
Reducing Poverty by Improving Public Policy and Public Administration in Bolivia

Presented by

Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting

March 2012
Abbreviations

CBB  Central Bank of Bolivia
CBC  Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Bolivia
FJ   Fundación Jubileo
FOCAPACI The Training Center for Citizen Participation
IPPMP Influencing Policy and Public Management Project
KMSC Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization
OGB  Oxfam Great Britain
PM   Project Manager
PT   Process Tracing
PPAT Programme Performance and Accountability Team
TI   Transparency International
ToC  Theory of Change
ToRs Terms of Reference

Photos

Cover Left: Women patiently await the beginning of a Jubileo workshop in El Alto (March 2011)
Cover Right: The Municipal Assembly in La Paz debate the draft law on Social Monitoring (April 2011)
Page 3: The public presentation of a FJ document on government use of funds from the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons
Page 11: Jubileo Executive Director, Juan Carlos Nuñez, addresses the press after an FJ press conference.
Page 12: A “break out” group at a Jubileo training on local government budgeting.
Page 21: Juan Carlos Nuñez meets with Bolivian and German church leaders to discuss the idea of an integrated information system for the Bolivian Catholic Church.
Page 24: A Jubileo staff member initiates a meeting of neighbourhood committee and local school committee representatives.
Page 30: One of La Paz’s famous “zebras” helps draw attention to the literature table at a Fundación Jubileo event.
Report Contents

1.0 Executive Summary ................................................................. 2
1.1 Key Findings ............................................................................. 3
1.2 Recommendations........................................................................ 4
1.3 Acknowledgements.................................................................... 4
2.0 Introduction and Purpose .......................................................... 5
2.1 Evaluation Approach................................................................. 8
   2.1.1 Research Methodology......................................................... 9
   2.1.2 Data collection...................................................................... 10
2.2 Limitations................................................................................ 11
3.0 Project Description .................................................................. 12
   3.1 Campaign Rationale............................................................... 12
   3.2 Theory of Change.................................................................... 13
   3.3 Program Activities................................................................. 15
   3.4 Resourcing.............................................................................. 20
4.0 Results of the Impact Assessment .............................................. 21
   4.1 Most Significant Outcomes.................................................... 21
      4.1.1 Repositioning of the Central Bank of Bolivia ...................... 23
      4.1.2 Integrated Information System of the Bolivian Catholic Church... 25
      4.1.3 Civil Society-Local Government Dialogue in the Municipality of El Alto........ 28
      4.1.4 Municipal Law on Social Monitoring in La Paz ................. 32
5.0 Recommendations..................................................................... 36
6.0 Conclusion ................................................................................ 37
7.0 Contribution Scores .................................................................. 40
Appendix I: Documentation Reviewed for the Impact Assessment .......... 41
Appendix II: List of Key Informants (in order of engagement) ................. 42
Appendix III: A Note on the Use of the Process Tracing Methodology ........ 43
1.0 Executive Summary

The “Influencing Policy and Public Management Program” is a program through which Bolivia’s Fundación Jubileo (FJ) seeks to address the country’s continuing high levels of extreme poverty through improved public policy and public administration outcomes. This connection between improved public policy and administration outcomes and reductions in poverty rates is the fundamental assumption of FJ’s theory of change. In addition to using its own relationships and access to information in order to influence key policy debates, the Foundation works to build the capacity of other civil society actors to successfully influence those debates. This study focuses on an assessment of the impact of Jubileo’s advocacy work during the period, 2008-2011. The Foundation emerged out of the international debate on how to address the stifling indebtedness of one of the world’s most impoverished countries, but, over time, Jubileo broadened its interventions to cover a wide range of governance and political participation issues.

This assessment uses a methodology known as Process Tracing to determine the impact of Jubileo’s interventions over the period in question. Based on Jubileo’s own identification of the Most Significant Outcomes of its work, the analysis focuses on four major outcome areas:

1) Repositioning of the Central Bank of Bolivia on key issues related to Bolivia’s external debt;
2) The decision of Bolivia’s Catholic Church to create an integrated information system;
3) Civil society – municipal government dialogue in the municipality of El Alto; and
4) The approval of a draft law on Social Monitoring in the Municipality of La Paz.

In addition to the establishment of the context of the report, the data collection activities supporting this research focused on the analysis of these impact claims from the following five angles:

- Nature of available evidence;
- Validation of outcome claim;
- Relative significance of outcome;
- Causal explanation; and
- Nature of Fundación Jubileo’s contribution to the outcome.

While we find considerable variation among outcomes in terms of the apparent impact of the Fundación Jubileo intervention, we conclude that the Foundation occupies a unique and quite strategic space at the current moment in Bolivia. A variety of actors share the view of Jubileo as a credible source of information and analysis on critical social and economic issues at a moment when evidence-based analysis of this sort is in short supply. It holds a clear and consistent position in support of the rights of Bolivia’s poor majority, but is capable of open dialogue on delicate issues with nearly all sectors of a highly-polarized society. Not content to limit itself to a knowledge creation and information dissemination role, Jubileo uses its position to advance its own advocacy agenda and to support other civil society actors in building the capacity to advance their agendas. Limited by resource availability and a political context in which serious,

---

1 That well-targeted and effective government policy in a variety of areas can reduce poverty is a well-established precept of the entire development enterprise. That said, debate continues concerning the extent to which government should involve itself in poverty reduction efforts. See, CIDA’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/inet/images.nsf/vLUImages/Policy/$file/POVERTY%20.pdf for a discussion of the Canadian government’s exploration of the connection posed by Fundación Jubileo. In Bolivia, for the time being, this issue has been resolved and the government actively claims to be contributing to the reduction in poverty there through social policy.
Evidence-based advocacy remains distinctly counter-cultural, Jubileo’s advocacy interventions are consistently directed toward policy positions and public management approaches that the Foundation believes will help diminish Bolivia’s persistently high rates of extreme poverty. As it approaches the tenth anniversary of its formal establishment, Fundación Jubileo faces a variety of important strategic and operational questions, especially in regard to the eternal challenges of sustainability and leadership development. Oxfam Great Britain is well positioned to accompany the Foundation in its effort to resolve these key questions and to support the continuation of its unique and important mission.

1.1 Key Findings

- As a credible source of information and analysis of policy and governance issues, Fundación Jubileo plays an important role in Bolivia at the present time. Jubileo’s credibility rests, in part, on the technical rigor of its data collection and the quality of its analysis, but FJ also derives credibility from the widely-held perception that its analysis is not tempered by a specific political agenda or party affiliation.
- FJ’s continuing connection to Bolivia’s Catholic Church is critical to its success. Due in large part to a special relationship between the Foundation’s Executive Director and the Catholic Archbishop of La Paz, Jubileo is able to capitalize on its relationship with the church while maintaining relative autonomy from the church hierarchy.
- While FJ’s “core business” is the collection and analysis of data and the dissemination of information based on that analysis, Jubileo also plays an important advocacy role in Bolivian society. The organization possesses an understanding of power analysis and advocacy strategy that remains counter-cultural in the Bolivian context. In addition to developing and carrying out its own direct advocacy strategy, it devotes considerable resources to providing other civil society actors with the information and knowledge necessary to become stronger advocates in their own right.
- The recognition of the rights of citizens and collective autonomies implied by Bolivia’s new Political Constitution provides certain legitimacy to rights-based claims and ample scope for a range of influence strategies as the laws that will give life to the Constitution slowly fall into place. That said, the highly conflictive nature of state-civil society relations in Bolivia (as well as relations within civil society), the governing style of the current President and the strong legislative majority enjoyed by his party all seem to work against the kind of careful, analysis-based advocacy carried out by Jubileo and its allies.
- To date, the concrete outcomes of Jubileo’s advocacy are certainly significant, but not necessarily transformative, in their own right. They represent, in general, important intermediate advances in processes that cannot be expected to reach full maturity in three years. In achieving these outcomes, the Foundation has made important contributions to the consolidation of concepts like “social monitoring,” “conflict prevention,” “government responsibility,” and “debt sustainability” with the national political discourse. That they have been able to achieve such influence in the current context is noteworthy and makes them stand out from many of their peers.
- Finally, almost ten years into the unique project that is Jubileo, the organization faces a number of strategic choices that will require a careful reassessment of some
of the pillars of their approach. Because of its well-established relationship of mutual respect with Jubileo, Oxfam GB is well-positioned to accompany Fundación Jubileo as it resolves these issues and continues to play an important role in Bolivia’s highly-charged political environment.

1.2 Recommendations

1. Much has changed in Bolivia since Fundación Jubileo last took the time for a deep internal strategic reflection in 2008. The Foundation should consider another strategic planning moment driven by the same desire to create a “living” plan to guide adaptive work over the next period.

2. In 2012, FJ’s capacity to translate its analysis into messages designed for particular audiences, and to efficiently deliver those messages, is almost as important as its ability to develop the evidence-based analysis, itself. As part of a strategic review, Jubileo should examine the contribution of its social communication strategies to its overall mission, and adjust and reinforce them, as appropriate.

3. Jubileo’s work on extractive industries is among its most important thematic interventions. Any re-formulation of IPPMP should include that work as an integral element of the program.

4. The success of Fundación Jubileo springs from diverse sources, but depends heavily on the contributions of two exceptional people and the special relationship between them. While continuing to take advantage of these rare gifts, Jubileo must begin to plan for the time when it can no longer rely on both its current Executive Director, and the long-time head of its governing Board.

5. The strategic partnership with Jubileo serves well Oxfam GB’s interest in supporting civil society participation in and contribution to the current change process underway in Bolivia. Provided that such support remains a priority for the agency’s work in Bolivia, continued deepening of this strategic relationship will make a positive contribution to OGB’s mission effectiveness.

6. Oxfam GBs focus on defining the impact of its support for Citizen Voice Initiatives is well-placed. That effort must distinguish between Oxfam GB’s internal assessment of the effectiveness of its own interventions and the assessment by Citizen Voice partners (such as Fundación Jubileo) of the impact of their efforts to influence policy and practice in their own contexts. Once distinguished, these two important assessment functions can be placed in right relationship to each other, and both given necessary support by Oxfam GB.

1.3 Acknowledgements

Besides doing the work that gives meaning to this report, the entire staff of Fundación Jubileo bent over backwards to make KMSC feel “en casa” at 12,400 feet. They responded with grace and Bolivian hospitality to every request, however, unrealistic, and never tired of more questions. Special thanks to Waldo Gómez who coordinated the adventure and always answered his phone, regardless of the hour, and to Juan Carlos Nuñez, who took time from an impossibly busy schedule to accompany this process at several key moments. On the Oxfam side, Lourdes Montero made sure, from a prudent distance that the process worked for all concerned. Her thoughtful support and insightful inputs were much appreciated.
From Oxford, Kimberly Bowman provided the much-needed guidance on the Process Tracing method and thoughtful comments on drafts of this report.

2.0 Introduction and Purpose

“Influencing of Policy and Public Management Project” (IPPMP) is the name given by Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) to a Citizen Voice Initiative supported by its country office in Bolivia. The primary implementing organization of the project is Fundación Jubileo (FJ), a Bolivian nongovernmental organization (NGO) founded in 2003 to work at the national and international levels to seek forgiveness of all or part of Bolivia’s external public and private debt. The current report documents a research effort undertaken between November 2011 and March 2012 by Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting (KMSC) to analyze the impact of Fundación Jubileo’s IPPMP during the three-year period between July 2008 and June 2011.

It is impossible to understand the outcomes of the Foundation’s work that receive attention here, or FJ’s unique contribution to those outcomes, without some reference to the historical context of the work.

For a number of years prior to 2003, a wide range of Bolivian social organizations, academics and opposition political groupings pointed to the negative impact of structural adjustment policies being implemented in Bolivia on levels of extreme poverty there. In order to remain eligible for the external credits desperately needed to keep the country’s economy afloat, the Bolivian government was forced to limit social spending and dedicate scarce financial reserves to the payment of ever-increasing debt obligations. Such policies were not uncommon during that period, but their implementation in Bolivia generated an unusual level of social conflict and political instability. As an indicator of this instability, the country had five different presidents during the first five years of the new millennium.

A sector of the Roman Catholic Church had consistently been among those voices calling for a reconsideration of public policy in the face of worsening poverty. Those church voices focused particularly on Bolivia’s staggering external debt and the impossibility and immorality of continuing to pay that debt. In 2000, the Archdiocese of La Paz, under the leadership of Archbishop Edmundo Abastaflor convened Foro Jubileo, a conference bringing together a wide range of social organizations to discuss Bolivia’s debt problems and to build the connections between Bolivian activists and the global movement to forgive the debts of the world’s poorest countries.
As the political situation reached a boiling point in 2003, church leaders, including the Archbishop, began to envision a technically competent organization that could provide leadership within Bolivia for the movement for debt relief. That organization would be closely connected to the church, but would have autonomy from it, and it would also be connected to, but independent from, Bolivia’s vibrant political opposition. They reasoned that, managed properly, such an organization could effectively build alliances within Bolivia and internationally.

Archbishop Abastaflor presented this idea to two German Catholic dioceses who he knew shared his concern about the debt problem. After a short period of deliberation, a formal written agreement between the three dioceses gave birth to Fundación Jubileo. FJ would be independent of the church hierarchy, but the Archdiocese would play an important role in the Foundation’s governing Board in the person of the Archbishop. That tripartite agreement remains in force today. Juan Carlos Nuñez, a widely-respected veteran leader of Catholic social programs was named the organization’s first director, a post that he continues to hold. From its inception, Fundación Jubileo’s mission was to use its connections across society and its capacity to gather and analyze information to influence both public policy and public administration in Bolivia. FJ would have its own advocacy agenda, but it would also use information and analysis to help other key actors, especially civil society organizations, to become more effective advocates in their own right. FJ did not seek influence for its own sake, but, instead, saw improved public policy and administration outcomes as indispensible preconditions to any serious effort to attack the social ill of extreme poverty in Bolivia.

Fundación Jubileo took some time to formally establish itself, but once a basic structure was in place it quickly became an actor of significance. FJ is widely recognized in Bolivia as a leader of Bolivian participation in the international campaign that achieved, in 2005 & 2006, important institutional commitments to debt forgiveness or debt reduction from many of the world’s most important multi-lateral and bilateral donors. These declarations, which resulted, at least in part, from a long-term global campaign to influence decisions regarding the debts of the world’s poorest countries, promised to lower dramatically the debt burdens of 32 countries. Bolivia’s debt of $4.6 billion was reduced by a total of $ 500 million. This may not seem hugely significant, but due to the structure of the debt and the nature of repayment, debt service payments in 2006 were reduced by over 70% because of the debt forgiveness and delays achieved in 2005.

While Jubileo noted the significance of that victory and continues to do so, the Foundation was under no illusion that the debt forgiveness offered by the international community in 2005-06 was a panacea that would solve the social problems related to high poverty levels in Bolivia. At almost the same moment that debt relief was being announced by the G-8, Bolivians went to the polls and elected a new president, Evo Morales. Morales was a union leader with close ties to the country’s largest indigenous group, the Aymara, as well as the social organizations that had forced multiple governments from power during the recent period.

Jubileo did not believe that the new government would immediately have answers for all of the problems that had rendered Bolivia virtually ungovernable, but FJ was hopeful that it
would be able to work with civil society, the Morales government and a variety of other actors to begin to address these issues. In particular, FJ wished to work with the new government to take advantage of the coming debt forgiveness by addressing some of the structural and public management problems that had driven Bolivia into debt in the first place.

During the first Morales administration, Jubileo maintained its focus on the debt issue by trying to get government institutions, particularly the Parliament, the Bolivian Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, to recognize the notion of “sustainable” external debt and acknowledge their shared responsibility to audit the country’s debt situation and to take steps to direct the country’s financial resources toward human development, rather than debt service. It also expanded its program into additional areas that it saw as closely related to the debt issue, such as public budgeting, political participation and citizen review of government practices.

In addition to establishing its programmatic reach, during this period FJ developed three important sets of core competencies: (1) its ability to gather quality information, mostly from official sources, and to analyze that information in a rigorous way; (2) its ability to develop strategies to influence key decision makers and adapt those strategies to a rapidly-evolving context and (3) its capacity to communicate the results of its research and advocacy work to varied audiences in ways that advanced its influence strategies. Each of these building blocks of successful advocacy was in short supply in Evo Morales’ Bolivia. FJ was able to develop as an organization in these ways without greatly expanding its staffing complement and overhead costs. It also did this without compromising its delicate position as an organization with access to both the government and the social programs of the Catholic Church but autonomous from both those sets of institutions.

Oxfam Great Britain made contact with Jubileo soon after the organization became operational in 2005 and provided its first support for the Foundation in April 2005, a grant for $10,500. By 2007, the process of consolidating Fundación Jubileo was underway and an increasingly systematic effort at strategic communications was creating a unique brand for FJ that gained increasing recognition at the national and international levels. At the same time, the organization faced considerable adaptive challenges. The Morales government had convened a National Constituent Assembly, and discussions of a new Constitution for Bolivia were well underway. Similarly, the government had taken decisive steps in the direction of assuming unprecedented control over the nation’s strategic natural resources. Finally, the government’s strategy included aggressive action to resolve the regional dispute between the central government and influential economic actors in Santa Cruz, who sought a degree of autonomy for their region that was unacceptable to the government in La Paz. Each of these strategic initiatives by the government carried with it tremendous implications for every aspect of the work of Jubileo and, especially, for its positioning vis a vis both the government and the Catholic Church hierarchy, which had identified itself quite closely with forces opposing the government in Santa Cruz.

In this context, FJ’s governing board (Directorio) called upon the Executive Director to lead the organization in a comprehensive planning process. This process, which began in 2008 and concluded in 2009, sought to establish a set of organizing principles and strategic lines
of intervention that would permit FJ to continue to work effectively in a rapidly changing context. In its 2008 proposal to Oxfam GB, Jubileo expresses its approach to planning the following way:

This process rested on a single general premise: that planning doesn’t end with the design of a concrete plan. It is, instead, a dynamic process and, therefore, should be subject to continuous readjustment and revision of what has been planned to constantly adapt the plan to the circumstances. It should also be subject to the evaluation of its results, in order to extract lessons learned (what has gone well and what has not) and to generate process of learning within the institution (author’s translation)

FJ’s planning process did not lead to dramatic revelations or changes of direction, but, instead, the intensive internal and external consultations resulted in the affirmation of the key elements of the direction developed over the previous three years with certain changes in emphasis. The planning process left Jubileo with the confidence that it should be able to attract resources to its work on a multi-year programmatic basis. As a result, FJ presented a three-year programmatic proposal, based on the strategic plan, to several funding organizations in early 2008, including Oxfam GB. This proposal came to be known as the “Influencing Public Policy and Management Program.”

This program includes all of the primary programmatic initiatives, except for the organization’s work on extractive industries, which includes its monitoring of the use of the income from the special tax levied against companies involved in the extraction of hydrocarbons. Given the importance of the extractive industries in the current context, this has become a very visible element of FJ’s program. The extractives work was originally included in the program proposal and Oxfam Intermón decided to fully finance that element. Ironically, an intractable administrative issue among the Oxfam’s prevented FJ from including this part of the program in IPPMP. This caused some confusion for FJ in the beginning, but the organization opted simply to manage the programs as if they were all fully integrated. The person who leads the work on extractives functions as a full member of the technical team responsible for IPPMP, and FJ staff report that this arrangement works well.

2.1 Evaluation Approach

This exercise forms part of a series of evaluations being undertaken by Oxfam Great Britain in an effort to test and develop methods to more rigorously access and effectively communicate the medium-to-long-term impact of the influence work it supports in a variety of political and geographic contexts. Through analysis of its own evaluation methodologies, Oxfam GB concluded that, while a fairly straightforward input/output analysis could serve its purpose in assessing the impact of many more traditional development interventions, another, more qualitative, analytical structure would be required to assess Citizen Voice Initiatives.
In an attempt to achieve an appropriate level of consistency across a number of impact evaluations undertaken as part of Oxfam’s Global Performance Framework, OGB decided to mandate the use of a single evaluation methodology across all cases. For this purpose, OGB’s Programme Performance and Accountability Team (PPAT) adapted a rigorous qualitative research protocol known as Process Tracing. According to the terms of reference (ToRs) for this project:

“This evaluation will use a predefined qualitative research protocol, Process Tracing, to assess the extent to which: a) the changes around [the program] influence the direction of public policy that the IPPMP project was seeking have taken place; and b) we can evidence that the project contributed to these changes.”

The OGB Project Manager (PM) provided KMSC with extensive documentation regarding Process Tracing, including a document designed to provide specific guidance for applying the method to the evaluation of Citizen Voice Initiatives and a set of “Top Tips” for effective use of the methodology. In addition, the PM was available to answer questions regarding the methodology and to help KMSC develop a specific approach to using the methodology for purposes of evaluating IPPMP. The PM also designed a final report template consistent with OGB’s expectations regarding evaluation outputs.

KMSC carried out additional research on Process Tracing. This work did produce some useful information, but the guidance provided by OGB provided the basis for the design of the current exercise.

2.1.1 Research Methodology

Process Tracing is a complex methodology in which a series of preparatory steps culminate in the identification, by key program stakeholders, of a set of targeted outcomes. These represent the most recent and important desired achievements of the program. Once these targeted outcomes are identified and clearly stated, data collection and analysis focus on determining the extent to which these targeted outcomes were realized and the importance of the program’s contribution to those outcomes. The OGB-provided document entitled, “Guidance on Evaluating Citizen Voice Initiatives Using Process Tracing” includes an elegant summary of the key steps in the process:

1. Work with relevant stakeholders to clearly specify the most recent intermediate and final outcomes the project expected (or is seeking) to achieve. Will usually involve a process of (re)constructing the project’s theory of change.
2. Systematically assess and document what was done under the project to achieve the targeted outcomes.
3. Identify and evidence what targeted project outcomes have actually materialised, as well as any relevant unintended outcomes.
4. Where necessary, work with relevant stakeholders to agree on a shortlist of no more than 6 of these outcomes, considered by stakeholders to be the most significant, for the evaluation to focus on.
5. Undertake “process induction” to identify all plausible causal explanations for the evidenced outcomes associated with Step 2.
6. Use “process verification” to assess the extent to which each of the explanations identified in Step 4 are supported or not supported by the available evidence.
7. Write a narrative analytical report to document the above research processes and findings.
8. Summarise aspects of the above narrative analysis by allocating project “contribution scores” for each of the targeted and unforeseen outcomes. This is not expected to provide a precise measure of contribution, but rather a qualitative sense of how much the campaign was likely responsible for observed change(s).

Given the particular situation of the IPPMP program, KMSC facilitated a Process Tracing exercise that included the following steps.

1. Analysis of project documentation provided by OGB;
2. Effort to reconstruct IPPMP theory of change;
3. Development of complete list of most recent desired intermediate and final outcomes;
4. Specification of key activities carried out to achieve those outcomes;
5. Identification of 4 targeted outcomes;
6. Collection and analysis regarding degree of achievement of targeted outcomes;
7. Analyze various explanations for observable outcomes and select best supported explanation for each outcome;
8. Based on available evidence, determine the likelihood that the program’s interventions contributed to the outcome; and
9. Draft a final report documenting the research process and key findings.

The first stage of the research process was carried out at a distance between Boston, Massachusetts and La Paz, Bolivia. Once discussions with FJ established the program’s target outcomes, a final stage of field research took place in La Paz between February 28 and March 8, 2012. Both the remote research and field research stages of the project relied heavily on the active participation of a member of OGB’s country office staff in Bolivia.

2.1.2 Data collection

Data collection is a key element of the Process Tracing (PT) method. While PT is not a quantitative method, it is certainly an evidence-based research method. To gather the information necessary to carry out this review, KMSC used the following data collection methods:

1. Analysis of project information generated by both FJ and OGB;
2. Review of a sample of the large number of reports, bulletins and other documents published by FJ over the period under review;
3. Identification of review of select literature addressing the evolution of policy making practice in Bolivia during the past three years and shifts in civil society approaches to political participation during the same period;
4. Interviews with OGB personnel connected to the project, with key FJ staff and with external informants in a position to offer specific validation of evidence regarding program outcomes;
5. Focus groups with the FJ team and with a select group of external individuals knowledgeable about the work of FJ and the context in which it takes place.

Most of the document review took place in the early stages of the process, and nearly all of the interviews took place in person, in La Paz. Both focus groups took place in La Paz. The Jubileo technical team participated in both interviews and one focus group. Lists of the documents consulted as part of this process, interviews conducted by KMSC and focus group participants are included as appendices to this report.

2.2 Limitations

Given all of the circumstances surrounding this project, KMSC feels that the Process Tracing method worked quite well. We did, however, face a few limitations that deserve mention.

**Methodological Comfort Level:** For a participatory evaluation to work, all of the key stakeholders in an evaluation must understand and feel comfortable with the evaluation methodology being used. This was not the case when the current exercise began. The fact that the key documents were all in English and were highly technically in nature constrained understanding of the process both within Jubileo and within the Bolivia office of OGB. These limitations were eventually overcome, at least in part, but the necessity of time investment in clarifying the methodology had high opportunity costs, especially in the area of data collection.

**Clarity of Key Terms:** For purposes of evaluating advocacy interventions, one of the great strengths of Process Tracing is that it is an outcome-based methodology, rather than one that focuses primarily on activities undertaken and outputs delivered. Successful, outcome-based assessment, however, does have its preconditions. The first of these is clarity across all stakeholders on what is meant by an “outcome” and why the methodology focuses on outcomes. In addition, outcome-based evaluation works better when planning and monitoring (real-time information gathering) is also oriented toward the achievement of outcomes. None of these pre-conditions was present in this case. Since this is such a common evaluation challenge, evaluators have developed an assessment activity called “outcome harvesting” as a response. This exercise relied on elements of the harvesting approach, which worked quite well, but some problems are difficult to overcome. No matter how good the outcome harvest, harvesting evidence to support those outcomes is another matter. Evidence gathered during implementation with an eye toward outcome achievement is always superior to trying to recreate the evidence after the fact.

**Theory of Change:** In KMSC’s experience, theory of change (ToC) can be a very powerful tool in program development and assessment. It is difficult, however, to introduce theory of change at the assessment stage with an organization that has not been working with the concept. The apparent requirement to reconstruct Jubileo’s theory of change after the fact only added to the general state of confusion that accompanied the entry of this unfamiliar concept. After several conversations, the OGB representative and Jubileo put together what they saw as a theory of change. Since it was not clear that it would help to spend more time on that document, KMSC opted to accept that ToC document and move forward. KMSC suggests that a serious theory of change exercise with Jubileo could be very helpful to the
organization, and, under the right conditions, is something they would embrace as a learning opportunity.

3.0 Project Description

This section provides the project rationale, as presented by FJ and a summary of the activities carried out by the Foundation as part of this effort. The financial contributions to the project are also included. The final element of this section is a summary of the “theory of change” that guides Jubileo’s work. Theory of Change is not a concept used by Jubileo in its own description of IPPMP, so this theory is a creation of the evaluator, based on conversations with a variety of FJ staff and on a review of all program documents provided by OGB and FJ. As suggested elsewhere in this document, we believe that theory of change could be a useful concept for the Foundation, and one that is quite consistent with its overall strategic approach. However, it is difficult to introduce a notion like this one at the evaluation stage of any project or program.

3.1 Campaign Rationale

Fundación Jubileo presented a rationale for its proposal that rested on five critical factors:

1. FJ’s accumulated experience and network of relationships, including the experience of its leaders stretching back long before the formation of the organization;
2. An analysis of the context that concluded that not only would there be an opening for effective civil society advocacy in the coming years, but such advocacy would be critical to the effort to get Bolivia out of the cycle of social conflict and ingovernability that threatened, once again, to plunge the country into chaos;
3. A claim that the combination of the core competencies that the organization had consolidated since its founding and its unique positioning within Bolivian civil society made FJ the ideal organization to catalyze successful influence work among key civil actors;
4. FJ’s strong sense that the population’s lack of access to information was going to be a tremendous barrier to the exercise of democracy; and
5. The idea, shared by many social actors, that while popular mobilization had contributed to the democratic opening of Bolivian society, the continuing high level of social conflict in the country threatened further advances and called out for strategies to prevent and transform social conflict.

FJ proposed that, over the following three years, its interventions would focus along five distinct lines:

1. Creating knowledge and proposals, through the collection and analysis of information;
2. Building capacity and stimulating effective management/administration processes;
3. Contributing to the strengthening of the organizations, institutions and networks with which it interacted;
4. Creating and strengthening spaces of public dialogue involving social and political actors; and
5. Modeling efficient and transparent institutional management, while strengthening the
public image and positioning of Fundación Jubileo.

Finally, FJ proposed carrying out these interventions in five thematic areas:

1. Financing for Development (including management of Bolivia’s public debt);
2. Participatory Public Budgeting;
3. Poverty and Inequality;
4. Transparency and Social Auditing; and
5. International Trade and Economic Integration.

The proposal provided extensive examples of the sorts of activities that would be carried out over the three-year period and the desired results of those activities. Desired outcomes were not as clearly defined. Oxfam GB, based on its previous experience with FJ, found the proposal compelling, but because of its internal policies could not entertain a multi-year proposal. The Bolivia country office approved the project on a one-year basis and signalled its openness to consider follow-on grants. From the beginning, Jubileo saw itself implementing a three-year program with Oxfam GB, beginning in July 2008 and ending in June 2011. Oxfam GB approved additional funding for IPPMP in 2009 and 2010. In addition to Oxfam GB, Misereor, the international development and human rights arm of the German Catholic Church, provided financing for the project over the same period, thus establishing the three-year implementation period that is the subject of the current research. Section 3.4 below contains the details of OGB’s financial and non-financial contributions to the project.

3.2 Theory of Change

Fundación Jubileo’s work is based on an analysis of its context that clearly identifies the problem that the organization is designed to address. That analysis also includes an identification of the levers of change through which social actors can reasonably hope to make progress on that problem, the primary obstacles to change and the particular role of Jubileo in engaging those levers of change. The Foundation does not use the terminology, “theory of change,” to describe that analysis, but it is quite open—in its publications and in interviews—about its sense of its own unique contribution to the change it seeks in the world. What follows here is KMSC’s summation of FJ’s theory of change, taken from a variety of publications and interviews.
FJ sees many problems in the world, but has chosen to focus on the problem of persistent extreme poverty in Bolivia. While acknowledging that there are multiple valid approaches to the problem of poverty, FJ trains its attention on the role of government policy at all levels and on the public administration of the resources available to government. Like all other Bolivians, the poor have rights and getting those rights recognized and guaranteed by government will be an important aspect of addressing the problem of poverty. In addition to recognizing and advancing the rights of all Bolivians, to effectively fight poverty the government must prioritize the use of public resources to promote sustainable, equitable economic development and to design and implement effective social programs—especially health, education and housing—that reach the poor. Finally, for Jubileo, it is difficult to imagine a real shift in public policy toward seriously addressing poverty without a new approach to public service that prioritizes the effective and transparent administration of the funds available to government.

Given this understanding of the problem it seeks to address, Jubileo is clear about the social actors whose perspectives, behavior and policies must be changed if the desired social change is to be achieved. Not surprisingly, at the top of this list sit the public officials whose decisions are responsible for the legal and policy framework at all levels. Since public administration is also a concern, those public officials who administer public funds are also critical actors.

Jubileo is clear that there exist powerful obstacles to the change it seeks. It mentions many such obstacles in its publications and public presentations, but FJ keeps coming back to four
obstacles:

1) A small group of Bolivians benefit disproportionately from the system as it exists and will act very consciously to preserve those benefits;
2) A notion of public service that is more about private benefit and the projection of personal power than it is about meeting social needs;
3) A critical shortage of reliable information about the social reality of Bolivians that can serve as the basis of constructive proposals to transform that reality; and
4) A deeply-ingrained political culture in which social mobilization and social conflict are seen as the only viable way to achieve social objectives.

In Jubileo’s theory of change, this analysis leads to an understanding of which interventions by an organization like itself are likely to be most effective in generating the changes FJ wishes to bring about. These interventions, which figure prominently in all plans presented to OGB for IPPMP, include:

1. Research and analysis;
2. Advocacy and lobbying;
3. Capacity building;
4. Participation in national and international organizational networks; and
5. Creating spaces for dialogue.

With one addition, we treat these “lines of intervention” in more detail below, in our survey of the primary activities carried out by FJ during the period 2008-2011. That addition is “social communication, which FJ considers more as a support function than a strategic line of intervention, but the number of communication activities reported by the organization to OGB led us to categorize it as such.

3.3 Program Activities

Over the three-year period, 2008 – 2011, IPPMP sought to influence the procedures, processes and practices of governmental institutions at both national and municipal levels. It also worked to transform the nature of relations between civil society and the state, especially at the municipal level. To achieve such ambitious goals, FJ carried out a dizzying array of activities. In surveying FJ activities during the period under study, it was necessary to constantly keep in mind that Jubileo remained a small organization, with no more than seven permanent program staff. The design of IPPMP,
including its choice of primary lines of intervention rests on the assumption that by contributing to improved public policies and public administration in Bolivia, Jubileo would be contributing to efforts to address the continuing high levels of extreme poverty in the country.

Two key contextual factors very much influenced choices around which activities would be carried out, as well as the specific character of those activities.

1. The approval, in January 2009, of a new Political Constitution for Bolivia; and
2. National elections later that year that gave Evo Morales and his Authentic Socialist Movement a strong mandate to govern the country and a super-majority in the Bolivian legislature.

Of course, a program as complex as IPPMP can be expected to implement a wide range of activities over a three-year period. The narrative reports that FJ provided to Oxfam GB on a periodic basis detail the activities carried out during that period in each of the program’s thematic areas. For purposes of this evaluation, we see value in organizing activities under the Lines of Strategic Intervention as they evolved over the life of the program. In addition, we have not attempted here to capture every single activity carried out over the three years under study. Instead, we have presented a set of exemplary activities that define each Line of Strategic Intervention.

We have defined six principal Lines of Strategic Intervention under IPPMP. It is worth noting that these are slightly different than the lines defined by FJ in its strategic plan.

1. Research and analysis;
2. Advocacy and lobbying;
3. Capacity building;
4. Participation in national and international organizational networks;
5. Creating spaces for dialogue; and
6. Social communication.

We note that, in its reports to Oxfam GB, Fundación Jubileo makes consistent reference to Lines 1-5. While it reports at length on its communications work, it does not identify social communications as a Line of Strategic Intervention.

1. Research and analysis

This line of work includes data collection, primary research, review of secondary sources and the creation of myriad publications on themes of interest to the program. It is the line that has most prominently positioned Jubileo’s “brand” in the national environment. In each report of FJ, reference is made to at least a dozen documents that Jubileo either published or contributed to. The following list includes examples of what Jubileo identifies as its most significant publications of the period:

- Report, *Impacto de la Iniciativa HIPC en Bolivia*; (Impact of the HIPC Initiative in Bolivia)
2. Advocacy and Lobbying

IPPMP points to the urgent necessity and the emerging possibility to not solely analyse Bolivian reality and create knowledge through that analysis. For FJ, it is essential to use this knowledge to raise the awareness of political decision makers in Bolivia, and to influence the policies and practices that generate and are generated by those decisions. It is in this sense that Jubileo builds direct relationships with political actors in Bolivia. We include here some actions emblematic of the orientation of Jubileo’s advocacy program.

- Interviews, exchanges and presentations directed at managers of the Central Bank of Bolivia (CBB) in order to share analysis of the current state of internal and external debt in Bolivia;
- Coordination of the effort to encourage Parliamentarians from around the world to sign the Declaration of Cape Town pointing out that internal and external debt levels remain unsustainable for many countries;
- Negotiations, over a period of two years, to achieve, initially, a Parliamentary Resolution highlighting the necessity of an audit of external debt in Bolivia and, eventually, the creation of a Parliamentary Commission charged with facilitating just such an audit; and
- Active participation in the complex process to achieve approval by a Municipal Assembly of the Municipality of La Paz of a bill that would formalize social auditing of key government activities.
3. Capacity Building

Fundación Jubileo has been very clear in highlighting the absence of certain capacities, both in some government offices and in civil society organizations, themselves. These gaps in capacity present important obstacles to the achievement of FJ’s desired outcomes. As a result, IPPMP has included a medium- to long-term commitment to provide both training and technical assistance that support its overall goals. Among the capacity-building activities undertaken by FJ during the period under review were:

- Used the publication, “En qué gastarán el dinero las prefecturas en 2009?,” as the basis of a series of workshops with local officials concerning their budgetary responsibilities;
- Organized 20 training workshops for social organizations on the topics of debt and social auditing;
- Used the publication, “Distribución y destino del IDH y regalías,” as the source material for a series of training events for journalists regarding the use of the special levies against oil extraction in Bolivia;
- Organized a pilot project in the Municipality of El Alto in which “La cartilla de capacitación sobre presupuestos – Municipalidad El Alto” was used to train local community leaders in municipal budgeting procedures;
- Shared its perspective on social auditing through a series of meetings organized by the government’s Commission for the Elaboration of Proposed Autonomous By-Laws;
- Provided technical assistance to several municipalities in preparing procedures for sharing budget information with civil society organizations;
- Designed and carried out a series of workshops for local officials regarding operating procedures for Autonomous Municipalities; and
- Provided technical assistance to officials in charge of preparing proposed legislation regarding social auditing at the municipal and national levels.

4. Participation in networks of organizations with similar interests at the national and international levels.

Jubileo recognizes that the scale and complexity of the problems it seeks to address require that it adopt a collaborative and cooperative approach. In addition to providing important learning opportunities, collaborating with organizations working in other geographic contexts opens up the possibility of influencing international actors that are difficult to access as a Bolivian organization working alone. An important criterion for FJ’s participation in networks is that the Foundation’s presence can help strengthen the networks in which it is active. The networks in which FJ actively participates include:

- The social pastoral network of the Bolivian Catholic Church, as well as the Bolivian Bishops’ Conference, the Latin American Bishops’ Conference and the Network of Social Pastoral Observatories of the Southern Cone. FJ has deep roots in the Bolivian
Catholic Church and continues to play an important role in the development of social policy within the church structure;

- Latindadd, a network of Latin American NGOs and other civil society organizations addressing the continuing problem of external debt in the region. FJ has coordinated Latindadd’s Commission on Sustainable and Sovereign Finance and has led debt-related activities within Bolivia; and
- Transparency International (TI), a global network of organizations addressing issues related primarily to access to information and public transparency. FJ has led the process to form a Bolivian chapter of TI and coordinates closely with all TI activities in the region.

5. Facilitation of Social Dialogue

The reports and proposals of Fundación Jubileo constantly refer to the importance of “spaces of dialogue.” What is less clear is what FJ means by these spaces.

Generally, social dialogue refers to intentionally convened interactions among social actors, with a mutually agreed upon agenda of discussion. FJ presents a view of social dialogue that includes, but is not limited to this sort of interaction. The activities considered spaces of dialogue in FJ reports include:

- All meetings between FJ and government officials at all levels;
- Meetings designed to promote dialogue and information between civil society actors and government officials at all levels;
- Municipal dialogues designed to achieve “Pactos de Desarrollo (Development Agreements);”
- Meetings organized by Jubileo on the theme, “Jubilee at 10 Years,” which included people from a variety of perspectives and were organized to stimulate debate; and
- The seminar convened by Jubileo under the title, “Economic development, civil society and fraternity,” brought together a broad group of people to dialogue concerning the content of an important pastoral letter from Bolivian bishops.

6. Social Communication

As a line of intervention, social communication takes into account FJ’s use of all of the instruments that it employs to deliver its messages to its priority audiences. In its reports regarding IPPMP, FJ gives much space to articles of various sorts that it was able to place in local and international media. It does not, however, give in-depth treatment to the question of communications strategy. This is most likely because, like many organizations, FJ considers communication as a set of important support activities, rather than a program activity in its own right that requires strategic attention.

The communication activities of IPPMP include:

- Marketing and distribution of the program’s enormous quantity of print and electronic publications (including the website);
• The many meetings and public presentations in which Jubileo does in-person messaging in the name of the organization, both inside and outside of Bolivia;
• The outreach undertaken to place articles, editorials and other material in the national and international press; and
• All of the seminars and workshops in which participants receive thematic messages of Jubileo as part of the content of the event.

3.4 Resourcing

As suggested above, Oxfam GB’s support to Fundación Jubileo began in 2005. By the time OGB made its first grant to IPPMP, the agency had already provided $238,616 in grants to the Foundation. Jubileo presented IPPMP to a number of donors as a three-year program in early 2008. The German agency, Misereor funded the project, as did OGB. Misereor was able to offer a three-year grant, while OGB approved one-year appropriations in 2008, 2009 and 2010. As a condition of Misereor’s support, Jubileo had to provide the funds for a part of the program costs. This could not be calculated as an in-kind contribution as is often the case, but FJ had to raise unrestricted funds from another organization and have those funds on hand at the time of each Misereor disbursement. For the three-year term of IPPMP, support totals were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misereor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FINANCING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in the table, OGB provided 53% of the financing for this project between 2008 and 2011. The agency approved these funding levels on an annual basis and, due to internal financial considerations, the amount provided by OGB decreased in each succeeding year. Since Misereor had committed itself to provide a fixed percentage of the overall budget, the OGB decreases also resulted in proportional decreases in the funds provided by Misereor. According to FJ, these adjustments meant that the Foundation received about 10% less financing for the project than the amount called for in the original budget.

According to both FJ and OGB, Oxfam provided important, non-financial support to the project. Among the most important aspects of this support were:

1) FJ identified OGB as a strategic ally long before the approval of this project. As such, the two organizations were in a process of dialogue on common strategic goals. Specifically, this dialogue was of great assistance to FJ in the design of IPPMP;
2) Contacts made through Oxfam GB helped FJ greatly increase the scope of its regional and global networks, and facilitated the Foundation’s participation in a number of important networks; and
3) OGB’s own quiet advocacy work within country was very consistent with FJ’s own goals and certainly helped Jubileo gain visibility and support for its positions on key issues.

While the financing provided by OGB was certainly of critical importance, OGB’s support went beyond resourcing the project.

4.0 Results of the Impact Assessment

The primary objective of the current exercise is to assess the impact of the work undertaken by Fundación Jubileo between July 2008 and June 2011. The entire process hinges on the ability of FJ, in consultation with OGB and KMSC, to identify what it considers the most significant outcomes of its work over this three-year period. This requires not only that FJ prioritize from a long list of important achievements, but also that the Foundation expresses those key achievements as outcomes. Guidance provided by OGB clarified the emphasis of this process on outcomes, but did not offer a specific definition of what OGB means by an outcome. As a result, it took FJ, OGB and KMSC a period of time to arrive at a shared notion of “outcome” as distinct from an “activity,” an “output,” or any other of the many terms currently used in Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation circles. The fact that the work was taking place in Spanish only complicated the question further. In the end, for purposes of this study an “outcome” became:

“a measureable change in an indicator (social, economic, environmental, etc.) identified by a program as central to its strategic intent OR a demonstrable change in the policies, practices or relationships of a key social actor.”

Obviously, to be considered an outcome of a given program, the change must be traceable, at least in part, to the interventions of that program. In the planning stage of program, outcomes reflect the desired or projected impact of a program. In the assessment stage, stated outcomes become claims of programmatic impact. The use of the term, “outcome” in this report adheres to that definition. Since IPPMP had not identified changes in any particular indicators as being central to its strategic intent, our consideration of IPPMP outcomes became more focused on the second part of the above definition. This section defines the outcomes considered by FJ to be the most important outcomes of its work (Most Significant Outcomes) and subjects those claims of impact to analysis. The guidance provided by OGB referred to this as “Targeted Outcomes.” KMSC, OGB and FJ found this terminology confusing from the outset and opted to use a term that we believe highlights what distinguishes these from other outcomes identified by FJ.

4.1 Most Significant Outcomes

Prior to the field research stage of this project, KMSC asked FJ and OGB to meet to identify the key outcomes of its work over the period in study. This was complicated by the definitional issue identified above, but was also complicated by the fact that FJ considered many of its achievements in the last period to be significant. Jubileo and OGB agreed on a
list of 23 important outcomes of the work. That list is included—in Spanish—as Appendix III to this report.

KMSC then facilitated a conference call with FJ and OGB that focused on (1) the need to prioritize this list to a more manageable number (3-6); and (2) the need to agree on a conception of what we mean by an “outcome” and express the Most Significant Outcomes as outcomes, according to that definition. The three participants agreed on the above definition and then FJ and OGB took on the task of choosing Most Significant Outcomes and expressing them as outcomes. That process led to the following list of Most Significant Outcomes.

1. **Repositioning of the Central Bank of Bolivia:** Actions by FJ contribute to a change in the private and public positions of the Central Bank of Bolivia in regards to the notion of “sustainable debt” and “public accountability for external debt.”

2. **Integrated Information System of the Bolivian Catholic Church:** Advocacy and technical assistance provided by FJ help catalyze a decision by the Episcopal Conference of the Bolivian Church to develop an integrated internal information system that can serve as a critically-important alternative source of hard data on poverty and social conditions throughout Bolivia.

3. **Social Auditing in the Municipality of La Paz:** A broad cross-section of civil society in the Municipality of La Paz builds consensus behind a proposed municipal law on social auditing and secures the approval of the Municipal Assembly of La Paz.

4. **Civil Society Capacity Building and Municipal Dialogue in the Municipality of El Alto:** Training and technical assistance provided, in part, by FJ lead to increased knowledge among local leaders and transform the nature of relations between civil society and local officials.

In keeping with the Process Tracing methodology, once established, the analysis of these claims dominated the research agenda of this exercise. The research considered these claims from five angles:

1. **Evidence:** What sorts of evidence were available to KMSC regarding this outcome?
2. **Validation:** Does the available evidence support the claim that the outcome in question actually occurred?
3. **Significance:** To what extent does the available evidence suggest that this outcome was significant in the current context in Bolivia?
4. **Causal Explanation:** Does the available evidence support any particular causal explanation of why the outcome occurred?
5. **FJ Contribution:** What does the available evidence say about the importance of FJ’s contribution to this outcome?

Following a summary of our findings regarding each outcome, we address each of these questions in relation to each outcome.

Narrowing the set of Most Important Outcomes was important in terms of establishing the parameters of the research on a scale that was feasible. It meant, however, excluding important aspects of FJ’s work from the scrutiny received by these four. FJ’s work with the
Bolivian Legislative Assembly in the question of auditing Bolivia’s debt, the work with international networks such as Latindadd and, especially, FJ’s advocacy with the country’s Catholic Bishops to secure a commitment to a pastoral letter on climate change and its subsequent leadership of the process to draft the actual letter fall into this category. The latter strikes us a particularly significant outcome (the letter will be released in the coming weeks) that could easily have been included in this list of Most Significant Outcomes.

The question of “unintended outcomes” is an interesting one in relation to this research. The Process Tracing protocol pro-actively encourages a focus on capturing the untended outcomes of a process and incorporating that analysis into the assessment of the work. The planning process developed by FJ during the period under consideration focused more on projecting the outputs of its work and the activities that would make possible those project outputs. This is a perfectly reasonable planning process used by many organizations and evidently accepted by Oxfam GB as legitimate. It is not difficult to arrive at an inductive reconstruction of the Foundation’s intended outcomes based on its planned outputs and activities, but the Process Tracing focus on “Target” or, in this case, “Most Significant” outcomes renders that exercise somewhat moot. Fundación Jubileo certainly understands the significance of unintended outcomes, and it considered some of the items on its original list of program outcomes (Appendix III) to have been unintended. The Foundation, however, felt that all of the outcomes chosen as “Most Significant” were logical outcomes of outputs identified by it as priorities in the original program proposal to OGB and affirmed at various points during the three years under study. KMSC explored this in some detail with the entire FJ technical team and with individual program leaders and concluded that FJ’s original proposal shows clear intention to achieve outcomes like the ones analyzed here. As a result, we agree that, while there were certainly unintended outcomes of FJ’s work, our focus on Most Significant Outcomes has not led us to analyze, in-depth, any of these outcomes.

4.1.1 Repositioning of the Central Bank of Bolivia

Along with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Central Bank of Bolivia plays a leadership role in the development of macroeconomic policy in Bolivia. Jubileo claims that, over a period of years, it has helped influence the positioning of the CBB in at least two important areas: (1) Getting the bank to integrate into its perspective and public discourse on debt the concept of the sustainability of international debt; and (2) Contributing to a shift in which the CBB acknowledges a connection between macroeconomic policy and debt levels, thereby assuming a degree of institutional accountability for the sustainability of the national debt.

Evidence

In this case, the primary sources of evidence for the analysis included:

1. Reports by FJ to OGB;
2. Interviews with FJ team members, especially Patricia Miranda, staff coordinator of the area of Financing for Development;
3. Interviews with an Advisor to the President of the CBB and with an Assistant to that Advisor;
Validation

This was the most difficult of the Most Significant Outcomes to validate. On the one hand, the particular Bank officials with whom we spoke, while acknowledging the relationship with FJ (including formal dialogues that had taken place between the two institutions) and the importance of its work, did not agree with the view that FJ had, in any way, influenced institutional positioning on the issues in question. They acknowledged the concept of sustainability of the debt, but said that this was a long-held internal view and, furthermore, Bank officials insisted that current levels of debt are entirely sustainability. They also accepted the notion that, through its policy decisions and operational posture, the Bank can influence debt levels, but saw no role for FJ in this public posture.

It is typical, in our experience, for technical-level representatives of powerful institutions to resist claims of influence by any external entity, especially NGOs. This is especially true of central banks, which are, by design, supposedly independent and free of external influence. In the face of this posture, FJ produced additional documentation in support of the significance of the FJ-CBB relationship and the claim of a shift in position as a result of that relationship. The documents affirm the notion of a relationship of significance between FJ and, at least, the President of the CBB, and a shift in Bank positioning on the issues in question. It is, however, extremely difficult to prove a connection between those two things without some direct affirmation of that connection by a Bank representative.

The available evidence supports the notion that FJ has cultivated an important relationship with the CBB. It further supports the claim that this relationship included dialogue on the sustainability of the national debt of Bolivia and the Bank’s ability to influence both the character and the dimensions of that debt. The data allows the logical conclusion that this dialogue influenced subtle, but clear, shifts in the Bank’s public posture on these issues, but we find no declarations by any Bank official that affirms this connection. Again, this is a typical issue in confirming this sort of influence activity. Given the weight of the preponderance of the evidence, we feel comfortable recognizing FJ’s claim of an important contribution of its work, in this case.

Significance

The significance of shifts in Bank policy regarding external debt is beyond question. The CBB is an extremely influential organization in economic policy-making and its President is close to both President Morales and Vice-President García Linares.

Causal Explanation

The evidence provides the best support for an explanation of this outcome that emphasizes the importance of the relationship developed by FJ with certain key Central Bank of Bolivia officials. Research and analysis produced by FJ provided the basis for this relationship, as did
the position of credibility and objectivity on this issue achieved by the Foundation. Because of FJ’s credibility on debt-related issues, the Bank had some incentive to respond to FJ’s overtures. After the Bank decided to engage, however, it was the ability of FJ staff to enter into meaningful and respectful dialogue with Bank officials that determined whatever change occurred. Other factors could also have supported a shift in the Bank posture on issues of debt sustainability and public responsibility for the debt. The Bank’s own analysis of the data available to it could have contributed to such a change. Similarly, the relatively open perspective of the current President of the Bank probably contributed to the shift, as did the input of other NGOs with similar perspectives to that of FJ. It is very difficult to sort out this sort of causality, especially when our primary informants from the Bank question the significance of any shift. While not definitive, careful analysis of the documentary evidence provided by FJ—especially the language of some of the declarations by senior Bank officials, including the President—supports the notion that the Foundation’s inputs to the Bank did have an impact.

This was the primary causal explanation for the outcome under consideration. The primary alternative explanation was that of those Bank officials who did not recognize the claim of influence offered by FJ.

**Fundación Jubileo Contribution**

We see evidence of numerous other factors pushing the Central Bank of Bolivia in the direction in which the work of Jubileo was influencing the institution. There were certainly other institutions that shared the general macroeconomic critique advanced by FJ, but none of those seem to have developed the relationship of potential influence developed by FJ. This suggests a high degree of contribution by Jubileo to whatever changes in Bank positioning took place.

### 4.1.2 Integrated Information System of the Bolivian Catholic Church

While many of the most meaningful influence activities of civil society organizations result in influence over state institutions, efforts to influence the positioning and the actions of other civil society institutions is often extremely significant. This claimed outcome of the work of Fundación Jubileo is an example of such advocacy work within civil society.

Despite gains made by a range of Protestant evangelical churches, the Catholic Church continues to hold a dominant position among religions in Latin America. In many places, the church has turned this broad and direct relationship with the population
into a role of great significance in the provision of essential services. Especially in remote locations, the church often is the primary provider of services to the population.

This is especially the case in Bolivia, where statistically reliable estimates suggest that the Catholic Church educates upwards of 25% of primary and secondary students and probably provides a higher percentage of existing services to orphaned and abandoned children at the national level.

According to church sources interviewed for this report, the church does this in a highly decentralized, if not disorganized, manner. There is no central administration of church programs and, even at the parish and diocesan levels, little information exists concerning the extent and impact of church social programs.

Fundación Jubileo has deep roots in the world of the social programs of the Bolivian Catholic Church. This is apparent from the history of key figures within the foundation and is supported by the testimonies of a wide range of people consulted for this report. One receives, however, the clearest confirmation of this relationship by accompanying FJ Executive Director, Juan Carlos Nuñez on a visit to the offices of the Catholic Archdiocese of La Paz. During our first five minutes there, three different people asked Juan Carlos who they should contact about one problem or another. Then, as Juan Carlos and the author sat in the waiting room outside the Archbishop’s, a group of priests emerged from the prelate’s office. Upon seeing who was waiting, one of the priests pointed an accusing finger at Juan Carlos, saying “It’s your fault” with feigned disgust. He then crossed the room, embraced Juan Carlos and said, with obvious affection, “You’re the “important meeting” that makes the Archbishop end an important discussion of our finances. You’re the reason I have to come back on Monday.” Juan Carlos greeted the Archbishop and then immediately headed back to his office. The Archbishop spent 75 minutes with the author representative, recounting the history and significance of a project that is obviously very close to the Archbishop’s heart. No amount of documentation could supplant this experience as an indicator of the relationship between the FJ and the Catholic Church, as personified in the relationship between FJ’s Executive Director and the Archbishop of La Paz.

As elsewhere, in Bolivia information is power. One of the great strengths of FJ is that it has access to official sources of information within the Bolivian government. One of the great weaknesses of FJ is that it must rely of the very questionable and unreliable sources of information within the Bolivian government. In one of our focus group interactions in La Paz, a professor of communications and journalism at Bolivia’s national university said, “To have information has become another source of privilege in Bolivia.” For him, the ability to provide information is one of the great contributions of FJ.

For years, FJ has been aware of the potential goldmine of information existing in the network of social services provided by the Bolivian Catholic Church. In many areas of the country, the church is in closer contact than the government with entire sectors of the population. Statistics on who the church is attending and the kind of attention these people require would be aggregated into a national database that could complement government data to provide a much more complete profile of poverty in Bolivia. The Foundation has dreamed of securing the support of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference (CBC) for an effort to
support church workers in developing this information. FJ claims to have contributed to a recent decision by the CBC to develop an integrated information system—a kind of national database of church social programs—that will greatly improve the church’s ability to provide services, while also serving as a critical alternative source of information for Fundación Jubileo and Bolivian society, in general.

Evidence

In this case, the primary sources of evidence for the analysis included:

1. Reports by FJ to OGB;
2. Interviews with FJ team members, especially Executive Director, Juan Carlos Nuñez and Communications Coordinator, Wilson Gisbert and Jaime Pérez, coordinator of FJ work in the area of Integrated Human Development;
3. Focus group input from Bolivian actors outside of FJ; and
4. Interviews with the Catholic Archbishop of La Paz, the Director of the CBC and the Head of the Social Communications Unit of the CBC.

Validation

The claim here is that FJ has contributed to a process that has led to a decision by the CBC to establish an integrated information system, as well as a decision by Misereor, a funding arm of the German Catholic Church, to provide financial support to the effort. The evidence fully validates each element of this claim of an intermediate outcome of the work of FJ.

Significance

The significance of this outcome lies in both the social reach of the Catholic Church and the scarcity of reliable information about social conditions at the local level in Bolivia. On both counts, a variety of sources concur on the significance of this intermediate outcome. The countervailing factors concern the fact that this remains an incipient process in an institution that is not known for its ability to establish centralized systems with high technical requirements. Even people who are extremely excited about this process remain cautious about its prospects for success.

Causal Explanation

The complexity of the Bolivian Catholic Church as an institution is reflected in the causal explanation of this intermediate outcome. At both the parish and diocesan level, church leaders have strong reasons to better understand the nature of the church’s social programs in their jurisdiction. As tensions with the government have grown, it has become even more important to be able to project the real social impact of church practice. This interest coincides with the aforementioned pressing national need for reliable information on social conditions at the local level. Jubileo is one institution that could see the potential mutual benefits of a national information system to both the church and society, as a whole. It came to the table with the church relationships to make possible dialogue on a possible system, and the technical capacity to help the Conference of Bishops to see how such a
system might be able to work. To enhance its own technical inputs, FJ formed a strategic alliance with Sumaj, a national consulting firm with broad experience in the areas of polling and data analysis. Over a period of time, FJ parlayed this combination of factors into an argument that convinced the Bishops’ Conference that the project was both feasible and necessary. Once the Bishops’ Conference supported the idea, interesting The German Catholic funding agency, Misereor, in providing financial support for the first stage of work on the information system was a relatively easy matter.

**Fundación Jubileo Contribution**

For a variety of reasons, different actors have seen the need for the church to have better information about social conditions and its own social programs existing throughout Bolivia at the local level. By all accounts, however, it was FJ who came up with the ambitious idea for an integrated information system that could serve the needs of the church and make an important contribution to national policy on social issues. Even beginning to turn the project into reality required convincing a range of both supportive and sceptical church actors (especially the Bishops’ Conference) of the project’s viability and potential benefits. This is one place where FJ’s unique positioning with Bolivia society allowed the Foundation to play a critical catalytic role. FJ has made an important contribution to get this project to this point, but the most challenging stages of this project are still before it.

4.1.3 Civil Society-Local Government Dialogue in the Municipality of El Alto

After twenty-five years of explosive growth, the city of El Alto is now the most populous urban center in Bolivia. In addition to suffering from the social problems that come with rapid, unplanned growth, El Alto has the reputation of being an extremely militant area, with active social organizations that believe they have the power to bring down the national government. On two occasions in the early 2000s, popular mobilizations initiated in El Alto (which borders La Paz) contributed to the premature departure of national governments. Evo Morales enjoys strong support in El Alto, but the pace and militancy of protests by residents in El Alto is, once again, on the rise.

Local politics in El Alto have also been characterized by high levels of conflict. Rather than improve local government, many observers believe that the degree of social conflict in the municipality has become a serious obstacle to efforts to address the social problems (crime, poverty, poor delivery of basic services) that threaten to spiral out of control.
In the mid-2000s, the Catholic Diocese of El Alto launched The Training Center for Citizen Participation (FOCAPACI) with a mission to provide citizens with the training and information necessary for them to relate to local government in a different, possibly more productive, manner. According to one FOCAPACI leader, the norm in El Alto when a citizens’ group had a complaint with local government was for the group to “kick down the door” to get its demands met. FOCAPACI seeks to stimulate a different approach from both local government and citizens’ groups.

In 2010, FOCAPACI approached Jubileo and proposed a collaboration to change the nature of the interaction between local government and social organization in El Alto. While it has no pretentions of being a group that can intervene intensively at the municipal level, FJ responded out of a sense that collaboration with FOCAPACI could produce an outcome with important, national-level effect in El Alto. In addition, FJ saw the possibility that a successful outcome in El Alto—arguably the most difficult municipality in which to transform municipal conflict—could be adapted for replication elsewhere in the country. FJ suggests that this two-year-old collaboration—which has focused on providing local groups with the information and advocacy training they need to interact with local officials in less conflictive and more effective ways—has contributed to demonstrably different relationships between local government and civil society organizations. Moreover, these altered relationships are already producing more efficient and participatory budget processes and a distribution of public resources that increases benefits to local communities.
Evidence

In this case, the primary sources of evidence for the analysis included:

1. Reports by FJ to OGB;
2. Interviews with FJ team members, especially Herbert Irahola and René Martínez;
3. Focus group input from FJ staff focus group; and
4. Interviews with the President and Vice-President of the Local School Committees of District 8 in El Alto and the Executive Director and Coordinator of FOCAPACI.

Validation

There is little doubt that FJ has joined FOCAPACI in intensive capacity-building work with both juntas escolares (local school committees), the parent groups that see to the quality of public education in El Alto, and the juntas vecinales (neighbourhood committees) that advocate for the delivery of public services at the community level. All informants confirm the notion that people have much more information about how the budgets work and how much money is available for certain activities in their districts. What is more difficult to define is the degree to which that additional understanding has led to more productive dialogue between civil society and local government officials, and, therefore, a transformation of the conflictive relations that have characterized local politics for an extended period. FJ’s claims are supported by both FOCAPACI and the local leaders with whom we spoke, but there is very little documentary support for these sorts of changes. One very specific outcome of the process has been a reversal of the long-established tendency of local officials to inflate local budget projections, only to then face the public embarrassment and criticism because of low levels of budget performance against those inflated projections. Ending, or at least limiting this practice has led to improved local administration in these districts and better relations between these officials and their constituencies. We conclude that Jubileo and FOCAPACI have engaged in some important work with local organizations to build their capacity to interact productively with local government. We believe that this process has begun to yield specific results in terms of the transformation of a situation of high conflict at the local level, but that this change will be a long-term process that has only just begun.

Significance

El Alto is not just another of Bolivia’s 311 municipalities. It is the largest city in the country, and the social organizations of this city play a key role in both local and national politics. A successful effort to transform conflict between civil society and local government there could have huge implications, especially if the method could be replicated elsewhere. On the other hand, the change desired by FOCAPACI and FJ is a long-term one that has only just begun to take hold. It is important not to overemphasize the importance of what has happened to date.
Causal Explanation

The level of social conflict in El Alto concerned the Catholic Church to the point that it brought FOCAPACI into existence in an attempt to transform that reality. FOCAPACI then worked at the district level for a few years, building connections and developing an understanding of the situation. During that time, it made contact with many people in El Alto who shared FOCAPACI’s interest in changing the character of the relationship between local government and civil society. FOCAPACI sensed that its work was having a positive effect, but that something was missing. Even if community groups were open to a different way of relating to the municipality, the lack of certain kinds of budgetary and other information made it difficult for them to enter into serious, informed dialogue with local government. FOCAPACI sought a collaboration with Jubileo—an organization they knew well through church connections as a means of bringing that specialized budget information and other training inputs to the table.

All three key actors consulted for this study—FOCAPACI, Jubileo and the local school committees—agree that FJ’s participation added critical value to a situation ready for change, and that, in the wake of FJ’s entry into the process, important changes began to take place. We note that we were not able to access the other key actor—local government—for our research. We believe that a good faith effort was made to arrange interviews in City Hall, but our visit to La Paz happened to coincide with the week-long celebration of the anniversary of the municipality and local officials were busy with the festivities.

One obvious causal explanation is that FJ’s added value allowed community groups who were ready to interact differently to do so. Other possible explanations would involve added value from another actor or a material change in the environment. A change of leadership in local government, for example, might have led to a change in approach to engaging with citizens’ groups that led to a different relationship on the ground in El Alto. There was, however, no change in local political leadership during this period, and although the school committees acknowledged that some local officials had shown signs of being willing to engage differently, they didn’t see this as a major factor in moving the process forward. None of these alternative explanations can be ruled out, but the fact that FJ pointed to the importance of its contribution and then FOCAPACI and the school committees offered nuanced versions of the same explanation was compelling to us. Again, it would have been helpful to have heard what local officials would say about this claim.

Fundación Jubileo Contribution

Collaboration with FOCAPACI has been the primary way in which Jubileo has intervened. FJ’s strong pedagogical sense along with its ability to provide people of different backgrounds with access to the internal workings of the system of public expenditure in Bolivia have proven to be a strong complement to FOCAPACI’s deep connections with communities in El Alto and expertise in the area of conflict prevention and transformation. While the two organizations definitely bring different competencies to the work in El Alto, their impact has definitely been a shared impact. Isolating and attributing the contribution of either organization presents a difficult challenge. Through this collaboration, FJ has made an
important contribution to efforts to change the nature of the relationship between local government and social organizations in El Alto. Other evidenced explanations include the interest on the part of the *juntas* to change their forms of interaction with the local government. The interview with the local school committees did suggest such an interest, but it is difficult to see how this interest would have expressed itself in the absence of the context created by FJ and FOCAPACI.

### 4.1.4 Municipal Law on Social Monitoring in La Paz

La Paz is Bolivia’s capital and, until recently, its largest city. It concentrates the country’s considerable political energies and an unusual proportion of the city’s one million residents hold politics very close to the center of their identity. In 2005, a reform-minded independent political movement challenged the traditional parties for control of the municipal government of La Paz. They ran on a promise to end the politics of corruption and patronage and to turn La Paz into a modern metropolis. That movement won the election, and has maintained control of city politics to the present time, despite the repeated challenges of candidates from the President’s political party. Corruption has not disappeared and criticizing the mayor and his administration remains a popular activity in La Paz, but the current leadership has obviously succeeded in building and enduring base of support.

The idea that there should be a formal process for civil society monitoring of government was a core principle of the people who formed Jubileo. Not a panacea, such monitoring was seen as a primary strategy to increase government transparency and the effectiveness of public administration. The rise of Evo Morales did not eliminate FJ’s sense of the importance of this sort of oversight, and the Constitution approved in 2009 enshrines a commitment to formal civil society monitoring of government at all levels. It is, however, one thing to embrace this watchdog role in principle and it is quite another to create laws that provide guidance for putting this principle into practice.

In 2010, Fundación learned of a plan to develop a municipal law establishing a formal commitment to Social Monitoring in the Municipality of La Paz. The idea was to develop a proposed law—*un anteproyecto de ley*—for consideration by La Paz’s Municipal assembly, a gathering of representatives of a broad sample of the innumerable social organizations in the municipality. At about the same time, FJ received inquiries regarding the process from two sources: the Municipality, itself, asked FJ to consider helping to facilitate the process of creating the proposal, and the civil society Steering Committee created to push forward the process also asked for technical assistance to its efforts.

In the same way that FJ saw symbolic importance in an effort to transform community-level conflict in EL Alto, it realized the potential significance of a first municipal law on social monitoring in La Paz. If consensus could be reached on the nature of such a law in the politically complex landscape of the capital, it might be possible to replicate the experience elsewhere. A successful effort to create a municipal law in La Paz might also provide some momentum behind the effort to create such a law at the national level.
On April 11, the 3rd Municipality of La Paz approved by acclamation the Anteproyecto de Ley Municipal de Control Social, (Draft Municipal Law on Social Monitoring) for the Municipality of La Paz. In order for this important piece of draft legislation to come about, a whole series of civil society actors—some of them quite unaccustomed to working together—had to build consensus around a sensitive and complex theme. In addition, the municipal government had to support—without meddling in—a process that could eventually cause it to be challenged by whatever monitoring mechanism comes into existence. For FJ, the combination of the importance of its support for this process and the significance of achieving success in this first effort to create social monitoring legislation in Bolivia make this outcome one of FJ’s Most Significant Outcomes of the period 2008-2011.

Evidence

In this case, the primary sources of evidence for the analysis included:

1. Reports by FJ to OGB and other documentation provided by FJ;
2. Interviews with FJ team members, especially Herbert Irahola, the Coordinator of FJ’s Social Monitoring department and Executive Director, Juan Carlos Nuñez;
3. Focus group input from FJ staff focus group and a group of women activists who were deeply involved in the process of creating the draft law; and
4. Interviews with the President of the civil society Steering Committee for the law and the municipal official responsible for supporting this process from the mayor’s office;
5. The proceedings of the 3rd Municipal Assembly of La Paz, provided by the Governability Unit of the Municipality of La Paz.

Validation

That an important outcome occurred in this case is without doubt. The proceedings of the 3rd Municipal Assembly confirm the approval of a draft law on social monitoring. This effectively substantiates FJ’s claim regarding this outcome.

Significance

Among the informants consulted for this report, there is little debate concerning the significance of this outcome. That the first draft law on social monitoring in Bolivia could be widely debated in society and passed by a broad municipal assembly of the residents of La Paz is understood as significant by people from a variety of perspectives. It is evidently a source of pride for many residents of La Paz. As suggested above, the approval is likely to spark similar discussions in other locations, and it also likely to speed up the discussion of a national law to provide a framework for such local debates. The approval of this law by the Municipal Assembly makes its approval by the City Council likely. In preparation for that approval, the committee that presented the bill to the Assembly is working on regulations to enable its implementation. Given that all actors consulted for this report felt certain that the draft would become municipal law, this intermediate outcome is certainly of significance for the people of La Paz and, potentially, for all Bolivians.
Causal Explanation

This outcome is the product of a particularly complex confluence of circumstances. Our sources differed on the relative importance of the various factors, but were in general agreement on this set of factors.

Constitutional Legitimacy: That the Constitution highlights the importance of the notion of social monitoring by civil society certainly boosted this effort in La Paz. The inclusion of this concept in the constitution was the result of a long historical process of advancing notions of civic participation, and FJ certainly had a role in that back story.

Openness of the Municipal Government: The civil society leadership of the process did everything it could to keep the city government outside of this process. That said, the openness of the government to some version of social monitoring was critical. There was general consensus that opposition to this initiative from the municipal government would have made the process much more difficult.

Technical Assistance from Jubileo: Support from Jubileo included not only ongoing tactical support to the Steering Committee in deciding how to move the process forward, but much more technically sophisticated help in defining the nature and the legal limits of social monitoring and the ways in which a law should express those limits. Perhaps most importantly, Jubileo helped design the consultation process through which versions of the draft law were consulted with the dense network of social organizations in La Paz.

All participants interviewed for this study cited the importance of the Jubileo. The President of the Steering Committee was more direct. “Without the support of Fundación Jubileo, we could not have succeeded in this effort.” He also added another element of the help provided by Jubileo...the human factor. For him, the ability of the Jubileo staff to manage relationships with all kinds of people was a critical part of what the Foundation brought to the table.

The Big Tent: From the beginning the process was designed to be as broad and inclusive as possible. The group of women we spoke with felt that this element of the design at least opened the door for their participation. They had to push the door open and make their presence known, but the inclusive nature of the process created a debate among a broad group of participants, rather than a conflict between constituencies inside of the process and those who had been excluded.

Leadership: The private sector often steers clear of processes like this one. The fact that the La Paz chapter of the Bolivian Federación de Empresarios (Business Federation) decided to play an active role in this process highlights its importance. The Steering Committee elected the private sector representative as its President. According to some participants, there were some rocky moments in the beginning as some civil society representatives chafed at some elements of the approach of their president. In the end, however, even the sceptics acknowledged that the organizational skills and the focus on results brought by the Federation representative made an important contribution to the success of the effort.
The fact that so many disparate elements had to be aligned for this process to succeed in La Paz left us wondering whether or not it would be replicable in another city or rural municipality of Bolivia. While acknowledging La Paz’s uniqueness, participants in this process insisted that it could be replicated in some form in other parts of the country. An FJ staffer made the argument that it might even be easier if this process could stimulate the national legislature to move forward with a framework law. We see the validity of this argument, but also see the difficulties in a La Paz-based organization supporting such a process in Potosi or even Santa Cruz.

**Fundación Jubileo Contribution**

The previous sections related to the discussion of this outcome establish the importance of the Jubileo. This was the outcome for which there were probably the largest number of indispensable causal factors, but it is also the one in which a key actor said very frankly that the outcome would not have been possible without Jubileo’s contribution. The interviews and other information provide ample evidence of FJ’s ongoing efforts in relation to this project, and of the powerful effects of these inputs on the draft law that stands as its very concrete result.
5.0 **Recommendations**

- Much has changed in Bolivia since Fundación Jubileo last took the time for a deep internal strategic reflection in 2008. The Fundation should consider another strategic planning moment driven by the same desire to create a “living” plan to guide adaptive work over the next period.
- In today’s Bolivia, FJ’s capacity to effectively translate its analysis into messages destined for particular audiences, and to efficiently deliver those messages, is almost as important as its ability to develop the evidence-based analysis, itself. As part of a strategic review, Jubileo should examine the contribution of its social communication strategies to its overall mission, and adjust and reinforce them, as appropriate.
- Jubileo’s work on extractive industries is among its most important thematic interventions. Any re-formulation of IPPMP should include that work as an integral element of the program.
- The success of Fundación has many diverse sources, but depends heavily on the contributions of two exceptional people and the special relationship between them. While continuing to take advantage of these rare gifts, Jubileo must begin to plan for the time when it can no longer rely on both its current Executive Director, and the long-time head of its governing Board.
- The strategic partnership with Jubileo serves well Oxfam GB’s interest in supporting civil society participation in and contribution to the current change process underway in Bolivia. Provided that such support remains a priority for the agency’s work in Bolivia, continued deepening of this strategic relationship will make a positive contribution to OGB’s mission effectiveness.
- Oxfam GBs focus on defining the impact of its support for Citizen Voice Initiatives is well-placed. That necessary effort must distinguish between Oxfam GB’s internal assessment of the effectiveness of its own interventions and the assessment by Citizen Voice partners (such as Fundación Jubileo) of the impact of their efforts to influence policy and practice in their own contexts. Once distinguished, these two important assessment functions can be placed in right relationship to each other, and both given necessary support by Oxfam GB.
6.0 Conclusion

The Process Tracing Methodology used in this study challenges us to look into the processes behind what FJ has identified as the Most Significant Outcomes of its advocacy interventions as a way of determining the importance of Jubileo’s contributions to those outcomes. The method likewise requires the placement of these outcomes in their social context as a means of gauging their social significance to society, as a whole. The next section on “Contribution Scores” seeks a quantitative expression of these factors as a means of weighing the overall impact of the work. Before plunging into that world of numbers, we attempt here to draw a few tentative qualitative conclusions based on the data collected for this review.

From its work during the period 2008-2011, Jubileo has highlighted four outcomes that it considers most important. Two of these—the outcomes from work in the municipalities of La Paz and El Alto—clearly concern building the capacity of other actors to work in ways that improve policy outcomes. Interestingly, in both cases, FJ was focused on more productive relationships between local civil society and municipal actors. In El Alto and La Paz, FJ has chosen to intervene in strategic and highly visible municipalities to show that civil society can come together around proposals informed by popular interest, information and evidence, and that those proposals can be negotiated with local authorities in ways that promote positive outcomes that benefit the residents of the area. In many places, such an intervention might not draw a lot of attention, but in a place like El Alto, where local organizations have shown great capacity to mobilize in protest, but less ability to build consensus around positive proposals, such interventions take on new meaning. The idea was not to create the basis for a march by FJ and its allies through all of Bolivia’s municipalities to lead similar processes. Instead, FJ sought a way to engage with the local reality of life in Bolivia while achieving important partial successes that might be taken up by themselves or others in other places. In this sense these projects take on a significance that might not be recognized in a single, local intervention. In both cases, FJ’s contribution is clear, but more as a catalyst than as a sole or even primary contributor.

The outcome related to the positioning of the Central Bank of Bolivia has FJ working in the more traditional role of advocate seeking to directly influence the position of a key institution. As is so often the case, the evidence for this outcome is less clear because the institution being influenced denies the effect of the intervention. The case clearly demonstrates the ability of FJ to devise a conscious strategy of influence and use its own recommendations regarding open dialogue to advance that strategy. We conclude that Jubileo has had some influence on the positioning of the Bank on important issues, and that any change in the public perspective of an institution like the Central Bank is of great importance.
The final outcome proposed by FJ as most significant concerns the decision of the Catholic Church to create an integrated information system that could both help the church better understand and promote its own social impact, while offering a rich, alternative source of information regarding social conditions at the local level to an information-starved society. Here, again, Jubileo claims to leverage its intimate relationships within the church into influence over the information policies of a critically important civil society institution. This is not a traditional advocacy outcome, but because of the important role of information and evidence in Jubileo’s vision of advocacy, the development of this potential treasure trove of information holds out the promise of a quantum leap in the ability of FJ and other civil society organizations to advocate on a whole range of issues. It, therefore, has tremendous potential as an outcome, but the significance of the outcome is tempered by the fact that the process is still at a very early stage. Once again, we find Jubileo using relationships and technical capacity to leverage a series of factors needed to create the conditions for a long-term outcome. We find that the available evidence validates this intermediate outcome, and that FJ has made an important contribution to it.

IPPMP takes place at a unique moment in Bolivia. While moments of political effervescence and democratic opening have given rise to hopes of broad social transformation in the past, it is difficult to point to the process of change initiated by the ascendancy of Evo Morales. As a President that the country’s largest indigenous group identifies as its own, Morales arrived in office with the social base necessary to carry out his ambitious agenda of change. While broadly supportive of that change agenda, Fundación Jubileo is among those civil society organizations who hope that Morales’s broad public support will give him and his party the confidence to consult its change process with the population, rather than force its approval, simply because it has the power to do so.

Jubileo applauds the progress that has been made in alleviating extreme poverty in Bolivia, but fears that this progress may rest on the latest of Bolivia’s recurrent, resource extraction-based booms and that a sobering bust may await the country. For FJ, only improved management of the country’s economic resources, combined with policies designed to put the country on a sustainable growth path can improve the situation of Bolivia’s poor majority, in the long run.

IPPMP gathers into a single program almost all of Jubileo’s efforts in this direction. The decision to focus on public policy and public administration rests on a theory of change that suggests that improvements in these areas are absolute preconditions to any success in the effort to address the country’s problems of poverty and social inequality. That theory of change also suggests that, contrary to many perceptions of Bolivia, well-designed, carefully-implemented political influence strategies can result in improved public policy and administration outcomes.

Jubileo chooses with care the position from which it launches these strategies. As one informant put it, “Jubileo es de la iglesia, pero no es de la iglesia. Jubileo es muy político, pero no es político.” (Jubilee is of the church, but not of the church. Jubilee is very political, but not political). This apparently absurd statement, suggests that Jubileo has deep roots.
and close relationships with the Catholic Church, one of the most important institutions in Bolivian political culture and social reality. It is, however, autonomous from the church in important ways. Similarly, Jubileo is absolutely a product of Bolivian political culture and has within it people who have deep knowledge of Bolivian politics and its many idiosyncrasies. It is not, however, under the direct influence or control of any particular political party, especially the Authentic Socialist Movement of Evo Morales.

This unique positioning opens to FJ an extremely fine line of action that must be navigated with great care. To the extent that the leadership of FJ can move the organization along that fine line, it can be a highly credible source of information on Bolivian reality, able to parlay that privileged position as a producer of knowledge into influence strategies that can shift important policy debates. Jubileo’s strategies include a combination of direct influence strategies and indirect strategies that seek to empower other the actors with the information and strategies necessary to become more effective advocates, themselves. Our analysis of what Jubileo has suggested are its Most Significant Outcomes reflects both the degree of success achieved by Jubileo, as well as the considerable obstacles that stand between Jubileo and the change it seeks.

It seems important to note that the sort of evidence-based advocacy work that Fundación Jubileo has placed at the center of its mission is still quite counter-cultural in Bolivia. The country is an extreme example of one in which family members and close confidants might have tried to influence the President to change policy by peaceful means, but regime change, through military coups and violent social mobilization has been a much more common means of achieving policy change. In its 203 years of independence, Bolivia has been the site of over 150 military coups. Militant social mobilization has also led to the premature departure of several governments, including two governments in the last decade. In the recent period, many Bolivian NGOs have adopted advocacy agendas, but relatively few have done it with the consistency and technical competency of Jubileo. Perhaps that’s why one informant with close knowledge of Jubileo and OGB’s work in Bolivia summarized his view of FJ by saying, ‘lots of organizations claim to have influence with the government, but Jubileo actually has it.’ Our research does not allow us to speculate on the influence of other organizations, but our findings echo the assessment that, by leveraging its relationships, positioning and knowledge creation capacity, Fundación Jubileo has achieved a measure of influence in a political context that does not encourage it.
## 7.0 Contribution Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted Outcome</th>
<th>Extent observed (high, medium, low, none)</th>
<th>Extent of project contribution (high, medium, low, none)</th>
<th>Specific contribution score*</th>
<th>Other evidenced explanations and extent of their contribution (high, medium, low)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duty-bearer Practice Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Central Bank of Bolivia | Medium | High | 4 | • Other NGO inputs (low)  
• Bank’s own analysis (medium) |
| **Other Final and Intermediate Outcomes** | | | | |
| Catholic Church of Bolivia | High | High | 5 | • Parish and Diocesan interests (medium)  
• Interest of Bishops’ Conference (medium)  
• Interest and technical inputs of Sumaj (low) |
| Civil Society/Municipality of El Alto | Low | High | 3 | • Inputs of FOCAPACI (High)  
• Desire of community for change in form of negotiation (low)  
• Openness of local gov’t (low) |
| Civil Society/Municipality of La Paz | High | High | 5 | • Constitutional Legitimacy (Medium)  
• Openness of Municipality (High)  
• Broad civil society participation (Medium)  
• Facilitative Leadership of Steering Committee (Low) |

### *Scoring Key – Specific Contribution of Project*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Outcome Consideration</th>
<th>Contribution Consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 points</td>
<td>High level of outcome change realised</td>
<td>High project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 points</td>
<td>Medium level of outcome change realised</td>
<td>High project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High level of outcome change realised</td>
<td>Medium project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 points</td>
<td>Medium level of outcome change realised</td>
<td>Medium project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low level of outcome change realised</td>
<td>High project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 points</td>
<td>High-medium outcome change realised</td>
<td>Low project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low level of outcome change realised</td>
<td>Medium project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 point</td>
<td>Medium-low outcome change realised</td>
<td>Low project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 points</td>
<td>High-none outcome change realised</td>
<td>No project contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any negative unforeseen outcome change</td>
<td>High to low project contribution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Documentation Reviewed for the Impact Assessment

Latindadd, et. al., “Propuesta para una Mesa Redonda en el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo sobre la cancelación de deudas con el BID,” (undated).
MANA, “Sistema de información de la iglesia católica en Bolivia,” (undated).
Appendix II: List of Key Informants (in order of engagement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lourdes Montero</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>Oxfam Great Britain, Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Gastelu</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Bolivian Business Federation &amp; Steering Committee, Draft Law on Social Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Carlos Nuñez</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldo Gómez</td>
<td>General Coordinator</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Miranda</td>
<td>Financing for Development</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Martínez</td>
<td>Public Budgeting</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Irahola</td>
<td>Participation and Social Monitoring</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Pérez</td>
<td>Integrated Human Development</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson Gisbert</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Jiménez</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Fundación Jubileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fausto Loza</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>District Council of School Committees of District 8 of El Alto (CODUE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Quispe</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>District Council of School Committees of District 8 of El Alto (CODUE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxana Roca</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Steering Committee, Draft Law...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanda Palacios</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Steering Committee, Draft Law...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosa Fernández</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Steering Committee, Draft Law...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natividad Cruz</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Steering Committee, Draft Law...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvaro Cusicanqui</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Office of Governability, Municipal Government of La Paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Romero</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Office of Governability, Municipal Government of La Paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obisbo Edmundo Abastoflor</td>
<td>Archbishop</td>
<td>Diocese of La Paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rómulo Torrez</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>LATINDADD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscar Calaisch</td>
<td>Owner and Founder</td>
<td>Sumaj Consulting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father José Fuentes</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Bolivian Bishops’ Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Rivera</td>
<td>Communications Coordinator</td>
<td>Bolivian Bishops’ Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolando Lazarte</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>FOCAPACI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Umaña</td>
<td>General Coordinator</td>
<td>FOCAPACI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ximena Flores</td>
<td>Ex-Member</td>
<td>Plurinational Assembly of Bolivia (national legislature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyala Guzmán</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Bolivian Permanent Assembly on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Pimentel</td>
<td>Ex-Minister of Mining</td>
<td>Bolivian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcela Revollo</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Plurinational Assembly of Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julio Alvarado</td>
<td>Director of Planning</td>
<td>University of San Andres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raúl Mendoza</td>
<td>Political Economy Advisor</td>
<td>Central Bank of Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatiana Quiroga</td>
<td>Asst. Manager, External Sector</td>
<td>Central Bank of Bolivia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III: A Note on the Use of the Process Tracing Methodology

We generally found the Process Tracing method to be a useful tool in our effort to discern the impact of IPPMP. Elsewhere in the report, we mention the important role played by the guidance materials in our own understanding of the method. We have also noted the difficulties posed by the fact that the guidance materials were all in a language not accessible in sufficient depth to either the OGB staff involved in the evaluation or the FJ staff responsible for coordinating the exercise. Finally, the challenges posed by introducing a methodology at the evaluation stage that carries with it data requirements that are not consistent with how data was collected during the monitoring stage are evident and serious.

In terms of the methodology, itself, we note the following elements, which we found to be particularly important for this exercise:

- The focus on outcomes is essential for a meaningful approach to the impact of advocacy programs;
- The encouragement to get the organization being reviewed to identify all demonstrable outcomes of a process and they focus attention on a particular set of most significant outcomes allows special attention on the real social changes that the organization believes it has helped bring about;
- The method encourages a sensitivity to the importance of unintended outcomes and provides the basis for integrating these into the analysis;
- The focus on analyzing the contributions of various actors reflects an understanding of how actors actually influence policy outcomes in the real world;
- The careful attention given to understanding the causal chain leading to a particular outcome allows for a much more nuanced view of the contributions of various actors to a given outcome, especially the actor under study;
- This focus on causal explanation also provides incentives for more careful data collection and review; and
- This is a rigorous methodology that “raises the bar” on the requirements for the validation of claims regarding the outcomes of any process.

We understand the notion of “Contribution Scores” as an effort to introduce some form of quantitative analysis to an otherwise qualitative method. FJ felt this to be the “Achilles Heel” of the methodology, an extremely subjective exercise to provide a numerical rating to processes that simply defy such facile quantitative treatment. Such was the discomfort with this element of the exercise that we opted not to discuss the contribution scores in our final focus group session in which we presented the working findings of the report to the entire staff of FJ. This is the only element of the report to which FJ had no opportunity to contribute.

While we do not share all elements of FJ’s critique of the contribution scores element, we do agree that the use of contribution scores in this way is problematic, depending on how Oxfam GB was to incorporate the scores in their analysis of the program. The scores are not, in our view, entirely subjective. There exists a rubric to guide scoring and that rubric is quite clear in its intent. With a different evaluator doing every evaluation (or even most
evaluations), however, the subjective view of the evaluator will play a big role in the scores. It, therefore, would not seem reasonable to use the scores as a comparative index of the impact of a number of projects, evaluated by different evaluators in very different contexts.

More importantly, from our perspective, there is no effort to quantify and incorporate into the analysis the relative significance to society of the outcome being scored. That is, a trivial accomplishment to which FJ made a large contribution would receive a high contribution score, and an extremely important outcome from a social change perspective in which, according to the evidence, FJ played a role of only moderate significance would receive a lower score. This flaw flies in the face of the contribution scores serving as any sort of measure of the social change impact of FJ’s interventions.

That said, elements of the Process Tracing method, as used by OGB in this exercise was certainly helpful to us and the experience of using this method is already affecting our approach to assessment of advocacy interventions in other contexts.