



Mid-Term Evaluation of the NGO Joint Initiative for Urban Zimbabwe Community Based Support for Vulnerable Populations

Full Report

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Evaluators: Lovemore M. Zinyama, Bakhethisi K.T. Mlalazi

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ACRONYMS

ACC	Area Coordination Committee
AREX	Agricultural Research and Extension Services (Ministry of Agriculture)
ASAP	A Self-Help Assistance Program
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CAP	Country Assistance Programme
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAAC	District AIDS Action Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DOMCCP	Diocese of Mutare Community Care Programme
EFZ	Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
HBC	Home Based Care
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JIG	Joint Initiative Group
LIG	Low Input Garden
LRF	Legal Resources Foundation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAC	National AIDS Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OVCs	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PRP	Protracted Relief Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	US Agency for International Development
ZPT	Zimbabwe Project Trust

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction to the JI Programme

The Joint Initiative (JI) Programme was developed by seven international NGOs to strategically combine their capacities and resources in order to address the acute needs of vulnerable groups in urban areas of Zimbabwe where poverty and deprivation have deepened during the past few years. The programme is unique in that it probably represents the first major collaborative thrust by both donors and NGOs to assist poor and very poor urban households in a comprehensive manner. The NGOs that make up the Joint Initiative Group (JIG) are Africare, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Practical Action and Save the Children UK. The programme is supported through a pooled funding mechanism from six international donors (DFID, USAID, SIDA, AusAID, CIDA and the Norwegian Embassy in Harare).

The programme started in May 2006 and the first phase is scheduled to end in November 2007. The programme seeks to assist up to 12,000 vulnerable households in six urban locations in (i) Mbare, Harare, (ii) Mzilikazi, Makokoba and Njube in Bulawayo, (iii) St. Mary's in Chitungwiza, (iv) Sakubva in Mutare, (v) Mkoba, Mtapa, Senga and Mambo in Gweru and Mucheke and Rujeko in Masvingo. A needs assessment conducted at the beginning of the programme identified a number of priority areas where assistance was most urgently needed by poor and very poor households: (i) livelihoods support, (ii) food security, (iii) shelter, (iv) education support for OVCs and HIV/AIDS. Child protection has subsequently been extended to cover all the programme's activities as a cross-cutting issue. In some communities, the JI partners work with local NGO partners to implement their activities; in other areas they are the implementers themselves.

Purpose of the Review

The main objective of this mid-term review was to assess progress of the programme against milestones and outputs outlined in the JIG log frame. A second objective was to review wider programmatic issues relating to the management and operation of the programme, the appropriateness of the interventions and the targeting of beneficiaries. Briefly, the consultants were required to address the following issues and to make recommendations for decision making with regards to the continuation of the programme: (i) the consortium approach; (ii) shelter intervention; (iii) project implementation and operating space; (iv) the political context and risks; (v) targeting of beneficiaries; (vi) the donor group and the funding mechanism; (vii) coordination of programme activities and linkages with other urban initiatives and stakeholders; and (viii) appropriateness of the response in relation to the needs and existence of gaps.

Methodology for the Review

The review was conducted by a team of two consultants. It was conducted over a two-week period from 21 May to 1 June 2007. The review involved (i) interviews with the JI partners, both local and international, the donors and other stakeholders such as local authority and government officials, (ii) interviews and group discussions with a non-random sample of the beneficiaries, (iii) field visits to sites in Mbare, St. Mary's,

Mutare and Gweru where the interventions are being implemented, and (iv) review of key programme documents.

Assessment of Progress to Date

The first few months from May 2006 were spent on mobilisation and sensitisation of key stakeholders, gaining approvals from the various urban authorities, identifying and registering potential beneficiaries, developing and piloting some of the programme tools. All this preparatory work was necessary before implementation of the prioritised interventions could begin. Actual implementation started in November-December 2006 after completion of the preliminaries.

A lot of progress has been made in almost all the interventions. The highest rate of attainment has been in the provision of monthly food vouchers where the target number of households is already receiving assistance. Likewise, the formation and training of community groups to support and strengthen their livelihoods is almost on target in most of the locations. Although the education support component is still lagging behind by a wide margin, the implementing agencies expect to reach the target number of beneficiaries in both Mutare and St. Mary's by the end of June 2007. At the time of the review, they were processing beneficiaries from the remaining schools in each site and discussing with the school authorities the nature of support from the block grants.

Only the shelter component was lagging behind at the time of the review. This is not surprising, given the complexity of the processes involved in construction and the legal requirements that must be met before work can begin. Unlike in rural areas where there are few or no legal requirements to be fulfilled in the provision of shelter, the opposite is the case in urban areas. After identifying the beneficiaries, it is then necessary to confirm their rights or entitlement to the land on which construction will take place, draw the building designs and have them approved by the relevant municipal authorities.

In the process, a lot of valuable lessons have been learnt by all the partners relating to (a) working in an urban environment that is politically highly charged and (b) in terms of working as a consortium. Despite some initial difficulties, the partners have invested a lot of time and energy in developing networks and this is now bearing fruit. The programme has also demonstrated that it is sufficiently adaptable such that ways are continuously being found to incorporate lessons learnt.

The review also examined several issues such as the implementation of the shelter component which has been source of disquiet among some of the donors, project implementation and operating space, the political context and risks of implementing such programmes in urban areas, the targeting process or beneficiary selection, programme coordination and the appropriateness of the interventions. In all, we were satisfied with the manner in which the programme is working to address the problem of poverty and vulnerability among the urban poor and very poor in Zimbabwe. Where appropriate, we have made recommendations for consideration by the JIG. It should be noted that, in many instances, our recommendations coincide with what the partners were already considering in order to improve the performance of the programme.

Overall Recommendation

Overall, we were highly impressed by the progress the programme has made to date and the impact it is already having on the lives of the beneficiaries. We strongly recommend the donor group to continue supporting the programme and, funds permitting, enable the partners to scale it up to cover more urban communities in the six towns and elsewhere.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Joint Initiative Programme

Urban vulnerability in Zimbabwe has deepened during the past few years. With formal unemployment over 80%, an inflation rate over 3,700% (April 2007), and average incomes of less than US\$1 per day, many urban households are finding it increasingly difficult to access most basic commodities, services and shelter. Recent government policies have also increased the vulnerability of the urban poor, notably the urban clean-up operation dubbed Operation “Murambatsvina” launched in May 2005 which left an estimated 700,000 people homeless and decimated many informal small and medium enterprises. Overall, an estimated 2.4 million people, or 18% of the total population, were directly or indirectly affected by the clean-up, hardest hit being the urban poor and vulnerable. The HIV/AIDS pandemic also presents additional problems for many urban households. Meanwhile, standards of service delivery by the urban local authorities have deteriorated sharply during the past five years or so. Many suburbs are going without clean water for long periods of time, refuse collection is erratic or non-existent, while liquid sewerage flows unattended through the streets where children play. At the same time, the electrical power authority is failing to provide a reliable power supply.

In late 2005, concerned about the deteriorating conditions of many urban households, seven international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) decided to strategically combine their capacities and resources in order to address the acute needs of vulnerable groups in urban areas of Zimbabwe. The seven agencies collectively known as the Joint Initiative Group (JIG) are: (i) Africare, (ii) CARE International, (iii) Catholic Relief Services (CRS), (iv) Mercy Corps, (v) Oxfam GB, (vi) Practical Action and (vii) Save the Children UK.

The JIG developed a programme called the “NGO Joint Initiative for Urban Zimbabwe” which is a coordinated humanitarian response to address the short and medium term needs of highly vulnerable urban communities through integrated programming. The over-arching goal of the programme is **to restore dignity and reduce suffering for the most vulnerable in urban and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe**. The first phase of the programme, which runs to the end of November 2007, has been supported through a system of pooled funding by six international donors, namely DFID, USAID, SIDA, AusAID, CIDA and the Norwegian Embassy in Harare.

The JI programme started in May 2006 and has sought to assist up to 12,000 vulnerable urban households. Members of the JIG seek to work on a collaborative basis, utilising their collective organisational strengths, human resources and networks to provide critically needed assistance through client-prioritised interventions. The programme is being implemented in the following cities/towns and suburbs across the country: (i) Harare (Mbare), (ii) Bulawayo (Mzilikazi, Makokoba and Njube), (iii) Chitungwiza (St. Mary’s), (iv) Mutare (Sakubva), (v) Gweru (Mkoba, Mtapa, Senga and Mambo), and (vi) Masvingo (Mucheke and Rujeko).

A needs assessment conducted among applicants for assistance at the beginning of the programme identified the following as the areas where assistance was most needed:

(i) livelihoods support, (ii) food security, (iii) shelter, (iv) education and (v) HIV/AIDS. Child protection has subsequently been integrated into the programmes of all the JIG partners as a cross-cutting issue. In some communities, the JIG partners are directly implementing their projects; in other areas, JIG partners work with local NGOs as the implementing agencies.

The interventions may be summarised as follows:

- 1) Support for household livelihoods comprises (a) the formation of voluntary and self-selecting internal savings and lending groups, and (b) assistance with the construction of market stalls at designated commercial shopping centres, as well as training in business management and basic bookkeeping the vendors or market traders. Membership of the loans and savings groups is encouraged among people that know each other in order to minimise the risk of defaulting on repayments.
- 2) Households identified as experiencing food insecurity are (a) provided with monthly food vouchers and (b) are given assistance to establish low input gardens (LIGs) at their homes together with training and the provision of basic inputs. The LIGs are being designed in such a way that the beneficiaries will operate in cells or groups, with lead members mentoring others.
- 3) Shelter provision entails assistance with construction of new houses or house extensions, the establishment of a revolving building materials fund into which beneficiaries pay back for some of the building materials they will have received, and support with the establishment of building material enterprises (e.g. brick moulding) for small scale entrepreneurs. The beneficiaries are organised into groups through which they provide labour such as moving bricks, digging the foundations, and mixing mortar and concrete.
- 4) The education intervention entails the waiver of school fees for two years for 50 OVCs in each participating primary or secondary school in lieu of which the school receives a block grant equivalent to US\$2,500 to cover the costs of approved projects such as the purchase of furniture, textbooks and equipment to support income generating projects. Schools also receive support and training to establish after-school clubs for the children.
- 5) The HIV/AIDS intervention involves the distribution of home-based care kits through a network of facilitators that are resident within the communities and municipal clinics to families living with HIV/AIDS, as well as awareness and training among youths and other groups.
- 6) As mentioned above, child protection has been incorporated as a cross-cutting issue to be implemented by all partners in their interventions and programmes.

The interventions by the JIG represent probably the first major collaborative thrust by international and national NGOs to assist poor and very poor urban households in a comprehensive manner. Previously, humanitarian and development agencies have focused their activities in rural areas in the belief that this was where assistance was

most needed. Thus, many NGOs operating in Zimbabwe have acquired a lot of experience of working in rural areas, but still need to learn to operate in urban areas.

The interventions have been developed within the context of a definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance that is broader than is normally found, especially among the donor community. The partners' definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance has been informed more by the realities of the Zimbabwe situation rather than from the textbook. In the past, urban workers contributed significantly to rural livelihoods and household incomes through urban-to-rural remittances. Today, many of these support systems have broken down. Urban dwellers are failing to meet their basic needs, let alone support their extended rural families, because of the severity of the prevailing economic meltdown which has hit the urban populations hardest. While the impact of the economic decline may not be immediately visible as would be the case in the aftermath of a natural disaster (a tsunami, flooding, etc), it is nonetheless harsh, widespread and prolonged, resulting in ever growing numbers of urban poor and destitute households.

1.2 Purpose of the Review

The main objective of the review, requested by the donor group, was to assess progress of the programme against milestones and outputs outlined in the JIG log frame. A second objective was to review wider programmatic issues relating to the management and operation of the programme, the appropriateness of the interventions and the targeting of beneficiaries. The Terms of Reference for the review are attached at the end of this report as Appendix 1.

Briefly, the consultants were required to address the following issues and to make recommendations for decision making with regards to the continuation of the programme:

- the consortium approach;
- shelter intervention;
- project implementation and operating space;
- the political context and risks;
- targeting of beneficiaries;
- the donor group and the funding mechanism;
- coordination of programme activities and linkages with other urban initiatives and stakeholders; and
- appropriateness of the response in relation to the needs and existence of gaps.

2.0 REVIEW PROCESS

2.1 Interviews with JI Partners, Donors and Other Stakeholders

The two-member review team was tasked to conduct interviews and analyse data from the JI partners comprising the INGOs, local NGOs, the donors, other stakeholders such as government and local authority officials as well as from a non-random sample of beneficiaries. The officials that were interviewed and their organisations are listed in Appendix 2. The review was conducted over a two-week period, 21 May-1 June 2007. Field visits were conducted to project communities in (i) Mbare, Harare, (ii) St. Mary's, Chitungwiza, (iii) Mutare, and (iv) Gweru. The consultants' schedule of work for the review is shown in Appendix 3. The types of interventions being implemented and the agencies involved in each of the field sites visited are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Priority interventions and implementing agencies canvassed at the time of the review

City	Suburb	Types of Interventions	No. of Beneficiaries*	Responsible JIG Agency	Implementing Agency
Greater Harare	Mbare	Livelihoods	477 (406 + 71)	Africare	Africare
		Shelter	62	Practical Action	Practical Action
		Food	5,176 (4,200 + 976)	Oxfam GB	Zimbabwe Project Trust
	St. Mary's	Livelihoods	528 (128 + 400)	Africare	Africare
		Shelter	82	Practical Action	Practical Action
		Education	200**	Mercy Corps	EFZ
Mutare	Sakubva	Livelihoods	207	CARE	ASAP
		Shelter	87	Practical Action	Practical Action
		Education	200***	Mercy Corps	DOMCCP
Gweru	Mkoba Mtapa Senga Mambo	Food	712 (633 + 79)	CARE	CARE
		Livelihoods	962 (460 + 502)	Africare	Africare
		HIV/AIDS	160	CARE	CARE
All Cities	All suburbs	Child Protection		Save the Children (UK)	All Partners

* Number of beneficiaries entered in the JIG database as at 30 April 2007. Under "Livelihoods" the first figure in parenthesis refers to ISAL beneficiaries and the second to market stall beneficiaries; under "Food" the first figure in parenthesis refers to recipients of food vouchers and the second to beneficiaries under the low input gardens.

** Drawn from 4 schools that had completed the process of beneficiary registration and verification and had received their block grants; the implementing agency was working on the remaining 10 schools which it hoped to have completed by the end of June 2007

*** Drawn from 4 schools that had completed the process of beneficiary registration and verification and had received their block grants; the implementing agency was working on the remaining 11 schools.

2.2 Interviews with Beneficiaries

The views of the beneficiaries were obtained through one-on-one interviews as well as through group discussions. The interviews and group discussions took place at whatever places the beneficiaries were found. Thus, some of the respondents were interviewed at their homes. Others were interviewed at their business premises (in the case of vendors and building materials producers (brick-moulding)). Shelter beneficiaries have been organised into construction teams ranging between 15 and 40 members per group. Discussions were conducted with all members of the group present at a given construction site. In other instances, the implementing agency had organised groups of beneficiaries specifically to meet the consultants for discussions.

2.3 Review of Documents

The consultants also reviewed a number of background and technical documents on the programme. These included the programme proposal submitted to donors in 2006; mobilisation and targeting guidelines for use by the JI partners when selecting and screening beneficiaries; the M&E plan to be used by all the partners; two previous progress reports to the donors covering the periods June-November 2006 and December 2006-February 2007; and the report of the baseline study conducted during December 2006-February 2007.

2.4 Limitations of the Study

We note that the time allocated for the review was limited and did not give us the opportunity to visit and conduct interviews at all the sites, notable omissions being Bulawayo and Masvingo. Even in those sites that we were able to visit, it was not possible to meet with all the actors, and especially the beneficiaries. However, after visiting the sites in Harare, Gweru, Chitungwiza and Mutare and interviewing the various parties, it is our considered opinion that we have been able to grasp the major features of the programme and to present them in our report.

The Terms of Reference were specific in that they required us to review the organisational aspects of the JI programme and its implementation. The focus of the study has therefore been on the implementing agencies and the donors. It did not provide much scope for capturing the voices of the beneficiaries. However, we have included comments from the beneficiaries where these are appropriate is so far as they relate to the issues at hand. More detailed consideration of the beneficiaries' views and comments will obviously come when the programme is evaluated, including assessment of its outcomes and impacts on their socio-economic lives. Suffice to say at this point that all the beneficiaries that we interviewed were grateful to the JI programme.

3.0 OBSERVATIONS

3.1 Assessment of Progress to Date

The JI programme officially started in May 2006. The first few months were spent on mobilisation and sensitisation of key stakeholders, gaining approvals from the various urban authorities, identifying and registering potential beneficiaries, developing and piloting some of the programme tools. All this preparatory work was necessary before actual implementation of the prioritised interventions could begin. Actual implementation started in November-December 2006 after completion of the preliminaries. Table 2 is a summary of what has been achieved by the programme during the past six months, set against the key outputs and milestones the JI partners had set for themselves and the types of interventions implemented to date.

Overall, a lot of progress has been made already in almost all the interventions. The highest rate of attainment has been in the provision of monthly food vouchers where the target number of households is already receiving assistance. Likewise, the formation and training of community groups to support and strengthen their livelihoods is almost on target in most of the locations. Although the education support component is still lagging behind by a wide margin, the implementing agencies expect to reach the target number of beneficiaries in both Mutare and St. Mary's by the end of June 2007. At the time of the review, they were processing beneficiaries from the remaining schools in each site and discussing with the school authorities the nature of support from the block grants.

Only the shelter component was lagging behind at the time of the review. This is not surprising, given the complexity of the processes involved in construction and the legal requirements that must be met before work can begin. Unlike in rural areas where there are few or no legal requirements to be fulfilled in the provision of shelter, the opposite is the case in urban areas. After identifying the beneficiaries, it is then necessary to confirm their rights or entitlement to the land on which construction will take place, draw the building designs and have them approved by the relevant municipal authorities.

Table 2: Summary review of progress against key outputs and milestones as at 30 April 2007

Overarching Goal: Restore dignity and reduce suffering for the most vulnerable in urban and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe		
Objective 1: Six urban communities have strengthened mechanisms for collaboratively and transparently managing resources to address priority needs		
Key Outputs/Milestones	Jl Interventions	Comments/Observations
Community groups created and/or strengthened to manage programme activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods support • Shelter provision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAL groups have been established/supported in Mbare (406 members), St Mary's (128), Gweru (460), Sakubva (207), Bulawayo (1,500) and Masvingo (192). Group formation is on target in all areas except Bulawayo (75% on target). ISAL groups are self-selecting and self-managing. • Shelter beneficiaries have organised themselves into groups to supply construction labour in Mbare, St Mary's and Sakubva, each organised by its own Housing Committee. • Training has been conducted for ISAL and self-help groups.
Objective 2: Vulnerable populations in six urban communities have increased access to priority needs and services		
Improved economic capacity for 5,000 vulnerable households to access basic needs and services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods support • Shelter provision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAL groups are facilitating capital formation with which to order larger volumes of wares for resale • Planning approval given and/or construction in progress for 9 of the 10 targeted market stalls in Mbare, St Mary's and Gweru. • Training in basic bookkeeping/business management and mentoring of ISAL groups are on-going. • Equipment and training is being provided to small-scale building materials enterprises (e.g. brick moulding) in Mbare and St Mary's. 14 out of the 30 (target) enterprises are now established and operating. • Brick moulding enterprises are contracted to supply bricks for house construction.
Reduced food insecurity for 7,000 vulnerable households in Mbare, Gweru, Masvingo and Bulawayo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food vouchers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monthly food vouchers being given to 6,812 households in Mbare (4,200), Bulawayo (1,600), Gweru (633) and Masvingo (379). Programme on target. • Establishment of low input gardens has started in Mbare, Bulawayo, Gweru, and Masvingo. Was scheduled to begin after the rainy season. Training of lead farmers has recently started in some areas and food crops are still at seedling/early cultivation stages in other areas. Lead farmers being given basic input packs. • Water shortage is a major problem in all areas; use of hose pipes banned by municipal authorities.
40,000 sq. m. of additional habitable space in St Mary's, Mbare and Sakubva	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shelter provision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 231 new houses or house extensions are at varying stages of construction, up to roof level for the most advanced, in Mbare (62), St Mary's (82) and Mutare (87). • Shelter provision is 4-5 months behind schedule. • Construction programme uses alternative cost-effective technologies wherever possible. • Small-scale brick moulding enterprises are contracted to supply bricks for house construction.

Essential education services are accessible for 1,400 orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) in 28 primary and secondary schools in St Mary's and Sakubva	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 400 OVCs in St Mary's (200) and Sakubva (200) have had fees waived for the next two years in return for block grants to their schools (4 schools in each area). • 53% of the 400 beneficiaries are girls. • The remaining 11 schools in Sakubva and 10 in St Mary's to be completed by the end of June 2007. • The 8 schools already completed received either textbooks, school furniture, borehole equipment or roofing materials from their block grants. • After-school clubs are being established; facilitators are being identified and trained.
Reduced suffering and improved resilience for 250 HIV and AIDS affected households in Gweru and Masvingo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIV/AIDS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of home based care kits through community-based facilitators and municipal clinics. • Training and awareness raising for facilitators and youths. • In all the six communities, 3,390 (38%) of the 9,048 households receiving JI support had one or more chronically ill persons.
<p><u>Objective 3:</u> <i>JI international and national partners demonstrate increased capacity to identify and integrate child protection considerations in their programmes</i></p>		
Child protection plans are fully integrated into JIG programming in each of the seven target suburbs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A cross-cutting issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All but one locations has had some training for staff from the JI partners on child protection issues • Total number of JI staff trained to date is 18. • JI partners reported that they were now incorporating child protection issues into their programmes.

3.2 Organisation of the Programme and its Implementation

3.2.1 *The Consortium*

All the organisations in the JIG and their implementing partners commented that working as a consortium was a new approach for them. Overall, the partners reported that they had found the experience beneficial to them and their organisations. Below are some of the perceived advantages of working as a consortium.

3.2.1.1 *Advantages of Working as a Consortium*

A number of advantages were highlighted by the respondents. These included the following:

- The consortium had made it possible for members to share experiences and information and to collaborate in several areas that would have been impossible previously, notably, budgeting, project planning, sharing resources such as personnel and vehicles. They were drawing on the synergies and complementarities that exist between them, i.e. taking advantage of each other's strengths (strength in diversity).
- The consortium had exposed some of the member organisations and their staff to new perspectives regarding their own work and had encouraged them to incorporate these ideas into their own activities both within and outside JI. This was most notable in the incorporation of child protection as a cross-cutting issue. Previously, some of the partners had not built this within their programmes, but following their joining the consortium, they had recognised the importance of incorporating child protection in their work.
- The formation of the consortium had simplified reporting by removing the need to report to several donors, each having different requirements. Under the consortium, each partner is required to submit its report to the management agency (Mercy Corps) which in turn consolidates the submissions into one report for the donor group. Management in the partner organisations can therefore spend more time on service delivery without worrying about diverse donor reporting requirements and deadlines.
- The formation of an Area Coordination Committee (ACC) to oversee and coordinate activities in each suburb was generally viewed positively since it encouraged the partners to work as a team. It also provided a means for incorporating other stakeholders such as the local authorities and the security forces (police and CIO) into the consultative process. The incorporation of the latter into the ACC was also reported by several partners as having promoted an enabling environment for them to operate, given the prevailing political tensions and restrictive legislation, notably the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) which bars the convening of public meetings without prior police permission. For instance, several of the partners reported that, once the security agents had been brought into the ACCs, it had become easier to obtain permission for their activities such as training sessions and meetings since the relevant decision-makers would already have been sensitised about them. Likewise, the inclusion of representatives from the local authorities within the

ACCs had facilitated the approval of building plans and applications for land for the construction of market stalls.

- Another advantage of the consortium was that it enabled the partners to work collectively in dealing with challenges, especially in handling issues of political interference and obstruction as well as facilitating access to certain institutions. Each partner brought with them to the consortium its network of contacts and institutional allies. These can now be leveraged for the good of all the consortium members. One example is the case of one NGO that was new to a particular suburb and was having difficulties in gaining access to the community. Eventually, it was able to gain access by riding on the back of the partner organisation that was already known in the area.
- Likewise, some partners already had links with other humanitarian assistance programmes and organisations outside the JI. Those members that did not have such linkages can now benefit from them as well in the form of information sharing and lesson learning. For instance, some JI members have been implementing projects under DFID's Protracted Relief Programme (PRP).
- JI activities as a proportion of total budgets for the partners vary from about 5% to as much as 50%. Nonetheless, the consortium has given the members access to additional funding which they might otherwise have not obtained. The consortium had also removed the competition for funding from the same group of donors that had previously existed when each member was bidding on its own.
- At the inception of the JI programme, members had agreed to adopt a harmonised process of mobilisation, registration and verification of beneficiaries, to maintain a common database of beneficiaries, to commission a joint baseline study, and to implement a holistic package of assistance. In so doing, both the partners and their beneficiaries benefit from these synergies as well as increasing trust among the partners.

3.2.1.2 Problems Experienced in Working as a Consortium

It would have been surprising if there were no problems emanating from working as a new consortium, especially at this early stage when modalities are still being worked out and tested in the field. However, these are considered relatively minor and do not detract from the advantages of the consortium.

- The main problem experienced by the partners revolves around the volume of work and coordination required under the consortium. This was perhaps to be expected given that the consortium approach is being tried out for the first time and it would take much time to set all the operational modalities in place. At the operational level, the partners have assigned varying numbers of staff that are dedicated to JI projects. However, this is not always the case at management level. A few of the partners (e.g. Oxfam GB, DOMCCP) pointed out that while JI budget constitutes a small proportion of their overall budget (for all their programmes), they are spending a disproportionate amount of their time and resources on JI business. For instance, a DOMCCP vehicle

donated by Irish Aid for other programmes was now committed to JI work for almost three-quarters of the time and management were obviously concerned about this. Each of the partners had prior commitments and programmes that needed to be balanced with JI programmes. Hopefully, as the JI activities and routines become embedded in the organisations, the extent of management involvement should diminish.

- Some of the partners reported that, perhaps through an oversight on their part, their budgets for JI had not provided for items such as computers and vehicles. They are often compelled to divert such requirements from other programmes to cover JI business. Sometimes, the organisations fail to send representatives to JI meetings and workshops either because there is no money to meet their travel expenses or because there are no vehicles for transport. While these are not major issues with the better endowed organisations, it can be a significant management issue in smaller organisations with limited resources and equipment.
- Some of the local implementing partners said they were finding the reporting channels and communications unclear and confusing. Sometimes, information was not relayed on time from the international partners to the local implementing partners. They requested that there should be a clearer distinction between dissemination of information (which is sent to all the partners, local and international) and instructions that should be transmitted through the international partners and the latter should do so in a timely manner.
- In those suburbs where implementation is being done together with a local partner, one or two of the local NGOs felt that their international partners should not be directly involved in day to day activities, but should play a more supervisory and mentoring role as part of capacity building in national NGOs. The active presence of the international partner on the ground is likely to reduce the operating space for the local partner. However, it should be noted that this depends very much on the nature of the agreement between the international and local partners and whether the contract has a component on local capacity building. Furthermore, as all the JI partners (international and national) are still at the learning stage of operating as a consortium and the need for coordination, it may be prudent for both parties to be present on the ground.
- It was reported that some of the ACCs were not meeting as regularly as they should. Yet there is need for regular consultation and coordination of plans and activities if the consortium is to succeed as a model for programme implementation. In particular, organising ACC meetings has been problematic in Mbare. However, we were informed that, more recently, all the agencies had agreed that ACC meetings should be scheduled monthly and their venues should be supportive of stakeholder attendance.
- While the project documents are clear on the composition of the ACCs, on the ground there are variations in membership between the different sites. Most ACCs have gone a long way to incorporate other stakeholders including the

police and the CIO. Mbare in particular is still largely confined to the implementing partners alone. The political environment had made it difficult to bring other stakeholders such as the security agencies into the ACC.

3.2.1.3 Some Lessons Learnt

All the partners acknowledged that they had learnt some valuable lessons through working as a consortium. In addition to the advantages mentioned above, other valuable lessons learnt arise from the following:

- The programme has shown that it is able to quickly adapt and adjust with experience and to respond to changing circumstances on the ground. For instance, all the partners now recognise the need to incorporate child protection issues in their programmes which some had previously considered as either unimportant or outside their mandates. Those involved with the education programme recognise that the waiver of school fees alone is not always enough to fully benefit the child; they have responded by providing stationery, exercise books and other learning materials.
- All the partners stressed the benefits of cooperation in the field, with joint visits and joint progress monitoring.
- Another important lesson is the development of a common database from which all can draw their beneficiaries. This enables them to provide a more comprehensive package of assistance that can reduce the vulnerability of the beneficiaries in a sustainable manner.
- The development of a standardised M&E system is expected to make it possible to collect and analyse a common data set from which to assess progress across all the interventions. Likewise, the baseline survey conducted at the beginning of the programme across all the interventions will make it possible to evaluate its outcomes and impacts across all the interventions and locations.

3.2.1.4 Recommendations

- 1. The Programme Management Unit should streamline its communications, making a distinction between (a) information dissemination versus (b) instructions. The former will be addressed to as many partners as necessary while the latter would be addressed to the relevant persons only, e.g. the Country Directors or JI Project Managers.**
- 2. The Programme Management Unit should continue to emphasise and ensure that all the ACCs operate to agreed standards and procedures, including frequency of meetings, reporting, joint planning and monitoring of activities.**

3.2.2 Shelter

The provision of shelter is probably the most visible of the interventions being implemented by the consortium. From the JIG's perspective, provision of basic permanent shelter or decongestion of existing housing would go a long way towards

restoring the beneficiaries' dignity. A number of other benefits will also emanate from meeting their shelter needs, including the opportunity to grow food crops around their houses or to engage in livelihoods enhancing activities. During the field visits, we observed that current accommodation for the shelter beneficiaries is, at best, very inadequate, inappropriate for families and congested.

At least two issues come to mind in shelter provision. First, many of the beneficiaries were victims of the government's urban clean-up operation in 2005, either because they lost their lodgings or because the illegal extensions they had added to their houses were demolished during the clean-up. Second, the types of responses that NGOs can provide have been prescribed by government restrictions and politically motivated definitions of what is acceptable shelter. Thus, we were informed that the government does not allow NGOs and other humanitarian organisations to provide temporary shelter using tents or other materials unless there is also a firm commitment on their part to provide permanent housing for the beneficiaries within a stipulated time period.

In our discussion with members of the consortium, we spent some time seeking clarification regarding the selection and verification of beneficiaries, and also establishing that the construction is being done in accordance with building regulations of the respective local authorities. The beneficiaries have been drawn from a common data pool as for the other JI interventions. The selection of shelter beneficiaries was based on priority needs stated by the beneficiaries themselves and subsequently verified through field visits. Verification varied from 30% in some suburbs to 100% in others, depending on the total number of applicants registered in that area.

It should be noted that some potential shelter beneficiaries may have been excluded because, in order to qualify for assistance, one should either possess a valid lease agreement with the local authority or have title deed to the property. The very poor who are in need of shelter are unlikely to own land in urban areas and therefore, would have been excluded from receiving assistance. However, for those with legal rights to the land, we are persuaded that the selection and verification process was rigorous such that the beneficiaries, by and large, fall within the scope of deserving cases.

Possession of a valid lease agreement or title deeds to the property is confirmed with the local authority during the process of seeking approval for the proposed construction works. Furthermore, all stages of the actual construction are inspected and approved by the Building Inspectorate of the local authority to ensure that the works comply with municipal building regulations and bye-laws.

The beneficiaries are organised into groups, each team providing labour at a building site under the supervision of a qualified bricklayer provided by the implementing NGO. The beneficiaries are expected to provide the unskilled and semi-skilled labour, such as carrying bricks, mixing mortar and concrete, or carrying sand and water. The labour groups comprise both males and females, frequently with women outnumbering the men. The implementing partner endeavours to use the most cost-effective materials and suppliers consistent with municipal building requirements. For instance, the small-scale brick moulding enterprises contracted to supply the bricks

are also expected to ensure that their products are durable and reach acceptable standards. They are supplied with the brick-making equipment, trained in its use, and their product monitored and tested.

There was concern among the beneficiaries that the implementing partner, Practical Action, had changed the rules since the time that they had registered for assistance. Initially, they had been made to understand that they would be provided with all the building materials at no cost to themselves. Subsequently, they were informed that, while the very poor and destitute will be provided with basic shelter at no cost, other beneficiaries will be required to contribute into a materials revolving fund after their houses are completed. They also claimed that, initially, they had been made to understand that the implementing agency would provide them with technical services for the preparation of the building plans, getting them approved by the planning authorities and providing legal assistance where there were disputes regarding title to the land. Afterwards, they were informed to commission their own architects to draw the plans for them. However, to its credit, in some areas, Practical Action was able to contract an architectural consultant to prepare the plans and also facilitated their approval with the local authorities.

The construction of houses is probably the most contentious of the interventions being implemented by the JIG. Some of the donors have questioned whether provision of permanent shelter is indeed humanitarian assistance or should be classed as development assistance. The contention between the donors and the JIG arises primarily from the fact that the donors currently do not have budget allocations for development assistance in Zimbabwe, but only for short-term humanitarian assistance. It is problematic for some of the donors to account for funds spent on the construction of permanent shelter. On the other hand, the JIG views shelter as crucial to meeting its over-arching goal which is to “restore dignity and reduce suffering for the most vulnerable in urban and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe”. For JIG, permanent shelter is a stabilising factor which helps to reduce vulnerability and provides a secure space on which various income generating activities can be conducted (as long as they are within the law).

3.2.2.1 Challenges of Implementation

The shelter component is currently behind schedule by about 4-5 months in all the suburbs where it is being implemented. A number of reasons account for the delays including:

- Difficulties in gaining access to the communities, getting approval from the local authorities, the Provincial Governors and District Administrators and in designing the plans and getting them approved.
- Logistical problems of procuring building materials in bulk in order to benefit from price discounts.
- Some of the beneficiaries have had difficulties in securing and transporting locally available materials such as building sand and stone aggregate for concrete.
- Erratic water supplies and restrictions on water usage (hose pipes are prohibited in some towns).
- The legal status of each property with respect to ownership of the lease or title deeds had to be verified and confirmed with the local authorities. In some

instances where a property was in the name of a deceased person, disputes had to be resolved first between the contesting heirs and confirmed with the local authority before work could begin.

3.2.2.2 Recommendations

- 1. The implementing partner, Practical Action, should provide more information to the shelter beneficiaries regarding the purpose and operational modalities of the proposed materials revolving fund in order to remove the existing mistrust and perception that goal posts are being shifted unilaterally.**
- 2. Practical Action should establish working relationships with NGOs with expertise in addressing some of the technical and legal issues on behalf of the beneficiaries. For instance, the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) already provides legal advice on issues such as birth certificates for OVCs and deceased persons' estates.**
- 3. Since construction is up to five months behind schedule, Practical Action should quickly enter into discussions with the Programme Management Unit to agree on an appropriate course of action and available options before the current JI phase ends in November 2007. Given the escalating costs of building materials, is the budget still able to meet the target number of houses? To what extent has the agency benefited from the exchange rate depreciation? Should a request for a no-cost extension be submitted to the donor group to enable it to meet its target number of houses? Should the target number be revised downwards to enable Practical Action to focus on completing those units already under construction?**

3.2.3 Project Implementation and Operating Space

The nature and complexity of the programme required that time was needed at the beginning to mobilise, register and thereafter verify beneficiaries; create a common database that would be used by all the partners; agree on the selection criteria among all the partners; set up the management structures including the Area Coordination Committees; conduct a baseline survey; identify stakeholders and get them to “buy” into the programme; and obtain the necessary authorisations to begin implementation. The partners also needed to agree on which organisations would lead the programme in each location, based on existing strengths in the selected locations, work history, local networks.

All the partners acknowledge that JI was a new and challenging approach for them, both in its organisation as a consortium and in terms of working in urban areas. For instance, they have found mobilisation in urban areas much more complex and difficult than they normally experience in rural areas. Screening or verification in rural areas is less problematic and less time-consuming since most residents would qualify for assistance anyway. Overall, all the partners have been on a steep learning curve during the past year. But it is encouraging that lessons learnt and the networks that have been established are now bearing fruit.

There were a number of external threats that contributed to make the start-up problematic. The magnitude of these threats varied between the different locations. In particular, project implementation was more difficult in Mbare (Harare) and St. Mary's (Chitungwiza) than in the other towns. The problems that the partners experienced revolved to a large extent on getting the necessary approvals to operate from the relevant authorities. At the technical level, officials of the various local authorities were supportive of the programme. However, difficulties seem to have been primarily from the politicians and the security agents (police and CIO). More specifically, problems mentioned by the partners include:

- Refusal by the police to grant permission to enable the partners to call for public meetings where they could inform the public about the programme, conduct meetings with beneficiaries for registration or training. However, the ACCs seem to have eventually worked out mechanisms for getting round some of these obstacles, for instance by inviting the local police and the CIO to attend their meetings so that they are fully informed about their programmes and activities and by cultivating amicable working relationships with the senior officers of these security organisations.
- Securing the consent of the political leadership in each area, without compromising the objectives of the programme. The most significant political offices in relation to the JI programme are those of the Provincial Governor and the District administrator in each locality. In almost all areas, support and engagement with the officials of the local authority was not forthcoming until the projects had been approved by the Governor and the District Administrator.
- Securing approval of building plans from the respective local planning authorities for new houses or extensions took longer than had been anticipated, especially in the initial phases. In the construction of market stalls for vendors, it was necessary for the local authorities to identify and approve the sites and then follow all the relevant regulatory procedures before development could take place. Consequently, in many sites, actual construction of the market stalls is yet to commence, although planning approval has now been secured.
- Registration and verification of beneficiaries also took longer than anticipated, partly because of difficulties in organising public meetings. Moreover, the logistics of processing the large numbers of applicants (almost 18,000 across all the locations), capturing the data into the computer (using SPSS) and screening took a considerable amount of time. Even at the time of the review (end of May 2007), data entry was still on-going as new applications for a number of activities came in from the various locations.

Since November-December 2006, implementation has speeded up. Except for those engaged in the construction of shelter and market stalls, the other partners are confident that they will be able to catch up and meet their planned targets by the end of June 2007.

However, there are a few issues that need continual attention by both the implementing partners and the Programme Management Unit as the pace of implementation speeds up on the ground. These include:

- i) ensuring a high degree of collaboration between the implementing partners;
- ii) ensuring that where the same intervention is being implemented by different agencies, there is an acceptable degree of uniformity in planning and implementation;
- iii) finalisation of the M&E system and monitoring tools to ensure a uniform standard of monitoring and reporting.

3.2.3.1 Recommendation

- 1. The development of the M&E system and monitoring tools should be expedited so that they can assist in further standardising the monitoring and reporting of service delivery across all the sites.**

3.2.4 The Political Context and Risks

All the partners acknowledged that they had learnt very important lessons on how to create operating spaces for themselves in the face of the unwelcoming political environment that currently exists in urban Zimbabwe. Despite obstacles placed in their way, each ACC was eventually able to resolve its problems, and was able to negotiate a reasonable operating space to enable it to implement its projects. It is to their credit that the partners were determined to invest so much in terms of effort and time to negotiate the operating space they currently enjoy, developing relations and networks with key stakeholders.

Free food distribution in any distressed community will attract much attention, including many undeserving applicants. Political interference with beneficiary selection was directed at the food assistance programme, especially in Mbare. We were informed that, during the registration and verification stages, the implementing agencies were asked to include some 500 names submitted by local officials of the ruling party. Some of these people did not meet the criteria stipulated for food assistance under the programme. The result was an impasse, forcing the agencies to suspend the distribution of food vouchers in the area for about two months. More recently, the agencies were compelled to deliver the food vouchers door-to-door to the 4,200 beneficiary households because they were denied permission to organise public meetings where they could give out the coupons, thus greatly increasing costs. In Masvingo, there was disagreement with a local councillor over the selection of one suburb over another for the shelter intervention.

While the partners are able to operate at present, they need to recognise at all times that the political risk remains high. This is not surprising under the current political environment where the ruling party and government are highly suspicious of donor and NGO activities that might be deemed to favour their political opponents, especially in urban areas where the opposition enjoys significant support.

Experience during the past year has shown that political interference and risks are greater in Mbare (and to a lesser degree in neighbouring Chitungwiza) than in the other urban areas. Mbare, like Highfield suburb, has great political symbolism in Zimbabwe.

The risk to operations being disrupted or even stopped will increase as the country approaches the local government elections scheduled for January 2008 and the presidential and parliamentary elections two months later in March. In previous elections, the ruling party has used food aid as a tool for “buying” votes. Political interference should therefore be expected in the distribution of food vouchers in the coming months.

The supervision of construction sites may also become risky as the election period approaches. It would therefore be preferable if the construction of both shelter and market stalls were completed well before the end of the year. Should tensions mount, residents seen to be working with NGOs may become the target of politically motivated violence.

The JIG is aware of the risks of violence and the likelihood of some of its activities being disrupted in the run-up to the elections in 2008. Recently, the partners held conducted a workshop on disaster preparedness and risk management. They have also sought to ensure that the beneficiaries of the market stalls being under the programme have their right of occupation secured by signing Memoranda of Understanding with respective local authorities for Mbare, St. Mary’s and Mkoba.

3.2.4.1 Recommendation

- 1. Work should be accelerated to develop and roll out a risk management strategy to mitigate possible political interference and/or disruption of its programme, and for possible exclusion/deregistration of foreign NGOs in the run-up to the 2008 elections. The strategy should ensure continuity of support to beneficiaries. It may include greater use of local partners and building/strengthening networks with key stakeholders who can cushion the JIG from political pressures.**

3.2.5 Targeting

The JIG developed a detailed and elaborate methodology for mobilisation, registration and verification of beneficiaries. Posters were distributed in areas identified as experiencing the most severe incidences of poverty and destitution. Public announcements were made through the churches and local community based organisations informing the public about the programme. Sensitisation and mobilisation meetings were held with the residents and stakeholders. Public registration was conducted at designated registration centres within each targeted suburb over a period of 3-4 days. Detailed background data on the household was collected on the registration forms. The registrants were also asked to state the form(s) of assistance they needed most. The information recorded by the applicants on their registration forms was captured into the programme’s database. The applicants were then classified according to their vulnerability and wealth status to determine those who qualified for assistance. Only those classified as poor or very poor would qualify. Thereafter, verification took place through visits to the families to confirm the

information they had given on the registration forms. Selection of beneficiaries was therefore done from a common database for all the interventions. For each intervention, 10% was left unallocated at the initial selection to accommodate deserving cases that might be identified at a later date.

Overall, the mobilisation and registration of beneficiaries was quite successful, especially in view of the large number involved (over 19,000 households had been entered into the database at the time of the review). However, it is possible that errors of both inclusion and exclusion in the final selection of beneficiaries may have occurred, although we did not have the time to verify one way or the other, or to establish whether such errors (if present) are beyond acceptable limits. Nonetheless, the possibility was also indicated by some of the implementing partners.

Errors of inclusion will have arisen from the extent of the verification process. In areas where the number of potential beneficiaries was small, the agencies were able to conduct 100% verification for each intervention by visiting all the applicants' households. On the other hand, only a 20-30% sample was verified in Mbare, the main reason being the large numbers involved. The inclusion of undeserving households receiving assistance is likely to be highest in the food assistance programme because beneficiaries may have exaggerated their degree of poverty and vulnerability in order to ensure qualification for assistance. Urban people are more street-wise than those in rural areas and community sanctions against those found cheating are not as stringent. People intent on exploiting loopholes in the verification process are more likely to succeed in town than in rural areas.

In respect of the shelter component, subsequent visits by the implementing agency and regular interactions with the households (e.g. at the design and plan approval stages, or when checking the tenure status of the applicants) will have helped to eliminate undeserving cases. Likewise, the involvement of school authorities in the selection of vulnerable children for the education support will have helped in the elimination of undeserving cases. All the HIV/AIDS cases being assisted under the home-based care intervention have been verified and cross-checked with the respective DAAC.

Errors of exclusion are likely to have occurred as well. Not all poor and destitute people can read, nor do they regularly attend church or other public gatherings. Likewise, some child-headed households, elderly people as well as the homeless could have been missed unless they were informed of the programme by their neighbours or other well-wishers.

With regards to the education component, the implementing partners had hoped that they would be able to identify out-of-school children and bring them back into school. But this has proved difficult. In many cases, returning to school may be quite expensive for the family in terms of a lost livelihood if the child is engaged in an income generating activity such as vending or begging in the streets.

The JIG is currently developing its own "home-grown" computerised M&E system to monitor progress in the implementation of its activities. Although considerable ground has been covered in developing the system, it is still to be finalised. When completed, the system should go a long way in generating reports and providing

information for the partners. However, success of the M&E system will depend on the implementing agencies collecting the data using the agreed format and in accordance with the tools that are currently being developed in consultation with all the partners.

3.2.5.1 Recommendations

- 1. The consortium should continue with verification of current beneficiaries and remove from the programme those found not to qualify for assistance. We are informed that this is on-going.**
- 2. At the same time, the consortium should endeavour to locate other deserving households that may have been missed out in the initial selection process. These can replace those being removed from the programme as undeserving of assistance. By so doing, targeted numbers of beneficiaries will be maintained. We are assured that this is also on-going – some of these new cases are being accommodated within the 10% that had been left unallocated at the initial selection.**
- 3. All the partners in the consortium should assign staff for training in data collection using the standardised tools that are being developed and also in the use of the M&E system.**
- 4. The Programme Management Unit should ensure that the database is secure, back-up copies are regularly created on CD and are stored off-site in case of fire or theft.**

3.2.6 The Donor Group

3.2.6.1 Pooled Funding Mechanism

The design for the JI programme was for pooled funding by donors, with one contract, one contact NGO, and one report from the group. This has meant that the donors had to come together and work more closely than if they each had separate contracts with the JIG or individual NGOs in the consortium. The donors therefore formed a donor network to fund and monitor the programme.

The arrangement is largely new for the donors, just as the consortium arrangement has been a new experience for the JI partners. Apart from USAID, the donors agreed to pool their funding to the JI without stipulating specific activities to be funded. They also agreed on a common activity reporting format, financial reporting, and procurement arrangements. To achieve this, the donors showed a great deal of flexibility, which signified their desire to see the initiative succeed. The overall assessment of the donors is that the arrangement has been challenging but worthwhile.

3.2.6.2 Interaction Among the Donors

The group is made up of like minded donors who have always cooperated informally in the course of their operations, and many of whom have previously jointly funded other projects and contribute to the UN group under the Country Assistance Programme (CAP). The JI donor coordination group meets regularly to share ideas, and before they meet the NGOs. As the programme has progressed, the donors have developed good understanding and are comfortable with the idea of one donor contact with the JIG.

3.2.6.3 The Nature of Funding vs. the Nature of the Programme

Due to the strained diplomatic relations between the Government of Zimbabwe and the donor group countries, there is no state-to-state cooperation or development assistance flowing into Zimbabwe. Donor funding is available only for humanitarian assistance. From interviews with donor representatives and the JI partners, it is apparent that there is tension between some donors regarding humanitarian assistance and some of the JI interventions which they are funding, especially shelter and education. There is a feeling that some of the activities in these interventions may not be truly humanitarian.

Further, because donors are using humanitarian funds to support the JI, and the initiative was designed to respond to an emergency, the donors had expected interventions with quick and visible results. On the other hand, the JIG sees urban poverty as a problem that is here to stay, and they designed their programme with a medium term perspective. Added to this, the programme had to adjust to an increasingly difficult operating environment which delayed outputs on the ground.

The field visits organised by the JIG to project sites for some of the donors have gone a long way to easing donor disquiet. They now have a better appreciation of what is being achieved, and of the scale of the need for assistance. However, it does not remove the tension inherent between the source of funding for the JI and some of the interventions. There is need for continued dialogue between the JIG and the donors in order to create better understanding of each others' perspectives. That understanding will bring about convergence of perspectives.

3.2.6.4 Donor Views on the Consortium Approach

The donors provided funding for the programme because they believed that it was good, though novel, concept which was worth supporting. They liked the collaborative approach, and the delivery of a package of assistance to beneficiaries using the collective strengths of the consortium members. The consortium approach also had the potential to leverage donor funding – although each donor would contribute only a proportion of the funding, they would rightly claim the results of the total funding since the delivery is collective. The consortium idea is also in line with what donors see as good practice, and is in line with the Paris Declaration on closer collaboration. Especially for those donors that have been on field visits recently and seen what has been achieved in such a short space of time, there is a growing view that the consortium is a good approach they would like to see succeed.

3.2.6.5 Some Issues Raised by the Donors

A number of issues were raised by donors for the attention of the JIG. Some still need to be addressed, others are already being addressed by the JIG.

- The donors' uneasiness about some of the interventions which they perceive as stretching the limits of humanitarian aid has already been discussed above.
- There are lingering questions as to whether the consortium is living up to its original idea of integrated assistance to the needy, and whether there is enough lesson learning and cross fertilisation within the consortium. A key finding of this review is that the consortium is, on the whole, working well. The JIG has been on a steep learning curve over the past year. Over the next six months, as

the interventions take shape on the ground and their impacts become clear, there will be more opportunities for lesson learning.

- The original design was for a six-monthly report through the lead agency. In hindsight, all agree that the reporting frequency was inadequate. This has now been resolved by introducing summary quarterly reporting, together with more frequent email updates.

There is general agreement that communication has improved. In addition to improved reporting frequency, donors have been able to meet the JIG as a group several times, to the benefit of both parties. Recent field visits arranged for the donors have greatly improved understanding of the progress and context of the programme.

Yet communication could be improved further. Donors would particularly appreciate an improvement in incidents reporting. They would like to see real-time incident reports, rather than getting them in the quarterly reports.

- Donors would like assurances that the JI programming takes cognisance of the real risk of operating in urban areas and that there is a coherent strategy for ensuring that urban beneficiaries will continue to receive assistance even if the JIG were to cease or suspend operations. This is especially necessary in view of the build-up to elections in 2008.

The JIG is considering disaster risk management which would cover this aspect. At the time of the review, members held a high level workshop on the subject. What is now required is for the JIG to develop a concrete strategy and roll it out into the field, bearing in mind that time is tight for a workable strategy to be put in place.

3.2.6.6 Recommendations

- 1. The JIG should continue discussions with the donors on the areas of programming that are causing disquiet, so that sensitivities on both sides are addressed.**
- 2. Field visits are a good vehicle for improving donor understanding of the programme. As the programme settles over the next six months and the impact of the interventions becomes more visible, more field visits should be organised for the donors by the partners.**
- 3. The JIG should discuss with the donors the issue of donor representation on the JI Steering Committee and agree on whether it remains as at present or should be increased.**

3.2.7 Programme Coordination

Aspects of programme coordination have already been reviewed in the context of the consortium and how it is operating (see section 3.2.1), project implementation (section 3.2.3) and the donor group (3.2.6). There are five levels of coordination and decision making for the programme, namely the (i) donor group, (ii) the JI Steering

Committee, (iii) Area Coordination Committees, (iv) Programme Management Unit, and (v) the partners' own operational and management teams.

The donors have separate meetings on their own. They meet as and when necessary, but also communicate among themselves by email. It was agreed at the inception stage that they would select one representative to sit on the JI Steering Committee. However, more recently, they have been suggestions from the donor group that this should be increased to two or more representatives. This will ensure that the donors are more fully engaged in the programme and will also facilitate information dissemination.

The JI Steering Committee comprises country directors of the seven agencies plus the donor representative. It provides the forum for discussion of key programme issues, planning, policies and direction. At present, it does not have formally scheduled meetings, only convening as when it is necessary. Much of the communication between the JI Steering Committee members is by email. During our discussions with the partners, there was no clear consensus on whether the Steering Committee should meet more often and/or have scheduled meetings.

The Country Director of the lead agency (Mercy Corps), on behalf of the Steering Committee, submits a consolidated quarterly report on the programme to the donors. The report is a consolidation of agency reports from the seven agencies who in turn will have consolidated submissions from their implementing partners. The original contract stipulated six-monthly reports, but it was subsequently felt that this was too long and did not provide sufficient feedback for the donors. The donors are satisfied with the financial accounting and reporting, despite the disquiet expressed by some with regards to whether what the programme is doing is indeed humanitarian assistance and not development work.

At the operational level, coordination in the field is conducted through the Area Coordination Committee for each area. As discussed earlier, the experience to date is varied. Some ACCs are functioning better show greater coordination than others.

The Programme Management Unit (PMU) at the lead agency comprises a Programme Manager plus four support staff including an M&E Coordinator. The PMU encourages joint planning, organises regular meetings with the partners in order to standardise practices and systems (e.g. targeting, database, service delivery and monitoring). The PMU also conducts field visits to project sites as part of its monitoring functions. Protocols for monitoring and reporting are still being developed and tested.

Each partner organisation has appointed a Contact Person or JI Programme Officer with whom the PMU Manager interacts. Communication between the PMU and the Contact Persons is by email telephone or meetings. When problems cannot be resolved at the level of the PMU and the Contact Persons, they are referred to the Country Director of the lead agency for discussion with the other country directors that constitute the Steering Committee.

Overall, the structures that have been established to oversee and manage the programme seem to be working well. During the time of the review, the consultants

were able to witness joint planning in practice. The partners were preparing their proposals for the second phase of the programme and all were fully engaged in the process.

3.2.7.1 Recommendation

- 1. As recommended previously (see section 3.2.1.4), the Programme Management Unit should ensure that all the ACCs function to the same standard in terms of coordination and monitoring, and engagement with stakeholders if at all possible. The ACC in Gweru can serve as “best practice” that can be used as a model for the others.**

3.2.8 Appropriateness of the Interventions

3.2.8.1 Are the Interventions Relevant?

The JI programme was launched in response to the immediate and visible needs highlighted by Operation “Murambatsvina”. This was an emergency situation calling for an immediate response. The JIG and the donor group sought to implement a programme that would have a significant impact. In this regard the intervention was directly relevant. However, as indicated earlier in this report, there already existed an underlying situation of vulnerability in urban areas, fuelled by the economic decline and resulting high levels of unemployment and the ravages of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which required a response as well if the programme interventions were to have a meaningful impact. Food distribution and temporary shelter alone would not have been adequate. There was a need to address livelihoods and HIV/AIDS.

The relevance of the programme’s interventions is amplified by the fact that urban local authorities and the government have acknowledged the pervasiveness of urban poverty and the inadequacy of their social safety nets. In response, some municipalities have initiated programmes that attempt to address urban poverty, but their efforts are hamstrung by inadequate funding. The City of Bulawayo has an urban agriculture programme which seeks to make available vacant municipal land to the poor for cultivation, and has a successful programme with World Vision International to support vulnerable households. The City of Gweru has initiated the Mayor’s Poverty Reduction Fund, which supports income generating activities by the poor. The JIG’s interventions have largely received the support of the local authorities because they meet acknowledged needs. Even the government has recognized this need, and has deployed AREX in urban areas to support urban and peri-urban agriculture.

Other components of the JI programme also build on existing programmes by various actors and extend them. The HIV/AIDS component makes use of municipal clinics for delivering supplies and medicines to beneficiaries, instead of setting up parallel structures. It also draws its home based care facilitators from those who were trained by the District AIDS Action Committees (DAACs) but who are now not being utilised because the National AIDS Council (NAC) has directed that at least 70% of its funds will go towards procurement of ARVs.

3.2.8.2 Is the Targeting Appropriate?

The JI programme seeks to support the most vulnerable members of the community. The target population is those identified as poor and very poor, who also meet the

required vulnerability criteria. The registration process showed that there were significant numbers of potential beneficiaries who meet these criteria. Records in the integrated JI database show that most of the beneficiaries selected fall within the target groups. There is a small percentage in the moderate to well-off, which will need to be investigated to establish the reasons for their inclusion. The overall picture is one of appropriate targeting. The only qualifier to this observation is that the classification is based on the information provided by the beneficiaries. There is always a temptation for potential beneficiaries to exaggerate their poverty in order to access assistance. Where verification is not 100%, it cannot be said with absolute certainty that this has not the case. To the extent that in some locations such as Mbare, verification was as low as 20-30%, there is a significant possibility of inclusion of inappropriate beneficiaries. There is also a possibility of exclusion, and the programme allowed a 10% provision to cover those who were excluded at the initial registration.

3.2.8.3 Does the Programme Provide Holistic Support?

At the core of the JI programming approach is the desire to provide a package of assistance to meet the specific needs of the beneficiaries, using the combined strengths of the partners, instead of each organisation trying to be expert at all the interventions. This requires joint planning and joint implementation. Where the programming is working well, the JI is providing holistic support. The base intervention is food distribution, because it is the poorest and most vulnerable who qualify for this assistance. The other interventions then select their beneficiaries from this pool of beneficiaries, resulting in qualifying beneficiaries getting a suite of interventions that combine to provide the most comprehensive assistance available.

However, observations during field visits suggest that this ideal degree of integration is not universal across all the interventions. At present, 55% of all the beneficiaries are receiving integrated support comprising two or more forms of assistance, of which 15% receive three or more interventions. On the other hand 45% of all the beneficiaries receive only one intervention.

Of greater interest is the comparison between the different types of interventions (Table 3). Beneficiaries on low input gardens (LIGs) are most likely to be multiple beneficiaries receiving support from other interventions. Only 22% are solely on the LIGs. The other 78% are receiving support from at least two other interventions, especially from the food vouchers programme. Four-fifths of the HIV/AIDS and ISAL beneficiaries are receiving support from two or more interventions. It is worth noting the importance of providing holistic support for people living with HIV/AIDS, including food to sustain the patients' nutrition as well as income support. The JI partners are fully aware of this and have incorporated it in their interventions for HIV/AIDS support

In contrast, 29% of the shelter beneficiaries and 8% of those on education support are multiple beneficiaries. The low proportion of education beneficiaries on multiple interventions is not surprising – the largest group of multiple beneficiaries tend to include food vouchers, but there is no food support in both St. Mary's and Sakubva where the education component is being implemented. The paucity of multiple beneficiaries among those receiving assistance with shelter was also evident in the construction labour groups that we met during the field visits. When asked if they

were getting other forms of assistance other than house construction, very few of them said they were being assisted in any other way.

The need for a comprehensive package of interventions is self-evident in many of the beneficiaries that we met. We were informed that this issue is being closely addressed by the JI partners, especially as they prepare for the second phase of the programme.

Table 3: Number of interventions being received by beneficiaries across all sites, by type of main intervention

Type of main intervention	% of beneficiaries receiving:				Total %
	One intervention	Two interventions	Three interventions	Four interventions	
Low input gardens	22.3	68.1	24.0	5.6	100.0
HIV/AIDS home based care	40.4	39.9	16.1	3.6	100.0
Internal savings & lending groups	42.7	37.6	13.8	5.9	100.0
Food vouchers	50.8	37.7	9.5	2.0	100.0
Market stalls/vending	52.5	44.6	2.3	0.6	100.0
Shelter	81.2	14.9	3.3	0.6	100.0
Education	91.8	7.7	0.5	0.0	100.0

3.2.8.4 Do the Interventions Support Local Coping Mechanisms?

Sometimes, the unintended negative consequence of assistance is to undermine the beneficiaries' own coping mechanisms developed over time. On the whole, JIG's interventions support and strengthen the coping mechanisms of the beneficiaries. The savings and loans schemes improve the capital and income bases of the beneficiaries through their own resources, and also create a social circle of support – members support each other in their business ventures and with personal problems. Support groups of people living with HIV and AIDS have adopted the internal savings and loans concept into their activities. This has increased their group cohesion and general sense of wellbeing as well as access to money to meet their needs. Low input gardens build on the beneficiaries' current gardening efforts, which utilise space around the houses, improve crop range, space utilisation and produce quality, resulting in improved nutrition and possible income generation. Access to shelter in urban areas is a great stabilising factor, beneficiary vulnerability is reduced, and their sense of self is enhanced. The block grant component supports the education of poor beneficiaries as well as school boards in carrying out activities which used to be financed from government funds that have shrunk considerably in the past decade.

3.2.8.5 Are There Gaps in the Interventions?

The JI approach to programming supports local enterprise – through support for vending and the use of local small contractors wherever possible - thereby supporting self-employment. So in essence the programme supports individuals and communities to cope better with the economic and social hardships experienced in urban areas.

However there are some gaps in implementation.

- The waiver of fees in exchange for block grants to the schools is in many ways the tip of the iceberg. Families that cannot afford to pay school fees are also likely to be unable to pay for books and uniforms, which cost much more than the fees. They are also likely to experience severe food deficits, and to have inadequate or no permanent shelter. The current education programme by the JI is not able to respond to these needs. Granted the consortium is aware of this shortcoming, and is providing exercise books to some beneficiaries. It is also proposing a more comprehensive support package in the next phase.
- Our understanding of the HIV/AIDS component is that it covers the supply of home based care materials such as basic medicines and hygiene supplies. The programme also supports beneficiary access to ARVs through public clinics. This programming is not sufficiently robust as it emphasises care and treatment, but seems to neglect prevention. Emphasis on care and support is an understandable response to the AIDS pandemic, but there is still a need for prevention activity to contain new infections and re-infections.
- Links with other non-consortium organisations could be improved across the board to deliver better services to communities and to enhance lesson learning (e.g. IOM, LRF as mentioned earlier).
- JI programmes cover adult beneficiaries and school children. There is also deliberate effort to ensure that women beneficiaries are in the majority. However, programmes aimed at youths are not apparent. There was mention of peer group activities and after-school clubs, but these were not observed on the ground. The youth problems due to unemployment and school drop-out are concentrated in urban areas and deserve more attention.
- Gendered sensitivity could be strengthened in programming. The large proportion of women beneficiaries is welcome. Also, savings and loans and flea market activities attract a healthy balance of female and male beneficiaries. The overwhelming majority of participants in the vegetable vending, HBC and construction programmes are women. Conscious and continuous efforts are needed to enhance female participation.
- As the programme becomes more widely known, coupled with the deepening economic crisis, demand for support in all interventions will increase. Moreover, there are many other urban areas where the need for support is just as great. As the programme prepares for a second phase, consideration should be given to extending its geographical coverage to other towns (e.g. the small mining towns that have experienced mine closures and worker redundancies in recent years).
- The JIG has already recognised that the food basket under the current intervention is inadequate to meet the average household's needs for a full month. Several of the food beneficiaries that we interviewed also requested that the quantities be increased. We support plans to increase the quantities of food to be provided during the second phase of the programme.

3.2.8.6 Recommendations

- 1. It is necessary, probably urgent, that JI partners carry out a 100% verification in those sites where this has not yet been done in order to be assured that the beneficiaries that are receiving food vouchers are the intended ones. This is necessary because the possibility of inclusion error is highest in this component, which is also the base for the other interventions. We were assured that verification was indeed an on-going exercise.**
- 2. School fees are but a small component of the cost of education. An effective education support programme should look at a broader spectrum of assistance. It is recommended that, the budget permitting, the JI should build on steps already initiated and consider a programme that supports a wider range of needs such as books, uniform, food and health (e.g. sanitary pads for adolescent girls).**
- 3. While some work is already happening through the training of youth peer educators and the establishment of youth friendly corners, the JIG should strengthen its HIV/AIDS component to include a more active prevention element. This may mean linking up with other organisations that are known to be expert and active in the prevention domain.**
- 4. More effort needs to be made to incorporate the youths as a distinct target group for assistance.**
- 5. Investigation should be undertaken to identify other areas of severe deprivation such as mine towns for scaling up the programme of assistance.**

3.2.9 The Urban Operating Environment

A lot has been discussed in this report about the urban political and economic environment. This section looks at the urban operating environment for donor and NGO activities.

Urban intervention in Zimbabwe is a relatively new development for both donors and NGOs. Most NGOs have a track record of development and emergency assistance in rural areas. The urban environment is significantly different from the rural environment and it presents unique challenges, a fact the JI partners have learned during the implementation of their programmes. From discussions with JI partners and field visits, a few issues crystallised and are outlined below.

3.2.9.1 Some Characteristics of Beneficiaries

Where the rural beneficiary tends to be patient, the urban counterpart is not. Urban beneficiaries want things fast; they tend to put a premium on cash, time and the individual. They tend to be more demanding – activities have to be on time, meetings should be short – and to voice their complaints. The tendency towards an individual focus means that community spirit is less pronounced than in rural areas, especially the community checks on errant individual behaviour. This means that if beneficiaries see an individual exploiting assistance, they are more likely not to do anything about

it. At the same time, there is a great hunger for learning, and a more ready adoption of new ideas.

In addition, urban beneficiaries are highly mobile. The poor and very poor tend to be lodgers, and they can change addresses frequently. This may involve moving suburbs. This might mean that they move outside the catchment area of the NGO or particular intervention.

3.2.9.2 Programming

Beneficiary mobilisation is more challenging in towns than in rural areas. In rural areas, information about meetings spreads easily. In urban areas, NGOs have to use multiple channels of communication over extended periods to reach potential beneficiaries, especially at the start of a programme where they are not known in the community. Churches and FBOs have been found to be very effective communication vehicles, and for keeping track of their members.

NGOs in urban areas have to deal with a large number of stakeholders and authorities who demand consultation. They have to navigate decidedly more regulations and bureaucratic red tape.

Interventions tend to show impact much quicker and to have a higher impact as well. Self-selecting activities such as loans and savings schemes work better as the beneficiaries work more closely together and have a higher motivation for success. Also, the incomes generated by the beneficiaries, even the poor, tend to be more significant than in rural areas.

3.2.9.3 Political Risk

The political risk profile of urban interventions is much higher than in rural areas. In rural areas the ruling political party tends to be the only force, whereas in urban areas opposition parties are more visible, and the population tends to be seen by authorities as supporting the opposition. The bureaucracy in urban areas is increasingly politicised and security agents are much more influential as they are used to keep a check on urban discontent. Also, community groups such as residents associations and volunteers used as facilitators are not always politically neutral, and a 'wrong' association with them can derail a well-intentioned programme. It is necessary to adopt a strictly non-political stance in programming. By being apolitical, NGOs can work with stakeholders of all political persuasions, and have the legitimacy to resist undue political pressure and interference.

3.2.9.4 Implications for Programming

The experience of the JI suggests that NGOs have to change their mindsets, approaches and practises to operate successfully in urban areas. For one, the professionalism of the staff who operate in urban projects has to be high. They need to deploy capable, mature staff to deal with the more complex operating environment. Timeliness is critical for success, activities should be on time, and meetings should be as short as possible. Also, beneficiaries have to be processed in relatively small groups.

Organisations have to develop robust, effective organisational systems. Planning should be good, and execution effective. Monitoring and evaluation should be supported by sound records.

4.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This mid-term review has shown that, despite the problems experienced at the start of the programme, the JIG has made considerable progress in addressing the priority needs of the urban poor and vulnerable groups. At the same time, important lessons have been learnt by all the partners. As more visible outputs of the interventions begin to show on the ground, the JIG consortium approach may serve as a model for others both from the perspective of the implementing agencies as from the donor group. We therefore strongly urge the partners to document their methodologies and experiences so that they can become available to others in the future.

We were highly impressed by the progress the programme has made to date and the impact it is already having on the lives of the beneficiaries. We strongly recommend the donor group to continue supporting the programme and, funds permitting, enable the partners to scale it up to cover more urban communities in the six towns and elsewhere.

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Joint Donor Annual Review of the NGO Joint Initiative for Urban Zimbabwe Community Based Support for Vulnerable Populations

The objective

The main object is to review the progress of the NGO Joint Initiative programme against milestones and outputs outlined in the JI log frame (Annex 1).

The second objective is to look at wider programmatic issues relating to the management and operation of the programme, the appropriateness of interventions and the targeting.

Scope

The review should address the following questions and provide basis/recommendations for decision making with regards the continuation of the programme.

- **The consortium** – The review should assess the benefits and added value of the consortium approach. What are the synergies between and within partner organisations? To what extent is there cross-institutional lesson learning? Does this approach provide value for money? Are the management arrangements functional?
- **Shelter** – The review should assess the extent to which this intervention is seen to be within a humanitarian context and meet the requirements of humanitarian assistance. How is the consortium linking up with wider debate within IOM, and UN working groups? What learning is going on? How is the JI intervention targeted? Are there links with city authorities ensuring security of tenure for target beneficiaries?
- **Project implementation and operating space** – Assess the rate of implementation as compared to the approved project proposal and lessons learnt by JI partners about the differences of working in urban areas versus rural.
- **Political** – Assess to what extent the risks from the present political context to urban programming, bearing in mind the fact that urban areas are political hot beds, have been taken into account and strategically responded to. Assess the extent to which political interference has affected programme targeting and implementation.
- **Targeting** – Has it been in line with the approved project proposal and the humanitarian agenda. What have been the key gaps, who we are missing and what can we do to improve. How effective are the targeting and M&E frameworks being used within the JI and what are their complementarities with other urban databases?

- **The donor group** – Assess the funding mechanism and the extent to which we can improve our pooling of funds.
- **Co-ordination** – Assess to what extent the JIG is coordinating its programme activities, taking into account the individual organisations’ comparative advantages and cost-benefit and effectiveness gains from coordination, linking up with other urban initiatives, UN working groups, residents associations and relevant ministries etc...
- **Appropriateness** - Assess whether the response is commensurate with needs. Where are the gaps? Are the project interventions providing holistic support and to what extent are they strengthening community coping mechanisms?

Methodology

The methodology should include but not be limited to the following;

- Conducting meetings with JI partners. Mercy Corps is the primary contact point.
- Conducting meetings with members of the Donor group as appropriate.
- Conducting field visits.
- Reviewing relevant documentation.

Reporting

The consultant will produce a report of the review (no more than 30 pages long) which should be presented to the donor group and JI partners. The report should clearly show progress against logframe goals as well as provide recommendations for the remainder of the programme.

The consultants will also give a short debriefing presentation to the donor group and JI partners at the end of the in-country visit. The presentation should highlight the key issues from the visit and provide recommendations on the appropriateness of a second phase.

Timeframe

The consultancy will take place 21 May and 1 June 2007, with no more than 5-8 days per consultant to be agreed with the contracts officer.

Management

The consultant’s main contact person is Bill Patterson, the donor group representative, and will work closely with the Jonathan Napier (NGO JI Programme Manager) in Mercy Corps.

Team Composition

Given the broad scope and different interventions within the JI, it is important to engage a multi-disciplinary team of experts (2-3 people) who can adequately address the issues raised above.

Consultant should have the following expertise:

- Social Development
- Institutional/governance
- Livelihoods (with strong urban experience).

Background

Urban vulnerability has deepened over the past five years. Unemployment is now over 80%, inflation is over 1400% and access to basic commodities continues to be problematic for most households making it increasingly difficult for urban households to cope. Government policies such as Operation Murambatsvina left 700,000 people homeless and decimated small and medium enterprises which had provided many households with a viable income. Municipal services such as water and electricity supply as well as basic health services are declining and many households are struggling to meet basic needs. The HIV/AIDS epidemic provides an added challenge for urban populations and continues to strain coping mechanisms. In late 2005, spurred by political and economic developments, seven international non-governmental organisations (iNGOs) decided to strategically combine their capacities and resources in order to address the acute needs of vulnerable groups in urban areas of Zimbabwe. These seven agencies collectively referred to as the Joint Initiative Group (“JIG”), are Africare, CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Oxfam GB, Practical Action, Save the Children UK and Mercy Corps.

The JIG developed a programme called the NGO Joint Initiative for urban Zimbabwe which is a co-ordinated humanitarian response to address the short and medium-term needs of highly vulnerable urban communities through integrated programming. The over-arching goal of the Joint Initiative for Urban Zimbabwe (JI) is to **restore dignity and reduce suffering for the most vulnerable in urban and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe.**

The programme began in May 2006 and is assisting up to 12,000 vulnerable urban HHs. The members of the JIG work together in a unique collaboration, utilising their respective organisational strengths and in-country networks to provide needed assistance in a variety of sectors including livelihood support, food security, social and child protection, HIV/AIDS, shelter and education. Child protection considerations have been integrated into the programme and JIG partners have been adequately trained thus ensuring that vulnerable populations have increased access to priority needs and services.

Members of the JIG are committed to principles of implementation that include an integrated, community-based approach to support the most vulnerable; a focus on enhancing local coping mechanisms; and a dedication to high-quality, cost-effective implementation

[Appendix 2 Removed]

Appendix 3: Consultants' Schedule of Work

Day	Date	0800-1000	1000-1230	1400-1500	1530-1700	
1	Monday 21/05/07	Meetings with JI NGO Partners: (i) Africare, (ii) Oxfam (GB), (iii) Catholic Relief Services, (iv) CARE, (v) Save the Children (UK), (vi) Mercy Corps (vii) Practical Action				
2	Tuesday 22/05/07	Interviewing beneficiaries in Mbare, Harare (shelter, livelihoods, food)		Interviewing beneficiaries in St. Mary's, Chitungwiza (livelihoods, shelter, education)		
3	Wednesday 23/05/07	Consultant 1 travels to Gweru		Gweru: Interviewing beneficiaries in Mkoba, Mtapa, Mambo and Senga (food, shelter, HIV/AIDS)		
		Consultant 2 travels to Mutare		Mutare: Meetings with local implementing NGO partners (ASAP, Practical Action, DOMCCP)		
4	Thursday 24/05/07	Consultant 1 – Gweru: (i) Interviewing beneficiaries in Gweru (ii) Meet with Gweru City Council officials		Consultants travel back to Harare in the afternoon		
		Consultant 2 – Mutare: (i) Interviewing beneficiaries in Sakubva (ii) Meet with City Council officials (iii) Meet with Ministry of Education officials				
5	Friday 25/05/07	Interview JI Programme Manager at Mercy Corps (Public Holiday)				
6	Monday 28/05/07	Interviewing local implementing NGO partners in Harare: ZPT and EFZ		1400-1600 Interviewing Chitungwiza Town Council officials		
7	Tuesday 29/05/07	0800-0900 DFID	0930-1030 USAID	1100-1200 Norwegian Embassy	1400-1500 SIDA	1530 Consultants report preparation meeting
8	Wednesday 30/05/07	Consultants compile their reports			1500 Interview Mercy Corps Country Director	
9	Thursday 31/05/07	Preparation of Draft Report				
10	Friday 01/06/07	Consultants submit Draft Report for comments				

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