

1. The Voice of Many

Honduran citizens hold the state to account to secure farm investment



A farmer's market in Copan Ruinas where farmers sell their produce directly to consumers in the urban area. ©OCDIH, 2009

Rural communities in Western Honduras have long been marginalized, suffering high levels of poverty and inequality. Governments have shown little interest in smallholder agriculture and as a consequence have invested little in the region. Following ten years of action to build civil society, however, communities and local authorities are now working together to claim their rights. Working progressively at different levels – community, municipality, regional, and national – Oxfam and its partners have campaigned to promote small-scale agriculture as a viable means of building livelihoods and reducing poverty. As a result, new funding is beginning to have an impact in rural areas.

Introduction

Honduras suffers from some of the highest poverty levels in Latin America. Of its population of about 7.2 million, 55 per cent of urban households and 70.8 per cent of rural households live below the poverty line, and one-quarter of the population – 1.6 million people – live in conditions of extreme poverty (UNDP).¹ Although it is classed as a middle-income country, Honduras scores 0.667 on the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), significantly below the Latin American average of 0.797,² due to its highly unequal income distribution.

Although 55 per cent of the population live in rural areas, over the years the state has reduced funding and technical assistance to the rural sector (UNDP).³ Instead, governments have prioritized support to large- and medium-scale commercial agriculture for export crops. This has hampered the country's capacity to produce food for domestic consumption and has increased its dependency on imported food. With rising global food prices and more land being used to produce ethanol for fuel, Honduras is increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity.

Citizens have historically been excluded from decision-making. Between 1963 and 1982 the country was ruled by a succession of military governments.⁴ The 1980s saw a culture of authoritarianism and party political sectarianism, with violent persecution of those opposing the government; many leaders of social movements were killed. While elections have been held more regularly in recent times, real participatory democracy is still a challenge. Governments have generally accepted participation that supports the implementation of their own policies, but have been less accommodating of participation by citizens when the aim is to bring about real change.

Nevertheless, in 1990 the Honduran government initiated a process aimed at decentralising decision-making. The central government retained responsibility for determining policy, but operational functions were devolved to the municipalities⁵ and the private sector. A new Law of Municipalities gave them autonomy to approve budgets, collect payments for local services, operate public utilities, and create mechanisms allowing citizens to participate in local democracy. The municipalities were to fund this new model with the income they collected, while an additional 5 per cent of national income was transferred to them from central government (UNDP).⁶

More additional resources became available in 1999, when Honduras became a beneficiary of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.⁷ In return for debt relief, the country agreed to design a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), setting out how funds would be invested. This provided a policy framework for negotiating new funds with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Honduras also joined in the global commitment to work towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which necessitated stringent public budgeting. The PRS and the MDGs became reference points to determine how state income – whether from grants, new foreign debt contracts, or domestic income – could be used.

As the allocation of resources and operational decision-making became increasingly decentralised and the state developed a greater focus on reducing poverty, so the opportunities for civil society to influence budget decisions at municipal and regional levels increased dramatically. Oxfam’s engagement in the process began in 1999, through a programme designed to support the development of a movement of active citizens in Western Honduras.

Empowering citizens in Western Honduras

In the country as a whole, rates of illiteracy range between 50 per cent and 70 per cent, and malnutrition, poor housing conditions, and limited health services mean that diseases such as polio and tuberculosis are rife (FAO).⁸ Western Honduras, comprising the departments of Lempira, Copán, and Ocotepeque, has experienced particularly acute problems of poverty, exclusion, and marginalization. The six departments of Honduras with the lowest HDI rankings are Lempira, Copán, Ocotepeque, Intibucá, Santa Bárbara, and La Paz, where the population is mostly of indigenous origin (Lenca and Maya Chortis ethnic groups).⁹

Initially the focus of Oxfam’s intervention was on creating space for citizens to participate and engage in dialogue with those who governed them, with the aim of finding ways to tackle the root causes of poverty. However, it was also clear that improving the capacity of rural people to generate income was critical in overcoming poverty and exclusion. Oxfam introduced a programme under its Global Agricultural Scale Up Initiative (GASUI), which consisted of two key components. First, the programme aimed to demonstrate the viability of agriculture as a livelihood activity that could link rural people to profitable markets (see Box 1); second, it engaged in advocacy and campaigning work that would be critical in changing local, regional, and national policies on agriculture and creating an enabling environment to support smallholder farmers.

Box 1: Demonstrating the viability of smallholder agriculture: small farmers and their businesses lead the way

Oxfam has been working with local partner the Christian Organization for the Integrated Development of Honduras (OCDIH) since 2006 to demonstrate the viability of small-scale agriculture as a profitable livelihood option. This means turning small family plots used to grow basic grains into integrated, diverse farms producing a range of fruits, vegetables, and livestock for consumption and for market. The model also aims to demonstrate the most effective and profitable ways of investing in the sector. In particular, the programme has supported:

Improved natural resource management: Through the development of irrigation systems and farmer-to-farmer training programmes, the programme has reached over 20,000 beneficiaries – increasing yields of corn by 54 per cent from 2006 to 2010 and incomes by 27 per cent in the same period. Farmer training programmes and demonstration farms have encouraged farmers to diversify the crops and livestock they produce, as well as to adopt new soil and water management practices that reduce the need for costly inputs, such as fertilisers.

Access to credit: Poor access to credit hampers the ability of farmers to invest in their farming activities. Formal financial institutions offer credit at extremely high interest rates. The programme has established over 90 savings and loan community funds (*cajas rurales*); in 2008 these had accumulated capital of \$294,370 and over 2,000 beneficiaries, 48 per cent of whom were women. Lower interest rates for women have improved their access to loans and their ability to repay them, and have also increased their ability to make autonomous decisions about the use of credit.

Linking to new markets: As well as boosting production, the programme has supported farmers to develop agriculture through small businesses in order to access new markets and achieve better prices. It has contributed to increasing producers' sales by \$150,000 in the past year in municipal farmers' markets and through wholesalers and supermarket chains. The number of women who have access to goods and agricultural inputs and are active in the market has now reached 31 per cent, far greater than the 1 per cent recorded in 2006. As a result, the base line of the Economic Justice programme reflects an increase in the contribution of women to household income from 10 per cent in 2007 to 20 per cent in 2008.

The first phase of work to influence policy and investment took place in 1999–2000, and was aimed at building active citizenship in the Western region. In 1998 the Association of Non-Governmental Organizations of Honduras (ASONOG) carried out an assessment on democracy and citizen participation in the region. Oxfam agreed to work in partnership with ASONOG on a process aimed at closely linking citizen participation with human development, in a way that would change the political culture in Honduras.

In that year Hurricane Mitch struck the country with devastating force, leaving 5,000 people dead, most of its crops destroyed, and damage estimated in the billions of dollars (World Bank).¹⁰ In the aftermath of the disaster, ASONOG supported municipal authorities with training in relevant municipal laws, planning, budget formulation, tax collection, and resource management. It also provided them with funds to develop small projects of social benefit for the poorest and most excluded people, after consulting with the communities themselves about the relevance of each project.

The programme began at the community level. Oxfam and ASONOG set out to engage with citizens and to encourage them to take action to claim their democratic rights. Successful strategies included:

- Using theatre, traditional dance, music and poetry festivals, and radio and TV programmes to educate people about the

importance of democracy and about what being a citizen involves;

- Developing 'advocacy schools' for different population groups, offering citizens training in advocacy and campaigning. These schools brought together different groups, leading to a collective dialogue and analysis of the situation in Honduras and the formation of networks;
- A 'training of trainers' model for communicating knowledge. Local leaders who received training committed to pass on what they had learned within their own communities or social organizations.

Combining recreation and education was a very efficient way of overcoming the apathy felt by many citizens towards the democratic process and of promoting an attitude of collaboration. In particular, collaboration on small community projects made it possible to lay the foundations for a more transparent use of municipal resources, as community members were informed about the quality and costs of materials and contracts agreed for machinery and equipment.

This set the stage for the next level of citizen participation, which saw the programme focus its efforts at the municipal level. In response to legislative changes introduced in 2002, which reduced the role of civil society in the country's Departmental Development Commissions,¹¹ ASONOG worked to support the *mancomunidades* (associations of municipalities). The *mancomunidades* were born out of a joint planning effort between civil society and municipal government, and are made up of representatives of each. They already existed when ASONOG began its civil society participation programme in 1999, but at that time had achieved only low levels of co-ordination and joint management.

Efforts were also focused on the *patronatos* (community councils); these involve community members in decision-making at the local level and raise funds to implement small-scale projects. Associations of community councils (*asociaciones de patronatos*) were set up to create alliances with municipalities in order to raise funds jointly. ASONOG also built up the social network by integrating member organizations (17 NGOs and farmers' associations) into its training and education programme. The programme also built the capacity of partners to mainstream gender, for example by including gender indicators in their planning processes and monitoring the progress of economic empowerment of women in the region. Women's increased influence in decision-making in the use of municipal funds in the Western and Central regions (Intibucá and La Paz) is evident in the increased allocation of special funds for women's projects. Ten per cent of the PRS funds, the equivalent of about USD 8000, was utilized for projects run exclusively by women.

The programme reached the next level when in 2005 a regional-level co-ordination council – the Western Regional Platform of Honduras, or EROC – was established, consisting of equal numbers of municipal mayors and representatives of civil society.¹² EROC acts as a channel for political discussion with the central government about development issues in the region. It represents a cultural change at the local level, fostering collaboration between actors with different political and party affiliations. The creation of the council was fundamental in enabling the development of a specific PRS for the Western region and in securing additional funding from central government to implement it (see Box 2).

Box 2. A critical moment: the development of a regional PRS

Honduras's first national Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) was ratified by the government and the IMF in 2001, even though the proposed draft neglected many of the concerns voiced by civil society. In Western Honduras, dissatisfaction with this national plan was channelled into the positive process of creating a regional PRS of its own. Led by EROC, the design of the Western Region Strategy began at the community level and involved thousands of individuals from community associations, women's groups, and municipal authorities. In 2006, the initiative was launched as an alternative to the national PRS.

There are key differences between the two. For example, while the national PRS proposes extractive industries (mining and timber exploitation) as key areas for economic growth, civil society in the Western region (represented by a coalition of 120 national organizations led by ASONOG and FOSDEH, the Social Forum on External Debt and Development¹³) proposes as key actions environmental protection and recovery, the conservation of water resources, and reforestation. While the national PRS proposes tackling food insecurity by increasing food imports, civil society believes that the emphasis should be on access to credit to enable farmers to improve production for domestic consumption. The official PRS proposes distributing debt relief funding according to size of population (which would favour large cities), while civil society in the Western region proposes distribution based on poverty indicators.

The central government originally refused to recognise the validity of the Western region's PRS, but two important factors forced it to change its mind. First was the fact that municipal authorities had been strongly involved in the design of the strategy and were publicly committed to it. Second was the national-level lobbying carried out by civil society in partnership with other networks such as the CCERP (Consultative Council for Poverty Reduction), with the support of the international development community and the World Bank, which publicly recognized the quality and validity of the Western Region Strategy.

The achievement of the Western region in formulating its own PRS is impressive, but at the national level huge challenges remain. Only a small proportion of PRS funding is decentralised, and civil society and the donor community have questioned the government's distribution of funds. It was originally proposed under the PRS to invest 50 per cent of available resources in rural programmes to promote agriculture and micro-businesses, but this has not

happened. Instead, successive presidents have applied their own interpretations of PRS principles, making the excuse that small-scale agricultural production is uncompetitive in markets. During the first six years of PRS implementation, there was scarcely any investment in the rural economy, while in 2007–08 it amounted to just 1 per cent of the total received in debt relief (World Bank).¹⁴

In response to this, in 2009, the Oxfam-supported programme launched a national advocacy campaign on small-scale agriculture aimed at leveraging change in policy and investment at the national level. Its objectives were the introduction of a reform law for the agricultural sector and a 10 per cent increase in resources for small-scale agriculture in the national budget. ASONOG is leading the campaign jointly with two of its member organizations, the Christian Organization for Integrated Development in Honduras (OCDIH) and the Organization for the Development of Corquín (ODECO).¹⁵ The campaign is active in six regions of Honduras, and at national level is linked to the Meso-American campaign and regionally to Oxfam International's Economic Justice Campaign within Guatemala, Mexico, and Honduras.

The NGOs have gathered evidence on how small producers can be competitive in markets, generating income to pay taxes and to raise funds that contribute to the development of their communities. In 2008 four important groups joined the campaign, giving it a genuinely national reach: the Central de Cooperativas Cafetaleras de Honduras (National Coffee Co-operatives Centre), the Co-ordination Council for Small Farmers' Federations (COCOCH), and local NGOs Asociación Ecológica de San Marcos de Ocotepeque (AESMO) and Coordinadora de Mujeres Campesinas de La Paz (COMUCAP), a rural women's organization.

The campaign was launched nationally in March 2009, with mass events held simultaneously in six regions of the country bringing together small producers, academics, and senior government officials. This level of mobilization was made possible by the organizational work and capacity-building that had started ten years earlier. It has paid dividends: recognizing the social force behind the coalition leading the campaign, the government has agreed to discuss a potential 10 per cent increase in the budget for small-scale agriculture. Additionally, the campaign was featured in the national media for five weeks after it was launched, which helped to generate favourable public opinion.

Results and achievements

Programming efforts over a period of nine years have led to significant changes in the political dynamics of the Western region of Honduras and its ability to access funds from government and other sources, such as the Swedish International Development Agency

(Sida) and other NGO and government donors. The participatory approach taken by ASONOG has proved adaptable and has grown in scale over time. Starting in 1999 with ten municipalities, ASONOG is now implementing the intervention with its two partner organizations, OCDIH and ODECO, in 67 municipalities. As a result of this work, civil society has been radically changed. At the municipal level, there are currently more than 400 *patronatos* able to act independently of party political interests, 13 *patronato* associations, five youth networks, 25 women's networks, and 67 citizen transparency commissions which audit the use of funds by the municipalities. The intervention has also led to the creation of EROC, which co-ordinates the efforts of community groups and municipal authorities at regional level.

The programme has improved the region's ability to secure debt relief funding. In 2006, a total of \$37m of PRS funding was devolved to municipalities nationwide, but with conditions attached that not all municipalities could meet.¹⁶ The Western region was the first – and so far the only – region to draw up its own regional PRS, in a joint effort by civil society and municipal leaders. In 2006, it received a total of \$8.84m for projects, the highest amount allocated to any of the country's five regions. Elsewhere, municipalities did not base their budgets on PRS funding and civil society was unable to influence the destination of funds.

As a consequence, Western Honduras has gained greater influence with the national government. Previously, the region was the most isolated and marginalized in the country, starved of funds for public investment and with no civil society representation at national level. The government engaged in dialogue only with politicians and big business. Now, however, the region has a voice and is able to present proposals to decision-makers, who are prepared to listen. EROC has engaged with the Consultative Council for Poverty Reduction (the body set up in 2002 to oversee national PRS funding, representing civil society, donors, and the state) and with the technical unit of the government responsible for analysing projects and municipal investment plans, which have gone to the Secretary of Finance, parliamentary whips, and the President of the Republic himself.

Box 3. Defending smallholders' interests at the national level

The capacity of civil society in the Western region to influence national policy was put to the test when the government of Manuel Zelaya, elected in 2006, rescinded an agreement signed by the previous government, led by Ricardo Maduro, to direct 100 per cent of debt relief funds to reduce poverty in the country's poorest municipalities.

Instead, President Zelaya issued a decree ordering the distribution of funds according to population density, and redirected Lempira 900m (\$47.6m) to finance current expenses and election campaign commitments, leaving just Lempira 700m (\$37m) to invest in poverty reduction. The decree also

reduced the role of the Consultative Council for Poverty Reduction by transferring responsibility for allocation of funds to the National Congress.

However, both provisions were revoked following joint action by civil society in the Western Region, led by EROC, and national-level lobbying by ASONOG and FOSDEH.

This unprecedented improvement in its status has put the region in a much better position to negotiate, and in 2006 it obtained funds of \$8.84m from debt relief and donors to invest in projects under its own PRS. By working at different levels, it has also proved possible to leverage resources from other donors. While negotiating on development issues with regional and national governments, for instance, EROC has established links with the wider donor community. In 2008 it obtained \$4.76m in funding from the Swedish government to support projects in 30 municipalities identified as being the poorest of the 67 in the region. The funds will be managed by the municipalities and audited by the citizens' transparency commissions. Of these funds, 31.7 per cent was used for infrastructure projects, which improved access to agricultural markets, and 4 per cent was invested directly into home-based agriculture, such as growing vegetables and rearing pigs or poultry.

Meanwhile, community associations have raised funds from central government and from donors to develop projects that they themselves have identified as priorities.¹⁷ Between 2006 and 2008, with assistance from OCDIH, community council associations in the north of Copan and the municipality of Lepaera in Lempira carried out 16 fundraising missions, obtaining \$1.9m to develop 83 rural community projects. Of this, 15 per cent went to fund community banks (*cajas rurales*), agricultural production, and rural infrastructure projects to improve transport to markets.

The availability of increased resources has had a clear impact on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. The funding earmarked for improving infrastructure is supporting work done under the Honduras Agricultural Scale Up programme, improving access to markets for farmers in remote areas. If the national agriculture campaign builds on its promising start and manages to secure a 10 per cent increase in the national agricultural budget, this will have an even more significant impact on the lives of over five million rural Hondurans.

Scaling up and replication

Oxfam and its partners pursued a strategy of scaling up which relied on their ability to secure financial resources from other actors at community, regional, and national levels. Establishing and strengthening community, municipal, and regional institutions for planning work and transparently managing funds have put in place

sustainable structures to ensure the appropriateness and effectiveness of future investment.

Building links between the advocacy component of the programme and work that demonstrates the competitiveness of small-scale producers in agricultural markets has been a critical aspect of this initiative. It has enabled the programme to secure investments far greater than any that a single civil society organization could have invested by itself.

The programme has also been strategic in using its positive experiences at regional level to leverage change at national level. The development of the national agricultural campaign builds on work with farmers to support production and market access as well as capitalizing on the growing influence of the Western region in national government. These experiences have made it possible for the campaign to provide both the government and the general public with real examples of how support to small-scale agriculture can contribute to reducing poverty and how such interventions can be managed successfully. The programme also plans to make the most of opportunities presented by regional and national debates on food security. Oxfam and its partners will strongly advocate for investment in smallholder agriculture as an effective means of providing affordable food for both urban and rural populations.

Another way of scaling up the approach has been to promote replication of the model in other regions. In 2005, using the learning gained in the Western region, development organizations Trócaire of Ireland, DanChurchAid of Denmark, Diakonia of Sweden, and Development and Peace of Canada began a process to develop regional poverty reduction strategies in three departments in the north of Honduras (Atlantida, Yoro, and Colon) and in the Sula Valley in the south of the country.

However, their success was more limited as they were not able to invest in the long-term, bottom-up process of building civil society at the community level. They were therefore not able to address the allegiances of *patronatos* to political parties, and ideological differences hindered them from establishing social alliances and networks. This meant that differing levels of engagement were achieved between municipalities and civil society in each of the regions. With a weaker base, civil society has less power to negotiate with the state. This only serves to emphasise the value of the process of building active citizenship that took place in Western Honduras.

Successes and challenges

A number of factors have contributed to the success of the programme in Western Honduras. Elements that have worked well include the following:

- The initial investment made in training and education on advocacy, democracy, and citizens' rights was minimal compared with the impact and reach achieved by means of participants passing on what they had learned within their communities and through farmers' and women's organizations. This made it possible to create a mass movement by disseminating skills and knowledge throughout the population.
- The strategy of gradually scaling up the intervention – first through action at community and municipal levels, then at the regional level, until finally reaching the national level – proved effective. It allowed an incremental build-up of human capital, stimulating networking amongst civil society and a systematic weaving of alliances with municipal authorities.
- The capacities developed by citizens and the alliances established with local governments gave the campaign legitimacy in the eyes of the government and of donors. This facilitated fundraising activities and helped to progress the decentralizing of resources in favour of the poorest rural communities.
- The creation of a strategic alliance between NGOs, such as ASONOG, OCDIH, ODECO, and others, and farmers' and women's organizations to promote the agriculture campaign was a crucial factor. A high level of inter-agency co-ordination allowed the NGOs to pool their expertise and learning in a spirit of co-operation. Their proposals were seen by the government not simply as another demand from the farming sector, but as the reasoned and articulate response of an alliance of social actors acting in pursuit of a common goal.

Some important challenges remain, however. Among them are illiteracy and low levels of education, and actions taken by political parties and charitable organizations that hinder social empowerment of citizens – for example, badly managed donations that encourage passive dependency amongst communities and bypass institutions established to manage these resources.

However, the most significant threat to the programme is the political crisis in Honduras. President Zelaya was sent into exile on 28 June 2009 amid a power struggle over his plans for constitutional change. Prior to the coup, most space in the media was taken up by the activities of the main political parties, which hindered the programme's advocacy and campaigning, as there was little opportunity to position other issues on the national agenda. Following the coup, there was a break in relations between central

and local governments, over lack of resources and political issues. What little aid there is has become politicized and centralized.

Following a period of interim government, elections were held in November 2009. Despite international criticism of the coup, President Porfirio Lobo was sworn into office in January 2010 as Zelaya went into exile. Following the coup, the programme strategy has been redefined to respond to the changing context. A new emphasis has been put on developing the leadership capacity of youth and women's groups, to further enable them to develop their own agendas and their ability to take part in political dialogue and to contribute to the construction of new state law. However, continued insecurity and disregard for human rights have resulted in threats, violence, and political persecution of leaders, so activities promoting protection have become more key to the programme.

Conclusion

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from this experience is the importance of the bottom-up process in influencing policy and investment decisions. It is clear that the work done to mobilize civil society at different levels was central to the success of the national campaign, especially as the many efforts previously undertaken in this area had failed. The impact of the work can be seen in the relationships established between communities and municipalities and between municipalities and the national government. As a result of this engagement, the state is much better equipped to allocate funding to activities that are relevant and desired by community members themselves.

The ultimate outcome of the national campaign cannot yet be known, but its immediate achievements, in terms of the media profile given to the launch and the willingness of the government to engage with its proposals, could never have been imagined just ten years ago.

Notes

¹ UNDP (2006) Human Development Report, Honduras, p.40.

² Ibid., p.27.

³ Ibid., p.67.

⁴ The last Honduran military dictatorship was led by Policarpo Paz García, who ruled from 1978 to 1982.

⁵ The 18 departments of Honduras are further divided into 297 municipalities. The municipalities have elected majors and municipal councils rather than departmental governors who are appointed by the President. Municipalities vary considerably in size, and their governments are constituted accordingly. Those with a population of under 5,000 have four council members, those with 10,000 have six, those with more than 10,000 have eight and a mayor, and those with more than 80,000 have ten and a mayor. See US Library of Congress: <http://www.countrystudies.us/honduras/88.htm>

⁶ UNDP (2006) op. cit., pp.83-87.

⁷ This was precipitated by Hurricane Mitch, which devastated the country in 1998. The IMF had repeatedly rejected Honduras's inclusion in the HIPC initiative, arguing that its economy was healthy. After Hurricane Mitch, however, this argument was untenable and Honduras was granted debt relief (Foro Social de Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras – FOSDEH).

⁸ FAO (2005) 'Status of Food Security in Honduras', p.35.

⁹ Around 90 per cent of the country's population are *mestizo* (of mixed indigeneous/European descent), with 2 per cent of African origin and 1 per cent European (US Library of Congress). According to the Confederation of Autochthonous Peoples of Honduras (CONPAH), 7 per cent of the population is made up of indigenous ethnic groups, among them the Lenca, Chorti, Garifuna, Tolupan, Pech, Nahoa, Miskito, and Tahuaca.

¹⁰ World Bank. Honduras Country Brief. Accessed 21 December 2009. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HONDURASEXTN/0..contentMDK:21035522~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295071,00.html>

¹¹ President Ricardo Maduro reformed the Decree for the Creation of the Departmental Development Commissions (CODEP) in mid-2002. This reform reduced the participation of civil society in decision-making, with increased responsibility given to Congress and the Governor Coordinator, both political positions designated by the President.

¹² In Spanish, EROC stands for Espacio Regional de Occidente.

¹³ In Spanish, Foro Social de la Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras. FOSDEH is a national NGO network created in 1996 by an ASONOG initiative.

¹⁴ According to government figures, in 2000–02 Honduras received \$81.7m in debt relief and spent \$67.2m; in 2003–05 it received \$718.2m and spent \$14.5m; and in 2006–08 it received \$215.1m and spent \$141.3m. The main areas of expenditure were salaries for teachers and police, medicines, and social protection and infrastructure. Source: World Bank Strategy for Honduras.

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HON>

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¹⁵ OCDIH (Organismo Cristiano de Desarrollo Integral de Honduras) and ODECO (Organización para el Desarrollo de Corquín) are both members of the ASONOG federation.

¹⁶ At the same time, the Government withheld \$104m to implement election promises and to support charitable causes promoted by the First Lady.

¹⁷ Members of community associations have been trained as fundraisers and supported by OCDIH.

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