One year after the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the first phase of setting up the bureaucratic structure of the European Union’s (EU) new foreign service has been completed. The EEAS has changed the way in which the EU conducts foreign policy. The structures and tools created by the Lisbon Treaty have the potential to develop a more coherent, effective, and visible EU foreign policy that ensures that the different strands of the EU’s external policies – including diplomacy, economic co-operation, development aid, and crisis management – are co-ordinated and consistent.

During its first year of operation, the EEAS has been learning by doing, for example by responding to the revolutionary changes brought about by the Arab Spring, political instability and the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa, and the ongoing shifts in the global balance of power. Drawing on the experience gained by both Oxfam and its partners on the ground, this paper intends to shed a first light on the strengths and weaknesses of the new EEAS. We encourage the EU’s institutions and Member States to come together and embed a coherent and progressive EU foreign policy that champions an international order premised on respect for human rights and international law, the principles of equality and solidarity, the eradication of poverty and trade that is fair.
Executive summary

The first anniversary of the European External Action Service (EEAS) finds the European Union (EU) in the midst of an economic, financial, and identity crisis that has aggravated the ongoing decline in Europe’s stature on the global scene as new political and economic actors emerge. The new diplomatic service provides the EU with an opportunity to address its shortcomings in foreign policy by bringing greater coherence to external policy making; by enhancing consistency across EU instruments; and by adopting a more comprehensive and strategic approach to global challenges.

Since the very beginning, the EEAS has faced major policy challenges. No sooner had it come into being – while still in the process of being built – than it had to react to the unprecedented wave of protests in Arab world, a NATO intervention in Libya, and a humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa – to name just a few. Supported by the new Service, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), has worked to galvanize the EU’s collective and multifaceted response to these international crises. After a shaky start, the EU foreign policy chief now gives a consistently improved performance, both in Brussels and abroad.

However, one year on, the procedural problems and structural weaknesses that have come to light are yet to be addressed. With the first phase of setting up the bureaucratic structures of the EEAS complete, disconnects between a top-heavy management, the expert desk officers, and staff in EU Delegations are still to be fixed. Moreover, the cooperation between the EEAS and the European Commission (EC) will need to be transformed in order to achieve a genuine two-way interaction in policy shaping and policy execution.

In addition, not all the Member States have genuinely co-operated with the EEAS to allow the EU to speak with one coherent voice, especially in multilateral settings. Other worrying trends include the risk of politicizing development co-operation and humanitarian aid. These trends betray a clear danger that ‘coherence’ could just become a cover for the instrumentalization of soft power for politically motivated security gains.

With the right institutional setup and vision, and with unambiguous support from Member States, the EEAS could represent a contribution to, rather than a deviation from, the EU’s treaty mandate to promote its values and champion an international order premised on respect for human rights and international law, the principles of equality and solidarity, the eradication of poverty, and trade that is fair. The findings in this paper show that in the changing global balance of power, an EU foreign policy driven by these values will help deliver the EU’s strategic interests and build its reputation and credibility as a leader in finding solutions to global problems.
Recommendations

To the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission:

• **As High Representative**, develop and lead a common EU foreign policy that offers a vision and an overall strategy that reaffirms the expectations that the EU is a global actor that delivers on its commitments.

• **As Vice-President of the European Commission**, use this role fully to create better synergies and greater coherence between EU external relations that are managed by the EC (trade, energy, climate change, humanitarian aid, and development), while making sure that all the EU’s external action instruments are consistent with its declared aim to reduce poverty around the world and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Engage more with other Commissioners who hold portfolios relevant for EU external policy by reactivating the group of External Relations (RELEX) Commissioners.

• **As permanent Chair of the EU Foreign Affairs Council**, further engage in increasing coherence and co-ordination among Member States as well as between Member States and EU institutions. Create a space for civil society actors to interact with the Foreign Affairs Council in order to enhance the much needed accountability of its decision-making process. This model should also be replicated by the Heads of EU Delegations as permanent Chairs of Member States’ Missions in capitals.

To the European External Action Service:

• **Design a clear vision for EU foreign policy**, responding to the question of where the EU wants to be in 2015 as a global actor that responds to global challenges. This vision – driven by EU values such as respect for democracy, human rights, and international humanitarian law – will deliver on the EU’s interests, building its reputation and credibility as a partner in developing solutions to global problems. This vision will provide clarity on the role of the EEAS, give it a sense of purpose, and renew its standing vis-à-vis Member States.

• **Develop an overarching strategy** for EU foreign policy that underpins this vision and guides external action to make sure it champions the eradication of poverty within a rules-based international order. This strategy requires strong co-operation between EU institutions and determined support from Member States so that the EEAS can carry out the EU’s ambitious Lisbon Treaty mandate in the world.

• **Move from a reactive to a proactive attitude** in order to fit all EU external policies into one overarching strategy, and guide contingency plans for future developments. Such an overarching strategy will include the following basic principles on which to build operational strategies: uphold universal values, set mutual accountability, foster multilateral solutions, engage with civil
society, and promote a gender perspective so that policies are informed by their possible impact on women. These principles would guide both thematic and geographical strategies and connect them in a coherent way.

- **Avoid politicizing development aid** as this undermines its effectiveness, gets in the way of poverty reduction, and often fails to build long-term economic security for recipient communities and their governments, as well as donors themselves. In co-ordinating development programmes, poverty reduction should remain the main purpose. Development aid should not be used to respond to other foreign policy objectives.

- **Respect the independence of humanitarian assistance**. While there is a need for co-ordination across external policy tools, humanitarian aid must remain part of a separate budget, while decision-making must be fully independent from political or security interests, in accordance with humanitarian principles and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

- **Give Europe one strong and coherent voice**, with stronger alignment between Member States and EU institutions for a greater impact on the international scene. This is particularly relevant in multilateral forums.

- **Bring together EU institutions and Member States** for a comprehensive EU response. Make better use of the toolkit of policies and instruments at the EU’s disposal to deliver on the Lisbon Treaty, through country-level joint programming in, for example, tackling climate change and capital flight, protecting civilians in conflict, and preventing irresponsible arms transfers.

- **Increase operational coordination with other EU institutions** by seeking greater value-based policy, institutional coherence, and a focus on core priorities. Coordination does not mean superseding the objectives and roles of other institutions, but being sensitive to the added value they bring, relying on their expertise and experience, and supporting their contributions. For example, this involves relying on updated reports from the field in humanitarian crises for relevant political analysis.

- **Streamline EEAS internal coordination, responsibilities, and communication** by reducing disproportionately heavy internal processes (i.e. servicing the top layer) and duplicated services within the EU family (i.e. briefings for all the Presidents), and entrusting middle management with direct responsibility for reaching out to bi- and multilateral partners.

- **Strengthen the role of EU Delegations** by devolving powers from Brussels and empowering EU Ambassadors to play a leading role in coordinating and defining a consistent EU policy regarding action in relations to developing countries. Instruct Delegations to actively engage with local civil society organizations (CSOs) for better context analysis, programming, and implementation.
• Be clear on the different responsibilities and reporting lines for EU Delegations, the EEAS, and the EC. Clarity on the role of development staff in EU Delegations is needed, and interaction between headquarters and Delegations must improve to better shape and execute policy. Good inter-service cooperation is key for the smooth and effective functioning of development cooperation on the ground.

To the European Commission:

• **Seize the opportunity** to benefit from more coherent external action to create space for political influence that matches the EU’s important funding role and provides a stronger impetus for common European responses to global challenges. Inter-service co-operation with the EEAS should be guided by this common goal, leaving behind historical territories and bureaucratic jealousies, and building on this new way of working.

• **Rise to the challenge** and ensure that the purpose of aid allocation and development policy remains – first and foremost – to tackle long-term poverty and provide direct, rapid, and effective assistance to those in urgent need.

To the EU Member States:

• **Throw more weight behind the EEAS and genuinely support** the role of the HR/VP in the external representation of the EU, allowing the EU to speak with one voice, especially in multilateral settings. Member States have a duty to sincerely co-operate with EU institutions, fleshing out the EU’s capacity as a peacebuilder through the triple areas of diplomacy, crisis management, and development initiatives.

• **Rise to the challenge** and implement aid effectiveness principles by embracing joint development programming, and provide better co-ordination of national engagement to provide complementarity to EU aid policies in all recipient countries by 2014. Make the move towards integrated implementation, so that, in practice, commitments translate into concrete benefits for people living in poverty.
Introduction

The first anniversary of the European External Action Service (EEAS) finds the European Union (EU) in the midst of one of the worst economic, financial, and identity crises in its history, defined by German Chancellor Angela Merkel as ‘Europe’s toughest hour since World War Two’. The economic difficulties of the past year have worsened an already long-term decline in the Europe’s standing in the world, in the face of emerging economic and political actors on the global scene.

While tough times are still ahead of the world’s richest countries, even tougher times are awaiting the world’s poorest people, whether the one billion people who go to bed hungry every night, those who struggle to survive in conflict-torn areas, or those who see their livelihoods diminished because of the effects of climate change.

As the world’s biggest Official Development Assistance (ODA) provider, a trade hub, and a leader in climate change negotiations, the EU has a vital role to play in developing global solutions to the problems affecting humanity. More than ever it is necessary for the EU’s foreign policy to uphold Europe’s commitment to a better world. This explains why Oxfam is engaged in the debate around an effective and progressive EU foreign policy, since Oxfam’s purpose is to help create lasting solutions to the injustice of poverty.

With the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, EU Member States have given themselves a chance to develop an integrated, coordinated, coherent, and consistent EU foreign policy. For a successful joint foreign policy, Member States must join forces and back the Union’s new foreign service with genuine political support. However, it is equally the role of EU institutions to prove that they are worthy of being the prime vehicle for common EU policies, be it security, development or trade. The EEAS must provide a clearer vision for EU foreign policy and show Member States the merits of a functional service that leads – and delivers – a progressive foreign policy that contributes to positive change around the world.

To face the economic and financial crisis, EU governments have realized that closer and stronger synergies between fiscal and economic policies are needed. Similarly, leading a rules-based foreign policy – one that is grounded in international human rights and humanitarian law, and which champions poverty reduction and peacebuilding – will deliver Europe’s long-term political, economic, and security interests. Making the EEAS work must be a top priority for the EU, its institutions and Member States alike, particularly at times of crisis.
Where does the EU want to be in 2015? A vision for the EU’s foreign policy

The Lisbon Treaty was intended to produce a more coherent, effective, and visible EU foreign policy. It introduced two important changes in the way the EU conducts its foreign policy: the creation of a diplomatic corps, the EEAS; and the establishment of a ‘super’ foreign minister, merging the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) with that of Vice-President of the European Commission (VP) and Permanent Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). This multi-hatted HR/VP conducts the EU’s foreign, security, and defence policies, contributes to the development of these policies, and – together with the Council – ensures consistency in the external actions of the EU. Primary authority for policy choice in these areas continues to reside with the European Council and the FAC. The European Commission (EC) remains responsible for policy initiation, implementation, and external representation in the other domains of EU external action such as trade, development co-operation, humanitarian aid, and relations with neighbouring countries.

This upgraded position of HR/VP should allow for stronger and more independent development and implementation of the EU’s foreign, security, and defence policies, which – potentially – would provide the EU with a more effective role on the international scene. However, the combination of three full-time jobs, each requiring different political allegiances, results in strains on physical presence, the juggling of conflicting interests, and delays brought about by the search for the lowest common denominator.

Indeed, the HR/VP’s mandate is very ambitious and will be too much to manage unless there is a clear vision for the EU’s foreign policy, underpinned by an overarching strategy and strong support from EU institutions and Member States. Such foresight would answer the question of where the EU wants to be in 2015 as a global actor that responds to global challenges. A vision driven by EU values such as democracy, good governance, human rights, and international humanitarian law will help deliver on the EU’s interests, building its reputation and credibility as a provider of solutions to global problems.

Catherine Ashton, on the occasion of Europe Day 2011

‘The ambition to build a strong EU foreign policy received a major boost with the launch of the European External Action Service – the EEAS – on the 1st of January this year. The service will act as a single platform to project European values and interests around the world. And it will act as a one-stop shop for our partners. The aim of all this is to forge a better, more coherent policy, developing European answers to complex global problems, working with our partners around the world. It’s something I know countries have long asked for – and that we can now deliver.’

A vision for an EU foreign policy driven by EU values such as democracy, good governance, human rights, and international humanitarian law will actually help deliver on the EU’s interests, building its reputation and credibility as a provider of solutions to global problems.
A common vision to move forward

Agreeing on a common vision, and getting it right, would help address some of the key difficulties and weaknesses that the EEAS has faced in its first year of operation. These difficulties include:

- Lack of full support from some Member States that undermines the ability of the EEAS to meet expectations and weakens its role in the external representation of the EU, especially in multilateral settings. An agreement on one EU foreign policy vision would reaffirm Member States’ commitment and provide clarity on the role of the EEAS.

- Frequent acrimonious inter-service interaction, most notably between the EC and the EEAS, has consumed a disproportionate amount of resources that should have been directed towards external efforts. In part, these tensions result from a structural division in which external policies (development, external assistance, enlargement, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)) remain within the EC’s remit. However, a joint institutional vision would give a sense of purpose to the EEAS and facilitate overcoming historical territories and bureaucratic jealousies.

- Lack of clarity on responsibilities and reporting lines between EU Delegations, the EEAS, and the EC, with hazy chains of command, blurred boundaries between certain portfolios, and feedback from the top that is sometimes late or lacking. A transformation is needed on how headquarters and Delegations interact with each other, in both the shaping and execution of policy. This would enable the Delegations to fully play their role as permanent President by co-ordinating positions between Member States’ embassies. Building on a common vision, presence, and knowledge on the ground should enhance the EU’s foreign policy aims, providing a bottom-up coherence to its external action.

In short, although ‘the biggest part of the heavy lifting is done’, and the organization is well on its way to establishing itself on a firm footing, the EEAS still needs to face the next challenge and take the lead on providing a clear vision that positions the EU as an effective global actor.
External action at the service of EU values

The Lisbon Treaty outlines the founding principles of the EU that should guide its external action. These include respect for democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the principles of equality and solidarity, the United Nations Charter, and international law. It is a self-proclaimed objective of the EU to enhance its strategic approach to tackling global challenges and to promote its interests and values more assertively, always in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit.

Over the years, the EU has adopted a scattered number of policy documents and strategic partnerships developed by different institutions, with closely connected themes but sometimes diverging aims. The European Security Strategy, the European Consensus for Development, the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, and ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs’ are just a few examples. Their contents are often closely interlinked, as the challenges posed by the security–development nexus have taught us. Tackling co-ordination head-on calls not only for better institutional co-operation, but also for an overarching strategy to guide external action.

An overarching strategy to guide external action

Building on a common vision, the EEAS needs to develop such an overarching strategy, which will lay down how and why the EU conducts its foreign policy, connects and co-ordinates existing initiatives, and guides contingency plans for future developments, such as another regime transition in the Mediterranean. A lasting framework should include the following basic principles on which to build operational strategies:

- uphold universal values, including human rights and international humanitarian law;
- set mutual accountability;
- foster multilateral solutions;
- engage with civil society;
- promote a gender perspective;
- respect the primary objectives of development aid and humanitarian assistance independent of political and security interests.

Once embodied in an overarching strategy, these principles would guide the review and development of more specific thematic and geographical strategies, and connect them in a coherent way. It is here that a fully fledged EEAS should make a difference: it must take a leadership role in supporting its political masters in the development of a comprehensive medium- and long-term approach to the EU’s foreign policy.
The EEAS needs to achieve coherence in EU external action by identifying the policy areas in which coordination is necessary, and where synergies can be achieved. When EU policies have an external dimension, the EEAS should play a coordinating role. These policy areas include those with a clear external character – Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), trade policy, development co-operation, enlargement, and the ENP – as well as those usually classified as internal EU policies, such as the development of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; transport; agriculture and fisheries; public health; environment; and energy. The added value of the involvement of the EEAS in strategic planning is to integrate these different strands of EU external action.

This development of an overarching strategy by the EEAS requires strong cooperation between EU institutions and determined support from Member States in order to carry out the ambitious mandate bestowed upon the EU by the Lisbon Treaty.

**Shifting gears from reactive to proactive**

Beyond producing a comprehensive strategy on paper, the EEAS needs to move from being reactive to proactive. A positive example is the EU’s changing response to the Arab Spring. The events that shook the Arab world in 2011 were a watershed in changing the way in which the EU conducts foreign policy towards the countries on its doorstep.

**EU’s response to the Arab Spring: shifting away from business as usual**

After initial hesitations on how to respond to the popular revolts, and following strong divisions around the issue of Libya¹⁰, the EU acknowledged that in the past double standards had undermined its credibility in the Arab world. It decided to shift away from ‘business as usual’ by placing human rights and democracy at the heart of its cooperation policy with the Arab neighbourhood¹¹. The EU’s new approach to the southern neighbourhood focused on contributing to ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ and led to a revision of the ENP to encourage more democratic reform and respect for human rights (civil, political, social, and economic)¹².

A positive example of a joint EU undertaking was the coordination of the civilian response to the crises in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya: a new team in EEAS headquarters, in cooperation with stronger EU Delegations, helped Member States’ embassies to coordinate their actions¹³.

The difficulty lies in making this new response a reality on the ground: if aid conditionality turns into economic conditionality, and thus distorts the objectives of aid, the EU’s ability to genuinely support democratization will be undermined. In chapter 6, we analyse the risks and opportunities of a new funding concept, named ‘More for More’, that aims to support the transitions following the Arab Spring.
One Union, one voice: an EEAS backed by Member States

Much has been written over the past year about the internal difficulties of setting up the EU’s new diplomatic service. However, it is clear that without stronger and unambiguous support from EU Member States, the EEAS will continue to struggle to meet its full potential. During its first year of existence, the EEAS has had to grapple with the double challenge of carving out its mandate in both the Brussels and international arenas. It has also had to face several EU Member States, in particular the larger ones, which persistently refuse to concede to the HR/VP and EEAS the very responsibilities they assigned to them in the treaties.

This lack of support undermines the ability of the EEAS to meet expectations and exacerbates existing tensions. Small Member States are willing to participate in the expanded EEAS, but their larger partners resist any attempts by the EU to encroach on their sovereignty. A number of large Member States were against a proposed 5.8 per cent increase of the EEAS budget14 and the United Kingdom blocked more than 70 statements from being issued ‘on behalf of the EU’.15

The issue of arms control illustrates how a like-minded community of states such as the EU could make a greater impact on the international scene, thanks to a stronger alignment of Member States with the HR/VP and the EEAS.

The Arms Trade Treaty: the EU speaking with one voice

Currently, negotiations are underway on an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), ahead of the UN Arms Trade Treaty Negotiating Conference expected to take place in July 2012. Prior to the establishment of the EEAS, the HR/VP’s Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was mandated to chair EU coordination meetings in New York and to take the lead in writing the official interventions made by the EU in the ATT Preparatory Committee. This was done in conjunction with the EU Presidency, but with some Member States delegating all Presidency powers to the HR/VP’s staff. This external representation followed the preparatory work conducted in the Council of Ministers’ Working Party on Conventional Arms Export (COARM). These arrangements allowed the EU to take a stronger, united role in the international negotiations on the ATT. Once the EEAS was established, this arrangement became official and permanent, with the HR/VP’s Special Representative leading the EU’s joint efforts. In addition, COARM is now permanently chaired by an EEAS staff member. Since May 2011, after the EU had secured speaking rights in the UN General Assembly,16 the HR/VP’s Personal Representative also reads out speeches on behalf of the EU. Thanks to this matching of expertise, political clout, and permanency in chairing meetings, the EEAS provides continuity at policy making level and better visibility for the EU in the UN General Assembly.
Unfortunately, since the EEAS has taken the lead and the EU finally speaks with one voice in ATT negotiations, the picture has been marred by the reluctance of some Member States to fully back the EEAS, either by making impromptu and contradictory interventions from the floor after EU declarations have been made, or by a significant drop in levels of participation by less interested Member States, thus diminishing the impact of the EU in the ATT process.

Thus, there is still a lot of potential for creating closer synergies between Member States. For instance, the EEAS and COARM should be more proactive in assessing or reporting on measures taken by Member States to bring their legislation in line with the EU acquis on defence procurement and arms exports. The EEAS could encourage Member States to share intelligence and analysis on sensitive issues at country level, for example, concerning imports and exports of arms to and from a country, including potential use or misuse of weapons, as in Libya or Chad. The latter could be done in-country, by the EU Delegation co-operating with Member States’ embassies. The EEAS could also mobilize expertise from the EC’s Development and Co-operation Directorate-General (DG DEVCO) to provide expert analysis and risk impact assessments and to share results with Member States. Thus, the eight criteria in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (which links the economic capacity of arms importing states to their state of development) could be better monitored.

The case of the ATT negotiations illustrates the benefits of a joint policy and the potential of the EEAS. However, it uncovers a worrying trend in which the role of the EEAS is weakened by certain Member States that undermine the EU’s efforts to speak with one voice and prevent the EEAS from fulfilling its potential to play a stronger role in multilateral arenas.

A demonstrator in front of the UN Building in New York, as part of the Speak Out: Control Arms Now! Campaign for an Arms Trade Treaty (2011-2012). © Oxfam/Olstein Thorsen
A coordinated Union: bringing together institutions and Member States

The single most important feature of the EEAS is its potential to take an overarching approach to external policies conducted by different strands of the EU, including trade, development, diplomacy, climate action, and CSDP missions. In order for this exercise to succeed, the different services of the EC need to demonstrate a genuine will to work together with the EEAS, Member States need to better align their external policies with those of the EU, and the EEAS should make sure that it abides by the obligations of the treaties and pushes for an integrated approach to EU external action.

Effective operation? Coordination with the EC

The task of the EEAS to forge integrated EU external action comes with the obligation of serving multiple political masters, including the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Commission itself, each in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations. The EEAS is expected to provide expert analysis with support from the on-the-ground presence and knowledge of the EU Delegations. This is supposed to provide bottom-up coherence to EU external action but, so far, this extraordinary asset of a world presence on the ground has been insufficiently used. This is partly due to the disconnect between a top-heavy management and the expert desk officers further down the chain of command who are expected to provide briefings for these different stakeholders.

During the EEAS’s first year, putting in practice the new division of labour between different EU institutions led to numerous inter-service clashes. Matters have now become clearer, for example, between the EEAS and DG DEVCO. The EEAS is responsible for working closely with the relevant members and services of the EC, throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning, and implementing the external assistance instruments. Based upon the Council Decision that established the EEAS, substantial management and implementation tasks lie with the EC, with the EEAS playing a role in programming. The management of development aid projects and their execution are retained by the EC, which oversees work performed at country-level by the EU Delegations.

This of course creates a risk when programming is conceived as a means to achieve political ends with narrow economic and security objectives, instead of following the primary objective of development
cooperation policy, which is, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the reduction and eradication of poverty.

Meanwhile, the EC’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) retains full independence in policy- and decision-making, and budget allocation. This institutional decision reinforces the independence of needs-based humanitarian aid.

Effective cooperation? Coordination with Member States

Joint development programming is an example of how the EEAS can lead the EU in setting up and implementing a coordinated policy for the EU with regard to its external partners. For the nascent Republic of South Sudan, the concept of joint development programming was developed by a group of EU experts and Member State representatives, in close cooperation with the government of South Sudan, and led to a joint country strategy paper for the world’s newest country in an effort to better identify priorities, plan funding, avoid overlaps, and create synergies.

Based on the positive experience of joint development programming for South Sudan, DG DEVCO and the EEAS are in the process of identifying a set of countries across the world where this model could be replicated. It should be the EU’s ambition for all development aid programming to be jointly coordinated by 2014. Member States should support this approach to make this a realistic target date. While cooperation between DG DEVCO and the EEAS on these issues has been positive, the decision on who takes the lead has led to cordial rivalry. This rivalry also manifests itself at EU Delegation level, between the EEAS-led political sections and the DEVCO operations sections, both of which report to the Head of Delegation.

Amidst jubilant celebration, the new Republic of South Sudan entered the international stage in July 2011 albeit as one of the least developed countries in the world. © UN Photo/Paul Banks
A comprehensive EU approach to South Sudan

The EU has been closely involved in the birth of the new Republic of South Sudan. In the run-up to its declaration of independence on 9 July 2011, the EU was involved in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement through the preparation of the referendum on independence of January 2011. The ongoing volatile security situation kept Sudan on the FAC agenda from November 2010 to January 2011.

The HR/VP created an inter-service task force for Sudan, bringing together the geographic desk of the EEAS, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, and the EC’s DGs ECHO and DEVCO, with video links to Juba, Khartoum, New York, and Addis Ababa. The task force introduced the ‘Comprehensive Approach to Sudan’, later endorsed by the FAC on 20 June 2011. The document represents an integrated model for political, diplomatic, security, stability, trade, aid, humanitarian, development, and governance issues.

The comprehensive approach exercise is a good example of how the EEAS can bring together EU institutions and Member States to collectively support a country, and apply aid effectiveness principles. In order for this exercise to succeed, Member States need to follow up on their commitment to join forces with the EEAS and the EC to improve the effectiveness of European aid, and ensure better consistency and coherence in the development of South Sudan in accordance with its national priorities.

Now that the strategy has been decided, it is key that the EU and Member States provide adequate funding to reinforce the capacity of South Sudanese civil society organizations as development actors, and work to involve them at all levels of the decision-making process in deciding humanitarian and development priorities.

Furthermore, the EEAS should also closely co-ordinate different EU institutions to ensure that there is no gap between humanitarian relief and development aid. In particular, there is an urgent need to improve food security through both emergency assistance in border and food insecure areas, and by supporting livelihoods and smallholder agriculture.

The EEAS should urge the institutions and Member States to provide timely and predictable funding to implementing agencies to improve access to basic services such as health, education, water, and sanitation. They must ensure such provision of services is distributed equitably across the country with a focus on vulnerable and neglected populations.
Providing aid that works for people, not politics

The risk of granting leadership to the EEAS is that development and humanitarian aid cooperation will be used for political ends rather than to deliver emergency relief, protect civilians, provide aid, and work towards reducing poverty in the developing world. Such politicization of development and humanitarian aid can undermine their effectiveness and damage impartial attempts to provide aid and tackle poverty. Furthermore, it often fails to build long-term security for recipient communities, their governments, and donors themselves. The review of the ENP of the past year, and the case of Yemen in particular, clearly illustrate this risk.

‘More for More’: Aid conditionality that supports reform?

In their May 2011 strategy on the ENP, the HR/VP and the EC made explicit the conditionality attached to shared values. The ‘More for More’ approach aims to give greater support to partners engaged in building ‘deep democracy – the kind that lasts’. This essentially means providing incentives in the form of more aid, more economic integration, and political cooperation in return for more democratic reform. As such, the EU does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform, but will insist that each partner country’s reform process reflects a clear commitment to the universal values that form the basis of the reinvigorated relationship between the EU and its neighbours.

It remains in question, however, whether the EU’s ‘softer’ power in the neighbourhood, and the relative size of the EU’s financial aid – destined to rebuild and transform the societies destroyed by years of dictatorial rule or recent internal conflict – will be enough to inspire the reforms that will one day form the basis for the kind of cooperation on which a single area of prosperity and good neighbourliness can be established. In order to contribute to democratic reform, the ‘More for More’ approach should support the role of civil society during transitions and reaffirm it once governments are elected. Furthermore, it seems that one crucial lesson learned from the recent upheavals in the Arab world is the growing need to engage with societies, not just governments. Thus, the role of civil society must be integral to negotiations. In designing the new neighbourhood policy and communicating the process, the perception is that the EU has not reached out to civil society in affected countries. Consultation with civil society must restore trust and cultivate its genuine role in policy making.

In terms of relations between governments and the EU, the EU can make forthright proposals, but according to the criteria for assessing democratic reform under ‘More for More’, agreed benchmarks must be negotiated in each country and include additional criteria such as non-discrimination and gender equality. ‘More for More’ should be strictly de-linked from any form of conditionality for liberalization of the economy and services. Without these considerations, the ‘More for More’ approach is unlikely to succeed.

In order to ensure co-ordination while avoiding the risk of politicization of aid, it is essential to keep separate budgets for humanitarian aid and development cooperation and to ensure they are managed by the relevant Directorates-General at the European Commission.
The EU needs to demonstrate consistency at country, regional, and global level in making democratic reform and human rights an important element of all EU co-operation programmes. A case in point is the green light given by the Council on 14 December 2011 for the EC to proceed with negotiations on a ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade’ area with Egypt – this while the authorities in place are neither elected by nor accountable to the people, and while serious human rights violations are ongoing. The EU needs to press for political participation and representation of civil society, especially women and youth, in the transition process and democratic reform. Otherwise, the new policy will be commonly perceived by civil society as ‘more of the same’ rather than ‘more for more’.

The EU must now do better in configuring its foreign policy to be credible in, not only in the eyes of governments but also vis-à-vis Egyptian and Tunisian citizens and voters. © EPA/Mohamed Omar

Civil society organizations express frustration that consultations are not integrated into decision making.

‘It provides just a register for our concerns without any commitment to take on board recommendations from civil society, and information sharing from the EU is limited’

Kamal Lahbib of Forum des Alternatives Maroc (FMAS), an Oxfam partner organization in Morocco

Yemen: still a long winter ahead of an Arab Spring

2011 was the year that also saw a popular uprising in Yemen, as well as a transition of presidential power facilitated by the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Yemen’s problems go far beyond its political troubles, and include a failing economy, high levels of unemployment, a shrinking water table, the influx of thousands of Somali refugees, an abundance of guns in private hands, the presence of insurgent groups, and inter-tribal conflicts. This volatile mix – that could have potentially grave regional repercussions – has led to a dramatically deteriorating humanitarian situation, with hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced People (IDP) and alarming levels of malnutrition.

The EU’s political message throughout 2011 – carried by a series of statements by the HR and conclusions of the FAC – has been a rather repetitive one, based on two approaches: (i) calling on all parties to act in accordance with international humanitarian law, and allowing unhindered and sustained access for humanitarian agencies to conflict-affected areas; and (ii) remaining ready, alongside regional and international partners, to respond positively with political support and assistance for the urgently required immediate implementation of Yemen’s political transition. The latter approach is potentially problematic in the sense that it runs the risk of politicizing development aid.
For instance, in July 2011, following her meeting with Abu-Bakr Al Qirbi, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, HR/VP Ashton declared that "by activating a credible plan for transition, the government could unlock the potential for significant international assistance to Yemen". Thus, poor and vulnerable Yemenis were promised help on condition that the political turmoil – over which they had little or no control – would be solved. The potential risk of tying aid to political change became a reality once certain EU member states withdrew aid funding that had been channelled through the Yemeni government without ensuring sufficient aid continued to be provided through alternative channels, and the humanitarian crisis in the country deteriorated further. On the positive side, the EC acknowledged the need for humanitarian aid regardless of the political stalemate, and continued to support the Yemeni people by contributing more than €60 million in humanitarian and development assistance in 2011 along with some Member States. The EU Delegation has continued with programmes where other donors have shut down operations. The strong role played by the EEAS in the country has helped the coordination of Member States’ efforts and kept a finger on the pulse with representatives of the UN, the GCC, and Yemeni government, swaying international action the EU’s way. The inter-service coordination between the EEAS and DG ECHO, both in Brussels and in-country, has helped with forging complementary roles for these two members of the EU family while maintaining the independence and neutrality of humanitarian aid. For instance, ECHO kept communication channels open with the Houthi community, tribes, and militia in northern Yemen so as to gain access to remote areas and offer humanitarian aid through local partners. This line of communication could not be pursued by the EEAS without raising questions about the recognition of separatist entities. All this is in keeping with the export of Humanitarian Principles recognized by the European Humanitarian Consensus, namely impartiality, non-discrimination, independence, and neutrality.

The case of Yemen illustrates not only the risk of politicization of aid, but also the need to maintain the independence of the EU’s humanitarian aid in any possible future constellation of the external mechanisms of the EU.
Conclusion

The stage of getting the EEAS up and running is almost complete. Truly establishing a firm and effective EU diplomatic service able to join up the different strands of EU external action is a long-term project. The EEAS needs time to build trust and smooth working relations both with Member States, which feel strongly that foreign affairs must remain a key part of their sovereign identity, and EU institutions, some of which are trying to find their own feet in the post-Lisbon context. However, this process requires that the EEAS, under the leadership of the HR/VP, seizes the next challenge and formulates a clear vision and overarching strategy to position the EU as an effective global actor.

The emerging multi-polar world – with major shifts in the distribution of economic, military, and political power across the world – is seriously challenging European leadership. Facing a reduced political global influence, Europe cannot afford to respond with splits in international forums and greater division between Member States, where national interests prevail over collective ones. Maintaining the status quo will hamper Europe’s ability to lead a development cooperation policy that seeks the reduction of poverty and champion a foreign policy that respects human rights, upholds international humanitarian law and encourages peace building, all of which, as this paper demonstrates, are in the EU’s best interest.

It is time to rise to the challenge and overcome the last decade of political squabbling, for Europe to play a leadership role in global affairs and deliver on its obligations.
Notes


3 See Catherine Ashton (2011) ‘Aiming High’, The Parliament 335:44, http://www.theparliament.com/policy-focus/development/development-article/newsarticle/aiming-high-catherine-ashton/ (last accessed 19 January 2012): ‘Since the EAS was launched in January, we have successfully brought together staff from different institutions, adopted common IT, security and human resources procedures and set about meeting our target that a third of our staff should come from national diplomatic services. The biggest part of the heavy lifting is done. That no “millennium bugs” happened is already a major achievement.’ See also David O’Sullivan (2011) ‘Setting up the European External Action Service: Part II’, Speech at the IIEA, Dublin, 6 October, available at http://www.iiea.com (last accessed 22 December 2011). O’Sullivan pointed out that the EEAS processed nearly 9,000 applications for 181 vacant positions, of which 66 managing posts were either in HQ or in EU Delegations; 66 per cent of those posts were filled by Seconded National Experts (SNEs) – well on the way to reaching the 2013 target of one-third of the EEAS contingent consisting of national diplomats. Incidentally, it is worth observing that the EEAS is not a giant diplomatic service. At full capacity, the EEAS will employ a total staff of almost 4,000 people, with approximately 1,600 staff in Brussels and the remainder based at 140 overseas posts. The service’s annual operating budget for the 2011 financial year stood at €464 million. As such, the EEAS compares to the diplomatic service of a small to medium EU Member State (e.g. the Netherlands), whereas the big three Member States employ thousands of people (e.g. approximately 13,500 for the UK and 12,000 each for France and Germany).


In an effort to increase both the co-ordination capacity within the EU and the external visibility of the Union’s crisis response missions, Catherine Ashton appointed Agostino Miozzo as Managing Director a day after the EEAS was formally launched. His first task was to establish an internal co-ordination platform, at Director level, chaired by the HR (or by the Executive Secretary General or Miozzo himself). Building on Solana’s Crisis Response and Co-ordination Team – which only focused on the European Security and Defence
Policy — a so-called ‘crisis platform’ was developed and tested in Tunisia (from January 2011 onwards) and Egypt (from February 2011 onwards), before it was essentially made official during the Libyan crisis (Benghazi, March–May 2011). The crisis platform has since become a quasi-institutionalized inter-service structure. Its primary aim is to share information among key EU actors, so as to create coherence in EU external crisis action. The frequency with which it convenes depends on the crisis, but it can meet daily if necessary. Miozzo built a team of more than a dozen people and helped create a new 35-strong EU situation room, so as to be able to rely at all times on real-time information and analysis when (i) deciding to activate the crisis platform, and (ii) co-operating with the EU Special Representative, CSDP operations and/or EU Delegations, each within their own realm of competences and mandates, to offer, for example, consular protection in a crisis situation (e.g. repatriating EU citizens).

The restrictive interpretation of ‘budgetary neutrality’, whereby the EEAS should not raise EU costs for external relations, has made the HR’s request for a budgetary increase unlikely to be approved at a time of national austerity, even when there is a strong functional and economic argument for taking advantage of the EEAS to rationalize the European foreign policy system as a whole.


On 3 May 2011, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 65/275 on the participation of the EU in the work of the UN by a majority of 180 out of 192 votes in favour (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/529/04/PDF/N1052904.pdf, last accessed 19 January 2012). The resolution sets out working modalities that allow the EU’s external representatives – including the EEAS and the EC – to present the positions of the EU and its Member States at the UN. This does not alter the EU’s observer status in the UN General Assembly. The resolution gives the EU, when speaking on behalf of the 27 EU states, the right to speak early among other major groups, and invites the EU – i.e. the President of the European Council and the HR/VP – to intervene in the general debate at the opening of the General Assembly. Previously, Palestine and the Holy See were the only observers that could take the floor in that debate. In addition, the EU has obtained the right to orally present proposals and amendments, a possibility that no other observer has at its disposal, and the right to reply once to a speech regarding EU positions. The resolution does not give the EU a right to vote or co-sponsor draft resolutions or decisions in writing. It applies to the participation of the EU in the sessions and work of the UN General Assembly, its committees and working groups, in international meetings and conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, and in UN conferences. Finally, the resolution has no direct implications for the EU’s participation in the work of other bodies or multilateral forums. Thus, the resolution does not apply generally in the UN system. The resolution was adopted following a collective EU effort to engage all UN members, after the procedural setback in September 2010.
17 For instance, in the July prepcom, only 11 EU Member States made a single intervention, none of which were 'new' Member States. This is a shame, as their recent history and radical transformation of import and export arms controls provided experiences that others could learn from.


20 On aid to the neighbourhood – for which Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, has the portfolio but not the staff – this division of tasks is less clear.

21 For a pre- and post-Lisbon comparison of the different EU actors’ involvement with Sudan, see J. J. Piernas Lopez (forthcoming) ‘La Unión Europea en Sudan Antes Y Después del Tratado de Lisboa: Coherencia “Sin Perjuicio De”’, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo.11


This paper was co-written by Steven Blockmans, Head of Research at the T.M.C. Asser Institute, Special Visiting Professor at the University of Leuven, co-founder and member of the governing board of the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER); Natalia Alonso; and Tidhar Wald. Oxfam acknowledges the assistance of Michael Bailey, Jamie Balfour-Paul, Esme Berkhout, Martin Butcher, Ed Cairns, Angela Corbalan, Julia Doherty, Elise Ford, Tom Fuller, Noah Gottschalk, Suying Lai, Robert Lindner, Kathrin Schick, Richard Stanforth, Nicolas Vercken, Catherine Woollard, and Francisco Yermo in its production. It is part of a series of papers written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues.

This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. Email publish@oxfam.org.uk. For further information on the issues raised in this paper please email advocacy@oxfaminternational.org. The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.


Oxfam

Oxfam is an international confederation of fifteen organizations working together in 92 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice:
- Oxfam America (www.oxfamamerica.org),
- Oxfam Australia (www.oxfam.org.au),
- Oxfam-in-Belgium (www.oxfamsol.be),
- Oxfam Canada (www.oxfam.ca),
- Oxfam France (www.oxfamfrance.org),
- Oxfam Germany (www.oxfam.de),
- Oxfam GB (www.oxfam.org.uk),
- Oxfam Hong Kong (www.oxfam.org.hk),
- Oxfam India (www.oxfamindia.org),
- Intermón Oxfam (www.intermonoxfam.org),
- Oxfam Ireland (www.oxfamireland.org),
- Oxfam Mexico (www.oxfammexico.org),
- Oxfam New Zealand (www.oxfam.org.nz),
- Oxfam Novib (www.oxfamnovib.nl),
- Oxfam Quebec (www.oxfam.qc.ca),

The following organizations are currently observer members of Oxfam, working towards full affiliation:
- Oxfam Japan (www.oxfam.jp)
- Oxfam Italy (www.oxfamitalia.org)

Please write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org. Email: advocacy@oxfaminternational.org