Evaluation of Khartoum Urban Poor Programme, Sudan

Full Report

Oxfam GB Programme Evaluation

October 2008

Commissioned by: Oxfam GB

Evaluators: Dr. Hassan Ahmed Abdel Ati, Idris El Tahir El Nayal, Ms. Samah Hussein
## List of Contents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of contents</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Methodology</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Constraints</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Khartoum Urban Poor Program (KUP): Background:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Context</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Khartoum IDPs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Sudanese IDPs: global features and new challenges:</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Employment and Incomes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 Food, Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4 Education in Khartoum State</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5 IDPs Education</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.6 Expressed Needs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Poverty and Displacement in Khartoum</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Attempts to Alleviate IDPs’ Poverty:</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Displacement and Gender</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 IDP Return: the challenges</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Khartoum Urban Poor Program (KUP)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 The livelihood Support Project:</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Programme Partner CBOs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Some CBO Examples</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3 Activities:</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4 Assessment</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.5 Community Views</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.6 Recommendations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.7 The Loan Component</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.8 Project Budget</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.9 Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 The Education Component</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Target Areas and Delivery</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Support to Community Organizations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 Capacity buildings</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4 Supporting Church Schools</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5 Impact on enrollment and retention</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6 The Education Campaign</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Challenges and Opportunities in the Near Future</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Challenges</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Opportunities</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conclusion and Recommendations</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Conclusion</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Recommendations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents Consulted</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex I: Human Interest stories</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex II: TOR</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex III: Persons Interviewed</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.1: Apparent Enrollment in Khartoum State by Sex</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.2: Marital Status of IDP Women (1987 and 2003)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1: Oxfam CBO Partners</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2: Loans and Repayment Rates of SAHA members (1999-2003)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.3: CBOs Capacity Building and Skill training 2001-2004</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.4: Oxfam Grants to CBOs by Area of Utilization (1999-2001)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.5: Cumulative lending, No of borrowers, average loan size and repayment rate</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.6: Distribution of CBO Borrowers by Timely Repayment (%)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.7: Livelihood Project Budget 2005-8 (£)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.8: Oxfam Targeted Schools in Khartoum state</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.9: Enrollment, Dropout and Performance Rates in Selected Schools</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.10: Achievement of the best and lowest 3 students</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.11: Teacher’s pupils Ratio</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.12: Average No. of Pupils/class in Selected Schools</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 1: Khartoum State population 1907-2007</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 2: Programme Budget Allocation per Activity</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 3: CBOs by Fund Allocation (1999-2002)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 4: Oxfam Support to partner er CDOs (2005 - 8)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 5: CBO Member Repayment Rates (1999 - 2002)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary:
General:
1. This report is primarily based on literature review (Oxfam project reports and literature on IDPs) and primary data collected from the project target areas during the May-June 2008. Areas visited include Mayo and Soba south of Khartoum, Jebel Aulia, Dar ElSalam and Gamair in Omdurman and Haj Yousif in Khartoum North.

2. The objectives was to assess Oxfam's Khartoum Urban Poor Programme (KUP) performance, impact and the appropriateness of methods and approaches used and to educate the programme future strategies by drawing lessons from past and providing contextual analysis and forecasting possible changes in the immediate future which can ensure relevance of Oxfam response and the sustainability of its strategic intervention.

3. The methods used were primarily participatory with primary and secondary stakeholders and they included (a) review relevant literature (mainly academic literature on IDPs and poverty, UN and INGO's reports and Oxfam KUP project documents), (b) Interviews were conducted with Oxfam project staff, Catholic church leaders, School headmasters, CBO leaders and some government officials at locality level, one leaders of parent-teachers associations. Some individual women were also interviewed to draw their personal/household biography, as human interest stories (Annex I); (c) Eleven group discussions were with representatives of institutions, organizations and networks dealing with Microfinance, with women and CBO groups (KUP partners), school teachers and parents associations and school friends, (d) Observation methods were also used during the field visits to complement other methods and generate debate, and (e) some numerical data was collected from some schools to assess the academic performance of pupils in Oxfam supported schools.

4. The main constraints were related to the secondary data available. (a) Scarcity and inconsistency of official data and absence of desegregation that directly suits the evaluation purpose, (b) Oxfam reports also suffer the problem of inconsistency and progress reports are not dated and a clear contradiction was depicted in CBO budget allocation figures between the reports and figures of previous evaluation reports. And (c) Some CBOs keep no regular records and most of the figures given were dependent on memory and/or estimates.

Interventions
1. The KUP targeted conflict affected IDPs and urban poor groups in camps and/or squatter settlements in the outskirts of Khartoum. Its main objectives was to improve target groups quality of life through increasing access to education for children, helping households build a sustainable livelihood base and raising community members awareness and capacity to campaign for their rights and entitlements. The two main interventions to realize those objectives were supporting basic education and livelihood with a third campaign component to serve the main interventions.

2. In education, the KUP supported the construction and/or rehabilitation of 18 schools, provided chairs and benches for children seating, boards, tables and chairs for teachers, supplied school books and provided training for teachers and PTAs. The project also succeeded in forming a loose coalition of INGOs, UN agencies and government institutions that, since 2004, annually
celebrated the Education For All (EFA) weak with high level participation from government, including the State President.

3. The impact of the intervention:
   - improved school environment, particularly in areas where the school was totally reconstructed and supplied with water and toilet facilities
   - increased capacity for enrollment, increased number of intake and reduced drop out rates
   - stability of staff and improvement of their teaching and professional skills
   - stronger linkage of school with surrounding environment and greater engagement of community and support to local schools, as a result of the PTAs and Friends of School committees and their linkage to state institutions and authorities
   - children academic achievements has improved (number joining secondary schools) though still lower than children of Khartoum urban proper schools

4. However, the drop out rates are still relatively high mainly for economic and social reasons to do with the economic inability and/or need of the children parents and/or their level of awareness which has particularly and negatively impacted on girls education. This calls for linking the livelihood and education interventions both to increase community awareness and the families' financial capacity to support their children education.

5. In the livelihood support, interventions included formation and/or support of women CBOs in the target areas through capacity building and institutional support and exposing and linking them to other institutions and organizations, providing grants to CBOs as a revolving fund to run a micro-finance programme, skill training for CBO members, especially in small business management and awareness raising on HIV/AIDS.

6. The impacts of the livelihood programme:
   - Organization of the marginalized communities created a voice that could be made more effective if the campaign component is further developed
   - improved women capacity for business management and emergence of some women leaders
   - increased household income and living standard and growth in household assets and diversification of income sources, thus reducing economic vulnerability
   - Family stability as migrants of direct beneficiary families returned, children went back to school and less family break downs were recorded
   - Development of institutional relationships within community as opposed to tribal and social relationships
   - Linkage to other institutions and organizations through exchange visits and membership of networks

7. The livelihood however suffer some problems, including
   a. The diminishing value of the loan fund (grant) due to (a) lack of replenishment as Oxfam stopped supporting it for a number of years, (b) low repayment rates by borrowers caused by mobility of clients as a result of voluntary return and/or squatter settlement re-planning policies implemented by the state and (c) market demands and skills gained by clients which makes the size of loans constitute a check and limit to beneficiaries
ambitions and capacities, and (d) Minimum level of accountability regarding repayment among several of the CBOs. At least in part, this can be attributed to the early disengagement of Oxfam as well as lack of the legal and/or social means of control by CBO leadership resulting from the absence of the state authorities.

b. Although the targeting of women is justified in both economic and social terms, the focus of the skill training on women has limited the programme capacity to offer more marketable and income earning skills.

8. The campaign component, though poorly funded and limited to programme direct activities, has proved extremely effective particularly in supporting the livelihood interventions where it had a much greater multiplier effect, most important of which was creating a momentum within communities and some state institutions (Social Development Fund, Bank of Sudan) to address poverty and problems of the poor, the results of which was the new pro-poor financial credit policies undertaken by the Bank of Sudan and the establishment of micro-finance windows within several commercial banks. Another major achievement by KUP was the formation of the Micro-finance Network that brought most of the stakeholders together in which the programme played a major and leading role. In education, the impact of the campaign was hampered, other than the limited budget, by the seasonality of its activities and the absence of a common vision and clear commitments shared by coalition members.

**Overall Assessment:**

1. The programme has been both in targeting of both interventions and its services are still needed and demanded by community and are welcomed by state authorities, particularly at locality level. Thus the targeting of areas and social groups has been an appropriate response

2. Both the livelihood and education programmes have succeeded in achieving their immediate results direct although the multiplier effect on a significant scale is yet to be seen.

3. Compared to the budget, the achievements has been really great, thanks to the efforts by the staff and the successful utilization of the campaign

4. The campaign has successfully supported both interventions, yet it has been bit weak in community empowerment as it avoided the political aspects relating to governance rights etc… This was in part dictated by the socio-political environment that existed when the programme was designed, but partly also by the small budgets and the seasonality in the case of education.

5. Education and the livelihood interventions are geographically scattered and functionally isolated. This one the one hand raises administrative costs, technically weakens programme capacity to monitor progress, particularly with the small number of staff, and reduce the likelihood of addressing both poverty and limited access to education of the target groups at the same time, although all documents stress their interrelationship.

6. In the absence of a proper M&E system, the reports remain the main tool of assessment and follow up. Therefore the reporting system of the programme activities needs to be improved as
most of the reports suffer the problems of repetition, change of objectives, being undated and inconsistent in figures and leaning more to narrating, in each report

**The Future:**
The local context and changes in which the programme will work in the near future is expected to be one

1. IDPs return on any significant scale is unlikely, particularly outside official IDP camps as many families now own their housing plots and are in a way or another integrated in economic and social environment
2. Poverty will continue to rise
3. Education will be more privatized and commercialized and good quality education, without external support, will be beyond the reach of most families
4. New opportunities are expected to open as a result of
   a. Democratic transformation which will create a space for local community voice
   b. More devolution of power to localities and local councils in line with the CPA and the Transitional Constitution requirements
   c. Economic growth and investment in Khartoum is likely to increase, although it is expected to be basically in real estate, commercial and service sectors
   d. State commitment to funding the poor as indicated by the new Bank of Sudan Micro-Finance policies and the establishment of Al Usra Bank for funding the poor and the condition of allocating 30% of its fund to women
   e. Improvement in electricity supply with Hamdab dam completion is expected to allow for the re-operation of a numerous number of factories in the manufacturing sector and attract new ones to open.
   f. The improved capacity of the target communities emanating from the interventions made including the organized community, improved technical skills and the engagement in networks and partnerships built

**Recommendations:**

1. The continuity of IDPs, rising poverty and rising costs of good quality education, warrants the continuity of the programme to consolidate what has been done as part of Oxfam exit strategy
2. To remedy the weaknesses in the two components and maximize their impact it is important that the livelihood support be combined with education to ensure that economic factors do not hamper access to education when schools and facilities are available
3. To enable the communities utilize the emerging opportunities, it is important that
   a. The competitive position of the target groups in the market be enhanced through large scale and high quality skill training and/or upgrading programme that should target both women and men
   b. New market space and sources of funding are open through skill training, exposure and expanded linkages
   c. The democratic space, election campaign and the devolution of power to local councils are used by the community to raise their needs and lobby for their rights. This can be attained by strengthening and further building the capacities of existing organizations and through intensive civic education programmes
4. New objectives need to be set and new approach needs to be adopted to transform the current campaign component into a civic education programme, widen its target groups (not to be focused on the beneficiaries of the education and livelihood programmes) and to engage more national civil society organizations in the delivery of the programme. That should not however, be at the expense of the present functions performed by the campaign since the forum, networking and the media work are critical for the success of all interventions.

5. The overall objective of the programme needs to be modified to target greater integration of the target groups into the market and the mainstream society.

6. The next programme cycle should be considered a transitional phase, in line with the development of the country, and also as a phasing out preparatory phase. This requires enhancing the institutional and management capacity of CBO partners, building new partnerships with some national NGOs/CSOs to undertake the ground work, continue supporting of networks formation and expanding the campaign component of the programme.

7. The above tasks need to be backed by adequate funding to ensure their satisfactory implementation and effectiveness.
1. Introduction:
This report is based on a literature review and field survey conducted during May-June 2008 in Khartoum State. Field visits covered Mayo and Soba south of Khartoum, Jebel Aulia, Dar ElSalam and Gamair and Abu Said in Omdurman and Haj Yousif in Khartoum North. The sites visited are mainly densely populated IDP and low class residential areas in which Oxfam GB is operating. Some 18 schools.

The survey was conducted as part of Oxfam Urban Poor programme evaluation to assess programme performance, impact, appropriateness of methods and approaches used with the overall aim of the educating the programme future strategies through drawing lessons from past experience. The review was also intended to provide comprehensive contextual analysis for Khartoum state and Oxfam target groups with special focus on policy and practical changes and recommend measures that could guide Oxfam future policies and strategies to ensure the sustainability of its strategic intervention.

The specific objectives and tasks of the review term as identified by the TOR, include
1. Reviewing and evaluating programme interventions throughout the period of its operation against the objectives and outputs identified in the projects' documents.
2. Assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of the approach used for the different interventions undertaken and identifying how to improve performance in the future.
3. Identify strengths; opportunities, weaknesses and threats and provide information on what Oxfam GB could do better.
4. Assessing to what degree the programme has been gender sensitive and identify opportunities for improving gender equality and improve conditions of women and girls.
5. Assessing the impact of the two projects components (education and livelihood support) and how far did they meet the required needs and the project objectives.
6. Providing contextual analysis of socio-economic and political situation and problems and needs of the target group, including analysis of current situation of primary education in general with a focus on policies and practices governing education?
7. Helping Oxfam understands the nature and extent of poverty among various groups in Oxfam GB programme area and the opportunities open for Oxfam GB to lift poor people out of poverty in future
8. Exploring the relevance of Oxfam GB work to the current and changing political/social, cultural and economic contexts and providing recommendations for future interventions

1.1 Methodology:
The methods used include:
a. Literature Review: This included academic literature (mainly on IDPs and poverty), UN and INGO's reports, Oxfam/project documents and reports and official documents relating to education and social services. Official documents, however, are very scanty and rarely area-specific and are none-existent at locality level. The value of official documents is also reduced by the fact that the target communities are only parts of residential areas, while official data is at best disaggregated at the residential quarter level. For all that reliance was heavy on Oxfam, UN agencies and INGOs' documents

b. Interviews: Interviews were conducted with Oxfam project staff, Catholic church leaders (New Gamair and Haj Yousif), School headmasters, CBO leaders and some government
officials at locality level and some leaders of parent-teachers associations. Some women were also interviewed to draw their personal/household biography, as human stories (success and failures) (Annex I)

c. **Group Discussions:** Eleven group discussions were held; One with representatives of Bank of Sudan Micro-credit administration, the Social Development Fund, Micro-credit network and Adra, 4 with women and CBO groups at Dar al Salam, Mayo, Soba Al AlAradi and Jebel Aulia, and 6 with school teachers and parents associations of Hai Al Nasr (Mayo), Soba, Jabel Aulia, Haj Yusif and Abu Saeid, including two with the School Friends (women). In relation to education the discussion focused on the relationship with Oxfam and other partners, benefits from Oxfam support, weaknesses and needs and the role of parents associations, school friends and the locality authorities, and the community ability to support their children during their schooling. Some statistics were taken from the group on the numbers of teachers trained and the material supplies provided by Oxfam. For the women involved in the livelihood programme, questions focused on organizations structure and capacity, community support, utilization of grants, methods of operation, activities and programmes other than the lending activities, new relations developed, changes that occurred (programme impact), problems and constraints and current needs. The discussion with CBOs also included some capacity assessment of the CBOs and their leadership.

d. **Observations:** This was applied during the process of conducting the field visits to complement other methods, particularly with regard to the physical structure of schools, type of housing and state of environmental health in the area, households furniture and assets and the general appearance and behaviour of children in the area.

e. **Check lists:** This was applied for schools and aimed at getting some statistical information to assess the impact of Oxfam support on children enrollment rates and schooling performance. A short check list (questionnaire) was distributed to head teachers to record the performance of cohorts during the last five years, and as well to show the number of the teachers who received training before and after they joined the school staff. The results obtained were correlated to assess the performance and impact of Oxfam programme.

The review has been based on an active participation of both primary and secondary stakeholders of the target communities.

1.2 **Constraints:**
The main constraint was related to the secondary data available. Official data is scarce and not consistent or disaggregated at a level compatible with our purpose. Oxfam reports also suffer the problem of inconsistency and progress reports are not dated and a clear contradiction was depicted in CBO budget allocation figures between the reports and figures of previous evaluation reports which were not sourced. Some CBOs keep no regular records and most of the figures given were dependent on memory and/or estimates.

The analysis was constrained by a number of factors. Most critical were

a. The inability to take other none-served communities and schools as comparator groups to objectively assess performance of the programme within the wider context
b. The limited resources that prevented a more comprehensive survey that is fully representative of the diverse experiences existing in such a vast place and with other development actors.

c. That most of the secondary data consulted, including Oxfam reports is not gender disaggregated

1.3 Khartoum Urban Poor Program (KUP): Background:

Although Oxfam GB has been present in Sudan since 1983, it started operation in Khartoum in 1996 in response to the high influx of IDPs into the out skirts of Khartoum, driven primarily by war in south Sudan and in the Nuba mountains area in south Kordofan. In line with its principle of the Right To Sustainable Livelihood, Oxfam GB targeted both IDPs and urban poor in their neighborhood. Hence the broad objectives were to help the target groups (IDPs and urban poor) achieve food and income security and have access to secure employment and improved living conditions to help them build a sustainable livelihood.

Generally Oxfam programme intervention passed through four stages:

1. Emergency stage: Immediately after IDPs arrival from conflict areas when food and medical care were their urgent needs.

2. Stabilization: When IDPs got settled Oxfam strategy changed from relief to provision of basic services focusing organization and sustainable livelihood on education and livelihood.

3. When community got organized, intervention started to shift to empowerment through capacity building and building their advocacy and lobbying powers.

Following the assessment in 1999, and in response to IDPs' demands, the programme started to take shape focusing on the two main components of basic education and livelihood support and inclusion of more urban poor communities in its target groups.

1.3.1 The livelihood Component:

The programme aimed at supporting the development of sustainable economic base for the displaced communities, especially women, through skill and capacity building, institutional support to local community based organizations (CBOs) and the provision of some financial support in the form of a grant for a revolving fund to help them start their own business enterprises.

The main target group and beneficiaries of the component were the internally displaced people and urban poor in Umbada and Jebel Aulia localities, Khartoum State. Locations include Dar El Salaam, Mayo, Soba, AlSalama and AlAndalus. Total number of direct beneficiaries is around 4000 and indirect beneficiaries estimated to be about 20,000, 85% of them women.

The programme aims at improving food and income security of internally displaced people and urban poor living at peripheries and shanty areas of Khartoum through capacity building and the development of sustainable socio-economic base. The specific objectives include

a. Strengthening the capacity of CBOs through organization and training;

b. Improving access to credit through provision of revolving fund grants;

c. Promoting networking and information sharing through joint activities and exchange visits;
d. Linking CBOs and community groups to credit institutions and increasing their access to credit through their access to financial resources through promoting CBOs capacity for advocacy and lobby on micro-credit policies; and

e. Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into projects' activities

Project activities include:

a. Building community organizational capacity and capacity to influence through formation and/or institutionally supporting CBOs and providing training in administrative, management and technical skills, exposure and facilitation of wider linkages and networking;

b. Direct livelihood support in the form of training on business management and supporting of local initiatives, provision of small grants and assisting self-employed people to access banks, formal credit institutions and donors; and

c. Awareness raising through supporting research on livelihood related issues, assessment surveys and awareness raising on HIV/AIDS, increasing access to information and promotion of IDPs capacity to lobby and advocate for their rights

Partnership is the main method of work adopted. Project activities are implemented through partnership with number of partners, including primarily CBOs working directly with target groups, national NGOs and some government institutions, with Oxfam playing the coordination and facilitation roles between the various actors. At present there are five CBO partners (women groups and community development associations). These CBOs have been officially registered by the authorities to be responsible for community work in their areas and are fully responsible for project implementation on the ground.

The Social Development Foundation and the Bank of Sudan are the most important governmental partners and through them, the project recently started working with Khartoum State Micro-Finance Network, which includes 66 local NGOs and CBOs working in micro-finance. The project collaborates with Sudan National AIDS Control Program (SNAP) in the HIV/AIDS awareness raising campaign. Besides, The project also coordinate its work with authorities in Jebel Aulia and Umbadda localities, HAC Khartoum State and several INGOs working with IDPs and urban poor, including ACORD, FAR, CARE, Goal and Together for Sudan (UK) according to the project activity and the specialization of the organization.

1.3.2 The Education Component:

The longer than expected stay of IDPs in camps and squatter settlements in Khartoum with the absence of basic services forced many of them to start some schools, mostly from local materials and with the support of some NGOs and faith-based groups and institutions. The education component of the project was initiated as a response to community demands and to the education needs of children from IDP and poor families living in camps and poor residential areas of Khartoum.

Education support was focused on improving basic education services and was provided in several forms including improving school environment (construction/ rehabilitation of classroom), supply of education materials and equipment, training of teachers and parents associations and by advocating for better education opportunities and resources for those communities. Besides, the project also supported literacy classes for adults and community awareness sessions on the importance of education (especially for girls) and on education rights and methods of lobby and advocacy for those rights.
The education programme was implemented in the two localities of Jebel Aulia (El Nasr administrative unit) and Abu Seid locality, supporting 23 schools in total. Beneficiaries of the programme were children (at basic school age), illiterate adults and CBOs including parents-teachers councils, friends of schools and community development committees.

1.3.3 The Campaign Component:
This came as an add-on to the education and livelihood activities, dictated by both necessity and lack of resources. It was adopted, primarily to fill the gap created by lack of resources and, as will be shown, achieved good results in both the education and livelihood programme

Other than the introduction, the report is presented in four sections. Section two provides a description of the context in which the programme operates with special focus on the situation of IDPs in Khartoum state, their state of poverty and how they are coping. Section three contains the analytic description of the KUP programme components contents, achievements and impacts. In section four a short forecast of the expected changes in the near future is presented with a view to help the programme design its strategy to suit those expected changes. The fifth and final section summarizes the conclusion and recommendations of the evaluation team.
2. The Context:
About 25% of Sudan's estimated population of 32.8 millions has experienced some form of displacement during the last three decades, caused by drought and environmental degradation and or by war. Displacement by war particularly after 1990 when new war fronts, in addition to the south, exploded in other parts of the country. According to UN reports, by 2003 more than four million Sudanese persons were internally displaced, about half of whom have moved to settle in Khartoum State (UN, Nov. 2003). The war in Darfur that flared in 2003 has added at least two millions to IDPs in the country, for some of them, Khartoum also became the final destination.

Khartoum since its establishment as a national capital and seat of government became the main centre of trade, industry and services. The 1960s witnessed the beginning of large scale rural migration to Khartoum attracted by job opportunities generated by the growing industrial sector. With the gradual decline in the rural economies and shortage of services during the 1970s, population movement from all parts of Sudan started to intensify both towards the capital Khartoum and/or the agricultural development schemes of central Sudan. The Sahelian drought of the 1980s marked the beginning of large scale displacement of population, mainly from western Sudan and towards Khartoum. The second largest wave of displacement in Sudan that targeted Khartoum as the main destination, followed the heightening of the civil war in Southern Sudan, particularly during the 1990s, which pushed over four million out of their homes. As a result of these latter developments, Khartoum population rose by about 300% between 1993 and 2007 (Fig. 1)

![Fig. 1: Khartoum State Population 1907-2007](image)

Khartoum IDPs:
The latest estimate of IDPs population in Sudan (November 2007) was 6,027,594 million\(^1\). According to UN reports\(^2\) only 14.4% live in official camps which makes it harder to monitor numbers and despite the scale of the problem, there is no mechanism to monitor population movements between states nor within towns. OCHA Regional Office for Central and East Africa, in its Displaced Populations Report, January - June 2007, gave an estimate of 4,465,000 IDPs for all of Sudan, 1,500,000\(^3\) of them (33.6%) in Khartoum. According to the OCHA's 2007 Work plan for Sudan, there are 2,071,000 IDPs in Khartoum.

The official camps and IDP main concentration areas include:

---

\(^1\) Source; OCHA, 30 June 2008, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B)


\(^3\) UNHCR, November 2007
1. **Mayo camp**: Located south of Khartoum with an estimated population of about 60,000 (Khartoum state ANA, 2000. Of the total population 49% are female and 17% are children under five of age (Khartoum state ANA;2000;5). The inhabitants are mainly from southern Sudan, Nuba mountains, Darfur and Kordofan with few people from the riverine areas of Sudan.

2. **Jebel Aulia Camp**. Located south of Khartoum and was originally established in 1992. The population is estimated to be around 39,000, with 43% of them females. Camp inhabitants are mainly from southern Sudan.

3. **Wad Elbasher Camp**: Located about 20 kms west of Omdurman with an estimated population of about 51,000.

4. **Dar Al Salam Camp**: It is at the western periphery of Omdurman with an estimated population of 116,600, 53% of them females and 15% children under 5 years of age (Ibid)

5. **Kartoon Kassala**: Although this is not officially an IDP camp, it has steadily grown and attracted IDPs and people from within Khartoum due to low rents of houses and the convenient location. It is located east of Khartoum North close to both the commercial and industrial areas of town.

6. **Soba Al Aradi**: It started as a squatter settlement south east of Khartoum in the mid 1980s and was replanned in the mid 1990s. In 1998 the total population was estimated to be 60,200 (Banaga, 1999). The largest group of inhabitants is the IDPs from southern Sudan (58%), although, like Kartoon Kassala, its convenient location and the policy of allocating re-planned areas, has attracted many of other urban dwellers.

### 2.1.1 Sudanese IDPs: global features and new challenges:

1. IDPs are heterogeneous in geographical and ethnic origins and cultures and the causes of their displacement. Known causes of displacement include war, drought, insecurity, uneven development and the collapse of rural economies. However, the sudden movement caused by wars and armed conflicts are usually associated with total loss of properties and assets.

2. Government policy towards IDPs is either nonexistent or negative towards IDPs and although the GoS is signatory to all International IDP Conventions, it has made minimal commitments to its obligations under the terms of these agreements. As a result IDPs suffer destitution and denial of rights of citizenship and their fate is left to the support of UN agencies, INGOs and national organizations.

3. IDPs' have limited opportunities for self reliance as a result of the loss of assets and property and lack of appropriate skills and the severe competition and suffer social exclusion and some kind of social stigmatisation as they are perceived as a suspect group

4. 14% of IDPs in Khartoum live in camps with relatively better health and water facilities, compared to those living in squatter areas

5. Some IDPs have managed varying degrees of integration, especially those from Western Sudan and those who stayed longer and secured permanent jobs

6. Average households size is 6.5 persons

---

1 Gumaa Kunda Komey (2005)
7. Though the growing number of peace processes raised hopes for improving IDPs' situation, experience proved that the subsiding of fighting does not necessarily lead to the return of IDPs, nor even to an improvement in their humanitarian situation, but on the contrary to diminishing support and humanitarian assistance.

8. Long term displacement brought with it new difficulties, such as property disputes, employment, arguments about IDPs' legal status and the effort to bring them out of their poverty (ibid, p. 7). Long-term and/or repeated displacement in Sudan\(^1\), also created the new challenge of cultural and economic adaptation by new generations in home areas.

Besides, IDPs in Sudan share some conditions and characteristics with those in several African countries, including:

1. IDPs often being targeted by fighting factions government troops (or rebels outside towns) bringing to the forefront the element of protection. However, according to UN reports in 13 of the 52 countries affected by displacement, IDPs cannot count on their governments for protection, because they are either hostile or indifferent to their plight, Sudan being one of them.

2. Because of lack of information and because IDPs can attract substantial emergency assistance, at least for INGOs and UN agencies, IDPs numbers are usually inflated, yet at the same time not all IDPs receive assistance. According to some reports, over one third of IDPs in the world are either fully or partially ignored by the UN (NRC, 2004 p.13). Lack or inaccurate information and misled targeting, opens the way to all sorts of corruption and the situation is made worse by the lack of coordination between actors involved.

3. IDPs are often among the poorest in their societies, both before their displacement and almost certainly afterwards. With the total loss of assets, due to looting and village burning, the cost of recovery is much higher and takes much longer.

4. The political gearing of humanitarian assistance has caused a sharp drop in international assistance to Africa.

2.1.2 Employment and Incomes:
The joint survey of IDPs in Khartoum by CARE, IOM and FAR, (February 2004), concluded that:

- Economic opportunities were so low that increasingly women resorted to illegal activities like prostitution and beer brewing which increased their risk of imprisonment
- Although basic services in IDPs camps were reported better than in squatter areas, the camps are far from commercial centers providing job opportunities
- Small numbers of IDPs manage to obtains jobs on construction sites or as domestic workers, but cannot afford transport to go to work
- Displaced women had very little means and economic opportunities and increasingly women to provide for themselves and their children resorted to alcohol brewing which is an illegal activity, as a result many ended in jail
- 74.7% IDPs in Khartoum were unemployed and 16% were self-employed and 9.1% were working for the government or in the public sector. The employed were in casual labour (10.3%), wage labour (7.1%) and petty trade (2.6%).

\(^1\) It estimated that 80% of Southern Sudanese has been displaced at least once in his/ her lifetime
- 33% were employed in agriculture before fleeing with no skills suitable to the urban job market
- The main sources of income for the IDPs are daily, casual and seasonal agricultural labour, as well as petty trade. Women generally provide the core income and perform most of the work.
- IDPs are expected to secure 85% of their annual food needs in 2001, the remaining 15% of needs were met through a variety of coping mechanisms and targeted food relief.
- The bulk of the IDPs income is spent on food and water, which leaves no extra income for other basic or immediate needs.
- For most IDPs in camps and squatter settlements, the most stressful period is July-September when the demand for labour in the city is very low, as brick-making and construction stops and as a result, temporary migration to rural farms and the large agricultural schemes for seasonal labor occurs.
- IDP and poor communities in peri-urban Khartoum pay as much as 40% of their income for small quantities of poor quality water

2.1.3 Food, Health and Nutrition

- Global malnutrition rated for IDPs in Khartoum capital is about 30%
- Less than 10% of school age children reported eating 3 meals per day in Khartoum IDP camps (2005)
- **30% have no access to medical services** and 57% of households could not afford the cost of health care from the clinics, Reproductive health services are lacking and the cost of midwives being prohibitive to IDPs
- Crude Mortality Rates in IDP camps in Khartoum in Mayo and Soba Arradi were close to the emergency threshold of 1/10,000/day (2004/5) and diarrhoea was the first cause of death among Khartoum IDPs (37%) Maternal mortality is 509/100,000 live births and 60% of children die during their first year (NCA, 2004)
- Only 50% of children aged 6-59 receive vitamin A supplement. Only 60% of pregnant women attend anti-natal care
- IDPs spent up to 40% of their income for poor quality water (2001)
- 30% of households had no access to latrines and building one was not a priority in the temporary shelters where they lived
- According to an NCA Report (2004), HIV/AIDS rate among IDPs is estimated to be 4.4% while the national prevalence rate is at 2%

2.1.4 Education in Khartoum State:
The economics of the war in the south and Darfur has negatively impacted on development in the Sudan. Social infrastructures were destroyed and the development budget was reduced. The development budget witnessed a significant increase after the signing of the CPA, rising from 3.8% of GDP in 2003 to 7.5% in 2005 to 8.9% in the year 2007. Yet that increase does not match the needs of the population or remedy the damage that has been building up since 1984.

---

1 UN November 2001, p.65  
3 UN 30 November 2004, p.177  
Khartoum being a primate city, by 1990 20% the capital region, which is about 1% of the total area of the Sudan, contained nearly 20% of the total population of the Sudan.

Generally educational services within Khartoum State seem to have deteriorated as a result of the fast and high growth of populations and public sector services in IDP camp were actually lacking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Children age 4-5 years</th>
<th>No enrolled</th>
<th>Enrollment %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>140,023</td>
<td>37,038</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>133,313</td>
<td>37,485</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>273,336</td>
<td>74,523</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the education statistics of reports of 2002/2003 37% of the children in urban areas of Northern Sudan are not attending school. Sudan MDGs Country report (2005) shows that the percentage of primary school children reaching grade 5 is 66%. School attendance in Khartoum is 72%. Girls are expected to be lower in enrollment and higher in drop out rates.

Low to rates of enrollment and pupil retention within the primary cycle can be attributed to:
1. Relatively high cost of primary education (fees, uniform, materials ..etc.);
2. Some cultural factors among some communities that do not favor female education;
3. The federal system left expenditure on education as a responsibility of localities; and
4. High child labor rates caused by high poverty rates among the population.

According to the Ministry of Education Statistical Report 2002/2003, the number of schools in Khartoum has increased from 1,216 schools in the year 2000 to 1,282 in the year 2003 (+5.4%) and the number of classes has increased during the same period from 10,209 to 10,730 (+5.1%). During the same period the number of enrolled children has increased by 11.5% from 538,473 to 600,295 and teachers by 4% from 16,471 to 17,137. A slight increase was recorded in the percentage of female pupils from 47.8% to 48.4%

These figures reflect, irrespective of their qualification or skills, the shortage of teachers and consequently the likelihood of poor or inadequate education and hence children vulnerability to illiteracy and/or drop out.

2.1.5 IDPs Education

About 48% of children of school age in Khartoum IDP camps are not attending school due to lack of access and poverty. While four government-recognized IDPs camps receive limited services from the government, unofficial camps receive little assistance. SC-UK assessment of the educational situation in Khartoum IDP camps and squatter areas main findings were:
- Children are kept out of school because their labour is critical to family survival;
- Teachers are few, unqualified and face a variety of obstacles such as being untrained, unmotivated and unpaid;
- Lack of educational materials and textbooks;

---

1 Atta El Bathani (2007)
- As a result of the above, education becomes prohibitively expensive in time and money for parents and usually the cost of maintaining household income for food and health care takes precedence over children's education;
- F.A.R. et al, 2005 survey added that The re-planning process has had a significant impact upon access to schooling as temporary schools were demolished

2.1.6 Expressed Needs:
According to the CARE/IOM, 2003 joint report on IDPs needs:
- 78% of the IDPs in Khartoum welcomed professional training which will help them to return to their former jobs, start own business and/or to change the occupations
- 43% stated they would need cash grants to re-establish their activities
- 66% would value training in life skills, and vocational/technical training and 6% in literacy skills.

2.2 Poverty and Displacement in Khartoum:
IDPs: Coping with Poverty and Displacement1
In all studies and reports, IDPs were listed as a major category of the poor and one of the most vulnerable, irrespective of the basis of classification. Yet, with or without external support, IDPs tend to develop their own coping and survival mechanisms. This is particularly true in response to the initial shock of displacement and before external assistance arrives, i.e. survival mechanisms. Collective thinking, short distance movements, geographical concentration, sharing of resources that could be moved and/or utilized, etc. are some of immediate responses, followed by longer-term decisions, such as where to move to and how. At the destination points, such as Greater Khartoum, IDPs also developed their own survival and adaptation systems and income generation options that are obviously influenced by the presence or otherwise of humanitarian support; level of access to resources and the compatibility of their skills (or lack of them) with the urban job market. In general, however, the options are very restricted particularly because of their poor access to credit institutions, their rural skills and their legal status and relative social exclusion.

Coping and survival mechanisms that were developed by IDPs, like other poor groups, fall into four major categories (Abdel Ati, 2000: 99-100):
   a. Collective/family mechanisms such as increasing the number of income earners per household, external support (cash or kind) from relatives, diversification of income sources and qualitatively and quantitatively reducing consumption (Sahl, 1997).
   b. Individual mechanisms including increased working hours, engaging in more than one occupation, mostly at the expense of the quality of the job and products, as well as the health and welfare of the individual.
   c. New ways of using assets, possessions and resources.
   d. Illegal and clandestine activities such as corruption (fraud, bribery, embezzlement), prostitution, etc.

Survival and coping mechanisms of IDPs in Khartoum, have been developed over quite a long period of time and have more or less been stabilized, with variations, caused by two major factors: (a) access or otherwise to humanitarian assistance and (b) access to the labour

1 This section is based on Hassan Abdel Ati Displacement and Poverty in Khartoum: two faces of the same coin?, A Study Report for MEAwards, the Population Council, Cairo, Egypt, December 2004
market, which is influenced by place of residence relative to the market, the legal context, and state policies towards IDPs’ employment, particularly women.

**a. Coping With Relief Assistance (inside camps)**

1. **Birth for food/Vaccination for food.** Since most NGOs use child vaccination cards for food distribution and give priority to pregnant and lactating mothers in service provision, some families opt for repeated births and some mothers tend to vaccinate their children several times (several cards) to acquire relief materials. These, in addition to the risk to children and mothers’ health, have pre-empted Family Planning Programmes implemented by the same NGOs that are distributing relief.

2. **Shifting between camps and NGOs providing relief.** In the absence of coordination among NGOs assisting IDPs and since most of them use relief as an incentive for their services (education, health, training, awareness raising, etc.), IDPs take advantage of that to secure relief stocks, especially as many claim that distribution is not regular in frequency nor sufficient in quantities. They also take advantage of the competition between faith-based organizations, this was particularly true during the 1990s (Christian and Muslim).

3. **Working with NGOs as volunteers or on part-time basis.** Assisting in relief distribution and service provision. Beneficiaries of these are mainly educated IDPs who receive training by NGOs operating in camps.

4. **Liquidation of materials acquired as food rations.** Selling them to relatives, mostly to use the cash generated to buy non-food items that are not provided by NGOs in camps. Very few, however, have managed to accumulate sufficient income to form basic capital to invest. This is mostly linked to some corruptive practices and limited to leading figures among IDPs.

5. **Illegal and clandestine activities.** Especially prostitution, brewing of local liquor (Marisa, Araqi) and accessing resources through violence (robbery).

**b. Coping without Relief: Outside the Camps**

These can be people living within the camp or in town, but are by and large with longer periods of residence. The main mechanisms include:

1. **Family Splitting:** While part of the family stays in the camp to secure relief materials, some move into town (new construction sites) to supplement the family income (mostly men) or have access to children schooling (mostly women).

2. **Forming Organizations (NGOs/CBOs) to directly access donors’ resources, without intermediaries.** Within the last 5 years, no less than 200-300 IDPs-based newly established NGOs were registered at HAC. These are mostly led by older and educated IDPs youth, partly driven by shortage in the formal job market for young graduates and partly in pursuit of asserting identity and breaking the state of social exclusion state, particularly after the signing of the CPA. However, many of these organizations are ethnic or locality-based and their activities are largely guided by donor priorities and agenda.

3. **All family labour/Multiple Income Earners:** Within this mechanism, only the very young and very weak are spared of contributing to the household income. Women work as food and tea sellers, girls as domestic servants and children as carriers, cleaners, or beggars. Earnings generated are used for both food and non-food needs, particularly children's education, including those who contribute to work after school hours. Child labour is the most noticeable mechanism among IDPs, as pushing children into the street serves both the function of earning and reduced household
consumption requirements. Working children constitute 10% of the total labour force and 24% of the total child population (UNICEF, 1999). According to Khalafalla (2005), of the surveyed households in Mayo IDP camp, 93.3% reported having working children, 21% of them on full time basis. The more serious social phenomenon, closely linked to child labour, is child vagrancy and streetism. Available figures suggest over 50,000 children in Sudan, most of them from IDP families and about 40% of them in Khartoum. The figure suggest a rise of 13.9% between 1996 and 2002.

4. Moving out to get to the centre: This is the most important long-term economic strategy adopted by IDPs, mostly those who have lived in Khartoum for longer periods and who intend to stay. Although the housing and resettlement policy adopted by the authorities in Khartoum State has been described as most inhuman in demolishing IDPs camps and squatter settlements, for some IDPs that was a major route to acquire land within Khartoum proper. IDPs in Khartoum mostly reside in illegal settlements within town or on the fringes of town in what, according to official classification, are fifth class areas, where residents are allowed to build settlements but not to use permanent materials (Bannaga, 1996, p.12). Both types of settlements were subject repeatedly to demolition by State Housing Authorities, and IDPs were forcibly evicted, creating a world-wide cry of human rights violations. This policy has also been used by some older IDPs and other town residents acquire land. Relocation, during 1995-2000, was coupled with some land tilting and recognized residence in these shanty towns and the number of children has been a major vehicle for acquiring land (lease). Many IDPs moved several times before they accumulated enough resources to buy land within the town proper.

2.2.1 Attempts to Alleviate IDPs’ Poverty:
Since the 1990s, targeting the poor has been a policy guideline in all policy and programme documents, be they governmental, UN, INGO or national NGO ones. Irrespective of the approach mechanisms, all these share some common characteristics and features. Poverty alleviation attempts were focused on organization, capacity building and provision of credit or Income Generation Activity (IGA) programmes. Other forms of assistance, such as direct food relief and water, health and education provision have helped the poor but not in alleviating poverty, at least in the short run. In Khartoum, the focus by most actors was on credit and IGA programmes provided by institutions and NGOs to help IDPs out of their poverty.

In general, the common features between IGA/credit programmes are;
1. Very few interventions were preceded by adequate feasibility studies or cost-benefit analyses, particularly the elements of project viability and future sustainability.
2. Most programmes targeted women, but focused on low-value, least competitive and time consuming stereotypical women's activities and products.

However, Child labour is becoming a phenomenon in Sudan as, according to the 1993 population census, about 1.43 million children and youth in northern Sudan were economically active, including 25% of children (10-14 years) and about 38% of the 15-19 years age group. Extrapolated figures for 2002 indicate an increase in child labour of 11.4%, indicating the deteriorating economic conditions of parents all over. (Abdel Ati and El Tayeb, 2002)

It is estimated that there were some 120 such concentrations within and around Khartoum in 2000

On the impact of the resettlement policy see Abdel Ati 2004 op cit.
3. Few projects were preceded or coupled with sufficient training or supported with technical advice. Especially lacking, are the elements of quality control, marketing, and business management.

4. Because of lack of feasibility studies and in recognition of the high risk involved, the credit/loan/grants given are usually small, partly to expand coverage. In some incidences, the admittedly needed participatory planning has been used but produced deformed projects.

5. All assistance institutions and organizations have been facing the challenge of increasing demand for their services, not only causing growing dependency, but also pushing organizations to lean towards coverage (quantity) rather than quality of service.

6. Although the issue of empowering the poor started to appear very forcefully over the last decade, in many cases the issue was restricted to organization at local level and to concepts, without considering the local’s position vis-à-vis a much stronger market and social/political groupings. In many cases, particularly by lesser experienced or politically motivated organizations, empowerment training ends up in encapsulating trainees into the local community, CBO or ethnic group.

7. Most credit programmes (by formal institutions or NGOs) are planned for one year, irrespective of the project nature, although several have been extended, but certainty was lacking at the start.

All these experiences and attempts failed to achieve the stated objective of enhancing the poor's access to and capacity to utilize resources. Yet some major lessons were gained, the most important of which are:

a. That the transfer of knowledge and resources to the poor is not enough to alleviate poverty, but their position needs to be strengthened vis-à-vis the market and other social/economic groups;

b. At the household level, attitude and behavioural changes are equally important as accessing resources, if the gender dimension of poverty is to be addressed;

c. Rather than providing alternatives external to indigenous systems, building on what they know (whenever possible) including indigenous knowledge, may provide a short cut to the structural causes of poverty;

The IDPs suffer also other problems, including

1. By virtue of being IDPs, with no certainty of stability and lacking assets that could provide loan guarantees, they have been denied access to formal credit institutions. As a result they can only access NGOs’ (or charity organizations) resources in the form of credit or grants.

2. Isolation and lack of alternative structures and competition /survival in the informal market, force many to be enclosed in an ethnic or social group, so the losses or gains cannot be attributed to the law of the market;

3. Lack of skills compatible with urban market needs reduces their competitive position and that of their products, when they are self-employed

4. Most IDPs lack documents and as a result they loose several rights. For example, a survey of Nuba Mountains' IDPs in Khartoum (2003) revealed that: 36% of them have no documentation; only 37% have a birth certificate and 8% an ID document; among newly born babies, 39% have no documentation; overall 44% of Nuba IDPs, have no documentation, including 42% of the under-5 (NRC, 2004, p. 146). The problem of documentation will also face the IDPs when they return and would be essential for the acquisition of property.
Because of all the problems above, the informal sector remains the IDPs main resort and absorber of their labour power, with no regard to age, sex or origin. It is also the standard way of trying to cope with poverty. It can safely be said that the economy of the IDPs is very much influenced by, or a function of, developments in the informal sector. The sector forms the main domain within which most financial resources are accessed, coping and survival mechanisms operationalized and even social organizations established, particularly the informal sector in Khartoum is characterized by ethnic clustering (Osman and Sahl, 2000) that is translated into mutual support economic and social linkages.

The informal sector is most attractive and/or accommodating to IDPs because (i) it involves no restrictions, limits or preconditions to join; (ii) no qualifications are needed; (iii) it is very flexible in mobility between its sub-sectors, occupations and geographical locations of operation and (iv) the important new development of the sector becoming a major distributor for the "formal" sector, both wholesale and retail, forming a network through which many have made their way to the formal sector and became suppliers.

The sector, however, faces a number of problems, both internal (inbuilt) and external (relating to official policy). Most important of these are:
1. The intrusion of the modern 'formal' sector, which is squeezing out many of those with rural backgrounds and traditional skills and who constitute the vast majority of those engaged in it. The systems of licensing and taxation introduced by the authorities are also formalizing the sector and raising prices for its customers, who are mainly the poor.
2. The system of police raids (kasha) on individuals working outside the weekly open air markets.
3. The instability caused by continuous change of locations
4. The competition from spreading modern fast/cheap junk food establishments and other services, are located in the more strategic locations
5. Within it, the sector faced with (i) the threat of saturation as a result of the continued growth of members and the predominant "copying" culture. (ii) using ethnicity as a competitive mechanism, sometimes, implying pushing out of the sector some groups just on the basis of ethnic /tribal grounds and (iii) continued lack of organization, other than the ethnic clusters, or other officially recognized mechanisms of control. As a result the sector has been the victim of quick changes in policies or administrative decisions almost on a monthly basis.

All these problems threaten the very existence of the sector, which will have negative repercussions the poor, including IDPs, both as buyers and sellers.

2.3 Displacement and Gender:
Osman and Sahl's (1999) indicated that about 43% of IDPs households are female-headed and most surveys and reports by NGOs and UN Agencies point to that fact and to females outnumbering males. As a result humanitarian assistance and development support is now largely focused on women. This policy has a number of problems, among which are:

1. Although sex ratios are normally imbalanced at the initial phase of displacement, it tends to get balanced with time and some households actually develop into extended families with largely balanced sex ratios. The table compares women marital status in 1987, when displacement was still relatively new, and 2003 when the number of
married women is more than five times that of 1987 while the divorced and deserted is only one fifth.

Table 2.2: Marital Status of IDP Women (1987 and 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/deserted</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (1) Suhair E. Khalil (1987), (2) Huda B. Khalafalla (2003)

2. In economic terms, given the isolation of IDPs, the empowerment of women in a male-dominated market and social set up have in many cases caused social tension within the household and under-values women's productivity outside the home. Likewise, training efforts exerted, within the largely “WID” programmes, do not enhance the IDP community members or women's capacity to compete in the job market.

3. The focus on women in NGOs activities has sometimes worked against the relative gender equality that pre-existed in the home settings of some of the IDP communities, e.g. Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains' areas. It also made the family, including husbands, more dependent on women for bread wining.

2.4 IDP Return: the challenges

Although OCHA report (2007) recorded the return of 1,323,535 IDPs by mid-2007, the survey conducted by IOM in 2005 found that at least 36% of Khartoum’s IDPs do not intend to return to their home areas and are likely to remain in Khartoum. Thus Khartoum is now hosting at least one million permanent residents who were previously regarded as temporary IDPs.

There are overwhelming challenges and vulnerabilities attached to IDPs retain, until they have successfully reintegrated in social and economic terms into their old communities, or into the communities where they have chosen to resettle. Among these are:

1. Local administrations still appear unprepared and the basic services and infrastructure is not yet in place for any large scale population movements and hence multiple displacement is likely to create conflicts over resources.

2. The problems of land tenure and ownership, both at official and individual levels, which will take along time to be settled. Allotment and titling of agriculture land during war years in both government and SPLA held areas, has basically been at the expense of the displaced. This could cause conflict with current occupants of land and could lead to multiple displacement.

3. The problem of cultural and occupational adaptation for the new generations, born in Khartoum, in home regions. Some reports actually confirmed that some of the returnee parents have left their children behind in the towns assuming that they will have better job and education opportunities than back in their villages.

4. The high financial cost of return for both the authorities and the IDPs themselves. At the same time, here in Khartoum, though they have managed to integrate into the market, integration at the social level remains a challenge.

2 OCHA, 2002, p. 17
3 UN, 18 November 2003, Vol. II, p.332
5. Other than the south, water remain a limiting factor in most of the IDPs home regions, in addition to the extensive environmental damage left by the war.
6. The issues of family reunification.
7. The problem of documentation
8. Lack of stabilized peace and reconciliation and conflict in some areas, e.g. Abyei area, leading to new displacements;
9. Climatic shocks and drought; and
10. Humanitarian action being hampered by insecurity and lack of access; ongoing conflict and the impact of soaring food prices and the attacks on humanitarian workers and looting of supplies

Staying also has its problems and challenges including:
1. The risks attached to the informal sector, the main absorber of the IDPs and job insecurity.
2. The risk of losing property rights at home, especially land.
3. The risk of losing cultural identity.
4. The continued marginal integration and social/cultural isolation.
5. The risk of family splits.
6. The risk of changing political attitudes and reprisals upon the results of a referendum on self determination.
3. Khartoum Urban Poor Program (KUP)

3.1 The livelihood Support Project:
The main target groups of this component are internally displaced people and urban poor in Umbada and Jebel Aulia localities, Khartoum State. Locations include Dar El Salaam, Mayo, Soba, AlSalama and AlAndalus. Total number of direct beneficiaries is estimated to be about 20,000, 85% of them women

The overall aim of the project aims is improving livelihood situation of IDPs and and urban poor living at peripheries and shanty areas of Khartoum through capacity building and the development of sustainable socio-economic base, with a special focus on women empowerment.

Under the livelihood component, the main activities were administrative and institutional support to CBOs, training and capacity building, provision of grants for CBO revolving fund loans and campaign and advocacy support for those activities. All activities were implemented through the CBO partners.

Although the information recorded is not highly consistent, for the period 1999-2002, available regular information show that about 40% of Oxfam funding to CBOs went to administration and institutional support, 23% for training and 37% for loans. During the period 2005-2008, allocation for administrative support went down to 33%, capacity building up to 29%, loan grants remained almost the same at 36% and the campaign component was allocated 30% of the budget (Fig. 2)

Fig. 2: Programme Budget Allocation per Activity

As shown in Fig. 3, during the period 1999-2002 there were clear variations between CBOs in their allocations for each of the three components. While allocation for administration costs was quite high for most CBOs, particularly FFEDA and CDS, SAHA and WOCDA stands out in their allocation of over 50% of the Oxfam support for loans. In general the rise in administration costs has always been at the expense of the loan fund as, the training component by being a requirement for receiving loans, kept its level as the lowest but most constant area of expenditure.
Overall, except for the 3% allocation for the campaign component in 2008, the project allocations for CBOs remained generally remained the same for the last four years (Fig. 4).

3.1.1 Programme Partner CBOs:
As mentioned earlier, Oxfam has initiated and/or supported the formation of several CBOs for its target communities in line with the project community organization and capacity building objective and also as a means of implementing its activities. In the area of livelihood support, Oxfam initiated/supported more than 10 grassroots organizations, of which 6 continued as long term partners. Table 4.1 provides basic information on these CBOs and their areas of operation. The common characteristics of these CBOs include:

- They are predominantly women organizations although, except for NED and SAHA, all include men members
- In organizations leadership, male members ratios are much higher than their percentage in membership. In fact four out of the six organizations, men constitute the majority of executive committee members. This was by and large dictated by the high illiteracy rates among women but it also indicates
- Most of the members are long term IDPs with more than 5 years of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of CBO</th>
<th>Date Established</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Women %</th>
<th>Women in Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women Community Development Association (WOCDA)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Shiglha – Ingaz area</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DarAlSalam Community Development Association (DCDA)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Dar AlSalam.</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Farm for Women Development (NFD)*</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Jebel Aulia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese Association for Humanitarian Aid (SAHA)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Soba, Id Hussein, Mayo, Salama.</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator for family Education and Development (FFEDA)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Soba Aradi</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokita Charitable Society</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Abu Seid area</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo Women Training and Promotion Society (MWTP)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Mayo</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Suspended in 2000
3.1.2 Some CBO Examples:

1. Mayo Women Training and Promotion Society (MWTP) - Mayo

Initiated 1996 and formally registered at HAC in 2000. Total membership is about 300 members most of them women. The society is managed by a 15-member elected executive committee, 11 of them women.

Oxfam supported the formation of the society and between 2000 and 2001 provided training for 101 women on small business management and provided a grant of 5,000 SDG as a revolving fund to support the small business loan programme and also provided in kind support of sewing machine. At present, Oxfam pays the rent of the premises and continued it skill training and capacity building support.

The organization also received some support from CARE, GOAL, IRC, FAR. While CARE focused on construction of pit latrines (300) through a Food For Work programme, the others implemented short-term and temporary interventions in the form of relief, health services etc..

At present MWTP revolving fund capital is 16,000 SDG. A total of 300 women received loans with about 40% defaulters mainly as a result of mobility, voluntary return, sickness or divorce. A total of 900 members benefited from the training provided and/or supported by Oxfam. With the drop in Oxfam support to the revolving fund since 2003, group loans were stopped as defaults were highest in the category.

Training workshops organized by Oxfam for the members of the CBO include gender mainstreaming, business management and accounts, literacy, HIV/AIDS awareness raising workshops, in addition to exchange visits and joint meetings and activities and exhibitions with other organizations and institutions.

According to women members the impact of Oxfam project was vary positively as indicated by:

1. the organization of community and democratization of decision making processes;
2. increasing knowledge and skills acquired through training;
3. school-age children of loan-beneficiary women have returned to school; and
4. direct benefits at family/ household level, including:
   a. improvement in family income
   b. family stability
   c. supported children education
   d. buying new assets and utensils especially electric equipment
   e. improvement in household hygiene and environmental health.
   f. improved technical skills

Other indicators of positive impact were;

1. Ministry of Health survey results, that indicate that between 2003-2007 awareness in the area has risen by 10%.

---

1 Based on responses of women who received loans
2 In Jebel Aulia part of the fund used for buying generator and chairs to be rented out as a source of funding to the school. The income generated helped avail books and other education materials and support to poor children.
2. Community engagement in various national and international activities (e.g. international Women and HIV/AIDS Day)
3. The organization was enabled to campaign and push for issuing licenses for women tea sellers.

2. Facilitator for Family Education and Development Ass. (FFEDA) - Soba:
Oxfam supported the initiation of the organization in 1996. Between 1996 and 2000, members received training on gender, conflict resolution, food processing and financial management. After 2000 new areas were added, mainly skills such planning, knitting and sewing coupled with the supply of a sewing machine to the trained women.

Oxfam total support to FEEDA during the period 1998 and 2001 was about 60,000 SDG equivalent, about 15% of which was the grant for the revolving fund. 123 persons benefited from the loans, 57% of them are still continuing, while the remaining 43% defaulted either because of return or change of residence after the re-planning of the area.

At present FEEDA revolving fund capital is about 10,000 SDGs. Oxfam annual budget to FFEDA is 13,000 SDGs for running costs and the implementation of all activities, including training and HIV/AIDS campaign.

Loan size range between SDG 100 to 500 depending on the nature of project submitted by the beneficiary. To widen coverage and democratize the process, FFEDA divided women members into groups of 5, loans are given to 3 of them decided by the group and the others receive loans after the first three repay their loans. However, women heading their households are given priority. Loans period is 5 months with a 2 months grace period and 2% interest rate.

Project implemented by loans recipients include perfume and dress making, vegetable selling, food and tea selling, donkey carts and grain selling. Some of the successful loan recipients managed to expand their business and developed from mobile sellers to shop owners. Some example of success within the area include:

a. Some of the women working on perfumes, are now cooperating with large companies on a much wider scale than when started
b. Several families which started with donkey charts now have Rakashas
c. Some moved from being mobile or with Kiosks into proper shops, selling clothes
d. One woman has employed her husband to run the furniture shop she established while she runs the one selling utensils
e. One lady started with a loan of 170 SDGs in 1998 now her operating capital is 4,000 SDGs, in addition to the improvements in the house furniture and family living standards.

The impact of the programme seems to have been extremely positive on FFEDA members as indicated by:
1. The clear improvement in the type of housing and house furniture in the area where the project is implemented compared to other surrounding areas.
2. According to some beneficiary women and FFEDA leadership, the project has very positive social impacts
   a. Social and family disputes and divorce cases went down considerably.
b. A spirit of cooperation dominates the community and most male youth and men are supporting the programme.

c. Most women used their incomes for children education.

3. Literacy classes/adult education is continuing in the center on three shifts: women during the day, youth in the late afternoon (including secondary school student) and men in the evening.

4. Quite strong women leaders have emerged, with their influence exceeding the programme to wider community affairs.

5. Community established linkages with various state and development institutions.

6. Demand for new and more market-oriented types of training such as shoe design and making, hair dressing and coloring etc. and the demand for larger size of loans including growth of business and confidence in own abilities.

3. Sudanese Association for Humanitarian Aid (SAHA)

SAHA was originally established in Salama Alkbabish (13 km South of Khartoum) in 1996 mainly to support primary education. Some of the schools supported by SAHA were closed after donors stopped funding following the signing of the CPA. The focus shifted to capacity building and child rights. The capacity building targeted women, training them on development issues, gender, peace building and IGA including Small Scale Business Management, Sewing and Tailoring, and Food processing. A total of over 100 women received training on one or more of the above areas. SAHA also networks with other organizations on issues of shared concerns, especially campaigns.

In 1999 SAHA received the first grant from Oxfam (SDG 10,000) as the basic capital for its micro-finance project. Between 1999 and 2003 loans were extended to about 500 women working on food and tea selling, clothes trade, leather making etc. Repayment rates were about 65% but no legal procedures were taken against defaulters in consideration of their economic situation and/or because of lack of knowledge of their whereabouts (Table 3.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repayment Rate (%)</th>
<th>Total Repayment (SDG)</th>
<th>No. of Loans</th>
<th>No. of Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Oxfam provided Fund (SDG)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>3,712</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20,800</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116.7</td>
<td>5,413</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113.1</td>
<td>4,667</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>20,658</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>38,800</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SAHA Reports

As shown in the table, the overall repayment rate is 53% but repayment rates have grown systematically over the years, most probably with the gradual development of the CBO capacity and population stability. The over 100% rate in 2002 and 2003 also reflect the CBO capacity to follow up and collect arrears of the previous years, especially Oxfam support to SAHA in that period was mainly for meeting running costs.

1 It is important note that one of the graduates of the adult education classes, continued to complete secondary school and is now teaching at center. Two of the participants were over 70 years of age.
3.1.3 Activities:
1. Capacity Building

The livelihood project has since its inception supported over 100 training workshops for various partner CBOs which included both skill and capacity building for individuals and organizations. As summarized in Table 3.3 below, between 2001 and 2004, 67 training workshops were conducted with an average of a 17 per year, and a total number of participants of 1723, the vast majority of them women. The percentage of men was about 3.5% till 2005 when it started to rise, reaching 15% with some CBOs.

Training topics can be divided into five main categories: (a) personal life skills and IGAs (sewing and knitting, food processing, tie and dye, bookkeeping etc.), (b) awareness raising topics (gender, literacy, HIV/AIDS), (c) community/CBO organization and capacity development (planning, mobilization, conflict resolution, ..etc) and (d) advanced technical skills (Computer, strategic planning, M&E, TOT training and (e) civic education (community organization, lobby & advocacy, networking etc..). However, over two thirds of the workshops was directly concerned with basic IGA skills and CBO management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Beneficiary Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Processing Training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FFEDA, SAHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitting and sewing,</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tie and Dye</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA, MWTPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro finance Training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial/ Small scale Business Management</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA, MWTPO, FFEDA, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer course</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>MWTPO, FFEDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS mainstreaming/ Counseling</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>MWTPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Credit policy workshop</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>SAHA, MWTPO, MWTPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Development</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>MWTPO, SAHA, SAHA, MWTPO, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy &amp; Lobbying</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA, MWTPO, FFEDA, DCDS, MWTPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MWTPO, FFEDA, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory/Strategic Planning</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>MWTPO, FFEDA, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SAHA, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FFEDA, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FFEDA, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT Training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>FFEDA, MWTPO, DCDS, SAHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange visits</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FFEDA, MWTPO, DCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total No</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>726</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several training workshops on organizational management, advocacy and networking aspects were organized for the community including TOT training out of which a preliminary training manual was produced\(^1\). In fact, from 2005 onwards, the capacity building component was largely implemented by Local trainers, particularly on topics relating to awareness raising and basic skills. For example in 2005, according to CBO leadership and reports:

- Dar AlSalam Community Development Association (DCDA) implemented a training workshop on Peace building, the content of which included definition of conflict and conflict resolution, types of conflict, mechanisms of conflict resolution, third party neutrality and negative and positive impact of displacement.

---

\(^1\) The draft manual has been revised recently and is planned to undergo continuous testing and revision till it takes the final shape
b. SAHA implemented a workshop on gender and participatory planning. The topics covered included the gender issues, women integration into development, gender strategic and practical needs and the difference between gender and sex.

c. SAHA conducted a TOT training on CBOs organizational/management, Participatory planning, gender sensitization and analysis and monitoring and evaluation.

d. FFEDA implemented training workshops on community development, peace building and advocacy, gender awareness, organization management, HIV/AIDS awareness, income generating activities and Start Your Business.

3.1.4 Assessment:

3.1.5 Community Views:
1. According to CBO members in Mayo (MWTP) and Soba (FFEDA), the training received has the following benefits:
- Improved knowledge about organization structure and organizing successful meetings
- Better utilization of the resources
- Participatory planning using PRA and PLA techniques
- Mobilizing community and activate their membership
- Knowledge about writing good project proposal
- The development of local trainers equipped with adequate techniques, which also created a feeling of full ownership of the organization
- The training workshops further exposed the organization (CBO) to local community, nonmembers and the authorities
- Establishment of new relationships through working and networking with other organization around the area (e.g. joint activities, training, campaign, lobby). Exchange visits to similar organizations and sharing of knowledge brought to their attention new activities, skills and methods of work
- Through training, women became more visible, economically active respected by men (men are aware about the importance of women) and their work appreciated by community.

The main criticism raised was that the duration of the training workshops was criticized for being short

2. Contrary to the expected, the number of basic skills training workshops was higher during the last year (2004), which questions the impact of training in previous years. For CBO members the training was cumulative, which made the development of local trainers easier, though limited to certain areas.

3. The development of women trainers in the target communities is hampered by their low level of education and technical skills which on the one hand raises the problem of limiting the sealing of the training to basic level (literacy, sewing, food processing etc..) and the threat of monopoly of leadership for the few educated women

4. Although training, together with the other components of the project, managed to create strong women leaders, its focus has largely been on economic empowerment, and that power is still exercised only at the CBO level.
5. Despite the programme recognized and much appreciated achievements, some concern were raised by CBO partners, including:

a. CBOs seem to be still at a low profile that makes them unable to adopt Bank of Sudan new Micro-Finance Policy, let alone contributing to its leadership.

b. The scaling up of the program activities and expectations was not matched with adequate institutional support; and

c. Some CBOs face eviction problems as the cost of rent is at the expense of activities and handicaps achievements.

3.1.6 Recommendations:

1. Financial and business management training need to continue at advanced levels to include feasibility studies and market surveys

2. Skill training need to be expanded and should include more men

3. Continued development of the technical capacities of the local trainers

4. Since no formal assessment for the TOT training impact and the trainers standards and performance was made, it is highly recommended that the TOT continues and be advanced with a special focus on civic education to enable communities utilize the changes in the political environment

5. In relation to the points made about women trainers and civic education above, it highly recommended that more men are attracted to work with women, particularly in the areas of civic education, campaign and lobby

3.1.7 The Loan Component:

Economic empowerment of women was a prime objective of the programme which was addressed through provision of credit together with the necessary training to manage business. The grants provided by Oxfam to the CBOs, with its management totally left to the CBOs. Under the supervision of the programme, CBO committees set the criteria for eligibility, selection, size of loan, installments and the grace period. All loan recipients were women. Oxfam undertook the leading role in training the CBO leadership in managing the CBO and the women members in managing small businesses.

Table 3.4: Oxfam Grants to CBOs by Area of Utilization (1999-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Total value</th>
<th>Admin. &amp; salaries</th>
<th>Loan fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOCDA</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>43,458.1</td>
<td>22,480.5</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS</td>
<td>1995-2001</td>
<td>173,547.3</td>
<td>79,034.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFD</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>18,100.0</td>
<td>6,000.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAHA</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>48,475.6</td>
<td>7,779.7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFEDA</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>5,617.3</td>
<td>3,092.8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokita</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>4,306.1</td>
<td>1,315.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWTP</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>5,844.2</td>
<td>2,279.2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>299,348.6</td>
<td>121,982.8</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in Table 3.4 Oxfam provided between 1999 and 2002 a total of over SDG 310,000 to 7 CBOs to fund their organization with a total of SDG 135,000 of the fund allocated for the loans programmes (revolving fund). The fund size as well as the allocation for the loan fund varied considerably between the years and for each of Oxfam different CBO partners. Although there was no specific pattern in allocation, in general expenditure on CBO
administration was going down and the loan fund was rising which is a healthy and justifiable pattern of allocation

**Loan product design in the different CBOs:**
Although there were some differences and variations in loan conditions, size and eligibility criteria, between CBOs, they generally agree on:

**a. Eligibility Requirements**
1. Residence in the area;
2. Training in business management; and
3. Good conduct.

**b. Loan value and loan system**
This ranged between minimum of SDG 10 as the maximum limit fixed by NFD, to a maximum of SDG 50 set by SAHA to a maximum of 250 set by WOCDA. The loan size is determined by availability of funds, type and cost project proposed by applicant, number of eligible persons among applicants. WOCDA do not consider the cost of project as part of the criteria.

c. **Loan duration:**
For all CBOs the duration is six months with no grace period. The justification for that, according to CBO leaders was that most of the projects presented were daily cash income projects where no production time is needed.

d. **Collaterals and alternatives arrangements:**
All CBOs require a guarantor, whether an individual or a group as part of the requirements. Experience proved that these guarantors were ineffective, were never used and no CBO managed to handle defaulters. SAHA insists on collateral (household assets or residential plot) but never used it.

e. **Loan charges and interest rates:**
All CBOs charge a flat rate of 2% except FFEDA which charge 10%

Neither repeat loan, nor incentives for repayment on time or earlier were reported and that was attributed to the shortage of funds and large quo of applicants. To avoid the problem of priority selection and accusations of favoritism, some CBOs (e.g. FFEDA) divided women into groups of five who decide among themselves on the first three and the others get the loans after the repayment of the first group members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>Total number of borrowers</th>
<th>Lending volume</th>
<th>Average loan size</th>
<th>Lending volume + profit margin</th>
<th>Repayment</th>
<th>Repayment rate % (Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WOCDA</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,552,700</td>
<td>18,267</td>
<td>1,583,754</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>3,423,200</td>
<td>16,378</td>
<td>3,642,100</td>
<td>1,775,325</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAHA</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4,035,170</td>
<td>17,468</td>
<td>4,109,968</td>
<td>1,265,318</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFEDA</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2,212,500</td>
<td>19,407</td>
<td>2,478,000</td>
<td>1,002,496</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokita</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>2,592,500</td>
<td>17,056</td>
<td>2,592,500</td>
<td>895000</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWTP</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>20,560</td>
<td>2,464,000</td>
<td>598,600</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NFD was allocated SDG 750 but no detailed information was available
Source: Oxfam reports
As shown in Fig. 5 below, from Oxfam CBO partners, DCDS, MWTP and FFEDA recorded the highest overall repayment rates ranging from 42% to 46%, which means that for all CBOs repayment rates never reached 50%\(^1\). On time repayment has also shown a systematic regression trend for all CBOs (See Table 3.6)

![Fig. 5: CBO Member Repayment Rates (1999-2002)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Average for years recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCDS</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFEDA</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWTP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oxfam reports

Although the credit component is considered by the community as the most important intervention that generated change and improvement in livelihood, the management capacity of CBOs to manage it seems to be still weak. This can be attributed to a number of factors, the most important of which are:

a. The grant approach for a community that for a long time depended on relief. That approach reduces accountability of the borrower both to Oxfam where there is no direct relationship and to their leadership as it is treated

b. The focus on the training on the business management (individuals and individual loans) as opposed to management of the fund (leadership oriented)

c. The failure to engage any authority (traditional or governmental) as a legal reference point. This however may in turn be caused by the absence of authority in IDP camps and squatter settlement areas.

The other most important intervening factor relates to government policies of re-planning which caused new displacement of some of the population and locality/ state actions against informal sector workers including change of locations, taxing and charges, police raids and confiscation of goods, all causing the loss of capital and/or inability of CBO to trace borrowers.

On the positive side however, several CBOs managed to sustain the fund for about five years after Oxfam stopped paying grants which indicates improvement in CBO management capacity. The expansion of business and engagement in the broader market by CBO members and the improvement in households assets and social conditions were also observed where the project operated, compared to their neighborhood.

\(^1\) No information was available on WOCDA
3.1.8 Project Budget:
The annual budget of the livelihood project has been in the tune of £ 40,000 for all programme components and management costs. Other than the small size compared to the set objectives, the following observations can be made about the budget:

a. Administrative costs are extremely high compared to the total budget. Taking the 2008 budget as an example, staff salaries and CBOs institutional support (mainly rents, incentives and stationary) together consume about 67% of the budget. Although the figures for administrative aspects themselves are not high, they seem illogical relative to the total.

b. The campaign component, which has always been one of the tools employed by the project and has yielded outstanding results, was only budgeted for during the last year. This indicates that the project and its staff have some capacities that have not been tapped, which can be realized via adequate budgeting.

c. While administrative costs are increasing, the allocations for capacity building (the main activity directly funded by Oxfam) are in the decline at a time when they are expected to be intensified as a soft landing strategy for the project (Table 3.7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008 (£)</th>
<th>2008 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Support Grants</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>15,908</td>
<td>13,604</td>
<td>7,274</td>
<td>11,436</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff salaries</td>
<td>13,088</td>
<td>14,396</td>
<td>15,835</td>
<td>16,812</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>06.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Budget</strong></td>
<td>42,996</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>39,109</td>
<td>43,248</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The criticism for the rising administration, however, should not divert the attention from the project achievements with a too small budget and too small staff.

3.1.9 Concluding Remarks:
1. According to the survey team observations, each area has its own specificity in characteristics and needs, particularly after the last decade of interventions by Oxfam which addressed the common needs. The variations in achievements are evident between different areas and CBOs. For example, in terms of the socio-economic change generated by Oxfam interventions, Dar El Salam community programme succeeded far more than Mayo. This can be attributed to (a) the longer presence of Oxfam in Dar El Salam, (b) the presence of a number of development organizations in the area which the CBO managed to link to, and (c) the favourable location near Suq Libya that enhanced the marketing of the CBO members' products. Although Oxfam support is still needed in all areas, the uniformity of interventions needs to be changed particularly with regard to emphasis.

2. The livelihood programme largely succeeded in improving the livelihood and position of women in the target areas. However, although women empowerment is conceptualized in the broad sense in the project document, in practice it is heavily centered on economic empowerment (small business enterprise and increased access to financial resources). Nevertheless, quite a strong, though few, women leaders emerged within the targeted communities, which they attribute to Oxfam interventions.
3. The programme needs to be linked to the education component so as to serve the objective of increasing access to education in order to reduce Oxfam burden of direct support to schools.

4. The programme contributed significantly to building partners capacity through various training workshops both at the individual levels (business management, Start Your Business) and the CBO/ community organizational level (Peace building, Leadership, lobby and advocacy and networking. Overall around 1,000 persons from five partner CBOs were trained most of them women

5. The Lobby and Advocacy around credit policy was one of the areas of great success. The programme in collaboration with other INGOs and some government institutions (e.g. the Social Development Foundation, El Amal Credit Programme) and some national organization, succeeded in gathering momentum to change micro-finance policies through debate sessions, dissemination of information, and the grassroots forum culminating in the new Bank of Sudan small-credit policy and the formation of the Bank Al Usra in 2008.

6. The programme also linked it CBO partners with each other, with credit institutions and with other development actors (INGOs)

The programme contributed to raising community awareness on HIV/AIDS and developed a number of local trainers who can sustain the activities if basic resources are provided.
3.2 The Education Component:
The education Programme aimed at increasing access to good quality education for IDP and urban poor children by
1. Increasing enrollment and retention;
2. Improving school environment;
3. Promoting learning opportunities for adults so as to realize their potential and confidence in work; and
4. Promoting the role of civil society to play effective role in education development through advocacy and lobbying to influence policies and practices that effect in their right to education.

The strategies followed to achieve those objectives included:
1. Supporting construction of new classrooms and the rehabilitation of old ones;
2. Supporting provision of teaching materials;
3. Building partners' capacity;
4. Building teachers' capacity; and
5. Networking and linking partners across localities, states, nationally and globally.

For the evaluation, the team conducted meetings and group discussions with education authorities, schools teachers and parents associations (PTA), including some School Friends (women). To assess the achievement and impact, the team used both quantitative and qualitative techniques in order to assess pupil’s performance and educational achievements at the end of the primary cycle as well as the schools infrastructure and to what extent it is suitable for improving pupils performance and preparedness for the secondary cycle. The meetings with PTAs and School Friend focused on their role in promoting the school and children performance, improving school environment and their assessment of the Oxfam interventions on the performance of teachers, pupils and their own role and on the ability of their community to support their children education.

A questionnaire was distributed to the head teachers to show the performance of cohorts during the last five years, and to show the number of teachers who received training and the type of training they had before an after they joined the school staff. The results obtained were correlated to assess the success and failure of the programme.

3.2.1 Target Areas and Delivery:
The education programme has been implemented in government schools Hai El Nasr (Mayo) in Jebel Aulia locality and Abu Saed in Omdurman locality, targeting in total 18 basic schools (Table 3.8)
Table 3.8: Oxfam Targeted Schools in Khartoum state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name of the school</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>El Bukhari Boys School</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>El Huda boys School</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>El Manar boys School</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>El Firdous co-education School</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>El Inqaz Girls Schools.</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>El Nasr School for Boys</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fatima bint Elkhatab School for Boys</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Khadija bint Khuwailed School for girls</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sultan Tairab Boys School</td>
<td>Abu saed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aisha Bint Abibakr School for girls</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>El Migdad School for Boys</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>El Humaira Girls School</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>El Imam Elshafie boys school</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mercy School for Education</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sultan tirab boys school</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Unity East boys School</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>El Taqwa Basic School for girls</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Nour Elrahman co-education school</td>
<td>El Nasr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dar AlSalam</td>
<td>Jebel Aulia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bakhinta School</td>
<td>Jebel Aulia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dar Al Naim</td>
<td>Jebel Aulia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Gamair</td>
<td>Omdurman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Hai Al Baraka</td>
<td>Khartoum North</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oxfam unwrapped final narrative report May 2008

For the schools support programme, Oxfam support covered the following areas:

- Nine headmasters and 61 teachers were trained in Abu Saed and Al Nasr localities. The training included English and Arabic languages, training on curriculum analysis and teaching methods, production of visual/teaching aid materials, in addition to training on school management for teacher.
- Pupils Seating: 1,175 pupils were seated in 18 schools in the two localities.
- Provision of Textbooks: Textbooks were made available for 2,000 pupil. Up to the 6th grade a book is shared by 2 pupils and for the 7th and 8th grade a book is made available for each pupil.
- Provision of library books: 3,000 books which were made available for 9 schools.
- School Rehabilitation: This included both construction and/or rehabilitation of 41 Classrooms, 4 offices and 6 play grounds and toilet facilities in Abu Saed and El Nasr administrative units. In some cases that involved almost total re-construction of the school.
- Financial support of 1,500 Sudanese pounds to six schools for the rehabilitation of the broken seats and desks.
- Awareness programme on HIV/AIDS: 100 parents and 300 pupils, from the 7th and 8th grades (12-15 years) in the Abu Saed and El Nasr benefited from the programme. Introductory pamphlets and leaflets were also distributed to the community.
- Providing support to schools-supporting organizations: Parents Teachers Associations (PTAs) and Friends of the Schools (FoSSs) (Women) were supported by training them and meeting some of their expenses. The two are community organizations which help in managing and supporting schools and links them with the communities.
3.2.2 Support to Community Organizations:
In the year 2003 Oxfam in collaboration with other partners organized a workshop to raise the capacities of 35 participants including members of PTAs and Friends of Schools and the head masters and mistresses of six schools and one of the most important outcomes of that workshop was the establishment of a joint educational council (network) that includes a network of six schools in Abu Saed and another representing the schools of El Nasr.

The organizational structure of the Joint Educational Council was the general assembly and the general council which was composed of 12 members. Members include the chairperson of the PTAs, the head master or mistress of all schools and a representative from each of the six schools as the executive body.

3.2.3 Capacity buildings:
   a. Training workshops were organized for the PTAs. Other members from the community also participated in those workshops.
   b. A training workshop was held for the English teachers of six schools in collaboration with SELTE Institute.

3.2.4 Supporting Church Schools:
The programme provided support to three church schools in New Gamair (Omdurman) AlWuhda in Khartoum North and in Jebel Aulia. All those schools were originally constructed by community members from local materials (thatch huts) and were supported by churches. These schools are more flexible in admission requirements as they admit children whose age has passed the admission age and in most cases teachers are volunteers and not employed by government. These schools charge 70 pounds for registration and 85 pounds for school bus between 1st and 4th grades and 100 pounds for 5th - 8th grade. Those fees pose a problem for parents and normally the Catholic Church leadership takes the decision about the children who fail to pay the fees. Fees are charged because the church does not receive any support from the national budget, though they carrying big educational programme for IDPs children. The Ministry of Education, in turn is refusing to support church schools because they are not adopting the national education curriculum, which poses another problem for graduates. Thus the church introduced fees to meet teachers' salaries, educational materials and other running costs.

3.2.5 Impact on enrollment and retention:
To assess the efficiency, cohorts sample schools were taken. The results are summarized in the tables below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Total No enrolled since school initiation</th>
<th>No Reaching 4th grade</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No who sat for Basic School certificate</th>
<th>No who passed</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Wuhda (N)</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour AlRahman (N)*</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asha Bint Abubakr (N)</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Rahma (N)</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huda Boys (A)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inghaz boys (A)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * N Al Nasr, A Abu Saed
** Not yet sat for examinations
*** Source field data
It is noted that the overall dropout rate in Al Nasr is extremely high reaching 38.3% before the 4th grade and only 31.7% of the total number enrolled were able to finish schooling and sit for basic school certificate. In Abu Saed 74% of total number enrollment was able to complete basic education and sit for the basic school certificate examination. The main reason for the high drop out rates according to teachers and parents is the inability of parents to pay the school and/or examination fees. Although some children were exempted from school fees or contributions in lower grades because it is under the teachers and parents control, for the 8th grade they have to charge the fee which is a State/Federal decision beyond their authority.

However, rates of achievements in the sampled schools are pretty low when compared with other urban schools where the average score for urban schools is well over 80% (Table 3.10). The average scores for low-achieving pupils indicate that the overall average may not qualify most of the students to join "good" average government secondary schools. This raises the likelihood of dropping schooling and reverting back to illiteracy because of the child inability to perform in secondary schools or the family's inability to pay for private/ good schooling.

### Table 3.10: Achievement of the best and lowest 3 students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Best students</th>
<th>% of full mark</th>
<th>Lowest students</th>
<th>% of full mark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Saed</td>
<td>Inghaz boys</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huda boys</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Saed</td>
<td>Sultan Tirab</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>El Rahma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>Aisha Bint Abi Baker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field Data.*

The school achievements in Abu Saed is much better than that of El Nasr schools. This can be attributed to the number and distance of schools from settlement, absenteeism caused by failure to pay contributions and the qualification and training of teachers. The very low achievement and the high dropout rate at El Rahma School in El Nasr is primarily due to the fact that the student number per class in El Rahma was found to be the highest amongst IDPs' schools (Table 3.11). Deficiency is highest in English, Mathematics and Science teachers almost in all schools.

According to international standards the maximum number of pupils/ class is 30, and according to the standards set by Bakht El Ruda Institute of Education, the optimum size of a class should not exceed 40 pupils/ class. From the above two tables below (Table 3.11 and 3.12) it is clear that classes in only one school are near the average size.
Table 3.11: Teacher’s pupils Ratio:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>No. of enrolled pupils</th>
<th>No. of teachers</th>
<th>Pupils teacher ratio</th>
<th>Ratio By subject</th>
<th>Ratio By subject</th>
<th>Ratio By subject</th>
<th>Ratio By subject</th>
<th>Ratio By subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arabic and religion</td>
<td>Science and mathematics</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. of teachers</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>No. of teachers</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>No. of teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>Wuhda East</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1:44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1:17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1:360</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>El Rahma</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1:74</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>Nour El Rahman</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1:78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1:352</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1:235</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>Imam Shafie</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1:74</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>Aisha Bint Abubaker</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1:66</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Saed</td>
<td>El Huda Boys</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1:56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1:611</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1:611</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Saed</td>
<td>Inqaz</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1:49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1:616</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1:308</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.12: Average No. of Pupils/class in Selected Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Average/class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Nasr</td>
<td>El Wuhda</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Rahma</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nour El Rahman</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Imam Shafie</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aisha Bint Abubaker</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Saed</td>
<td>El Huda</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Ingaz</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field data
The congested class rooms pose a number of educational problems:

1. Pupils can not sit properly, and this will affects their ability to teach who to write.
2. Teachers can not move within the classroom during the teaching session, and this will reduce their ability to observe mistakes and correct them on the spot.
3. Teachers can not mark exercise sheets during the session and discuss mistakes individually with pupils.
4. The large number of students also create problems in school materials as the supplies of books by the Ministry of education for example is usually less than need and based on average number in urban schools. Besides, for poor communities, this also handicaps the community ability to provide facilities and/or fill the gap.

In such a case the learning process and the development of writing and reading skills will be jeopardized

As well the federal Ministry of Education has classified every school into three sets and specified the quality and qualifications of teachers for each set. In the third set (7th and 8th grades) the English language and Mathematics should be taught by a specialized/trained teacher. This directive is not strictly followed in the surveyed schools. In many schools the English and mathematics teachers do not teach first and second sets. This means that these two subjects are taught by un-specialized teachers. This situation got worse after the Federal Ministry directed schools to teach English language from first grade.

In view of the above it is likely that IDPs children may not be able to compete for secondary and higher education unless they receive private or extra tuition out side the school. This situation encouraged some teachers to conduct private classes at cost. The PTA intervened at this juncture by providing incentives to teachers to work in the afternoons with pupils in the 7th and 8th grades. But nevertheless the performance of the IDPs children in the Basic School Certificate examinations is still low when compared to other urban schools. Other factors contributing to poor performance as well as high drop out rates include the high poverty rates within IDP communities, the unfavorable school and home environments, which attract or force some children to work in the afternoons or leave school altogether.

### 3.2.6 The Education Campaign:

Although some campaign elements were used from the start, direct and planned involvement of Oxfam in the education campaign started in 2004 with the purpose of mobilizing government and decision makers to adhere to and be accountable for the commitments made by all world leaders in the year 2000 in the Millenium Summit when together with the MDGs commitments they agreed to support the Education For All (EFA) initiative, to meet the 2015 agreed targets and to encourage communities to lobby and advocate for EFA.

The education campaign activities since 2004 have annually been carried out in April each year in line with the Global Campaign for Education (GCE), which is a world-wide network composed of national alliances and organizations from different
countries and regions that conducts a one-week event known as The Week of Action. The main objective of the Week of Action is to mobilize partners, government and other stakeholders and raise their attention to education problems in Sudan and to lobby government authorities to increase budget allocation to support education.

The KUP in coordination with Oxfam regional office in Nairobi from 2004 onwards started to take the lead in Sudan for implementing the annual event, involving some UN agencies (UNICEF), INGOs (SCF Alliance, Plan Sudan, ADRA, etc.) and some national organizations and PTAs. Through the joint campaign by the various actors, the Federal Ministry of General Education started to support and the activity since 2006 and take the lead and coordinate the activity and became part of the national alliance. High level policy and decision makers started to show interest and in 2006 the President attended the campaign and launched its activities.

The Week of Action in Sudan focuses on raising attention of decision makers, stakeholders and communities about the children excluded from education and it acts to ensure strong commitment to help every child have access to good quality education.

The campaign also aimed at raising public awareness in remote areas about the importance of education to their lives and among some social groups with limited opportunities such pastoralists, and tried to solicit community support for improving access to and quality of education. Since 2004, the Week of Action took place in Khartoum, White Nile, South Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Gedarif States.

The main activities during the week include:
- Workshops to discuss specific themes and/or studies conducted on education;
- Large public gatherings events in which new programmes are launched and awareness raising activities conducted;
- Children and youth activities using theatre, drama and sports;
- Rallies and marches;
- High media coverage of the event (Radio, T.V and newspapers);
- Exhibitions;
- Lobby forums with donors, government and other stakeholders;

The achievements of the programme include:
- Government support and endorsement of the campaign;
- Joint planning and coordination with different alliance members and their commitment to the campaign and its objectives, particularly UNICEF, UNESCO and INGOs;
- The large number of community members attendance and taking part in the activities;
- Sharing the GCE reports and the GCE documentation of the Sudan activities in its annual publication that is widely distributed; and
- Media coverage, especially in Radio and newspapers, of the issues raised and concerns about education. Some of the daily newspapers continue to write on the issues raised during the events long after its ending.

In addition to the complex political context in which the programme has been implemented, the main weaknesses of the campaign are:
a. The working-together approach is still weak and poses a threat in view of the self-interests among some alliance members who use the event as an opportunity to reflect their organizations' identity and role, which deviate attentions and minimizes the intended impact on the targeted decision makers.
b. Lack of proper advocacy and lobbying strategy and the focus on the seasonal event, indicating poor commitment by the stakeholders to meet the target set in the EFA;
c. Absence of monitoring, evaluation and response mechanisms; and
d. Lack of a national identity and leadership of the campaign due to lack of strong national civil society organizations that can perform that task; and most importantly
4. Challenges and Opportunities in the Near Future:

4.1 Challenges:

1. As indicated by various IOM and UN reports, IDP return on any significant scale is unlikely since
   a. The conflict in Darfur is continuing and started to spill over into Kordofan state.
   b. None of all the previous war zones is back to normal civilian life and full stability, except probably some parts of eastern Sudan.
   c. The effort of rehabilitation of war-affected areas is extremely modest and most areas still lack basic service institutions. In fact even areas where service institutions were established, the problem of livelihood sources and opportunities remain a major obstacle to return.
   d. The problem of cultural, social and economic adaptation for children, youth and young adults born and/ or brought to Khartoum.

   However, a relatively large scale return may by recorded for voting during the referendum (2011) but the move will most likely be partial (adults) and temporary.

2. Although, economic growth is expected to continue in Khartoum State, inflation and cost of food prices are also expected to rise and so is poverty both in scale and depth. Poverty rate is expected to increase as a result of
   a. The continuing conflict in Darfur and draining of resources on arms and security
   b. Possible trade embargo or other economic blockade measures by international community in relation to Darfur conflict and/or the dispute over the ICC issue,
   c. the international food price increases,
   d. The increasing professional selectively of the urban job market which will undermine employment opportunities for the unskilled and uneducated groups, and
   e. The growing trend of employing unskilled foreign workers, mainly from Asia, Ethiopia and Eritrea

Although an appreciable increase in FDI flow is expected to be concentrated in Khartoum, with the exception of the construction sector that may absorb some of the unskilled workers, most of the other investments are likely to employ skilled and professional workers. The service sector, including food and drinks, transport and petty trade is also expected to be dominated by companies (both local and foreign) with the expected growth trade chains which will put pressure on people working in the informal sector or push them totally out of the market.

3. Despite the official declaration and constitutional articles re-affirming free and compulsory basic education, the cost of education is expected to rise and private schools are likely to increase at the expense of public schools. Schools in the IDP and poor residential areas suffer the multiple problems of poor physical environment (buildings materials, facilities and equipment), shortage of teaching materials, shortages and poor training of teachers and the inability of communities to support the schools. Results will be poor academic performance and rising school dropout rates.
The impact of those changes would be negative on IDPs and urban poor as cost of living will rise and in terms of expenditure, children education will be the first victim as food will have the priority over all services. This is likely also to add to schools dropout rates and to child vagrancy and/or labor. For Oxfam the changes will increase the demand for its current services, and in case temporary return occurred, disruption of some of its ongoing activities.

4.2 Opportunities:
Some positive changes are also expected to provide new opportunities for IDPs and the urban poor, if prepared for and well utilized. These include

1. Democratic rule and devolution of power to localities and local councils, in line with the CPA and the transitional constitution. Although in both fronts change has been slow, it is expected to gain momentum as the national election time approaches. Both changes open the way for greater participation and empowerment for local community. It also provides an opportunity for local communities to integrate more in mainstream society. However, for democratic transformation to occur and the devolution of power to reach the people, some effort need to be put to enable the community to seize the opportunity, mainly in the area of civic education and rights-focused awareness rising. This is particularly important as local councils are to become part of the legislative organs of the state and most likely will include some of the leadership of the local organizations currently supported by Oxfam. Also, for democratic transformation to occur and be beneficial to the grassroots community, community awareness raising about constitutional rights, civic education (including voters education), and leadership training on campaigning and negotiation skills, are critical.

2. State commitment to financing the poor as indicated by the new Bank of Sudan Policy of Micro-finance. Late 2007, a unit for micro-finance was established for the first time in the Bank. BOS and seven commercial banks allocated 89 million SDGs as the basic capital for micro-finance of which 30% is conditionally for women and 70% for rural areas, More recently, "Bank ALusra " (Family Bank) was also opened as a window for the same function. Several regulations and funding requirements were changed to increase the poor access to credit including amendments on guarantees, state taxes, … etc. The Social Department Fund has also intensified its work with community grassroots organizations and small cooperatives (375), forming and capacity building of organizations, conducting research and surveys and providing small scale credit (maximum 10,000 SDGs loans) and for the first time linking micro-finance to service projects such as water, gas, consumer goods… etc.

These developments, were a result of a sustained campaign for over 10 years, in which Oxfam urban project played a vital role in bringing actors together, conducting research and disseminating results to the concerned parties and in linking local organizations with the relevant state institutions and other stakeholders, culminating in the formation of the micro-credit network.

The developments provide an opportunity for increasing access to credit for the poor, enhance dialogue between actors and take some of the financial burden form Oxfam. Nevertheless, no follow up mechanism is yet in place and the BoS main focus is still
on the financial aspects with little consideration to the social dimensions and needs of the target groups (or clients). Besides, although the campaign by Oxfam and the partners succeeded in proving the viability of micro-finance activities at local community levels, there is still a long way to go for these groups to influence policies. This highlights the need for the campaign to be expanded and Oxfam to play a leading role in that area.

3. The year 2009 is expected to witness the completion of Hamdab dam and huge increase in the generation of electricity and supply to the national network. The increase in electricity supply will allow most of the currently redundant factories to operate, for operating ones to increase the number of shifts and, together with FDI flow, for establishing new ones. This in turn is expected to generate demand for labour and create job opportunities. However, the competition for jobs will be high both because of the skills needed and the competition by foreign workers. For the IDPs and the urban poor (Oxfam target groups) to compete, technical skills need to be upgraded together with raising awareness about appropriate working practices e.g. respect of time, administrative hierarchies … etc as most of them are either coming from a pastoral background, were self-employed in the informal sector or have been unemployed.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations:

5.1 Conclusion:
The KUP programme has effectively contributed to improve the lives of its target groups, both direct and indirect. Most important achievements can be summarized in the following:

1. Organization of women and women CBOs in IDPs camps and poor residential areas communities,
2. Increasing children access to education and raising the likelihood of continuity in schooling (reducing drop out rates) through improving schools’ physical environment in several IDP areas, provision of teaching materials and teaching aids, the training of teachers and raising PTCs capacity to manage and support schools.
3. Improving livelihood of the target families through financial support (grants) and skill training of women, thus increasing employment opportunities and incomes, which contributed to the emergence of some women leaders and a few successful petty traders. One of the most important observations and unique feature among most INGOs and national organizations credit programmes is that most of the CBOs still possess at least half of the grant provided by Oxfam for the revolving fund (Loan Fund) despite the problems encountered (re-planning, IDP return and the poverty of the community), which indicates the improved management capacity of the CBOs.
4. The campaign has been the noticeable success story in both the education and livelihood components of the KUP programme. In education the major success was to bring together official government institutions at the highest level to work jointly with international development actors as well as the coordination among INGOs and the relatively high media coverage of the event. Within the livelihood component, the formation of the Micro-finance network, the new Bank of Sudan policy encouraging micro-finance and small businesses and the availing of the Micro-Finance SDG 80 million-Fund are some of the results of the sustained campaign in which Oxfam KUP took the lead and the concerted effort to keep the issue on the debate table as well as that of linking various actors and stakeholders together, specially linking of CBOs with credit institutions and policy makers.
5. Awareness raising on HIV/AIDS and on the importance of education and the adult education classes were seen by interviewed community members as areas of positive change.
6. Though the systematic capacity building of the target group, dissemination of information and exposure to other experiences, the program has enhanced the lobbying and advocacy capacity and created some grounds for sustainability.
7. The development of local trainers (through ToT training and exposure) of some youth is also a sustainable impact.
8. Although the feminization of poverty thesis (female-headed households are poorer than male-headed households) is debatable, the programme targeting of women is certainly valid since (a) women tend to have more dependents, not only economically but also socially, (b) women are burdened with domestic work and in-house social responsibilities that limit their movement and (c) women suffer considerable shortfall in educational attainment and hence access to employment and vulnerability to job losses.

The weaknesses of the programme include:
1. The limited resources, both budget and personnel, allocated for the KUP programme, particularly the campaign component
2. Most problems e.g. shortage of funds, have been carried over for several years as had been mentioned in most of the internal quarterly reports, which indicate weakness in project responsive planning
3. Absence of local institutions or national NGOs/CSOs from Oxfam lists of partners. Partners are all either at grassroots level or at high Ministerial/State level. At the grassroots level, Oxfam CBOs partners capacity and structures are not expected to contribute to change outside their direct membership or beneficiaries. Thus institutional development/capacity building should be targeted
4. Interventions are geographically scattered and the livelihood component is not strongly linked to the education programme, which may defeat the objective of increasing access to education in areas where, despite Oxfam improvement of education facilities, children may be denied schooling because of financial inabilities of their families
5. The campaign component, which proved very effective, is poorly funded and largely festive (in education) and seasonal in nature.
6. Although the organization of women contributed to change within the target communities, its impact at the community at large remains limited the thing that restricts change to the programme areas of intervention with limited multiplier effects. The focus on women empowerment has largely been on economic empowerment (small business enterprise and increased access to financial resources) which does not contribute much to their visibility at community level and sustain the social gap between them and men with regard to social and political power. The focus on women alone has also reduced the possibility of diversifying skill training and upgrading packages which narrows the market space for the trainees and keep women into low-income-generating skills

5.2 Recommendations:
1. Increased funding of the programme
2. Since IDPs return on a significant scale is unlikely, urban poverty is expected to rise and education will be more costly in the future, the three components of the programme remain needed by the target communities but should be provided in a accumulative and more concentrated manner (advancing ToT training and facilitating their work, continued support to networks built etc..). It is important to consolidate what has been achieved as part of Oxfam exit strategy. Oxfam role in both education and livelihood support can be limited to advocacy (i.e. the Forum, training, community organization, media work, research and dissemination of information ..etc.) and coordination
3. To enhance the competitive position of the target groups to utilize the forthcoming economic opportunities (See Section 4), skill training needs to be expanded for both women and men and exposure and linkages need to be widened to enable them access new markets and new sources of capital. Although the targeting of women is warranted by all measures, with the foreseeable changes in the current saturation of the informal sector and market demand, it is recommended that the skill training targets both women and men and focuses on technical/vocational and life skills
4. New objectives need to be set and a new approach needs to be adopted for the campaign component with adequate funding to maximize its impact and include wider segments of society in the advocacy programme. That requires
   a. Including it in a civic education programme to widen its target groups (not only the beneficiaries of the education and livelihood programmes) to enhance their capacity to have a voice in governance, making use of the devolution of power to local councils and to use the democratic space and election campaign to raise their needs.
   b. Sponsoring research on the target groups and their problems and disseminating the results of that research through publication, media and through Oxfam partners
   c. Encouraging dialogue over issues of concern to Oxfam target groups, through continuing the organization of the forum on regular basis, including and/or disseminating results of the debate all stakeholders
   d. Partnering with some national NGOs, with the capacity to work on civic education and advocacy on political and development aspects. This will ensure the sustainability of the programme and help overcome the political sensitivity of the issues it tackles. These organizations, however, may need some logistical support to undertake those tasks

5. The coming few years are considered transitional in the country's socio-economic and political life which is expected to have significant repercussions on the lives of IDPs in particular. Oxfam following programme cycle needs to be transitional as well both in response to those developments and also as a soft landing strategy for disengagement. That requires:
   a. Intensive capacity building of institutions and advanced/ high quality training of CBO partners and community leaders in the target community and linking them to other partners and decision makers. This may require special capacity assessment survey for those CBOs, in order to design the training needed
   b. Widening partnerships with national organizations that could act as intermediaries between Oxfam and the target communities
   c. Consolidate existing interventions, particularly by linking the livelihood component to the education component on the ground. As at present the two programmes are implemented in different places, which in some cases, makes Oxfam improvement of education opportunities unreachable to some children because of poverty. Thus the livelihood programme should be used as an incentive for children education, particularly girls.

6. At present, there is a need to continue contributing to the policy debate on economic policies and funding of the poor to help CBOs and CSOs to contribute to pro-poor political and economic changes and make sue of available opportunities.
Documents Consulted:


CARE and IOM (2003) Sudan IDP demographic, socioeconomic profile for return and reintegration planning activities: Khartoum IDP households. CARE and IOM.


CARE, IOM, FAR (2004), Informal Consultations with IDPs in Khartoum, February


Khalafalla, B. Huda (2003) The Impact of Tribal Conflict on Displaced Women: a Case study from Mandella Camp, Unpublished MSc thesis, Dept. of Sociology, Nilein University,

Khalil, E. Suhaire (1987), *The Socio-economic and political implications of the environmental Refugees in the vicinity of Omdurman*, Environmental Monograph Series, No 6, Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Khartoum


Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), Several Reports (Internet)

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2004) Global IDP Database Project, Sudan Country Profile (Internet)


UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), (2002). Re-integration and recovery of displaced persons in Sudan: A report of the Inter-agency Mission (1-17 November 2002), 18 December

Annex I
Human Interest Stories

(Annex Removed)
Annex II
TOR

Context:
The Sudan longest civil war in the South for more than 40 years and drought stroked some parts of the country as from early 80\textsuperscript{th} of the last decade have led to the loss of people’s assets, destruction of social structures and rural economy system, resulting in high level of poverty in rural and urban areas. Most of the people flee their areas and become displaced in big cities and of course the capital, seeking for income and security. Khartoum stretched very much with millions of people living at the periphery of the town in camps, squatter and un planned area and suffers from poor socio- economic situation, lack of assets and properties, inadequate social basic services. This situation has led to great vulnerability and poor livelihood of most of IDPs and urban poor.

Millions of primary-age children in Sudan are unable to attend school due to socio-economic, cultural and political factors. Inadequate and declining public expenditure on education (less than 0.9 of GDP) and decentralization policy are among major factors leading to the deteriorating situation of primary education. Many primary schools are overcrowded with more than 150 children per class, buildings are dilapidated and without adequate latrines and water, quality of teaching is poor and often undertaken by unqualified volunteers. Teaching resources such as textbooks and furniture are rare or non-existent and the overall environment has lead to alarming dropout rates

Programme Background
Oxfam GB has worked in Sudan since 1983 and has established a strong competency in the provision of basic social services and local understanding through strong partnerships and working with others.

Khartoum urban programme is implementing two projects: (attached)
1. Basic education for IDPs and urban poor;
2. Urban livelihood project.

Review purpose:
Oxfam GB is undertaking strategic review for it’s programme in Sudan to inform better decisions on future strategies and how and what Oxfam GB should do differently to have greater impact and lasting change for poor people.
In this regard, Khartoum urban programme staff initiates programme review to have information on programme performance, impact, appropriateness of implementation and approach, lessons learnt. Also the review will include comprehensive contextual analysis with special focus on policy and practice change and to provide recommendations and guidance on ways and strategies for sustainability and strategic future intervention.

Reference to that, there should be a need to focus on different projects activities, target beneficiaries, geographical location, as well as critical assessment of project success, impact, sustainability and strategic future intervention as well as good analysis of the current context and opportunities for change.
Specific Tasks:

- Review and evaluate programme intervention throughout the period against overall and specific objectives and outputs as identified in the projects documents.
- Assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of the approach used (capacity building, advocacy, services provision, community involvement etc.) and identifies how Oxfam GB role could be stronger in the future.
- Identify strengths; opportunities, weaknesses and threats and provide information on what Oxfam GB could do better.
- Assess to what degree the programme is gender aware and draw lessons for good practice. (Are there opportunities for social, economic, cultural etc change that could have been taken as advantage for increased girls’ education? Increased women’s role? etc).
- Evaluate and assess the impact of the 2 projects on beneficiary’s live, performance, how far it met their required needs and projects objectives.
- Provide context analysis on socio-economic and political situation and problems- and needs of the target group.
- Analyse current situation of primary education in general, in programme area focus on policies and practices governing education?
- Help Oxfam understand the nature and extent of poverty among various groups in Oxfam GB programme area and what opportunities does Oxfam GB have in lifting poor people out of poverty in future? What national policy and / or practices of government and private sector are providing opportunities for change? How change happens?.
- Explore the relevance of Oxfam GB work to the current and changing political/ social, cultural and economic context and provide recommendations for future intervention. (How do you think the political, economical and social picture will be changing over the next 5-10 years and why? What does all these means for people’s capacity to earn a living, have access to economic resources? For children to have access to good quality basic education? For people’s to influence decisions and advocate for their rights etc.

Methodology / Team:

The review has to be based on an active participatory and cross learning process that involves stakeholders, community and partners based on both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches, using:
Secondary data findings and statements identified from review of relevant documents including, but not limited to: Projects documents, quarterly reports, implementation plans, and projects documents at partners’ locations.
The programme will avail all needed documents. Also there is need for comprehensive literature reviews in related Government Ministries, departments and institutions, research and academics institutions, UN etc to inform current context analysis and opportunities for change.

Primary data will be gathered through field visits and interview target beneficiaries, stakeholders related to the project, Oxfam GB staff and partners on current project and future perspective. The participation of partners in the review should be maintained at all times and at all levels, reflecting opinions about contribution of the programme to improved livelihood. Also comprehensive fieldwork using participatory research methods that directly involve target groups, representatives of
partners, community members and community leaders, CBOs, NGOs and any other organisations and local government authority at the localities are important.

**Suggested Team:**
The team has to be composed of one consultant (team leader) who has well experience in community and organizational development and has good research and analytical skills to be able to provide information for future response and strategies.

The consultant has full right to select his core team in coordination with Oxfam GB programme staff. The consultant has to meet dead lines and achieve the review in line of the objectives.

**Consultant responsibilities:**
- Develop mechanism/methods for the evaluation.
- Develop the draft and final report
- Conduct debriefing session for Oxfam GB staff, receiving comments and’
- Submit final report.

**Oxfam responsibilities:**
- Link the consultant with the reliable partners and stakeholders.
- Link the consultant with any government institutions needed.
- Facilitate any necessary permits needed for the review.
- Avail relevant information and documents needed for the consultant.

**OUTPUTS:**
In general the review is expected to produce a comprehensive report which including assessment of project concept and design, project relevance, achievement, weaknesses, strengths, constraints, lessons learned, sustainability and future strategic intervention.

**DURATION:**
This Contract covers one month commencing on ..........and shall expire by satisfactory completion of the services and delivery of the report, by .............

**Payments:**
Payments will be done in local currency and conducted as follows:

60% advance payment upon signature of the contract while 40% to be paid upon satisfactory completion of the assignment as attached agreement.
Annex III
Persons Interviewed

(Annex Removed)