectées par la crise humanitaire complexe au Nord du Mali, cercles de Bourem et de Gao.
3. Irish Aid WASH and EFSL Response to the Complex Emergency Gao Region (n.d.)
4. Royaume de Belgique, : Oxfam Solidarité
5. Titre de l'action: Réhabilitation des moyens d'existence des ménages agropasteurs par une intervention intégrée en nutrition et sécurité alimentaire au Mali.
6. Dutch CN Réhabilitation des moyens d'existence des ménages agropasteurs par une intervention intégrée en sécurité alimentaire et WASH au Mali, région de Kayes, 10.06.2012

Reports from External Sources

1. Rapport d'évaluation Urgence NORD MALI, 14 mars 2012 – 14 avril 2012, Alima
2. Mali Mise à jour des perspectives de la sécurité alimentaire Septembre 2011, FEWSNET
3. Mali Food Security Outlook July to December 2011, FEWSNET
4. Mali Food Security Alert May 10, 2012, FEWSNET

HR

1. Terms of Reference for Advocacy HSP deployment, 15 March 2012, Oxfam GB
2. Sahel Food Crisis 2012 CP Spreadsheet 27 August 2012
3. Spreadsheet jobs (n.d.)

Communications

1. Mali Food Crisis Response External update #1 - 31 July 2012
2. Mali's deepening humanitarian crisis, Oxfam, 27th July 2012

Interviews and Correspondence

1. Cardyn Fils-Aimé, MEAL Coordinator
2. Benoît Poirier, Humanitarian Programme Manager
3. Christine Gaignebet, Regional OI Hum MEAL Coordinator

Annex II - Global Humanitarian Indicator for Slow-onset disasters

Degree to which humanitarian responses meet recognised quality standards for humanitarian programming:

Number	Quality standard	Met (6/6)	Almost met (4/6)	Partially met (2/6)	Not met (0/6)
1	Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours of pre-defined trigger, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days				
2	Coverage uses 10% of affected population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count				
3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards				

Number	Quality standard	Met (3/3)	Almost met (2/3)	Partially met (1/3)	Not met (0/3)
4	MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators				
5	Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs				
6	Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle				
7	Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive				
8	Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys and vulnerable groups				

Evaluation of Mali Food Insecurity Response – Project Effectiveness Review

9	Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned				
10	Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field				
11	Country programme has an integrated approach including reducing and managing risk though existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future				
12	Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming				