Evaluation of Kenya Drought Response 2011/2012

Using Oxfam’s Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

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Photo: Jo Harrison
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1. Background

1.1 The Disaster & Response

The drought-related food security crisis that unfolded in the Horn of Africa in late 2010 and peaked mid-2011 has been reported as being the worst this century, based on its scale and severity.

Of the 13 million\(^1\) people affected across the region, 4.3 million were in Kenya. The counties of Wajir and Turkana, where Oxfam has long-term programmes\(^2\), were among the regions hardest hit.

In addition, nearly 200,000 refugees from neighbouring Somalia where the situation reached famine levels\(^3\) sought humanitarian assistance in Kenya in 2011, settling at Dadaab refugee camp, where Oxfam already had a public health programme for longer-term refugees.

Early signs of an impending crisis were evident months before it became a humanitarian emergency. The potential impact of a failure of the ‘short rains’ as a consequence of La Niña phenomenon was predicted in August 2010, but the response from the humanitarian community was minimal. Alarm bells were rung more intensely in early 2011 as a result of predictions of low rainfall in April-May but even at this stage few donors or humanitarian actors reacted with due speed, funding or attention.

As forecast, the rains failed again. This prolonged period of drought, in a context of chronic poverty, poorly structured markets, escalating food and fuel prices, and inertia within the Kenyan government and the humanitarian community produced a situation that was finally recognised as a major humanitarian crisis in June 2011.

Oxfam started to respond to the early warning signs in April 2011, with funds granted by ECHO to a consortium of INGOs to mitigate the effects of La Nina. Through 2011 it also increased its efforts to raise the media profile of the food security crisis across the Horn and lobbied for due protection and assistance for residents and new arrivals at Dadaab camp.

Both situations worsened daily but did not hit the global headlines until July 2012, following the Government of Kenya’s declaration of a humanitarian emergency.

Within days, additional funding opportunities became open and Oxfam declared the disaster a regional ‘Category 1’, thereby making its response an organizational priority. With a target of 1.3 million people in Kenya, Oxfam mounted a major, rapid scale-up in Turkana, Wajir and Dadaab to enable those affected by drought, specifically women and children, to secure access to food, water, and sanitation.

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\(^1\) Source: OCHA, September 2011 (3.5 million in Kenya, 2.5 in Somalia, 4.9 in Ethiopia and approximately 150,000 in Djibouti)

\(^2\) Currently called ‘Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme’; Oxfam has been present in Wajir since 1993 and in Turkana since 1998.

\(^3\) Phase 5 ICP
1.2 Evaluative Methodology

This evaluation uses a new methodology designed to enable Oxfam GB to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from Oxfam GB that meets established standards for excellence.

The methodology is based on a Humanitarian Indicator Tool consisting of 12 quality standards with associated benchmarks, and a scoring system (see Annex 2). It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence, to be collected and analysed against these benchmarks. A score is generated for the programme’s results against each standard, and as a cumulative total.

To evaluate the Kenya response, the methodology comprised of the following steps:

- Presentation of methodology and process to Kenya team.
- Identification and provision of relevant documentation
- Initial analysis of documentation and identification of gaps
- Interviews/correspondence with staff and partners to obtain supplementary information.
- Assessment of all evidence against the benchmarks
- Submission of draft report to the Kenya team for review
- Final analysis and completion of evaluative report.

1.3 Structure of Report

A quantitative summary of the results of the evaluation is provided in Sections 2. A fuller explanation of the rating for Oxfam’s performance against each standard is provided in Section 3.
2. Summary of Results

2.1 Quantitative Result by Standard

The quantitative rating given for each standard and the cumulative rating for the response are provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Quantitative ratings for the Kenya Drought and Food Insecurity Response, using the Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Timeliness</td>
<td>Partially met</td>
<td>2/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coverage</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>4/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards</td>
<td>Partially met</td>
<td>2/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation</td>
<td>Partially met</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programme reflects measures to address dignity and protection issues</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Partially met</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Exit strategy/recovery plan in place</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Programme addresses advocacy issues</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final rating**

24/30
3. Detailed Analysis of Results

3.1 Introduction

In this section of the report, the data collected from documented and verbal sources are analysed against the benchmarks for the quality standards, and justification of the rating for Oxfam’s performance against each standard is provided.

Unless an explanatory note on alternative benchmarks is provided, it can be assumed that the benchmarks and standards used are those included in the Humanitarian Indicator Tool (See Annex 2).

3.2 Analysis Using Standards and Benchmarks

3.2.1 Quality Standard One: Timeliness

Box 1: Explanatory Note on Benchmarks for Multi-season Slow Onset Drought

Following discussions with Oxfam’s advisors and a review of programme documentation, the following benchmarks were used for this evaluation:

Standard met:

1. **Responsive intervention** started within 4 weeks of early warning signals.
2. **Key measures implemented before** severe coping strategies* are widespread.

Severe coping strategies are measures taken to manage food shortfall that have significant negative impact on people’s health and well-being or are irreversible. In Kenya these are likely to include skipping whole days of food consumption, restricting adult food consumption in order for children to eat, resorting to gathering wild foods or immature crops, distress sales of livestock and distress migration.

The Kenya programme chose to measure programme impact using the Coping Strategies Index (a tool developed to measure food insecurity by Maxwell et al, 2003).

Oxfam’s long-term work in Turkana and Wajir aims to build resilience to drought and other hazards and shocks among pastoralist and drop-out communities. It was, therefore, well-positioned to receive early warnings and take early action to mitigate drought impacts.

Based on first-hand knowledge and official reports of increased food insecurity (See Box 2 – Extracts from Early Warning Messages), Oxfam Kenya’s DRR and Livelihoods teams supported an initial assessment\(^4\) with several District Relief Committees of affected areas and partner organizations in December 2010. The assessment formed a basis for the formulation of the advocacy strategy that was put in place by February 2011 after the realization that there high food insecurity in the areas where the assessments were done. The teams also developed proposals for submission to various donors based on the findings from this assessment.

\(^4\) 31 December 2010 to 5\(^{th}\) January 2011
With encouragement from ECHO, the Oxfam team in Kenya led the development of a consortium\(^5\) proposal for drought mitigation measures, covering Arid and Semi Arid Lands. Within the overall proposal submitted to ECHO on February 11\(^{th}\) (to benefit 253,440 people), Oxfam planned to reach c95,000 people in Turkana and Wajir through cash for work, emergency de-stocking and emergency deworming activities, with the objective of enabling them to maintain their food security status and livestock during the drought period.

The proposal was approved by ECHO in on 25 February 2011 and approved in Oxford on 10\(^{th}\) of March 2011 but agreements between Oxfam and its consortium partners were not signed until between March and April 2011\(^6\) thus delaying implementation by 3-5 weeks. According to consortium members, this significantly reduced the window of opportunity for effectively implementing the destocking component for some areas or locations although the deworming and vaccination component was still timely. **For the purpose of this evaluation, the ECHO La Niña project is regarded as Phase 1 of Oxfam’s response to the drought and subsequent food security crisis.**

Following the failure of the long rains (April-May 2011), a number of major INGOs, including Oxfam, intensified their lobbying of international donors and Kenyan government to react to the deepening crisis. By this stage INGO assessments were indicating the urgent need for an emergency food and livelihoods response.\(^7\) They met with very little success. Oxfam continued, however, with implementation of its pre-drought programmes and the ECHO La Niña response, undertaking a limited cash distribution, food distribution, destocking, deworming and vaccination campaigns, and maintaining water sources.

At the same time, monitoring by UNHCR of the population of Dadaab refugee camp indicated an alarming increase in the number of new arrivals from Somalia. In 2010, on average 7,000 refugees arrived each month. In the first semester of 2011, approximately 10,000 new refugees arrived monthly, and in the second semester this number quadrupled.

Despite obvious needs, Oxfam was not able to continue or expand implementation of its existing WASH programme to respond to new needs in the camps because the Government of Kenya had ordered UNHCR and its partners -- including Oxfam - to suspend all works there until decisions were made regarding the future of the camp.\(^8\) Consequently, instead of scaling up, in April 2011, Oxfam reluctantly took the decision to scale down its programme and staff in Dadaab until further notice.

From May to July 2011 the situation changed dramatically. On 30\(^{th}\) May the Government of Kenya publicly recognized that the country faced a food emergency. On 20\(^{th}\) July the UN Resident Coordinator for Somalia declared a situation of famine. Around mid-July, the Government of Kenya gave its authorization for works at Dadaab to restart, and for additional camps to be set up to absorb the growing number of refugees.

Together, these three events triggered the long-awaited international reaction to the now critical situation. Oxfam upgraded\(^9\) its internal classification of the disaster to a Category 1 (making response an organizational priority) on July 1\(^{st}\) and granted unrestricted funds\(^{10}\) from its Catastrophe funds, to enable the scale-up to start. A DEC appeal was launched and Oxfam submitted proposals to a range of major donors in July and August, in which it highlighted that the food insecurity situation had become critical due to breaks in the World Food Program’s food pipeline, increased debt-levels as households were purchasing greater percentages of their food-needs on credit, increased reliance of cash for work for to meet food needs, and the widespread death or weakening of livestock on which people’s livelihoods depended.

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\(^5\) Consortium members included: Oxfam Great Britain (OGB), VSF Germany, VSF Belgium, VSF Suisse and ACTED Kenya

\(^6\) Source: La Niña Learning Review

\(^7\) SCF HEA Outcomes report, July 2011

\(^8\) Source: Oxfam proposal to DFID for WASH programme in Dadaab

\(^9\) In June 2011 Oxfam classified the disaster in Kenya as a Category 2.

\(^10\) Amount not provided to evaluator
With a range of new funding sources Oxfam was able to launch a major emergency programme which, for the purpose of this evaluation, is regarded as Phase 2 of its response. By 15th of July Oxfam teams had already installed water tanks and delivered jerry cans for new arrivals waiting outside the camps, and by the first week of August they had begun to install latrines and water tanks inside Ifo II West camp (Dadaab). By the first week of September 2011 new WASH activities and cash distributions had started up in Wajir and Turkana. By this stage many of the poorest households had already lost or sold most of their livestock, but they commented that the cash distributions were timely and enabled them to reduce debt levels, purchase food, water and fuel, and be considered credit-worthy for future loans into the coming hunger period11.

In summary, Oxfam responded to early warning signs with a new mitigation project funded by one of the few donors that was prepared to intervene early, as well as through advocacy to international donors for funding to prevent the predicted crisis. It was not able, however, to implement key measures before severe impacts and coping strategies, such as the death and distress sale of livestock and a sharp increase in the number of pastoral drop-outs were widespread among the most vulnerable sectors of the population12. As such, it is considered that Oxfam partially met the standard for a timely response.

**Box 2: Extracts from Early Warning Communications, Sept 2010-June 2011**

**September 2010:** The impacts of the recently declared La Niña event ... could reverse the on-going recovery in northeastern pastoral lowlands, with a decline to high levels of food insecurity beginning in early 2011. The expected severe deterioration in food security in these areas suggests the need to institute interventions to address food insecurity and livelihood viability (Fewsnet Kenya)

**October 2010:** Due to below-normal October to December rains... in areas where limited humanitarian assistance is expected (i.e. south and central Somalia), pastoral households are likely to become extremely food insecure (Fewsnet East Africa Food Security Outlook Oct 2010 to March 2011)

**March 2011:** In the worst case scenario, rains would be less than 50 percent of average. Substantial crop failure and massive livestock mortality would occur, resulting in an expansion of extreme food insecurity.... Large-scale contingency/response planning should begin immediately. (Fewsnet - regional)

**May 2011:** Food insecurity for an estimated 700,000 people in northern and eastern pastoral areas is likely to deteriorate to Crisis and Emergency levels (IPC Phase 3 and 4) beginning in June. Countrywide at least 2.4 million people require food and non-food assistance through most of 2011, and activation of contingency planning is advised.

**Table 3. New Somali Refugee Arrivals at Dadaab camp, January – August 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>9,958</td>
<td>10,176</td>
<td>11,334</td>
<td>10,636</td>
<td>9,214</td>
<td>32,383</td>
<td>41,334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Source: Focus group report, WASH and EFSL, January 2012
12 Sitrep 17th September, 2011: Pastoral dropouts rising – 20-30% of pastoral households have lost all livestock due to this drought.
3.2.2 Quality Standard Two: Coverage

Estimating the scale of the need for humanitarian assistance in Kenya during the food security crisis of 2011 is not a simple calculation, given that over one third of the country’s population experiences chronic food shortages13.

Based on reports from the Kenyan Government, the UN and the USAID Famine Early Warnings System Network (see Box 2), it is considered that approximately 2.4 million people were in need of assistance in April 2011, and 3-4 million people in July 2011.

Box 3: Extracts from Reports of Estimated Humanitarian Need, Sept 2010–June 2011

March 2011: An estimated 1.4 million pastoralists in Kenya face moderate to high food insecurity due to the impacts of consecutive poor seasons, declining terms of trade, poor milk availability, and herd losses (FEWSNET).

April 2011: Approximately 2.4 million people will require drought-related food and non-food assistance for at least six months (Kenya Food Security Steering Group - KFSSG):

September 2011: 3.75 to 4 million Kenyans face food insecurity, of whom an estimated 1.85m are in pastoral areas and another 1.9m are in marginal agricultural areas (OCHA).

September 2011: Over 450,000 refugees are living in the Dadaab camps, of whom 140,000 arrived in 2011 (UNHCR)

As shown in Table 3, in Phase 1 of its response (ECHO La Niña Project), Oxfam targeted and reached approximately 95,000 people14 in Wajir and Turkana, equivalent to approximately 4% of the total number of people in need of drought-related food aid nationwide.

The total number of intended beneficiaries of the ECHO-funded (and Oxfam-led) consortium’s operations in April 201115 was 253,44016, equivalent to approximately 11% of the total number of people considered in need of drought-related food aid at that time.

As shown in Table 4, in Phase 2 Oxfam’s target rose to 1.3 million beneficiaries, approximately 32% of those in need of assistance. This massive scale-up operation funded by multiple donors remained focused on Wajir and Turkana, but also included Dadaab refugee camp. Although the system17 used to track and report beneficiary numbers lacks clarity in terms of numbers of beneficiaries per programme location and per sector, the data provided for this evaluation indicate that Phase 2 of Oxfam’s programme reached 960,568 people, equivalent to 24% of the population in need.

Assuming this data is accurate, Oxfam met the benchmark for coverage.

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13 Price Monitoring and Analysis Country Brief, FAO, Sept-Dec 2010
14 Source: Nigel Tricks (Oxfam Kenya Country Director) in response to review of draft evaluation report, April 2011
15 This figure refers only to the April 2011 programme, not to any subsequent programmes by the consortium
16 Source: Nigel Tricks (Oxfam Kenya Country Director) in response to review of draft evaluation report, April 2011
17 Sitreps from 8 July to 14 November 2011
Table 3: Intended and Actual Beneficiary Coverage, Phase 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Location</th>
<th>Population in need, April 2011</th>
<th>Target beneficiaries, April 2011</th>
<th>Beneficiaries reached in Phase 1, starting April 2011</th>
<th>Coverage as % of population in need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-wide</td>
<td>2.4 million</td>
<td>95,000 in Turkana and Wajir (4% of total in need)</td>
<td>95-100,000</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadaab</td>
<td>40,000 new arrivals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Intended and Actual Beneficiary Coverage, Phase 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Location</th>
<th>Population in need, July 2011</th>
<th>Target beneficiaries July 2011</th>
<th>Beneficiaries reached in Phase 2, starting July 2011</th>
<th>Coverage as % of population in need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-wide</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>1.3 million&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>960,568&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt; (of whom c135,000 in Dadaab camp and host communities)</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadaab</td>
<td>c200,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3 Quality Standard Three: Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards

**Sphere standards for water supply and sanitation** are incorporated into the programme’s logical framework, the operational plan, proposals and reports to several major donors. It is clear from their consistent use in sitreps that they served as a constant point of reference for WASH teams.

When achieving Sphere standards was not possible, or not feasible in a short timeframe, sitreps and donor reports provide clear justifications. For example, reports submitted to DfID and DEC identify obstacles to achieving Sphere standards in water supply, and explain the proposed modified standard as follows:

“Given the severity and extent of the drought and household level water stress; and the dispersed nature of the settlements it will not be possible to achieve Sphere Standards in Water Supply in terms of per capita water availability per day, through water tankering. The implementation strategy envisages a rapid start up of water trucking, followed by progressive increases in available water volumes through the commissioning, repair and maintenance of water infrastructure with a provision of a 0.3 mg/l residual chlorine level in tankered water…”

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<sup>18</sup> Source: Nigel Tricks (Oxfam Kenya Country Director) in response to review of draft evaluation report, April 2011  
<sup>19</sup> Sitrep 18, 14 November 2011
For food security and livelihoods, the Coping Strategies Index (CSI)\textsuperscript{20} was used in preference to Sphere. CSI is explicitly mentioned in the ECHO La Niña baseline, some donor proposals and in the overarching logical frameworks for Turkana and Wajir, and trends in certain coping strategies are mentioned in some sitreps.

Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards\textsuperscript{21} were used for deworming and destocking activities, and the Sphere indicator for per person calorific requirements was used to calculate the contents of the monthly food basket (which informed decisions on the value of cash transfers), but these standards were rarely explicitly mentioned in programme planning or reporting.\textsuperscript{22}

It is not clear whether Oxfam’s partners were trained in CSI, LEGS or Sphere during this intervention. A capacity assessment of ALDEF, one of Oxfam’s Wajir partners, states that Sphere standards are known to ALDEF staff. Given the long-standing nature of this partnership, it is possible that training in Sphere and/or other standards took place prior to this response.

In light of the mixed results for WASH and EFSL, and the absence of any further information about technical training and support for partners, it is considered that Oxfam partially met the standard for use of technical standards.

3.2.4 Quality Standard Four: Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured.

A logical framework for Phase 1 of Oxfam’s response to the drought (ECHO-funded La Niña Project), was produced by the participating agencies in the consortium and submitted to ECHO in February 2011, prior to the start-up of the programme.

A set of Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) tools for all consortium partners was developed by Oxfam between April and May, and put to use immediately by some partners for baseline and Post Distribution Monitoring. However, at this time Oxfam did not have the capacity to collect and consolidate data generated by other consortium members, nor to support take-up of the tool kit by the full consortium membership. As a result, the tools were under-used, despite having been produced in time.

For Phase 2 of Oxfam’s response, a comprehensive programme logic model was opportunistically created in July 2011\textsuperscript{23} for interventions in Turkana and Wajir, upon which various logical frameworks were built for multiple programme proposals submitted in July and August 2011. These were subsequently consolidated into one logical framework per location\textsuperscript{24} for ease of monitoring. A separate logical framework was developed for the programme in Dadaab, and was included in the proposal to DfID on 28th July.

All of the above-mentioned logical frameworks include process and impact indicators which are specific, measurable, achievable and relevant. Most, however, do not explicitly incorporate ‘time-bound’ characteristics, with the exception of water supply which adopted a phased approach. In general, the indicators are not disaggregated by gender, nor do the logical frameworks include any gender-specific indicators. Although it is clear that most monitoring processes genuinely sought inputs from men and women (see section 3.2.8 for further details).

An enhanced set of MEAL tools was developed for Phase 2. A MEAL plan was produced for each programme location, with clear means of verification, frequency of each activity, and responsibilities for data collection. A selection of evidence of implementation of the MEAL plan was made available for this evaluation, including:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Using Coping Strategies Index As a Measure of Food Insecurity in Drought Response, ECHO La Niña Consortium 2011
  \item http://www.livestock-emergency.net/
  \item Source: Nigel Tricks (Oxfam Kenya Country Director) in response to review of draft evaluation report, April 2011
  \item Programme Logic Model, 22.07.11
  \item Logframes Turkana and Wajir, October 2011.
\end{itemize}
Baseline surveys for Turkana and Dadaab
Weekly and monthly activity reports for technical teams
Post-distribution (cash grants) monitoring reports for Turkana and Wajir
Reports of Focus Group Discussions for Wajir
Community Animal Health Worker records for Wajir and Turkana
Payment details to beneficiaries whose animals have been destocked for Wajir and Turkana
Complaints and feedback forms for Wajir and Turkana
Situation reports for all locations

A specific monitoring exercise on the impact of cash distributions on gender relations in Turkana was carried out in September 2011\(^{25}\). The timing of this exercise was critical in understanding the complexity of targeting in polygamic structures, and in identifying areas for improvement in the community-based targeting process.

Interim reports to major donors\(^{26}\) contain quantitative and qualitative reports of monitoring data collection and analysis, including for cash disbursal, use of cash, and impact on coping strategies. Final reports for most donors were not yet due\(^{27}\) at the time of this evaluation, but end-line surveys (which will also be used as base-lines for the recovery stage) were being undertaken for this purpose.\(^{28}\)

On this basis, it is considered that Oxfam met the quality standard for indicators and monitoring.

### 3.2.5 Quality Standard Five: Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation

Although neither Phase 1 nor Phase 2 of the Kenya drought response had a formal accountability strategy, the programme’s implicit strategy in Wajir and Turkana was based on the following:

- Partnership with well-established local organisations (Wasda and Aldef) which are longstanding Oxfam partners\(^{29}\), and whose staff were known to and trusted by the beneficiary communities. These robust relationships helped to open up opportunities for communication at all levels.
- Transparent beneficiary selection criteria – A 20-step process\(^{30}\) for beneficiary selection and community-based targeting for Phase 2, starting with meetings with the District Steering Group and community leaders, passing through a market assessment and a public baraza to select beneficiaries, and with continuous monitoring of external conditions and project activities throughout.
- Consultation with affected men, women and children on programme design and implementation. This included consultation on the size of cash grants, the type of cash for work, and the design of water points.
- Post distribution monitoring which included questions on beneficiary perception of cash distributed and cash paid for destocked animals.

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\(^{25}\) Outcome Review Report Of Cash Programming On Gender In The Pastoralist Community In Wajir-Kenya, September 2011
\(^{26}\) DFID Monthly Response Reports for October to December 2011, OFDA 31.01.12; SIDA, April-September 2011;
\(^{27}\) Most final reports are due by mid-2012
\(^{28}\) Source: Clemence Nyamandi, email 24.02.12
\(^{29}\) Dates of partnerships
\(^{30}\) Beneficiary Selection and Implementation Approach, undated, provided by Nigel Tricks
Focus group discussions on accountability (usually combined with programme effectiveness issues).

Helpdesks set up at cash distribution points to receive feedback and complaints from beneficiaries and other stakeholders on targeting and other issues (see Box 4).

An accountability toolkit which included a form for documentation of complaints received at helpdesks and through other channels, and a database to facilitate follow-up and analysis. Examples reviewed for this evaluation included a description of the investigation process and the resolution for complaints received in Turkana.

### Box 4. Extract from Gender Report, September 2011

A complaint desk was set up during the cash distribution and the complaints received were:

- Alteration of voucher number,
- ID number is missing,
- The name in the ID is different
- Some beneficiaries didn’t know what their entitlement and, some said this was because they didn’t ask.
- A number of women and men complained of their exclusion of the scheme.

The first 4 complaints were responded quickly and the last complaint the Relief Committee and partners’ staff explained to them Oxfam’s funding capacity and its equivalent target number of beneficiaries in each settlement.

For Dadaab the accountability strategy and its implementation appear to be less clearly-documented. Verbal evidence indicates that the Oxfam team carried out focus group discussions with beneficiaries on water point designs, and sitreps mention that meetings were also held with the host communities, but information about these is sparse.

On the basis of these mixed results, it is considered that Oxfam partially met the standard for accountability.

### 3.2.6 Quality Standard Six: Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle

The drought response programme was implemented with local partners in Wajir (Phases 1 and 2), but was operational in Turkana and Dadaab (Phase 2). The following comments are therefore relevant only for Wajir.

WASDA and ALDEF were both long-standing partners for Oxfam in Wajir. Following the closure of Oxfam’s own office in 2008, WASDA assumed management of the long term development programme there. The third partner, DPA (District Pastoral Association), is also a relatively long-standing Oxfam partner.

In response to the drought, the following new partnership agreements were signed:

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31 First desk set up in Wajir September 9th 2011, following first cash distribution.
32 Complaints database
33 Insert Sitrep date where reported.
34 Several contracts were made available for this evaluation; further data was provided by Oxfam Country Director, Nigel Tricks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of partner</th>
<th>Sector and activity</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALDEF</td>
<td>EFSL (Cash Transfers) and Animal Health support</td>
<td>217,000EUR 53,739EUR</td>
<td>February to October 2011. February 2012 to June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASDA</td>
<td>EFSL (Cash Transfers) and Animal Health support</td>
<td>217,000 EUR 45,590 EUR</td>
<td>February to October 2011. Phase II - February 2012 to June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>EFSL (Cash Transfers) and Animal Health support</td>
<td>80,726EUR 14,346EUR</td>
<td>February to October 2011. February 2012 to June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDEF</td>
<td>Cash grants distribution and monitoring, plus technical support, financial support, and advice on gender.</td>
<td>GBP 187,554</td>
<td>Aug 1 2011 to Jan 31 2012 (Signed 24 October 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDEF</td>
<td>Fuel distribution, water trucking and PH</td>
<td>385,558</td>
<td>Aug 1 2011 to Jan 31 2012 Signed 13th October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA (District Pastoral Association)</td>
<td>WASH Activities, setting up of rapid response team and Repair and Maintenance of boreholes</td>
<td>£105,207</td>
<td>14 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From December 2011, partners shared information on the evolving situation and provided staff to undertake joint assessments with Oxfam. This information was used to design the advocacy strategy and the La Nina proposal.

During the programme design stage of the major scale-up, Oxfam’s programme teams held meetings with partners to share information with partners about potential funding opportunities. Partners played a critical role in deciding what activities to include and where these should be focused, based on their understanding of the needs and dynamics of the communities where they work. The discussion also covered issues of budgeting to help define the value of the support needed from Oxfam to attain agreed goals and objectives.35

Roles and responsibilities for programme implementation were defined in contracts and supplementary partner agreements. In all cases, partners were responsible for a major components of implementation such as managing cash transfers or water trucking. Oxfam was a supporting organisation during implementation, accompanying partners with technical advice in livelihoods, water, gender and financial management, to complement the existing strengths of partners.36

Monitoring was carried out jointly by partners and Oxfam staff. Based on the agreed data collection tools the teams from both organisations undertook process and programme monitoring. Partners produced specific reports on particular monitoring activities, as well as weekly and monthly progress reports with details of progress in implemention. These reports formed the basis for Oxfam’s siterps and interim reports to donors, along with the results of monitoring exercises carried out directly by Oxfam staff.

According to written37 and verbal reports38 provided for this evaluation, all three partners gave feedback that they felt consulted by Oxfam and that they were ‘co-owners’ of the programme, responsible for many

35 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director for Kenya, following review of the draft evaluation report.
36 Source: Marianne Vik, HSP EFSL and Programme Coordinator Wajir
37 Email from Francis Lacasse
38 Source: Marianne Vik, HSP EFSL and Programme Coordinator Wajir
key activities but with technical backstopping from Oxfam. Looking beyond the current response, they recommended linkages of emergency programmes to longer-term development programmes that build community resilience to drought and other shocks. Other recommendations made by partners concerning contractual procedures, retaining their new technical capacity, and strengthening links between national and local advocacy were also documented and communicated to the Country Director.

On the basis of these results, it is considered that Oxfam met the standard for partner engagement.

3.2.7 Quality Standard Seven: Programme reflects measures to address dignity and protection issues

Documentation about protection issues from Phase 1 of Oxfam’s response was not made available for this evaluation, However, in Phase 2 of Oxfam’s programme, protection issues identified in assessment reports and sitreps included the following:

- Women and children in Kakuma and Lokichokio (Turkana) increasingly participating in risky survival practices after moving to large towns following loss of livestock.  
- Significant increase in number of people killed in resource-based conflict (mainly cross-border livestock raids) in Turkana.  
- Insufficient food and NFI coupled with poorly planned distribution have increase vulnerability of women and girls in Turkana to sexual exploitation and abuse.  
- Increased violence, sexual assault, and general insecurity within and outside Dadaab camp boundaries.

While it could not ‘resolve’ them, Oxfam’s interventions in all three locations were specifically designed to reduce the incidence of abuse, violence and harmful coping strategies such as these.

During implementation, protection issues directly related to Oxfam’s programme activities were monitored by Oxfam staff and partners through focus group discussions which included questions about beneficiaries’ perceptions of safety when attending community meetings and accessing services. Question guides included questions such as:

- Can you tell me if the latrine constructed in block X is safe for all groups (women, girls and boys)?
- Do the most vulnerable households and individuals have access to latrines and other WASH facilities?
- Are small children afraid of using latrines or is there any risk to them for using latrines? If so, what do you suggest we can do to resolve the issue?

Where operational problems were identified, monitoring teams provided feedback to programme teams who tried to find appropriate ways to resolve them, and to let the beneficiaries and communities know how the issues had been dealt with.

Oxfam sought to address major protection issues, such as protection of the rights of Somali refugees, through national and international advocacy, often in coordination with other actors concerned with protection issues. Examples of such actions and their effectiveness are provided on page 18 of this report, under Standard 11.

On the basis of these results, it is considered that Oxfam met the standard for protection and dignity.

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39 Sitrep 9th September  
40 Source: Sitrep 17 September  
41 Source: Sitrep 17 September (Preliminary findings of Protection Working Group Assessment, Turkana)  
42 Sitrep 10th October (Preliminary findings of inter-agency assessment on child protection at the Dadaab camps)  
43 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.  
44 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.
3.2.8 Quality Standard Eight: Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups

A gender analysis was not undertaken specifically for Phase 1 of Oxfam’s response, but some members of the consortium (such as Oxfam) were already familiar with gender dynamics in the communities to be benefited by the ECHO grant. Practical and strategic measures to promote gender equity were therefore mainstreamed through Oxfam’s programme in the following ways:

- Destocking: As smaller herds of small animals were prioritized for destocking, women became a target beneficiary group as they tend to have small herds and keep goats and sheep rather than cattle or camels. Men with smaller herds (and more vulnerable than those with larger herds) also benefited from this activity.

- Cash for Work: As men were often away with their herds, women tended to benefit more from CFW activities. These were designed to requiring avoid hard labour, and special activities were included such as childcare for elderly or disabled people. Some women used the cash to start a small business as an alternative source of income.

- Water sources: Ensuring access to a water source by desilting water pans, for example dramatically reduced the workload for women and girls as they no longer had to walk as far to collect water. It also of benefit to men who were responsible for herds of animals.

At the start of Oxfam’s major scale-up in Phase 2 it was foreseen that a gender analysis would be crucial to understanding the impact of cash programming on men and women’s status and roles. A specific study was carried out in Wajir, which provided the team with timely feedback and recommendations, such as:

- “Being the custodian of the cash grant scheme, commands respect to women from the men. This raised their self-confidence and they have been valued by the members of the households and community. The reversal of power transforms the status of women beneficiary.”

- “The cash grant scheme registered only 1 wife within polygamous family structures. Cash need to be divided equitably between co-wives to promote dignity and harmony in the inter-intra household level.”

- “Beneficiaries were satisfied with the registration process but suggested that the target numbers should be increased as there are still many vulnerable people especially women in the settlements and in the bush not included in the scheme.”

- “The men from Qanjara added that the cash grant is a big relief for them as bread winners considering they have lost their livestock and it is difficult for them to find casual work during the drought.”

Following this assessment, re-registrations were carried out in some locations in Wajir, to solve the intra-household challenges identified by beneficiaries and to clarify criteria and beneficiary lists. Additionally, due to the positive impact registered by the beneficiaries, the team also submitted funding proposals for to increase the number of beneficiaries that were being supported with cash transfers.45

A specific gender assessment was not conducted in Dadaab, but Oxfam teams held focus group discussions with refugee men and women to select the most appropriate, safe and culturally sensitive sanitation facilities. One of the key results of the FGDs was that latrines should not be segregated by sex. Both men and women said that they preferred to have latrines serving one or several households because of concerns about all-male latrines not being kept clean. Consequently the Oxfam WASH team agreed to provide sanitation facilities that the families could share.46

45 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.
46 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.
Other WASH issues were consulted with men and women through the use of visual aids, to ensure that beneficiaries who could not read or write could voice their views.

Monitoring and reporting on the programme’s implementation in Turkana, Wajir and Dadaab was undertaken in ways that facilitate analysis of gendered impacts. For example, all focus group discussions were held separately with men and women, and all post-distribution (cash) monitoring results were disaggregated by sex.

**Vulnerable groups**

In Wajir and Turkana the community-based targeting method was used to select beneficiaries for the EFSVL component of the programme. The following criteria were agreed between Oxfam, partners and local Relief Committees to identify the most vulnerable:

- Pastoral drop outs (male or female)
- People not benefiting from WFP and HSNP (male or female)
- Widows
- Women with no husbands, no work and with small children.
- Men and women with disabilities
- Elderly (male or female)

People with disabilities or physically weak elderly people were able to nominate another person of their choice to collect cash or food on their behalf.

The criteria were well-communicated to beneficiaries through community meetings and working with relief committees and were generally well-known.

Post-distribution monitoring reports indicate that to a large extent the criteria were used. There were challenges with some areas where the relief committees were reported to have influenced beneficiary selection.

In focus group discussions in Wajir, all participants commented that the cash grant and food aid were of great help in providing the nutritious food needed by the most vulnerable members in the households: children, pregnant, lactating mothers and elderly women and men.

The WASH component in Wajir and Turkana was designed to increase water access for as many communities as could be covered with the funds available. To a certain extent the location of any installations was pre-defined by the siting of previous facilities, but communities were also given the opportunity to select which water pans should be de-silted, for example, of which hydrogeologically-viable boreholes would best meet their needs.

In Dadaab, the needs of particularly vulnerable people were considered in the following ways:

- Engineering teams made designs for water points (tap stands) and shared them with the beneficiaries and Handicap International. Based on feedback from both, Oxfam refined the designs before installing them.
- Teams conducted door to door campaigns to ensure that vulnerable people who could not come to awareness sessions or community meetings would still get public health information.

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47 Gender Outcome Review Report Of Cash Programming On Gender In The Pastoralist Community In Wajir-Kenya, 24-28 September, Oxfam
48 Ibid.
49 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.
• NFIs included items that were not available locally or only at very high costs.

No information is provided in any programme documentation about HIV/AIDS, despite prevalence rates of 5.7% and HIV&AIDS being identified in Oxfam’s contingency plan as a risk to food security.

On the basis of these results, it is considered that Oxfam partially met the standard for gender and vulnerable groups. On gender alone, it is likely that Oxfam would have met the standard.

3.2.9 Quality Standard Nine: Exit strategy/recovery plan in place

Oxfam regards the drought response of 2011 as the time-bound implementation of an emergency social safety net within Oxfam’s longer term ASAL programme. In practice, this means that Oxfam intends to support some families who cannot return to their previous livelihoods via a long-term safety net programme. In order to then exit families from these programmes, Oxfam also intends to build on its market stimulation and alternative livelihood programmes.

In addition, Oxfam is working with DFID and other donors to enhance the HSNP in order to make it more responsive to changing conditions. This would involve incorporating mechanisms to ‘top up’ unconditional grants in extreme conditions (such as drought) and including larger parts of the population for cash support in times of crisis.

At the time of this evaluation, Oxfam was carrying out baseline analyses (via household interviews and community FGDs) for the recovery stage of the programme. Based on the results of these, the different components (EFSL and WASH) will be defined.

In the case of Dadaab, programming is envisaged to continue for the coming 2-3 years, though at a reduced scale. The team have a documented plan and budget for this.

On the basis of these results, Oxfam is considered to have met the standard for having an exit strategy and recovery plan in place.

3.2.10 Quality Standard Ten: Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response

Oxfam Kenya had an approved Oxfam International contingency plan prior to this crisis. The plan identified drought as its ‘number 1’ hazard scenario, and refugee influx from a neighbouring country as another potential crisis scenario.

On the basis of early warning messages from sources identified in the plan, Oxfam carried out assessments in December 2010 prior to formulating the ECHO La Niña proposal (Phase 1 of Oxfam’s response).

The Phase 1 programme closely followed the lines of the contingency plan: interventions in Turkana and Wajir; focus on WASH (rehabilitation of water points, and water source development) and EFSL (destocking, cash vouchers); funding and technical support to WASDA, ALDEF and DPA in Wajir.

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50 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.
51 Impact of HIV/AIDS Among Pastoral Communities in Kenya, ITDG, 2005
52 OI Contingency Plan, July 2010
53 Source: Drought Strategy 2011
54 Source: OFDA Proposal, August 2011
55 Source: Nigel Tricks, Oxfam Country Director, following review of the draft evaluation report.
56 Dadaab Operational Strategy Update – Oxfam GB – September 2011
Phase 2 of the programme was not foreseen in the contingency plan. It appears that the country programme was not prepared for the scale of the intervention required from July 2011 as the plan stated “All response scenario planning is based on Category 2 & 3 emergencies, as it is very unlikely to have a Category 1 in Kenya.” As such, the plan did not provide appropriate guidance on advocacy, funding, HR or Logistics for a major scale-up, nor did it contemplate the simultaneous occurrence of various scenarios. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that at the time of the Real Time Evaluation in October 2011, few key staff in Kenya and Oxfam’s Humanitarian Department knew of the contingency plan. In October 2011, once Phase 2 was underway, a new scenario-planning process was carried out by the country team based on four possible scenarios around rains in Kenya and food insecurity in Somalia. As a result the Contingency Plan was updated with response strategies for each of the scenarios, the first of which became a reality when the October/November rains occurred.

In conclusion, Oxfam twice met the standard for using its contingency plans. It is recommended, however, that future contingency plans for Kenya contemplate all categories of disasters.

3.2.11 Quality Standard 11: Programme addresses Advocacy Issues

Oxfam Kenya acted quickly to develop an advocacy and media plan after the failure of the first rains late 2010. By February 2011 Oxfam had its first plan in place, with key messages around funding allocation and coordination, targeted at the Government of Kenya. Between February and July 2011 Oxfam’s strategy evolved significantly as fears for an impending crisis grew. It developed messages urging international donors, governments and the aid community to react to the situation in Kenya, while still keeping up pressure on the Kenyan government to meet its responsibilities for coordination and to respect the rights of refugees. It was largely unsuccessful until the middle of 2011 when the UN declared famine in Somalia, the international media’s spotlight was placed on East Africa. From that point Oxfam’s advocacy team was able to seize opportunities and began to deliver some long-sought results, including the following:

- Oxfam met with UNHCR Gutierrez on 11th July about the urgent need for expansion of the Dadaab refugee complex, as well as releasing a press release requesting the government of Kenya to open the prepared extension (IFOII) The press release achieved wide coverage and got wide coverage in national and international press, and the Government of Kenya declare the extension open on 15th July. Oxfam immediately began work to communicate its followin message: that the Government of Kenya should streamline the refugee registration process to avoid unnecessary delays.
- From July to September 2011 Oxfam attracted public attention to the situation and its work by organizing media and celebrity trips to the affected regions. These helped to maintain the crisis in the public spotlight and helped to put pressure on governmental donors to make funding available.
- By end of July Oxfam was working closely with its partners to build civil society engagement in advocacy. Prior to and during the Drought Conference (8-9 Sept) Oxfam and its allies advocate for the establishment of a National Drought Management Authority and a National Drought Contingency Fund. These were subsequently put in place. Also at the Drought Conference five heads of state, including the Kenyan Prime Minister, adopted the ‘Nairobi Strategy’, which looks at new ways to end drought emergencies and support pastoralism, including support for starting a

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57 Source: Real Time Evaluation, 2011
58 Source: (see Drought Strategy 2011)
59 Real Time Evaluation, 2011
60 Sitreps 1-4
sedentary life. The Oxfam and its partners subsequently supported a national workshop to broaden awareness of the Kenyan component of the plan and to agree measures to drive it forwards. By the end of September the Kenyan Prime Minister was the first leader of 60 countries to sign the INGO/CSO driven ‘Charter to End Extreme Hunger’

Building on earlier successes, in January 2012 Oxfam launched an OI Policy Paper ‘A Dangerous Delay’, recommending that:

- All actors should manage the risks, not the crisis. Instead of waiting for certainty before acting, they should develop commonly accepted triggers for early action.
- National governments should provide political leadership for drought response., All countries should sign Charter to End Extreme Hunger.
- The aid community should invest in a DRR approach rather than recurrent emergency projects
- Donor should provide more agile and flexible funding in multi-year grants to increase resilience

Having generated discussion among donors and INGOs alike, ‘A Dangerous Delay’ is likely to have repercussions beyond Kenya. For example, it appears that donors are more willing to engage earlier in the international response to worsening food insecurity in West Africa in 2011-2012.

Based on these results, it is considered that Oxfam met the standard for advocacy.

3.2.12 Quality Standard 12: Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area

Following a strategic reorientation in 2007, Oxfam’s Arid & Semi Arid Land (ASAL) program was re-framed to integrate humanitarian interventions with longer-term objectives to address the chronic poverty and vulnerability of pastoral communities in ASAL areas. The long-term thus programme became a ‘social protection’ type of intervention, combining safety-net strategies with others to improve access to water, improve market access for pastoralist traders, and develop alternative livelihoods for pastoralist drop-outs. As such, it is oriented towards reducing disaster risk through:

- Reducing economic vulnerability by providing regular cash transfers to the most vulnerable, access to water for the livestock on which pastoralists livelihoods depend, new opportunities for income generation, and more favourable terms of trade for pastoralist traders.
- Reducing physical vulnerability by providing food to the most vulnerable and water for human consumption.
- Reducing political vulnerability by building the capacity of associations of pastoralists to represent the interests of their communities at regional and national levels.

The long-term programme is also designed to be prepared to detect and respond to hazards such as drought or price hikes of food or fuel by:

- Maintaining a presence in areas exposed to drought and among populations that are highly vulnerable to them.
- Having local partners with humanitarian and development experience.
- Being well-connected to early warning networks and inter-agency coordinations.
- Preparing donors for transition to and from a response mode through innovative projects to increase resilience.
- Having mechanisms to expand cash transfer or food distribution components.
- Maintaining a technical capacity to expand public health engineering and livelihoods components
In the case of the 2011 drought, the Oxfam Kenya team activated a response to the worsening food security situation. This response – ECHO La Niña Project – was well-designed to mitigate the impacts of the drought, although its coverage was limited and its implementation was delayed. However, due to the unavailability of funding and a lack of consensus over the severity of the situation (inside Oxfam, and in the international community in general), Oxfam was unable to scale up its intervention in time to avoid the worst impacts of the drought. This is an area in which Oxfam will need to improve in the future, through the development of clear triggers for changes in programme type and scale.

Nevertheless, with respect to connecting humanitarian action with longer-term disaster risk reduction, both Phases 1 and 2 of Oxfam’s response sought to reduce future vulnerability to drought by:

- Drilling boreholes to improve long-term water supply in areas where surface sources are quickly depleted.
- Developing awareness of the concept of timely destocking.
- Building awareness of personal hygiene and public health issues.
- Preventing stock depletion through the provision of veterinary services and cash/food to discourage distress sales.

Based on these results, Oxfam is considered to have connected the programme with DRR strategies and measures in its areas of operation, thereby meeting the standard for linkage with DRR.
Annex 1: Sources of Data

Documents

Internal Reports

✓ Sitreps 1-19, various authors
✓ Email from Pauline Ballaman regarding Sitrep continuity/frequency, 28 Jan 2012

Assessments

✓ Outcomes Wash Assessment Associated To The Drought Host Community (50km Radius From Dadaab) February 2011

Programme Strategy and Design

✓ OI Contingency Plan July 2010
✓ OI Contingency Plan October 2011
✓ KENYA STRATEGY for OI HCGC
✓ P0790 Logic Model
✓ Kenya Scale Up Operational Plan, J Loveless, July 2011
✓ Kenya PIP Short Description: J Loveless 24th July 2011
✓ Kenya Programme Drought Scale Up Budget & Personnel Plan (12-Month Period)
✓ Project Logical Framework – Turkana July To December 2011
✓ HECA Funding Grid, undated, author Tess Williams
✓ ASAL Strategy Report, December 2011
✓ Strategy Matrix WASH 2011
✓ Draft EFSL Strategy undated, no author
✓ Dadaab Operational Strategy Update – Oxfam GB – September 2011
✓ Comments (email) on PIP and strategy formulation , J Loveless, 26/07/2011
✓ Comments (email) on Logic Model Makarand Sahasrabuddhe 26.07.12
✓ Kenya Implementation Plan (no date or author)
✓ OGB ASAL Strategy, no date
✓ Destocking Approaches (undated, unauthored)
✓ Cash Implementation Guidelines For All Agencies Implementing ECHO La Nina 2012
✓ Beneficiary Selection and Implementation Approach for Cash for Work (undated)

Monitoring, Accountability, Evaluation and Learning

✓ P00790 offline version, MEAL Section
✓ Final Summary Report, EFSL Regional Workshop, Oxfam GB, Jan 17th to 19th 2012
✓ Livestock Destocking Payment Voucher April-May 2011 offtake
✓ Cash For Work Programme In Wajir East District Brief Report On Mobilization For Eight Centres, ALDEF
✓ ECH LA Nina Project Review and Learning Workshop Report, November 2011
✓ ECHO La Nina Accountability Plan, undated
✓ Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability And Learning Plan, January 2012
✓ Ensuring Accountability In Wash And EFSL Programmes Wajir, January 2012
✓ Beneficiary Tracking Database (format)
✓ Sample complaints forms (x3)
✓ Sample documented verbal complaints (x2)
✓ Community Feedback Session: Accountability Focus Group Discussions WASH and EFSL Programmes, January 2012
✓ Using Coping Strategies Index As a Measure of Food Insecurity in Drought Response ECHO La Nina Drought Response, undated, no author
✓ Baseline ECHO Consortium Cash For Work Turkana, October 2011
✓ MEAL Plan Dadaab, September 2011 to April 2012
✓ MEAL Plan Turkana September 2011 to July 2012
✓ MEAL Plan Wajir September 2011 to June 2012
✓ MEAL Support Visit Report Wajir Dec 2 2011
✓ Monthly Output report tracking (format)
✓ Oxfam ALDEF WASDA Wajir EFSL PDM October 2011
✓ Baseline Report Emergency Cash Transfers to Drought Affected households in Turkana North and Market Support in Turkana North and Central, October 2011
✓ Flow Chart Guidance For Complaint/ Feedback Mechanism Drought Response Programme, Kenya
✓ Beneficiary Tracking Complaints Database (Format)
✓ Focus Group Discussion Plan, WASH/Accountability/Protection
✓ Tool 8 Complaints Form
✓ Outcome Review Report Of Cash Programming On Gender In The Pastoralist Community In Wajir-Kenya
✓ 24-28 September 2011
✓ Real Time Evaluation of the Kenya Drought Response, September 2011
✓ IFO Baseline Results, undated

Partnership

✓ Assessment of ALDEF’s Organization Capacity for Project Delivery, Francis Lacasse, February 2012, ALDEF Contracts and Letters of Agreement (various)
✓ DPA Contracts (various)
✓ WASDA/ALDEF/DPA Presentation on ECHO La Nina Response Feb 2011- March 2-12
✓ Echo La Nina Final Narrative Report – WASDA, undated
✓ PHP Activity Report for WASDA, November 2011
✓ Francis Lacasse email on Wajir Partner Review, February 2012

Coordination

✓ ECHO La Nina Meeting Schedule 2012
✓ Planning Meeting Minutes, undated no author
✓ ECHO consortium Mapping of Kenya Drought Response March 2011
✓ Minutes ECHO Consortium Meeting Nov 22 2011
✓ Meeting with ECHO and all consortium members on Wednesday 23rd November 2011
✓ ECHO Consortium meeting minutes Oct 2011
Advocacy

- A Dangerous Delay: The cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa, January 2012

Donor Proposals

- KENC11 OFDA Market Support, August 2011
- KENC14 Comic Relief Wajir, July 2011
- KENC19 DFID WASH Dadaab, July 2011
- SIDA: Emergency Response Wajir, August 2011
- Irish Aid Market Support to Traders, July 2011
- Irish Aid WASH for Turkana and Wajir, August 2011
- CIDA: Emergency Cash Transfer Response, Wajir, July 2011
- ECHO La Nina Annexes, February 2011
- ECHO La Nina Amendment – Various Annexes, August 2011
- Oxfam Australia, WASH Wajir and Turkana, July 2011
- Kenya Emergency Response Fund Project, July 2011
- ONE Foundation, WASH Northern Kenya, August 2011
- Correspondence and Annexes for DEC appeal, August 2011
- Belron Trust, Wajir Response, July 2011

Donor Reports

- KENC19 DFID Monthly reports, August - December 2011
- Belron Trust, February 2012
- Comic Relief, January 2012
- DEC Phase 1 Narrative Report #1
- DEC Phase 1 Narrative Report #2, January 2012
- ONE Foundation, December 2011
- OFDA September 2011
- OFDA December 2011
- SIDA September 2011 (multi-country)

Reports from External Sources

- Vulnerability And Dependency In 4 Livelihood Zones Of North Eastern Province, Kenya Assessed Using The Household Economy Approach (HEA), Save The Children, 2007
- Understanding The Impact Of Drought In North East Kenya On Key Aspects Of Household Access To Minimum Food Needs, SCF, Sept 2011
- SCF Drought Assessment Northern Eastern Kenya (Wajir East, South And Manda) April 2011
- Fewnet Kenya Food Security Alert March 22, 2011
- Fewnet East Africa Food Security Alert March 15, 2011
- Fewnet East Africa Food Security Alert November 2, 2010
- USAID Horn of Africa Drought, July 21 2011,
- Kenya Food Security Alert May 5, 2011
- Kenya Meteorological Department Review Of The Weather In March-April-May, June-July-August
- Impact Of HIV/AIDS Among Pastoral Communities In Kenya: ITDG 2005
✓ OCHA Eastern Africa Drought Humanitarian Report No. 1 30 April 2011
✓ UNHCR Camp Population Statistics Dadaab, February 2012
✓ UNHCR Briefing Note On The Health Sector Dadaab Refugee Camps October 2011
✓ Final KAP Survey In Dagahaley, Hagadera And IFO Camps Outskirts, July 2011, CARE, NRC

Interviews and Correspondence:

✓ Clemence Nyamandi, MEAL Coordinator, Oxfam International, Kenya
✓ Gwenola Grouhel, ECHO Consortium Lead, Oxfam GB, Kenya
✓ Laura Phelps, EFSVL Advisor, Humanitarian Department, Oxfam GB, U.K.
✓ Solange Fontana, Oxfam GB Regional Emergency Food Security & Livelihoods Advisor, Horn, East & Central Africa
✓ Marianne Vic, HSP EFSVL, currently Hunger Safety Nets Programme Coordinator, Kenya
✓ Nigel Tricks, Country Director for Oxfam GB, Kenya
Annex 2: Global Humanitarian Indicator: % of people who received humanitarian support from responses meeting established standards for excellence disaggregated by sex

**Slow Onset – Drought, Slow Flooding, Escalating Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Quality standard</th>
<th>Met (score 4)</th>
<th>Partially met (score 2)</th>
<th>Not met (score 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Timeliness – rapid analysis within <strong>one day</strong> of getting reports of raised alarm, assessment within <strong>one week</strong> and assistance started within <strong>one week</strong> of assessing need to response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2      | Coverage – 25% of the total affected population but in exceptional circumstances then:
|        | Total number of beneficiaries is at least 5% of the disaster-affected population and selected areas the most-affected or marginalised                                                                                     |               |                         |                   |
| 3      | Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards                                                                                                                              |               |                         |                   |
| 4      | Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured                                                                                                                                               |               |                         |                   |
| 5      | Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation                                                                                            |               |                         |                   |
| 6      | Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle                                                                                                                                                     |               |                         |                   |
| 7      | Programme reflects measures to address dignity and protection issues                                                                                                                                          |               |                         |                   |
| 8      | Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups                                                                                                                                    |               |                         |                   |
| 9      | Exit strategy/recovery plan in place                                                                                                                                                                            |               |                         |                   |
| 10     | Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response                                                                                                                                       |               |                         |                   |
| 11     | Programme addresses advocacy issues                                                                                                                                                                             |               |                         |                   |
| 12     | Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area                                                                                                                                            |               |                         |                   |