

Evaluation of Somalia Drought Response 2011/12

Using Oxfam GB's Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool



Andy Featherstone, February 2012

Cover Photo - Somaliland: Mother-of-five Khadra Suleiman lives in Ali Hussein camp. "A few months ago when I went to the market I would buy 1kg of rice, but now I usually only have enough money for half-a-kilo. My children eat far fewer vegetables. They used to eat four times a day – breakfast, lunch, dinner and a mid-morning snack at 10am. Now they only get two – breakfast and lunch. In the evening we do not eat." (Credit: Alun McDonald/Oxfam)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background & Methodology

Context of the drought and Oxfam's response

A combination of drought, war, restrictions on aid organisations added to the widespread poverty that people experience throughout large parts of Somalia and pushed areas of the country into famine in 2011. While Oxfam has been working in Somalia for many years and had sought to respond to the drought as a category 2 emergency, it wasn't until it was escalated to category 1 on 5 July 2011 that there was a significant scale-up in operations. Just 2-weeks later, on 20th July 2011 the United Nations (UN) declared that parts of southern Somalia (southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle) had met the technical criteria of famine.

Methodology

As part of a wider organisational undertaking to better capture and communicate the effectiveness of its work, a decision was taken for Oxfam GB to pilot a new evaluative method to assess the quality of targeted humanitarian responses. This method uses a global humanitarian indicator tool which is intended to enable Oxfam GB to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from Oxfam GB that meets established standards for excellence. Equally importantly, it enables Oxfam GB to identify the areas of comparative weakness on a global scale that require institutional attention and resources for improvement. This tool consists of 12 quality standards with associated benchmarks, and a scoring system. It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence, to be collected and analysed against these benchmarks. A score is generated for the programme's results against each standard and as a cumulative total.

Performance of the Somalia Response against the Global humanitarian Indicator Tool

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
1	Timeliness – rapid analysis within one day of getting reports of raised alarm, assessment within one week and assistance started within one week of assessing need to respond			0
2	Coverage – 25% of the total affected population but in exceptional circumstances then: Total number of beneficiaries is at least 5% of the disaster-affected population and selected areas the most-affected or marginalised	4		

3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards		2	
Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
4	Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured		1	
5	Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation	2		
6	Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle	2		
7	Programme reflects measures to address dignity and protection issues		1	
8	Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups		1	
9	Exit strategy/recovery plan in place		1	
10	Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response		1	
11	Programme addresses advocacy issues	2		
12	Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area			0
		10	7	0
	Final rating			17

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLT	Country Leadership Team
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EFSVL	Emergency Food Security & Vulnerable Livelihoods
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GHIT	(Oxfam's) Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCGG	Humanitarian Consortium Governance Group
HIJRA	Humanitarian Initiative Just Relief Aid
HSP	Humanitarian Support Personnel
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability & Learning
MoV	Means of Verification
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGB	Oxfam Great Britain
OI	Oxfam International
ON	Oxfam Novib
OPAL	Oxfam Programme Accountability & Learning
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PHE	Public Health Education
PHP	Public Health Promotion
PIP	Programme Implementation Plan
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
VRC	Village Representative Committees
WASDA	Wajir South Development Organisation
WASH	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene

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1. Background

1.1 Context of the drought response

Conflict in the Somalia/lands

Since the early 1990s there has been widespread and large-scale conflict and lack of effective government in South Central Somalia. Much of the public infrastructure was destroyed in the early 1990s, social services collapsed, livelihoods were disrupted, and large numbers of people were displaced. Despite numerous mediation attempts, a low-intensity state of conflict with widespread intermittent violence has persisted until the present day. In contrast, the northern areas of Puntland and Somaliland have managed to limit violence and establish democratic systems and institutions, and are providing some basic services, although both need strengthening in various ways. Somaliland formally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, and has, in spite of being twice affected by civil strife (1992 and 1994-96), achieved substantial reconciliation with the involvement of traditional leaders, built democratic political and administrative institutions, and held a referendum on the constitution (May 2001) while maintaining peace, security, basic social services and an active civil society and private sector.

The separation of Somalia into three distinct areas comprising 2 semi-autonomous regions has an important bearing on humanitarian response as the operating environment is different in each. While Somaliland has enjoyed a level of security and until recently, NGOs have had access throughout much of Puntland, Southern Somalia continues to suffer gross insecurity which has inhibited access to those in need. While the shifting sands of clan alliances and the relatively recent arrival of Al-Shabab and response of AU forces and international military forces (primarily from Ethiopia and Kenya) has at different times permitted some semblance of access and security, the situation remains highly volatile.

Background to Oxfam's work in Somalia

Oxfam GB has been working in Somalia for many years and has experience of working both in urban and rural areas providing long-term development assistance targeting pastoralists and humanitarian assistance in the WASH and livelihoods sectors. While for security reasons Oxfam GB focused its work in Somaliland and Puntland for a number of years, in the last 5-years it has re-established a presence in South Central Somalia, building on an initial cross-border programme which was supported from its programme in Wajir, Northern Kenya. Oxfam GB currently works in Somaliland, Lower and Middle Juba, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Banadir and the Afgoye Corridor. In South Central Somalia Oxfam delivers its programmes remotely, working through a network of partners and employs an innovative range of mechanisms to ensure support is provided, that technical and quality standards are attained and that programmes are monitored.


Background to the drought

A combination of drought, war, restrictions on aid organisations have added to the widespread poverty that people experience throughout large parts of the country and pushed areas of the country into famine. With agricultural production severely reduced even by Somalia's own modest standards, and the price of food increasing, the lives and livelihoods of many millions of people began to be severely affected. While some travelled many miles to Kenya and Ethiopia, others

remained in the country hoping to get assistance from aid organisations many of whom were struggling to scale-up their programmes due to insecurity and lack of access to many of those in most need. On 20th July 2011 the United Nations (UN) declared that parts of southern Somalia (southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle) had met the technical criteria of famine and on 3rd August 2 districts of Middle Shabelle, the Afgoye corridor IDP settlement and the Mogadishu IDP community were added. On 8th August 2011 the CAP was revised upwards to include the needs of an estimated 3.7 million people, 3.2 million of whom were considered in need of 'life-saving assistance' and 2.8 million of whom were located in southern Somalia, representing 63% of the population.¹

Box 1: Origins of the livelihoods crisis in Somalia and UNOCHA food security data for Nov-Dec 2011

Failure of the 2010 Deyr rains and the La Nina effect precipitated an acute food and livelihood crisis in Somalia putting at risk lives of over two million Somalis many of who were already experiencing a humanitarian emergency coupled with severe food insecurity. According to FSNAU rainfall comparison data released in November 2010, parts of the war-ravaged country received only 0%-15% of normal rainfall. As a result, poor performance of the rains led to widespread crop failure in most of the southern crop-producing regions and considerable water and pasture shortages in the key pastoral areas of the country. One of the effects of this was a dramatic deterioration in livestock conditions. Field assessments by Oxfam partners showed similar trends although it wasn't until July 2011 that a category 1 crisis was called and the emergency became a corporate priority.



Overview of Oxfam's response to the drought

After the category 1 emergency was called, Oxfam scaled-up its programme in Somalia to provide life-saving clean water and also to prevent the spread of disease through the provision of chlorinated water, repair and maintenance of boreholes and the rehabilitation of shallow wells. Oxfam also provided fuel for borehole pumps to ensure that water could be accessed without disruption. Oxfam's water and sanitation work was complemented by the delivery of public hygiene messages, non-food items and training to partners. Despite Oxfam's limited experience in delivering EFSL programmes in Somalia, cash transfer programmes were embarked on through an innovative partnership model across operational areas. Programmes to treat acutely malnourished children, to counsel pregnant women, and to support immunisation services in Mogadishu that had been started prior to the re-categorisation continued to receive support.

¹ See Somalia Emergency United Nations, (2011) CAP 2011 Revision, 08 August 2011, pp.5 (internet). Available at <http://ochaonline.un.org/somalia/AppealsFunding/CAP2011/tabid/6760/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

1.2 Oxfam's Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool (GHIT)

As part of a wider organisational undertaking to better capture and communicate the effectiveness of its work, a decision was taken by Oxfam GB to pilot a new evaluative method to assess the quality of targeted humanitarian responses. This method uses a global humanitarian indicator tool which is intended to enable Oxfam to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from the organisation that meets established standards for excellence. Equally importantly, it enables Oxfam to identify the areas of comparative weakness on a global scale that require institutional attention and resources for improvement. The tool consists of 12 quality standards with associated benchmarks, and a scoring system. It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence, to be collected and analysed against these benchmarks. A score is generated for the programme's results against each standard, and as a cumulative total. The full tool and accompanying documents are provided in annex 2.

1.3 Methodology

The GHIT provides details of evidence required (see annex 3) which was collected by the Somalia team and this was reviewed alongside external contextual data. Where gaps existed in the information the consultant endeavoured to fill these through interviews with Oxfam staff and partners. The evidence from these sources was measured against organizational benchmarks and standards (see annex 4) in order to determine a score for each of the criteria. In recognition of the complexity of the operating environment in Somalia where restrictions on access due to insecurity has led to an organisational decision to deliver programmes remotely through partners, the evaluation took these issues into account although standards for the delivery of assistance, analysis of gender and vulnerability and participation remain relevant irrespective of how assistance is delivered. The time period under evaluation is primarily from the re-categorisation of the crisis (July 2011) although for the timeliness quality standard documents from as far back as December 2010 were reviewed.

1.4 Limitations

While the methodology dictates a desk-based approach which relied heavily on documented evidence albeit supported by informant interviews, this does have its limitations, particularly where Oxfam staff are themselves one step removed from operations. While there was an assumption that the remote nature of the programme would have led to a comprehensive approach to documenting evidence, the process of submitting relevant documents was extremely labored. The evaluation focused on a review of these documents supplemented by key informant interviews with Oxfam staff and a partner. For the sake of transparency and learning a table has been developed which outlines the evidence provided and highlights the gaps (see annex 4). It lists the documents that were provided by the Somalia programme against those that Oxfam requires evaluators to review to assess each of the quality standards. That the methodology, evidence and standards were extremely clear provided a transparent and 'enabling' environment for the exercise which is helpful both to the evaluator and the country programme team being evaluated. That it did not elicit a more comprehensive approach to providing the right information in a timely manner is disappointing.

1.5 Structure of the report

The report has been structured according to the quality standards with a section for each. At the beginning of each section is a score which is then described below with reference made to the evidence (primary and secondary). Text boxes inserted into the report have been used to highlight innovative practice or particular successes or challenges.

2. Timeliness

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
1	Timeliness – rapid analysis within one day of getting reports of raised alarm, assessment within one week and assistance started within one week of assessing need to response ²			0

The earliest documented reference to the drought in Somalia is contained in an updated OI Action Plan dated March 2011³ which speaks of '2.4 million people' being affected and reported a 'critical lack of water, food assistance and health services' in a number of regions focusing on South Central.' At this time the Somalia programme remained a category 2 emergency – which had been the case since 2008. This remained in place until July 2011, 2-weeks before the UN declared famine in parts of the country.

While successive iterations of the drought strategy provide evidence of a range of actions being taken from early 2011 which included re-orienting existing programmes to meet drought needs, obtaining a modest CHF grant and approaching other donors with funding requests, it wasn't until after the Category 1 emergency had been called that the programme significantly scaled-up its internal capacity and look to take on new partners and expand into new geographic areas. The RTE documents a range of actions that took place from July which included mobilisation of headquarters personnel, the prioritisation of processing project proposals, the offer and acceptance by the programme of resources including humanitarian funding and personnel and authorisation to scale-up the Kenya-based team.

Documents submitted for the evaluation highlight the redoubling of efforts to scale up the programme at this time. Assessment reports for Lower and Middle Juba and Gedo from July 2011, the preparation of proposals for DFID, Unicef and ECHO in July followed by a CIDA and Scottish government proposal in August, the development of a Somalia HR scale-up plan in August and the HSP deployment spread sheets all testify to this. Once the category 1 response was called, action was fairly swift, but the question remains why the categorisation didn't change gear sooner given the scale of the need and that the deteriorating situation had been documented internally on a regular basis for the 6-months prior to the escalation in categorisation.

A report authored jointly by Oxfam and Save the Children and released in January 2012 raises the important issue of the slow response to the drought despite early warning systems highlighting considerable deterioration in the food security situation as early as November 2010. '*A Dangerous Delay – the cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa (2011)*'⁴ provides evidence of the failure of the aid community to heed evidence from early warning systems.

² The issue of 'raised alarm' is potentially misleading in a situation such as Somalia where there were early warning systems which charted the failure of rains and the increasing fragility of the food security situation over a period of time far in advance of the alarm being raised either by Oxfam or other humanitarian agencies. The more compelling evidence is that organisationally the deterioration in the situation was noted as early as December 2010 and yet an increase in programme scale didn't happen until after the re-categorisation in July. It may be necessary to revise the quality standard to take account of similar slow onset crises where 'alarms' are either ignored or not raised until long after the situation has deteriorated. It might also be helpful to clarify whether this refers to an internal, Oxfam alarm or an external, UN or early warning system or either of the two

³ The document makes mention of an emergency HCT meeting held in January 2011 and the first iteration of the OI Somalia Drought Action Plan in the same month but no evidence of the meeting or the action plan was made available to the evaluator.

⁴ Oxfam & Save the Children (2012) *A Dangerous Delay – the cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa*, 18 January 2012 (internet). Available at <https://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/dangerous-delay>

This document followed the Humanitarian Practice Network Paper entitled '*System Failure? Revisiting the problems of timely response to crises in the Horn of Africa*'⁵ which deals with the same set of issues. The candour of the first of these publications is particularly helpful in informing a judgment about the timeliness of the Oxfam programme.

'Many agencies, including Oxfam and Save the Children, had begun a small-scale response by December 2010, and tried to focus international attention on the impending crisis. But while some performed better than others, most agencies did not adapt their programming on a sufficient scale to meet the level of need over the following six months, and did not begin to respond at scale until after the 2011 rains failed in May. Some agencies declared the situation a corporate priority as early as February, but this only happened in Oxfam and Save the Children at the end of June and early July respectively.'

For slow onset crises, particularly those with established early warning systems as in the case of Somalia the onus should be on the agility of organisational systems to register the deterioration in the situation and to respond to it in a manner that both saves lives and protects livelihoods before it becomes a crisis. In this regard and by its own admission, Oxfam was slow to react although once the organisation had escalated the emergency and established Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa as a corporate priority, support and access to resources followed relatively swiftly.

While it is acknowledged that determining the categorisation of a crisis is a complex art, Oxfam's internal guidelines outlined in the Humanitarian Dossier provide a set of criteria to base decision-making. At the most basic level, the nature and scale of the crisis (very high impact on population; circa > 2,000,000 people affected, circa > 50% of people affected are vulnerable groups, likelihood for the crisis to get worse) should have triggered a re-categorisation of the much sooner than July and while no evidence was provided about corporate reflections on the reactions of the Country Leadership Team (CLT) and/or the Humanitarian Consortium Governance Group's (HCGG) response, given the release of '*the Dangerous Delay*' advocacy paper it will be important that internal reflection and learning accompanies external advocacy on the failures of the humanitarian system more broadly.

While (in the view of the evaluator) the timeliness quality standard continues to be ill-suited to slow onset crises, the failure to scale-up programmes to address the drought despite knowledge of the deteriorating situation means that the standard has not been met by Oxfam.

3. Coverage

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
2	Coverage – 25% of the total affected population but in exceptional circumstances then: Total number of ben's is at least 5% of the disaster-affected population and selected areas the most-affected or marginalised ⁶	4		


⁵ Levine S *et al* (2011) System Failure? Revisiting the problems of timely response to crises in the Horn of Africa in *Humanitarian Practice Network, Network Paper No. 71, November 2011*, Overseas Development Institute

⁶ The quality standard lacks clarity but inasmuch as the Oxfam programme targeted between 11-17% of the affected population, a 'met' score has been awarded. While the Oxfam quality standard for coverage awards a score based on the % of total affected population targeted, a better measure would be the extent to which Oxfam filled 'gaps in coverage' rather than just 'coverage' – where there is 100% coverage by other humanitarian agencies, 25% represents wasted resources whereas in a crises where there is 0% coverage by other agencies, even 5% would represent essential life-saving assistance.

Prior to the drought Oxfam’s programme portfolio in Somalia had been growing but was still geographically limited. There is evidence that Oxfam had been seeking to raise the profile of the crisis with successive iterations of the OI Somalia Drought Action Plan making reference to the deterioration in the situation and Oxfam affiliate efforts to address emergency needs, however limited progress was made in this. Successive updates of the strategy paper show the initial slow progress made in growing the programme; an ECHO proposal was developed to extend WASH services in Lower Juba in March but it wasn’t until July that the possibility of extending a response to Gedo and an expansion of the Mogadishu programme and an expansion into the Afgoye corridor was mooted as part of an organisational effort to scale-up the programme.

It is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy the extent to which Oxfam’s programmes are focused on the most affected areas or most marginalised people, however, a simple mapping exercise (conducted as part of the RTE in October 2011 and replicated in box 2) suggests that a significant proportion of the programme is focused in the areas that are amongst the worst-affected. The RTE notes the challenges that expansion into new geographic areas brings which has required that Oxfam works with new partners often with organisations that it has had no prior experience of. Given the complexities of working in Somalia through remote management processes which carries considerable risk, the decision to expand the programme was a courageous one.

Box 2: Nutrition situation vs. Oxfam’s programme coverage (RTE Somalia Drought Response, October 2011)



While the 14th October OI Somalia response strategy speaks of a prioritisation of the response based on (i) the level of vulnerability (threat to life, health/dignity), and (ii) the areas and populations where response investment promises maximum impact on vulnerability, there is no indication in the evidence provided to the evaluator of how choices made in the geographic spread of the programme relate to these.

While the number of people targeted by both Oxfam affiliates is updated in most of the sitreps, there are some inconsistencies in how the numbers are represented which complicates the task of assessing the number of people whose needs the OGB programme has met. Assuming the data is reliable, it can be said that between July and December 11 between 438,000 and 550,000 people's needs were being met by the programme with an estimate for the total number of beneficiaries reached between 01 July and 01 December 2011 as 909,082 (02 December Sitrep).⁷

Box 3: Oxfam GB Somalia drought beneficiary figures and total beneficiary count (OI sitreps, May – Dec 11)

Month	May 11	July 11	Aug 11	Sep 11	Nov 11	Dec 11	TOTAL OGB
L. Shabelle			211,058	214,761	No details by region	No details by region	Total OGB beneficiaries reached from 01 July – 01 Dec 11
L. Juba	135,000	135,000	133,966	111,799			
M. Juba				46,602			
Banadir			93,376	147,266			
Gedo		0	0	27,090			
Mogadishu		356,000					
TOTAL		491,000	438,400	547,518	524,921	498,551	909,082
Reference	8 May sitrep	18 July sitrep	11 Aug sitrep	16 Sep sitrep	11 Nov sitrep	02 Dec sitrep	02 Dec sitrep
Total Affected	2.4 million	2.84 million	3.7 million	4.0 million	4.0 million	3.0 million	
Reference	Somalia Humanitarian Overview Vol. 4 Issue 5, May 2011	FSNAU, 28 June situation update	OCHA Somalia Situation Report No. 10 23/8/11	OCHA Somalia Situation Report No. 13 14/09/11	OCHA Somalia Situation Report No.21 08/11/11	OCHA Somalia Situation Report No.25 06/12/11	
% coverage	5.6	17.288	11.8	13.68	13.13	16.66	

Over the same period, the total number of people considered to be in need of food assistance is estimated to have been between 2.85 million (in July 2011) to 4.0 million at the peak of the crisis between September and December 2011. The box below provides an analysis of the % coverage of the Oxfam programme which is a very crude calculation (given the inherent inaccuracy of the numbers). The evidence provides no data about the gaps in coverage and the extent to which the Oxfam programme has filled these and as such it's difficult to calculate the added value of the Oxfam response although given the challenging environment, the gross insecurity and the limited access that many agencies have to the country, the coverage is impressive.

4. Technical quality

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards		2	

4.1 Public Health

Public health strategy

WASH was the main focus of Oxfam's work in Somalia long before the programme was re-categorised and the strategy document written after the change speaks of an immediate strategy of expanding 'current WASH programme[s] to provide water for both human consumption and livestock...'. While no formal WASH strategy was submitted to the evaluator, the 14 October 2011 OI

⁷ The Oxfam monthly figures do not include Somaliland

Somalia response strategy speaks of a plan for '1,207,736 vulnerable women, men, boys and girls to receive a basic emergency water and sanitation package to sustain their lives and livelihoods' by scaling up WASH interventions to reach 362,000 people in Mogadishu and the Afgoye Corridor, 230,000 people in Middle/Lower Juba and 140,000 people in Gedo and 74,000 people in Somaliland. The OI strategy is accompanied by an operational plan (albeit without a date) which provides a detailed implementation Gantt chart which breaks down key activities by month.

Public health proposal submissions

WASH proposals provide a detailed indication of the needs (particularly the DFID proposal for Lower Shabelle which draws extensively from a baseline assessment undertaken by Oxfam's partner HIJRA) and broadly speak to good practice targets and standards. Many (although not all) of the proposals directly refer to Sphere minimum standards. Importantly, reference is also made in some of the proposals to constraints to meeting standards due to the limited yield from groundwater sources. Across its proposals, the basic indicators for meeting the standard are articulated as (i) beneficiaries have access to at least 15 litres of safe drinking water per person per day by the end of the project; (ii) no beneficiary has to walk more than 1-hour to a water distribution point, and; (iii) queuing time at borehole water points is not more than 30-minutes. Proposals for a number of the larger proposals also speak to accountability standards (Sphere 'common' standards) and a raft of other standards (including 'do no harm', 'safe programming' and partnership although minimal detail is provided in the proposal of these and no explicit objectives or means of verification are included to measure the success or otherwise of implementation.

Public health monitoring & results

Of the proposals submitted to donors that included a WASH component, interim reports have been submitted to DFID, CIDA and the DEC. A review of the reports shows a strong emphasis on achieving targets and meeting (and contextualising) standards. The performance tables in the October 2011 CIDA interim report which provide a detailed narrative against each of the indicators represents good practice (irrespective of whether it is a pre-condition for funding or not). The level of analysis provided in this section of the report suggests that detailed monitoring and reporting is occurring on a range of aspects related to the programme. It also acts as an endorsement for the model of partnership which Oxfam has adopted which is particularly challenging due to the difficulties in providing technical assistance (see box 4 below).

The most comprehensive assessments of technical quality are provided by the independent evaluation of the WASH/cash distribution project in IDP camps in Mogadishu. This excellent report provides a detailed overview of the programme based on qualitative and quantitative data and speaks directly to Sphere minimum standards. In addition to providing details of programme achievements it also speaks to commitments to understanding and meeting the needs of women, the effectiveness of the model of partnership and issues of participation of the local community.

Box 4: The Challenge of providing technical support to the WASH programme (RTE, October 2011)

'Given that this is one of the principal professional competencies of Oxfam, it is disconcerting and frustrating for Oxfam that it is unable to supply the level of technical support in Somalia that it could have or would like to. Once again the problem of lack of access poses a major challenge for Oxfam to undertake necessary technical assessments alongside partners and offer solutions. Suitably qualified PHEs and PHPs in Somalia are in short supply. Somali-speaking Kenyan nationals also have limited access into the country. Technical support supplied from across the border in Kenya is of limited use as decisions, adaptation and modifications must be made on the ground. Once again, there is a heavy reliance on the small handful of partners that do have the experience and training acquired previously...Both affiliates [OGB and ON] acutely sense the shortage of WASH expertise in some of the partners. As suitably competent personnel are difficult to come by, Oxfam will continue to have to support partners remotely from Kenya.'

The Somalia programme also benefits from a comprehensive WASH activity monitoring spread sheet which is disaggregated by donor. Data collected includes physical facilities, latrine coverage, assessment data, programme coverage, NFIs, water quality and capacity building activities. While interpretation of the table requires a level of familiarity with the programme, it certainly suggests the presence of robust systems in place to monitor key performance indicators which is reassuring given the nature of the remotely-managed programme.

Oxfam has also taken on the position of co-chair within the WASH Cluster which has provided an opportunity to lobby for and develop contextualised sectoral standards which has influenced programme quality beyond Oxfam's own interventions.

4.2 Emergency food security & vulnerable livelihoods

EFSVL strategy

EFVSL is referred to in the July OI drought response strategy albeit as a list of areas for intervention but it is only in the 14 October OI Somalia response strategy that it appears as a more coherent part of an overall response to the drought in Somalia alongside a basic indicator (*'609,736 vulnerable women, men, boys, girls have increased access to food and integrated livelihood support to increase their purchasing power and households incomes to a minimum food basket threshold'*) and set of geographic interventions.

Interviews confirmed that no overall strategy document exists for EFVSL but the RTE describes the programme as consisting of a range of interventions including nutrition/CTC in Banadir and Hiran, agricultural support in riverine areas, small scale livestock support in Galguduud, and some cash for work activities in Lower Shabelle (which is reiterated in the October OI Somalia Response strategy alongside ON interventions). The most dominant component of EFSVL is the cash transfer programme which is geographically extensive (the RTE notes that it is of *'an unprecedented scale for Oxfam'*) and which started in a few areas in September 2011 before gaining critical mass in recent months. Because of the scale of the programme, the complexity of the country, the nature of Oxfam's remote programming and for a number of other food security-related reasons the programme is considered to be a challenging one.

EFSVL proposal submissions

Oxfam has submitted a number of proposals for funding for EFSVL projects (DEC, DFID, CIDA, Unicef). Each of the proposals routinely provide a rationale for the intervention, a targeting strategy, documents risks and mitigation strategies and provides details of performance measurement plans and means of verification. While these do not mention the Sphere standards explicitly they broadly reflect the standard and speak to many of the indicators. They also speak to issues raised in the guidance notes section of the handbook.

There is a valid concern raised in a number of the documents about Oxfam's implementation capacity that was addressed to some extent by the deployment of an HSP to the programme to act in the role of a food security coordinator. While it's a leap of logic to suggest that this bridges the knowledge gaps of Oxfam's partners there is evidence to suggest that targeted capacity building of partner organisations went some way to filling these gaps and in ensuring that implementation went as planned. An innovative approach to financial risk management was also taken which saw the majority of funds being delivered directly to the money transfer company. A comprehensive evaluation of the company was conducted after a far smaller cash transfer programme in the Afgoye corridor and which provided significant learning and a sound basis for the partnership. Training to partners also provided important coordination and fire-fighting capacity which was warranted given the unprecedented scale and complexity of the programme.

EFSVL monitoring & results

Interviews with the former EFVSL Coordinator suggest that a web of monitoring systems were adopted in order to ensure satisfactory delivery of the programmes; from September 2011 Oxfam contributed to an interagency mechanism which was complimented by individual project monitoring and an independent mobile hotline (see section 6 for a more detailed discussion of this). This information was further strengthened by a system of monthly reporting between each of the partners and Oxfam programme managers, some of whom were able to make irregular field trips to check on progress (trip reports were received from the PM for Mogadishu/Afgoye corridor which verified this). A cash distribution monitoring matrix exists (albeit dated November 2011) which provides top line beneficiary figures and donor data for programmes in Banadir, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo. The document submitted to the evaluator is incomplete but if regularly updated the table has the potential to make a significant contribution to Oxfam's internal monitoring and would have provided a stronger evidence-base for the evaluation.

Of the 3 donor reports submitted for the evaluation (DFID, DEC, CIDA), the DFID and DEC report both provide a comprehensive overview of the EFVSL programme preparation and reports on partner training, beneficiary targeting and selection and highlights results alongside constraints that the team faced in delivering the programme which includes insecurity. The reports detail monitoring systems which include complaints and an indication of how these have been handled.

Outside of donor reports there are 2 other documents which provide evidence of programme monitoring and sensitive handling of complexity. The most detailed report on EFVSL was written by the outgoing Coordinator (also a Humanitarian Support Personnel staff member) as a handover document for his successor but this is more an operational rather than a monitoring report. It highlights many of the practical challenges and provides a level of assurance that these are being proactively managed. It does include a section on monitoring which recommends improvements to data collection including the use of qualitative feedback in addition to quantitative information and analysis. It also suggests a number of modifications to the existing monitoring tools to capture missing information. The document does not speak directly to Oxfam's EFVSL minimum standards or Sphere although interviews gave provided evidence that these are adhered to across Oxfam's EFVSL programmes.

A second document that speaks to the technical quality standard is a post-distribution monitoring report from the Cash Transfer programme in Mogadishu and Gedo dated January 2012. It links the size of the cash grant to the FSNAU-recommended minimum food expenditure basket suggesting that it is contextually relevant and explores issues of compliance, complaints, use of the cash and makes recommendations for the improvement of the programme. The results of the PDM interviews suggest some encouraging results from the programme which targeted 15,435 households which were targeted (52% of the 499 respondents felt that the amount of the cash transfer was sufficient to cover basic needs, 71% were aware of the complaints mechanism) in addition to contributing to fine-tuning of the programme (Around 51% of the respondents agreed that the traders have increased their process due to the cash distribution). The PDM exercise concluded that the programme in Mogadishu and Gedo had achieved its objectives in ensuring that households have access to food and basic needs such as clothing and healthcare and remarks that the representation of women in the programme was *'very good'*.

In addition to programme quality, the effectiveness of Oxfam's relationship with its primary cash distribution partner was also evaluated in June 2011 in order to draw lessons from the experience and better understand the strengths and to highlight and address challenges. While, because of the sums of money involved, the exercise was very sensitive, it is testament to the strength of the partnership that a comprehensive review was possible which highlighted some important successes of the model in addition to highlighting a number of areas which required fine-tuning. Amongst

other findings, the evaluation provides evidence of the project's comparative '*effectiveness and efficiency*'.

5. Indicators

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
4	Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured		1	

OPAL

The PIP was (last) authorised in August 2011 and contains a summary of the impact of the programme, a set of outcomes with indicators, MoV and monitoring framework. Included in the attachments are a '*contextual model*' for Oxfam's PH-EFSL interventions and a '*logic model*' both of which provide additional contextually-relevant detail about the strategy, outcomes and impact of the programme.

For the first 3 outcomes the first two of which are related to technical interventions and the third of which related to partner capacity, the associated outcome indicators are specific, measurable, relevant and time bound. For the fourth outcome which speaks to policy change in support of more effective protection and aid delivery, the linkage between the outcome and the 2 outcome indicators is less clear and the sources of data identified and the means of verification are less specific and will be difficult to objectively measure. The logic model and contextual model are both helpful in describing strategies to achieve the programme goal and to have impact.

Gender is incorporated into the logical framework as an outcome indicator for the '*effective protection and aid delivery*' outcome and has a data collection strategy and MoV linked to it. Safe access to latrines for women is also included as a means of verifying progress against the latrine usage outcome indicator. There are no explicit gender-related indicators for the EFVSL or partnership outcomes.

Given that the final version of the PIP was authorised relatively soon (within 4-weeks) of the category 1 emergency being called, the monitoring framework will have provided an important blue print for data collection across the programme. Evidence of this data having been collected is patchy, and perhaps understandably so given the desk-based nature of the evaluation which relies heavily on review of electronic data which is limited. No programme updates were submitted from Oxfam's partners although Oxfam staff trip reports, independent monitoring reports and donor reports go some way to filling this gap. There is also a comprehensive WASH activity monitoring sheet which suggests that data for technical outcomes is being routinely collected. A similar spread sheet for EFVSL was reviewed although it appeared to be incomplete. No evidence of monitoring for the partnership outcome indicators was found and apart from ad-hoc references made in sitreps no coherent monitoring data was found for the '*effective aid delivery and protection*' outcome.⁸ While the indicators in the PIP each have a suggested frequency for data collection there is insufficient evidence to determine whether data these ambitions are being met.

Proposals

The larger proposals (DFID, DEC, ECHO, CIDA) all had clearly articulated outputs, indicators and means of verification for programme activities which were broadly in line with the PIP. Monitoring

⁸ The Somalia drought advocacy plan finalised in November 2011 has a more contextually-relevant set of indicators which, while they are not uniformly SMART (they have no MoV), will permit a far greater degree of measurement (see section 10).

frameworks were included in most of the proposals. The proposals differ in the extent to which they make explicit reference to the needs of women although gender considerations are generally included as part of logical frameworks and often have specific indicators. While proposals routinely had means of verification, the periodicity of verification was not always articulated.

Interim narrative reports generally provide strong evidence of progress against outcomes (although data is rarely, disaggregated by sex). The post-category 1 evaluative reports which include a cash evaluation report (05 Dec 2010), an evaluation from the CIDA programme in Mogadishu (April 2011), and a cash post-distribution monitoring report (Jan 2012) have contextually-relevant methodologies (given the constraints to access in Somalia) and partially speak to outcome indicators included in the proposals (it's not possible to be more specific as it's difficult to match evaluative reports with specific donor proposals). The WASH activity monitoring spread sheet referred to above provides a breakdown of progress against donor objectives which is very clear and appears to be reported on a monthly basis.

The independent monitoring reports are also worthy of mention here as they provide an excellent assessment of results. While it is difficult to link proposal outcomes and activities with each of the partner sections in the report, the qualitative data provided which includes a narrative progress report, photos and the outcomes of discussions with project participants provides an excellent accompaniment to the results captured in donor reports. Given the limited ability of Oxfam staff to travel to project areas to monitor results, the analysis provided by the reports is excellent.

6. Participation & Accountability of crisis-affected communities

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
5	Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation	2		

6.1 Community participation in programme design and delivery

It is difficult to make a judgment on the level of beneficiary consultation and participation in programme design and delivery which is in large part due to the remote programming model which Oxfam (and many other agencies) have adopted for work in South Central Somalia. A review of the 2 assessment reports submitted for the evaluation highlight the different practices of Oxfam's partners. The July 2011 Lower Juba and Gedo assessment report which determined a significant part of the programme makes no reference to discussions with communities; in contrast, the baseline survey undertaken by Hijra in May 2011 describes a highly participatory process and provides significant qualitative feedback in addition to quantitative data.

A review of the DEC proposal and interim report suggests that community consultation has been part of the process of programme design. Specifically for the cash distribution programme, reports suggest that initial rapid assessments were conducted in some of the most-affected areas in order to elicit information about needs following which Village Representative Committees (VRCs) were established to assist in implementing the programme, to inform communities about the programme (including criteria, entitlements, payment points, registration, complaints and feedback mechanisms). The results of the exercise to test the hotline during the RTE suggest that this process could be relatively effective for those who have access to a mobile phone (see section 6.2 below).

The evaluator only had access to a small selection of complaints of which none were serious. While there was evidence of action being taken, no examples were provided of complaints leading to a documented change in programming and so it's not possible to comment on the extent to which

feedback led to changes in programming – although interviews provided anecdotal evidence that this had been the case.

6.2 Steps taken to elicit and act on feedback from communities

There is far more evidence in support of the existence of beneficiary feedback mechanisms which forms part of a 'good enough' (Somalia RTE, October 2011) monitoring system (see box 5 below). Of the methods outlined, evidence was submitted from the use of mobile phone hotlines as a means of eliciting feedback and monitoring progress. A number of trip reports were submitted from Oxfam staff monitoring visits which provided evidence of results (quantitative data and photo's) and of problem-solving with partners. Several programme evaluations were also received which were conducted by independent consultants.

Box 5: How Oxfam monitors aid delivery in the Somalia famine response (Oxfam 2-pager, Dec 2011)

Oxfam's key methods of direct monitoring of aid delivery in Somalia's limited access environment:

- Use **traditional monitoring** method of **field visits** when and where access is possible by staff of both Somali ethnicity and international staff. To maximise this, we invest in regular and thorough security analysis.
- Leverage Somalia's communications networks and **mobile phone** technology to **talk directly to beneficiaries**.
- Employ **independent monitoring firms** staffed by both Kenyan and Somali consultants to travel to Somalia and provide third party information to Oxfam on both programme and financial information of partner agencies.
- Maintain open channels of dialogue with partner agencies **to triangulate and verify information** shared with Oxfam by partner agencies working in the same regions
- Oxfam **builds capacity of partner agencies** to work with communities to monitor program impact of assistance.

For its cash distribution programme, Oxfam collected mobile phone numbers of participating beneficiaries (the RTE suggests that 10-15% of beneficiaries registered their phone number) and during the RTE in September 2011 a small number of people were called to provide feedback on the programme with some noteworthy results:

'Out of 12 numbers called, 5 answered (one of whom actually returned their missed call). The purpose of these conversations was to assess beneficiary knowledge of their selection criteria, their impression of the process, understanding of the project, and whether the recipients knew how to lodge any complaints if needed. 4 out of 5 respondents were the women who's [*sic*] names appeared in the registration list. The 5th person was the husband of the woman registered. All knew, understood and agreed with the selection criteria used by the partner and confirmed that there was no controversy in the community about this. All said they knew how to contact an official from the organization in case they needed to. All were aware that they had been registered to receive a cash grant, however, none of them were aware when, how and how much money would be received.'

A second means of eliciting feedback from project participants is through a '*beneficiary hotline*' which is a number that can be called (or SMSed) to provide feedback or register a complaint which will then be returned by a Somali-speaking Oxfam staff member. Between mid-September and end-October Oxfam had received 82 calls, the majority from women, to request information about the programme, to raise additional need and to provide feedback on programme activities. This system is only able to function in TFG-controlled areas due to restrictions imposed in Al Shabab-controlled areas. The DEC Phase 1 report submitted in January 2012 reports encouraging results and follow-up from its hotline as indicated in box 6.

A sample Monthly Beneficiary Hotline Update was submitted to the evaluator dated 4 October 2011 which contains a description of calls received disaggregated by geographic region and gender. A description of the nature of the calls is logged on the spread sheet and separate tables for minor and major complaints are provided with a column (filled in) for action taken by Oxfam and/or its partner. The logging of complaints alongside follow-up constitutes good practice and provides a level of reassurance that action has been taken to follow-up on issues raised by project participants in a timely manner.

Box 6: Feedback from beneficiary hotline (DEC Phase 1 Report, Jan 2012)

Two levels of complaint and feedback mechanisms have been established, one in the field (WASDA will receive complaints and act on them) and another one at Nairobi where Oxfam MEAL Officer will also receive complaints from the field directly through the Nairobi hot line number. 30 Community focal points have also been recruited and have been given mobile phones so that communities can forward their complaints and being assisted. Procurement of mobile phones is ongoing. 40 Cases were collected so far and addressed through the community focal persons who are working under the guidance of MEAL officers, partner and Oxfam.

Nature of the cases received:

- 80% of the feedback were compliments and beneficiaries calling to say "thank you to the donor"
- Beneficiary names missing from the payroll
- Mistakes in the names of the beneficiaries
- Beneficiaries enquiring when to expect their next payment
- Report of Lost beneficiary cards
- Beneficiary cards stolen

Measures taken to address the above feedback/complaints

- Contact all those beneficiaries who missed the first round of payment due to typing error or screening process and confirming to them that they will receive their money in the subsequent payment after confirming all is correct
- Correct all names in the payroll by going back to the community and doing public screening
- Replacement for lost beneficiary cards and cancelling the previous ones

However, the feedback on the use of the hotline isn't uniformly positive with the draft independent monitor's report for February 2012 suggesting that in Soma Action and WASDA's programme areas respectively, 43% and 61% of beneficiaries interviewed were unaware of the mechanism. Furthermore, for Soma Action, 75% of beneficiaries said they didn't know how to use the mechanism – the fact that it relies on access to mobile phones which are more common (and effective) in urban areas may go some way to explaining this. It's important to note that the independent monitors report itself draws on extensive beneficiary feedback and as such should be considered good practice in remote monitoring and in community participation. The report is refreshingly frank and action orientated and as part of a 'menu' of monitoring mechanisms makes up for some of the technical limitations of the hotline.

There is evidence of a similar hotline in place for Oxfam's WASH programme guided by a telephone feedback mechanism protocol which provides guidance to Oxfam staff on how to register and follow-up complaints received. No information pertaining to the use of this system was provided to the evaluator and so it's not possible to comment on the extent to which the system has been used or the sorts of issues that have been raised.

7. Partnership

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
6	Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle	2 ⁹		

Oxfam manages its programme in Somalia remotely and has established mature partnerships over a number of years with a small number of partners who are geographically confined due to their clan-affiliations. While this model was considered appropriate for longer-term development work, it was considered a constraint to scaling up the programme and at times has even risked being divisive as a result of inter-clan rivalry. One of the biggest risks to working in some of the parts of the country most affected by the drought was the need to take on more partners, most of whom were unknown to Oxfam. Given the limited capacity of many partners and the urgency with which Oxfam needed to start programmes, there was little time to engage in lengthy capacity assessments.

The key piece of evidence provided to the evaluator was a report from a 2-day capacity assessment mission during which 3 potential partners were visited and assessed against a standardised set of criteria which included the structure and governance of the organisation, financial and information systems, management and internal systems and results and performance. It is unclear the extent to which the assessment met the requirements of Oxfam's partnership policy (as articulated in the Humanitarian Dossier v4, 2011) as the document is not explicitly referred to but the speed with which the exercise was conducted and the outcomes suggest that at best a fast-track process was applied. Based on this all 3 partners were put forward as potential implementing partners albeit with a range of recommendations including targeted capacity building. The extent to which those recommendations have been followed through is unclear as only limited evidence was provided about Oxfam's capacity building activities. No reference was made to the OI partner capacity assessment tool or the extent to which each of the partners had met benchmarks that it defines. The RTE notes the time-consuming nature of having to undertake capacity assessments and capacity building/institutional strengthening programmes and the potential implications this has on the scale of the programme and the speed of response.

In its Somalia strategy (14 October 2011) Oxfam International has established a set of performance standards which include OI and Sphere standards, gender and protection mainstreaming. It is assumed that other of Oxfam's signed-on commitments are implemented by its (implementing) partners. Oxfam outlines its relationship with its partners in a partnership relationship document (Aug 2010) where it states that;

'The remote partnership model is based on the principle of equal partnership with a near or complete handover of day-to-day implementation responsibility to the national partners. At the same time, because of limited access to program implementation areas in South Central Somalia, there is understanding of not relying on trust alone in partnership relationships and must place a high priority on monitoring and evaluation, as well as accountability mechanisms in order to ensure quality and effective programming.'

One of the implications of this is that in evaluating performance of programmes, evidence from a mix of qualitative and quantitative monitoring mechanisms are used. A secondary implication is that partners are fundamentally responsible for all aspects of the project cycle. The extent to which this

⁹ The nature of the remote programming model adopted by Oxfam in Somalia requires that partners are involved in all aspects of the project cycle – which is the benchmark for Oxfam's quality standard, however, if the 'quality check' contained in the consultants guidelines is applied then the benchmark would only be partially met. It is recommended that the quality standard is re-phrased to reflect broader partnership issues including assessment and capacity building commitments.

is supported by the breadth of evidence required by the GHIT is limited; no learning reports were submitted to the evaluator and evidence provided of partner capacity building activities was limited to (i) the management response to the RTE which speaks of a £10,000 grant to cover organisational capacity development for HIJRA and WASDA, (ii) training of Oxfam partners in cash programming by the EFSVL team, and (iii) training on OI minimum gender standards for 3 of OI's partners in Somalia (ALDEF, WASDA and NAPAAD by January 2012). The October OI Somalia response strategy speaks of the need for a capacity building plan to be developed starting with an organisational capacity needs assessment and the importance of an earmarked budget to facilitate this. Reference is made to the partnership model being reviewed during the mid-February programme review meeting and interviews revealed that this took place concurrently with the evaluation.

The only (unsigned) partnership agreement submitted for the evaluation pre-dated the category 1 by a year. It was for the implementation of an ECHO programme by WASDA in Gedo and it provides a very strong foundation for accountable and effective partnership. There is no evidence to show that this template was extended to partners engaged in the drought response although this may be assumed.

While Oxfam delivers its entire programme portfolio through partners and has a rigorous monitoring framework, the evaluation had incomplete evidence of an accountability paper-trail. No partner progress reports were submitted to the evaluator (although interviewees from partners and Oxfam spoke of their existence). However, a number of independent and Oxfam monitoring reports from across the programme were reviewed which provided a narrative overview of progress against objectives, quantitative results and photo's to confirm that results had been achieved. The 2 evaluation reports and 3 interim donor reports that were submitted are uniformly positive about achievement against objectives and provide a strong endorsement of both the relationship and the capacity of partners.

Despite the desk-based nature of the evaluation and the limited information provided on partner capacity assessment, training needs and capacity building ambitions interviews with both Oxfam staff and partner representatives suggest that good links have been made and while there is progress still to be made, particularly with the newer partners, the results of the recent partnership meeting suggests a mutual interest in continuing to strengthen relationships.

8. Dignity, protection, gender & vulnerability

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
7	Programme reflects measures to address dignity ¹⁰ and protection issues		1	
8	Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups		1	

¹⁰ The reference to dignity in the quality standard would benefit from greater elaboration in the quality standard and quality checks contained in the '*guide for consultants*'. If, as assumed by the evaluator, it refers to the '*right to life with dignity*' as articulated in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter, this goes far beyond issues of protection (the right to protection and security is considered as a separate common principle in the Sphere handbook). Fundamentally, aspects of dignity cut across many of the standards contained in the GHIT. Rather than seek to undertake a cursory stand-alone examination of Oxfam's contribution to addressing issues of dignity an assessment of this is best formed based on an examination of the evaluation in its entirety.

8.1 Programme addresses gender & vulnerability

The most significant reference to gender since the re-categorisation of the Somalia humanitarian programme to category 1 is contained in a one-page PIP gender analysis which is a requirement for authorisation. The submission includes an analysis of the situation of women in Somalia and a set of bullet points which provide the basis for Oxfam's efforts to ensure women '*enjoy life with dignity...[and] have greater control over their situation*' (see box 7 below). The PIP pre-dated the finalisation of the OI minimum standards and hence no mention is made of these.

Box 7: PIP submission describing efforts by the Somalia scale-up programme to ensure gender equity

- Employ women staff and partner staff when possible;
- Target mainly women for cash transfers;
- Distribution of sanitary protection kits to women as part of hygiene promotion activities;
- Take every opportunity to engage women, men, boys and girls in the discussions about project and programme design, implementation and progress;
- Facilitating fair representation (composition and responsibilities) of women and men in the responsible committees (like Village Relief Committees and WASH Committees). This also means adapting where possible the timetable of activities for women to take into account other demands on women as caretakers e.g. organizing any trainings and meetings to accommodate other responsibilities women have at the household level;
- Facilitating fair access to income opportunities in construction / rehabilitation of infrastructure, particularly for women. This could mean women working on culturally acceptable components of infrastructure construction / rehabilitation such as fending, collection and sorting of sand and gravel for well and pan construction / rehabilitation. This also means adapting where possible the timetable of activities for women to take into account other demands on a woman as caretaker;
- Seeking advice from users of the sanitation facilities, specifically on special needs of women during pregnancy.

The OI Somalia Response Strategy has a more strategic approach than the OGB PIP which speaks of a commitment to OI's minimum standards on gender equality and women's rights in emergencies; targeted capacity building of Oxfam staff and partners and the development of a gender strategy based on the capacity, needs and plans of both Oxfam and its partners. A gender strategy dated 30 January 2009 for the period 2009 – 2011 exists but an updated strategy has not yet been prepared although this is planned for the future.

A review of the assessment and baseline data provides a mixed picture in terms of performance of Oxfam and its partners against the minimum standards with several of the assessments (for Lower Juba and Gedo) paying scant attention to the specific needs of women or disaggregating data by sex and the failure of the WASDA baseline report to include the situation or needs of women. This is tempered by a baseline report by Hijra which included a female staff member in its team, which managed to facilitate several women's focus group discussions and went some way to identifying specific needs.

From an operational perspective the evidence suggests that the Oxfam team have made some progress in ensuring that programmes meet the needs and reflect some of the priorities of women;

- Proposals: The selection criteria for the EFVSL programmes outlined in the DFID, CIDA, and ECHO proposal all speak of a prioritisation of pregnant and lactating mothers and female-headed households and mothers of malnourished children. Objectives related to WASH fail to refer to the needs of women or have specific objectives or indicators associated with gender. Proposals for smaller donors omit to make reference to women's needs or specifically to gender standards (Scottish government, Band Aid Trust, Medicor).

- Donor Reports: Logical frameworks and interim reports provide scant detail of Oxfam's aspirations for meeting gender minimum standards (the DFID interim report only mentions women in connection with the distribution of sanitary protection kits). Apart from the CHF interim report (which shows a 50/50 split between male and female beneficiaries), there is no sex-disaggregated monitoring data given against broader EFVSL and WASH objectives.
- Internal monitoring: The WASH activity monitoring spread sheet disaggregates beneficiaries by gender to the village level which is an impressive achievement. The November 2011 EFVSL spread sheet does not disaggregate data and is only partially completed. Sitreps do not provide sex-disaggregated data although they do contain periodic updates about the impact of the programme on women.
- Evaluation Reports: Evidence from the April 2011 CIDA programme evaluation report goes to confirm the targeting strategy for EFVSL programmes and the impact it had on household food consumption, suggests that women's needs for privacy and safety were taken into account when latrines were sited and that the sanitary protection kit was considered extremely relevant to the needs of women who were participated in the programme. The report also provides beneficiary figures disaggregated by gender which shows that 75% of WASH committees were formed of women and 85% of its users were women and that 100% of the EFVSL programme was targeted at women.

The RTE provides important analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the OGB programme in terms of gender, and highlights the successes of the programme in targeting vulnerable women but also raises concerns about the limited analysis that currently exists within the team and the lack of awareness within OGB and its partners about the OI Minimum standards. It flags the limited support that the programme has received from the regional gender advisor (who was deployed to the programme between the end of August and end of January and initially divided her time between Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) and the challenges that Oxfam has faced in trying to meet targets such as employing women at implementation level. Given the challenges identified it is curious that the RTE offers no recommendations to address these issues.

An interview with the Humanitarian Global Gender Advisor and a review of the action plan she prepared provides evidence of the capacity building initiatives that Oxfam has embarked on internally and with its partners but reveal also the *'journey'* that will be required and which will take time to complete. Her limited engagement in the early months of the drought response and the lack of a designated gender advisor in the OGB Somalia team (although there is an OI resource which the programme benefits from) may also go some way to explaining the relatively limited integration of gender non-negotiable into the MEAL framework which also continues to be a work in progress and one that will be important to finalise in the future.

8.2 Programme addresses issues of dignity & protection

The PIP explicitly refers to the protection of civilians as one of the programme outcomes and has an outcome indicator linked to this albeit one that is not easily measurable. Reference to protection is also made in the logic model which highlights the important potential contribution of the Somalia advocacy strategy to the achievement of this outcome. The 2011 – 2013 Somalia advocacy strategy has protection as its second objective and has developed a problem statement, change analysis, a set of messages and targets which speak to the *'rights of civilians to be protected from harm through upholding international humanitarian and human rights law and a Security Sector Reform agenda that is focused on the protection of civilians'*. The Somalia drought advocacy plan which was produced 4-months after the category 1 was called has a protection objective which states that, *'by the end of January 2012, EU, UK, UNPOS, AU and others press for more effective control and accountability over TFG and allied forces in order to improve the safety of civilians in areas under their control and to ensure aid can reach people in need in an unhindered manner'*. For al-Shabab held areas, the advocacy objective focuses on *'access to high quality humanitarian assistance'* and doesn't mention protection explicitly.

While the advocacy strategy places an emphasis on protection, what is less clear is how this is linked to the drought programme which is not helped by the limited reference made to protection across programme strategies, assessments, proposals, reports and project documents. The October 2011 OI Somalia Response Strategy provides some analysis of protection-related concerns although the strategy it articulates provides scant attention to protection (the word only appears twice in the document related to the 'protection' of shallow wells and as a risk mitigation measure). A one-paragraph protection analysis was only included in the ECHO and DFID proposals (see box 8 below).

Box 8: Integration of protection into project proposals

Proposal	Protection analysis	Protection-related budget/activities
Scottish government	No mention of protection	
Band Aid Trust	No mention of protection	
ECHO	Link between 'safe programming' and advocacy related to protection	20% contribution to policy and protection advisor post
CIDA	No mention of protection	
DFID	Protection analysis	Mainstreamed across the programme
Medicor	No mention of protection	
CHF	No mention of protection	
DEC	No mention of protection	
Unicef	No mention of protection	

It was not possible to review budgeting for protection as there were no stand-alone protection activities and no budget lines dedicated to protection-related activities. The DFID proposal describes Oxfam's approach to protection in the drought response as being mainstreamed throughout the programme with a commitment to *'monitor, reduce, avoid or mitigate [risks] as much as possible'*. It speaks of linkages made to UNHCR protection partners and support to strategies that promote access to *'impartial, relevant and reliable information about services'* to which beneficiaries are entitled. It also stresses the link between protection related activities, information and advocacy. The ECHO, DEC, CIDA, CHF, Unicef and DFID interim reports do not contain reference to any protection-related issues or results and there are no stand-alone protection updates which provide evidence of progress being made against Oxfam's programmatic commitment to protection.

Of the 3 partner assessment reports received, only one (Hijra, Baseline report, May 2011) speaks to protection issues related to the lack of latrines and the implications this has on the safety of women and girls which likely draws on training that Oxfam provided to them (and WASDA) in April 2011. Of the 4 most significant evaluative reports reviewed (DFID, CIDA, cash evaluation report, cash PDM report) none of them made reference to protection. Sitreps made reference to protection-related issues in the *'Advocacy & Lobbying'* and *'Media and Communications'* sections highlighting the strong linkage made between macro-level protection issues in Somalia and Oxfam's advocacy however it is more difficult to find evidence of linkages between programme-related protection issues and advocacy.

Interviews with Oxfam staff tended to underscore the disconnect between Oxfam's advocacy on protection and its programme although measures have now been taken to close the gap which include an inclusive strategy development process and more regular meetings between advocacy staff and Oxfam's partners. Interviews with programme staff highlighted an emphasis on *'safe programming'* the focus of which is on ensuring that public health and livelihoods interventions do not create or heighten risks to communities.

9. Coherence (preparedness, disaster risk reduction, recovery & exit)

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
9	Exit strategy/recovery plan in place		1	
10	Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response		1	
12	Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area ¹¹			0

9.1 Programme informed by contingency planning

A contingency plan dated March 2010 was reviewed and interviews suggest that it was of limited relevance to the initial drought response which pre-dated the re-categorisation of the emergency. Drought was one of the 4 scenarios envisaged by the plan although the estimates of the number of people that would be affected was extremely optimistic and there was inadequate attention given to the need for Oxfam to expand its response beyond its existing programme areas and sectors as evidenced by the small number of partners and the focus on WASH in the document. However, there were also some contingency planning successes; Oxfam's existing partners have successfully scaled-up their programmes to deliver emergency assistance in their areas of operation as indicated in the plan and interviews suggest that contingency stocks which had been pre-positioned in Mogadishu went some way to delivering urgent WASH services for drought-affected IDPs arriving in the Afgoye Corridor.

From January 2011 the contingency plan was superseded by an OI Action Plan which sought to guide OI's response to the drought. This was regularly updated as the situation changed and while it had limited impact on the size of Oxfam GB's programme prior to the Category 1 emergency being called, it certainly contributed to preparation for scale-up.

Despite evidence of planning, that the programme didn't significantly scale-up until July suggests that there was a break in the alert and response chain which stretches from project participants to partners to the OGB Somalia country programme to the OGB HECA regional office to Oxfam House. There is insufficient evidence to identify the weak link, but the RTE (October 2011) poses some important questions that Oxfam will need to answer in order to strengthen the timeliness of its responses in the future.

'Preparedness is a factor of two variables: the anticipation of the emergency and the readiness or capacity to respond appropriately. As discussed earlier, the crisis in Somalia did not come as surprise to anyone in the country programs. What is debatable is the degree of seriousness with which the early warning signs were taken by the confederation. Attempts at alerting the media and global attention also fell short (see benchmark #7) of mobilizing international action. This raises the all-too-familiar familiar question of what does it takes to trigger the kind of response that was needed? What are the incentives for relief organizations to take speedier action?'

The RTE goes on to note a '*disconnect*' between regional warnings and HQ triggers and speaks of Oxfam having to '*scramble*' to identify partners in a country where partnership is complex and direct access by Oxfam to project participants is not possible which certainly suggests some serious deficiencies in preparedness planning, or at the very least in the expectations between different parts of the organisation of a proportionate response.

¹¹ As feedback on the phrasing of the standard, it is recommended that the evaluation retains a focus on what has been achieved rather than on what might occur in the future.

The learning from the drought response and recommendations from the RTE have been addressed in part through the articulation of an OI Contingency Plan for Somalia/Somaliland (dated November 2011) although there is a risk that by omitting Puntland which is itself highly vulnerable to crises, both man-made and natural, history may still repeat itself. Importantly the plan identifies potential partners (a weakness in the drought scale-up) identifies response strategies and resources and makes recommendations for budgets and funding. However, it is less clear what Oxfam has done at an oversight/organisational level to address the failure of the process of humanitarian categorisation which accompanied the 'disconnect'.

9.2 Programme links to disaster risk reduction

There is fairly scant evidence in the documentation of linkages to disaster risk reduction although it is referred to in the most recent iteration of the OI Somalia strategy which speaks of '*community managed disaster risk reduction mainstreamed into the project to strengthen capacities of the disaster-prone rural as well as urban communities to cope with both natural and man-made hazards and disasters.*' In the OI Contingency Plan for Somalia written in November 2011 reference is made to DRR in section 6 of the document under '*Possible response strategy*' in the form of a number of bullet points against specific hazards.

Box 9: References to DRR in Oxfam's drought response project proposals

Date	Proposal	Reference to disaster risk reduction
11 Oct	CIDA cash transfer	No reference
01 Aug	Scottish government WASH	No reference
14 Jul	Unicef WASH	No reference
19 Jul	ECHO cash transfer	No reference (despite guidance)
30 Aug	Medicor Foundation	No reference
04 Aug	DEC	No reference
02 Aug	Band Aid Trust	No reference
Jul	DFID WASH & Livelihoods	Link between village relief committees and DRR

Only 1 of the project proposals submitted for the evaluation made a cursory reference to DRR and although interviews suggested that a water catchment programmes had been funded with Oxfam appeal funds, no evidence was provided of these. Interviews with team members suggested that DRR hadn't been incorporated into programmes to any great extent although current discussions were focused on moving from life-saving assistance to recovery operations which would provide far greater latitude for DRR to be implemented.

Looking to the future, interviews highlighted the potential learning on DRR available from elsewhere in the Oxfam programme including from the (i) 3-year EC-funded Community-driven Livelihood and Food Security Initiative programme in Lower Juba (which itself has been badly affected by the lack of water for irrigation) and (ii) the Somaliland cross border pastoral programme which is trialling an innovative approach to measuring adaptation and risk reduction for its drought preparedness project as part of Oxfam's new Global Performance Framework. However at present these programmes appear to stand alongside the post-July 2011 scale-up work rather than be an integrated part of it.

While the quality standard developed by Oxfam provides latitude to accept an aspirational commitment to include DRR into programmes, this evaluation will limit itself to looking backwards rather than trying to gauge commitments to DRR in the future. As a consequence there is insufficient evidence at this moment to support either a '*met*' or '*partly met*' score against the standard.

9.3 Programme links to recovery & exit

The 14 October OI Somalia Response Strategy provides details of an early recovery strategy as a second phase of the response and provides broad ambitions for Oxfam's response including an

overview of activities and target groups. In the document the timescale of the phase is a 6-month period between January 2012 and 30 June 2012 which is followed by a '*longer-term*' phase with a timeline of 9-months.

'In this [recovery] phase, early recovery activities, including rehabilitation/restarting livelihoods by providing necessary inputs, rehabilitating productive assets, capacity building (sectoral and in technical areas) will be implemented. Early recovery activities will include: CFW, de-silting of canals and water pans, de-silting of dams and deepening and protection of the shallow wells, hydro-geological survey and drilling of new strategic boreholes and maintaining existing ones. Other activities envisaged to encourage recovery for those in AFLC include distribution of agriculture inputs such as seeds, provision of veterinary services, re-distribution of livestock, fodder production and capacity building on improved farming and livestock practices. Income generating activities will be targeted to female headed households, IDP women and the elderly among other vulnerable groups.'

This description is expanded on in the EFSVL handover document which provides a timeline and a broad programme strategy which includes the continuation of cash assistance for a period of 3-months to be complemented and replaced by cash for work for agricultural rehabilitation and livelihood restoration. Cash grants are anticipated for women-headed households and livestock protection for pastoralists both of whom are considered to be particularly vulnerable groups. Written several months after the OI Response Strategy it suggests a progression in thinking not least of all because the timescale is significantly different (a 12-month process between March 2012 – 2013). Interviews highlighted the challenge that the programme faced in trying to move from humanitarian to recovery programme and suggested that this timeline is likely to continue to shift.

Box 10: References to recovery in Oxfam's drought response project proposals

Date	Proposal	Reference to recovery or exit
11 Oct	CIDA cash transfer	No reference
01 Aug	Scottish government WASH	No reference
14 Jul	Unicef WASH	No reference
19 Jul	ECHO cash transfer	A sentence on the link of intervention to recovery of farmers
30 Aug	Medicor Foundation	No reference
04 Aug	DEC	No reference
02 Aug	Band Aid Trust	No reference
Jul	DFID WASH & Livelihoods	Section included on sustainability of intervention and recovery

Although some longer-term programming aspects have been built into some of the projects (such as well and borehole rehabilitation) only 2 of Oxfam's proposals make reference to recovery; the DFID WASH proposal contains a section on sustainability and there is brief mention of agricultural recovery in the ECHO proposal. Given the shifting timelines, the lack of reference to recovery in proposals and the lack of a coherent strategy (or even a one-pager), it can only be assumed that planning for recovery continues to be a work in progress.

10. Advocacy

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
11	Programme addresses advocacy issues ¹²	2		

¹² It is the view of the evaluator that both the quality standard and quality check contained in the 'guidelines for consultants' document provide insufficient rigour. It is recommended that the quality check includes evidence that the strategy includes outcomes, activities, indicators and MoV (which the Somalia strategy does) and that evidence is provided that outcomes have been achieved.

The 2011 – 2013 Somalia advocacy strategy developed in November 2010 and is comprehensive in the contextual detail it provides and in how it seeks to address key issues raised in the problem statement through internal lobbying and direct action including briefings external communications and media. The strategy takes a holistic view of what needs to change in Somalia in order to protect civilians and preserve what humanitarian operating space remains although in doing so is considered by some to be overly complex to lack relevance to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

The Somalia PIP roots the Somalia drought response in the longer-term advocacy strategy, stating as one of the 4 outcomes that the *'policies of [the] international community better support effective aid delivery, protection of civilians and encourage Somali voices through OGB's contributions to the OI Rights in Crisis Somalia Advocacy Strategy'* which is further reinforced through the logic model submitted as part of the PIP. The October OI Somalia Response Strategy identifies a number of actions to contribute to the achievement of the outcomes.

Despite these important building blocks, the October 2011 RTE report raises concerns about the lack of clarity about the different roles played by headquarters, regional office and country offices and makes a recommendation to close the gap between programming on the ground and Oxfam's advocacy work, a recommendation which Oxfam's management response to the RTE seeks to address by proposing that plan is developed for quick sourcing of information to inform media and policy work and to hold regular sessions with partners on long-term plans. Both of these actions were reported as having been addressed by the policy and media team in the February 2012 update.

Further progress was made through the development of a Somalia advocacy plan which was finalised in November 2011 and which will guide Oxfam's advocacy efforts until the end of March 2012. The document benefits from a more contextually-relevant set of objectives, outlines a number of products and activities and contains a set of indicators. The focus on activities (10 products and 14 lobbying activities are listed) and indicators is welcome and represents good practice. It also provides a welcome degree of clarity with which to assess progress.

A comprehensive set of documents were submitted to the evaluator as evidence that progress has been made against many of the actions which has included private and public briefings, the preparation and publication of policy papers, letters to influential targets, analysis and meeting minutes. An interview with a member of the policy team also revealed progress made against establishing links with and lobbying new actors. While it's beyond the scope of this exercise to evaluate the contribution made by Oxfam to positively influencing the situation in Somalia, the drought strategy and the documents provided in support of it provide compelling evidence of action taken to agitate for change and in so doing meets the Oxfam standard.

Annex 1: Evaluation Participants

Oxfam Country Staff

Tess Dico-Young, Global Gender Advisor,
Humanitarian
Adan Kabelo, Country Director
Medard Hakizamungu, Humanitarian
Coordinator
Abdi Maalim, Public Health Advisor
Karen Monteiro, Advocacy Advisor

Loreto Palmeara, former Food Security
Advisor (& HSP EFSL)
Ahmed Ibrahim Abdi, Programme Manager
Mohamed Abdillahi Mohamed, Programme
Manager

Oxfam Partner Staff

Ali Adbi Ibrahim, Soma Action

Annex 2: Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

The evidence needed for each benchmark under the indicator needs to be checked for quality and effect.

Benchmark	Evidence	Quality check	
1	Timeliness – rapid analysis within one day of getting reports of raised alarm, assessment within one week and assistance started within one week of assessing need to response	Initial assessment report RTE report Sitreps from first three weeks Request for Cat Funds Date of first concept note	Check the date of the assessment report – both when the assessment was carried out and when the report was written – not more than three days between dates Check that assessment report has proposed intervention included Check the RTE under benchmark 1 and 2 for mention of timeliness The Sitreps should give the date of first implementation Concept note should be written within 2-3 days of the assessment The request for Cat Funds will also show timeliness as it should be within 2-3 days of assessment
2	Coverage – 25% of the total affected population but in exceptional circumstances then: Total number of beneficiaries is at least 5% of the disaster-affected population and selected areas the most-affected or marginalised	Coverage assessment using the scale RTE reports	Look at the assessment report and the concept note for the total number of affected UN reports will also give total number affected The RTE will give an estimate of programme targets and whether these have been reached In the case where 25% of the population has not been reached, look for explanations such as lack of funds, access issues or good government or UN response – the explanation needs to have been documented – if middle income country then look for proof of government ability to respond If the explanation is plausible and unavoidable, the rating (for exceptions) can be met
3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards	Proposals PH and EFSL strategies Technical adviser visits Log Frames and monitoring frameworks Gender analysis Accountability strategy Sitreps and donor reports RTE and other evaluation reports Monitoring reviews Internal audit (where applicable)	Check proposals and strategies to see if standards are mentioned not just as a possibility but that they are considered in the context of the response – this might mean that Sphere has been adapted to suit the context The indicators on the Log Frame for technical areas should reflect Sphere standards Check adviser reports for mention of mention and how these were implemented Check for a gender analysis that takes into account the roles of men and women and the needs for each Check to see if the MEAL minimum standards have been used and if not is there a plausible explanation? Interview the manager/managers to check if they know about and have implemented the standards Check the RTE report for mention of standards Check the PH and EFSL strategies for OI Minimum standards Check the accountability strategy(if one is present) for mention of HAP, One World or OI standards

4	Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured	<p>Log Frame in proposals Logic model and outcome statements in PIPs Monitoring framework Reporting – technical reports, donor reports Evaluations Outcome statement on OPAL</p>	<p>Check the indicators – are they SMART? Is there a target, quantity and quality? Are there indicators at the different levels that reflect that level? Are the same indicators used at different levels? Do the indicators reflect gender? Are there clear Means of Verification (MOV)? Is there a monitoring framework with MOVs and a timeline? Is there evidence of monitoring data collected and analysed against indicators being used to inform programme progress and maintain activity quality? Check the logic model (for the PIP) and an outcome statement that is replicated in the project Log Frame Check if there has been an evaluation that looks at the outcome indicators – what was the method used and is it robust enough to measure outcomes? Check the donor reports for mention of monitoring and measurement of outcome – are the conclusions plausible and well demonstrated? Check monthly/quarterly reports for mention of monitoring and measurement of progress towards meeting indicators Check if unintended outcomes have been reported or documented in internal or donor reports</p>
5	Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation	<p>Feedback/complaints system Follow up mechanism Evidence of use and follow-up Evidence of complaints being addressed and reported on to complainant Evidence of consultation with community Evidence of feedback incorporated into planning</p>	<p>Check evidence of a system in place including logging of feedback/complaints and a method for follow-up Check for evidence of feedback/complaints leading to changes in programming Check for evidence that serious complaints were dealt with appropriately (satisfactory outcome for both complainant and Oxfam) Check for evidence of consultation with the population regarding methods in place and satisfaction levels with the system (look at evaluation reports, RTEs and MEAL reports) Check assessment reports for degree of consultation (especially more in-depth assessments) Check for evidence of consultation and feedback being incorporated into programme design Check especially technical reports for degree of community participation and decision-making</p>
6	Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle	<p>Partnership agreements RTE reports Planning meeting minutes Evaluation Technical adviser visits</p>	<p>Oxfam International has a policy around partnership and an assessment tool – check that these are known and have been followed Check partnership agreements that they have been carried out and signed Check assessment report for mention of partner engagement Check planning meeting reports and technical adviser reports for partner involvement Check monitoring and accountability framework/strategy for partner involvement Check learning event reports for partner involvement Check for plans for partner capacity building and evidence of implementation Interview partners for their perceptions around the</p>

			working relationship
7	Programme reflects measures to address dignity and protection issues	Assessment report Gender analysis Advocacy strategies Technical reports RTE reports Evaluation Affected population feedback session reports Protection and other advisor visit reports Other protection actor reports	Check that protection was considered and that a risk analysis was carried out (proposals and Sitreps) In situations deemed to be risky, check that protection was integrated into the programme (protection strategy) If above check that Sphere protection standards were used Check WASH and EFSL strategies to ensure that dignity and safety were considered and addressed Check reports for evidence of feedback from separate women and men’s groups Check that Oxfam staff are aware of other actors protection activities if not being addressed by Oxfam
8	Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups	Assessment report Gender analysis Technical strategies Technical reports RTE reports Evaluation Affected population feedback session reports	Check the assessment report for a gender analysis Check the proposal for disaggregated data and a plan for addressing needs for separate groups Check that a gender analysis had been done and evidence that it has influenced programming Check that women’s needs were taken into consideration in programming Check that feedback was obtained from both men and women regarding specific needs and whether the programme addressed these Check if vulnerable groups were identified and how the identification process was chosen Check if facilities provided took into account the needs of vulnerable groups Check if vulnerable groups were involved in evaluating the services provided Check if gender specific indicators exist in the programme Log Frame and that gender specific monitoring data is being collected and analysed
9	Exit strategy/recovery plan in place	Proposals RTE report Close of project on OPAL	Check the proposals for mention of the exit strategy or recovery plan Check the RTE report on Benchmark 6 If project is closing/closed check the closure procedure and whether the affected population were informed and at what point in time If recovery phase check for a recovery phase strategy and how it was planned Check whether there was wide consultation around the recovery plan Check whether the recovery plan was distributed widely so that partners and the population were informed about it
10	Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response	Contingency plan RTE report Evaluation reports	Check the contingency plan – was it updated in the last year? Does the contingency plan have the current type of emergency as a scenario – if not; is there a plausible explanation as to why not? Does the RTE report mention use of the contingency plan? Interview managers and key people such as logistics, finance and HR to gauge use of the plan during the response Check whether the contingency plan was updated with lessons learnt after the last response

11	Programme addresses advocacy issues	Advocacy strategy in place Evidence of results	Check the advocacy strategy – does it appear to take into account context? Check Sitreps, donor reports and evaluations for evidence of results from campaign Interview advocacy adviser both in-country but also at HQ for triangulation
12	Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area	Evidence of DRR links either before or after RTE and evaluation looks at DRR Planning and proposals have DRR focus	Check proposals for mention of DRR Check evaluations for mention of DRR and action – either implanted or planned Interview DRR adviser either in-country or at HQ for triangulation

How to score

It is a judgment call as most programmes do not have all the documents mentioned in the guide. The problem will be between “met” and “partially met.” If in doubt go for “partially met.”

Annex 3: Secondary Data Sources

While documents from 2010 and the first six-months of 2011 were reviewed to provide background for the evaluation, priority was given to documents developed from July 2011, after the Somalia drought response had been designated as a category 1 emergency.

The table below lists documents referred to in the '*guidelines for consultants in the use of the humanitarian indicator tool for low onset emergencies*' (reproduced in annex 2) and serves as evidence of the documents made available to the evaluator and gives an indication of where the gaps were.

	Internal Documents	# Docs
1	Contingency Plan	2
2	Initial assessment report	4
3	Assessment reports of other actors: UN, partners, other agencies, governmental bodies	0
4	First concept note, dated and including evidence of proposed coverage	0
5	Request for Cat Funds	0
6	All Sitreps - evidence of decision regarding frequency of sitreps	17
7	Proposals	19
8	Log Frames and monitoring frameworks (proposals, PIP, advocacy strategy)	22
9	PH Strategy	0
10	EFSL Strategy	0
11	Accountability Strategy	0
12	Advocacy strategy and evidence of results	18
13	Gender analysis	2
14	Partnership agreements	1
15	Planning meeting minutes	3
16	RTE report	2
17	Technical adviser visits reports	3
18	Protection and Other adviser visits reports	0
19	Donor reports	5
20	Other evaluation reports	6
21	Monitoring reviews	3
22	Logic model and outcome statements in PIPs	1
23	Outcome statement on OPAL	1
24	Close of project on OPAL with exit strategy	0
25	Documented evidence of existence of Feedback/complaints system	3
26	Documented evidence of existence of Follow up mechanism	1
27	Documented evidence of complaints being addressed and reported on to the complainant	1
28	Evidence of feedback incorporated into planning	0
29	Affected population feedback session reports	0
30	Other protection actor reports	0
31	Internal audit (where applicable)	0
32	OI Somalia Strategy documents	13
33	Partner capacity assessment document	1
34	Funding grids	3
35	External OCHA sitreps	10
36	External reports	22

Annex 4: Benchmarks & Standards

The standards listed below are either internal to Oxfam International or are those which Oxfam has made a commitment to delivering against. It is important to note that several pre-date the drought scale-up and hence can't be applied to the early months of the response (e.g. the OI gender minimum standards were not completed and rolled out until November 2011).

Standard	Available where?
Sphere standards	www.sphereproject.org
HAP standards	http://www.hapinternational.org/standards.aspx
People in Aid standards	http://www.peopleinaid.org/pool/files/code/code-en.pdf
WASH minimum standards	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-emergency-food-security-and-vulnerable-livelihoods-subgroup
EFSVL minimum standards	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-wash-subgroup
MEAL minimum standards	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-meal-subgroup
Gender minimum standards	http://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-gender-subgroup
Oxfam Programme standards (standard 8 especially)	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-meal-subgroup/documents/program-standards-oxfam-working-towards-agreed-set-standards-across-oi
Red Cross Code of Conduct	http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm
Oxfam Protection Minimum standards	Being developed by EMN subgroup
Oxfam Programme Cycle Management	http://intranet.oxfam.org.uk/programme/pm/guide-to-pcm/index.htm#resources
Minimum DRR?	Draft being prepared – EMN subgroup

Annex 5: Analysis of Evidence

The evaluation is primarily evidence-based and both the GHIT and the checklist below were developed internally by Oxfam. It is hoped that the traffic light system below provides an indication of the quality and quantity of the evidence provided (green = adequate evidence, amber = some evidence, red = no evidence).

Please note that the traffic light scheme does not represent a score for the quality standards themselves it represents the extent to which adequate evidence was provided with which to make a judgment. In cases where no or inadequate evidence was provided the quality standard received a low score as per the guidelines for consultants.

Benchmark	Evidence	Quality check
1	Timeliness – rapid analysis within one day of getting reports of raised alarm, assessment within one week and assistance started within one week of assessing need to response	Initial assessment report x Check the date of the assessment report – both when the assessment was carried out and when the report was written x
		RTE report x – not more than three days between dates
		Sitreps from first three weeks x Check that assessment report has proposed intervention included x
		Request for Cat Funds x Check the RTE under benchmark 1 and 2 for mention of timeliness x
		Date of first concept note x The Sitreps should give the date of first implementation x Concept note should be written within 2-3 days of the assessment x The request for Cat Funds will also show timeliness as it should be within 2-3 days of assessment x
2	Coverage – 25% of the total affected population but in exceptional circumstances then: Total number of beneficiaries is at least 5% of the disaster-affected population and selected areas the most-affected or marginalised	Coverage assessment using the scale x Look at the assessment report and the concept note for the total number of affected x UN reports will also give total number affected x The RTE will give an estimate of programme targets and whether these have been reached x In the case where 25% of the population has not been reached, look for explanations such as lack of funds, access issues or good government or UN response – the explanation needs to have been documented – if middle income country then look for proof of government ability to respond If the explanation is plausible and unavoidable, the rating (for exceptions) can be met

3	<p>Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere and Oxfam quality standards</p>	<p>Proposals PH and EFSL strategies Technical adviser visits Log Frames and monitoring frameworks Gender analysis Accountability strategy Sitreps and donor reports RTE and other evaluation reports Monitoring reviews Internal audit (where applicable)</p>	<p>x x x x x x x x x x x x</p>	<p>Check proposals and strategies to see if standards are mentioned not just as a possibility but that they are considered in the context of the response – this might mean that Sphere has been adapted to suit the context The indicators on the Log Frame for technical areas should reflect Sphere standards Check adviser reports for mention and how these were implemented Check for a gender analysis that takes into account the roles of men and women and the needs for each Check to see if the MEAL minimum standards have been used and if not is there a plausible explanation? Interview the manager/managers to check if they know about and have implemented the standards Check the RTE report for mention of standards Check the PH and EFSL strategies for OI Minimum standards Check the accountability strategy(if one is present) for mention of HAP, One World or OI standards</p>	<p>x x x x x x x x x x x x</p>
4	<p>Indicators (both process and impact) in place and being measured</p>	<p>Log Frame in proposals Logic model and outcome statements in PIPs Monitoring framework Reporting – technical reports, donor reports Evaluations Outcome statement on OPAL</p>	<p>x x x x x x x x x x</p>	<p>Check the indicators – are they SMART? Is there a target, quantity and quality? Are there indicators at the different levels that reflect that level? Are the same indicators used at different levels? Do the indicators reflect gender? Are there clear Means of Verification (MOV)? Is there a monitoring framework with MOVs and a timeline? Is there evidence of monitoring data collected and analysed against indicators being used to inform programme progress and maintain activity quality? Check the logic model (for the PIP) and an outcome statement that is replicated in the project Log Frame Check if there has been an evaluation that looks at the outcome indicators – what was the method used and is it robust enough to measure outcomes? Check the donor reports for mention of monitoring and measurement of outcome – are the conclusions plausible and well demonstrated? Check monthly/quarterly reports for mention of monitoring and measurement of progress towards meeting indicators Check if unintended outcomes have been reported or documented in internal or donor reports</p>	<p>x x x x x x x x x x x x</p>
5	<p>Feedback/complaints system in place and functioning and documented evidence of consultation and participation</p>	<p>Feedback/complaints system Follow up mechanism Evidence of use and follow-up Evidence of complaints being addressed and reported on to complainant Evidence of</p>	<p>x x x x x</p>	<p>Check evidence of a system in place including logging of feedback/complaints and a method for follow-up Check for evidence of feedback/complaints leading to changes in programming Check for evidence that serious complaints were dealt with appropriately (satisfactory outcome for both complainant and Oxfam) Check for evidence of consultation with the population regarding methods in place and satisfaction levels with the system (look at evaluation reports, RTEs and MEAL reports) Check assessment reports for degree of consultation (especially more in-depth assessments)</p>	<p>x x x x x</p>

		consultation with community Evidence of feedback incorporated into planning		Check for evidence of consultation and feedback being incorporated into programme design Check especially technical reports for degree of community participation and decision-making	
6	Partners fully engaged in all aspects of the project cycle	Partnership agreements RTE reports Planning meeting minutes Evaluation Technical adviser visits	 	Oxfam International has a policy around partnership and an assessment tool – check that these are known and have been followed Check partnership agreements that they have been carried out and signed Check assessment report for mention of partner engagement Check planning meeting reports and technical adviser reports for partner involvement Check monitoring and accountability framework/strategy for partner involvement Check learning event reports for partner involvement Check for plans for partner capacity building and evidence of implementation Interview partners for their perceptions around the working relationship	
7	Programme reflects measures to address dignity and protection issues	Assessment report Gender analysis Advocacy strategies Technical reports RTE reports Evaluation Affected population feedback session reports Protection and other advisor visit reports Other protection actor reports	 	Check that protection was considered and that a risk analysis was carried out (proposals and Sitreps) In situations deemed to be risky, check that protection was integrated into the programme (protection strategy) If above check that Sphere protection standards were used Check WASH and EFSL strategies to ensure that dignity and safety were considered and addressed Check reports for evidence of feedback from separate women and men’s groups Check that Oxfam staff are aware of other actors protection activities if not being addressed by Oxfam	
8	Programme delivery addresses gender and specific needs of vulnerable groups	Assessment report Gender analysis Technical strategies Technical reports RTE reports Evaluation Affected population feedback session reports	 	Check the assessment report for a gender analysis Check the proposal for disaggregated data and a plan for addressing needs for separate groups Check that a gender analysis had been done and evidence that it has influenced programming Check that women’s needs were taken into consideration in programming Check that feedback was obtained from both men and women regarding specific needs and whether the programme addressed these Check if vulnerable groups were identified and how the identification process was chosen Check if facilities provided took into account the needs of vulnerable groups Check if vulnerable groups were involved in evaluating the services provided Check if gender specific indicators exist in the programme Log Frame and that gender specific monitoring data is being	

				collected and analysed	
9	Exit strategy/recovery plan in place	Proposals RTE report Close of project on OPAL	X x x	<p>Check the proposals for mention of the exit strategy or recovery plan</p> <p>Check the RTE report on Benchmark 6</p> <p>If project is closing/closed check the closure procedure and whether the affected population were informed and at what point in time</p> <p>If recovery phase check for a recovery phase strategy and how it was planned</p> <p>Check whether there was wide consultation around the recovery plan</p> <p>Check whether the recovery plan was distributed widely so that partners and the population were informed about it</p>	x x x x x
10	Evidenced utilisation of contingency plan in last humanitarian response	Contingency plan RTE report Evaluation reports	X x x	<p>Check the contingency plan – was it updated in the last year?</p> <p>Does the contingency plan have the current type of emergency as a scenario – if not; is there a plausible explanation as to why not?</p> <p>Does the RTE report mention use of the contingency plan?</p> <p>Interview managers and key people such as logistics, finance and HR to gauge use of the plan during the response</p> <p>Check whether the contingency plan was updated with lessons learnt after the last response</p>	x x x x
11	Programme addresses advocacy issues	Advocacy strategy in place Evidence of results	x x	<p>Check the advocacy strategy – does it appear to take into account context?</p> <p>Check Sitreps, donor reports and evaluations for evidence of results from campaign</p> <p>Interview advocacy adviser both in-country but also at HQ for triangulation</p>	x x x
12	Programme is linked to/will be linked to DRR interventions in area	Evidence of DRR links either before or after RTE and evaluation looks at DRR Planning and proposals have DRR focus	x x	<p>Check proposals for mention of DRR</p> <p>Check evaluations for mention of DRR and action – either implemented or planned</p> <p>Interview DRR adviser either in-country or at HQ for triangulation</p>	x x x