



# Evaluation of Aceh Media Reconstruction Assistance (AMRA) Programme in Indonesia

Full Report

Oxfam GB Programme Evaluation

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# ABOUT THIS EVALUATION

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

In May 2005, a programme was initiated to support reconstruction and development of media in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province destroyed by the tsunami on December 26, 2005. This programme, which was given the name Aceh Media Construction Assistance (AMRA), received funding of € 1,097,927 from Free Voice, Oxfam, ICCO, and NED. Under the coordination of Free Voice, the AMRA programme is run by Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR 68H), and Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia Daerah (KPID) – hereinafter referred to as the AMRA partners. From July through August 2006, Free Voice, in its capacity as programme coordinator, decided to carry out an external evaluation of the AMRA programme through an independent evaluator. The purpose of this evaluation was to compare the results achieved by the partners with the objectives established in the project proposal and other preparatory documents. The evaluation also aims to identify the extent to which the collaboration between the partners had created synergy to build the media in Aceh and to make recommendations for future programme implementation – including specific recommendations on implementation of Aceh's first ever direct elections of regional heads, which are scheduled to take place on December 10, 2006.

### Evaluation Purpose and Objectives

The main objective of this evaluation is to document AMRA programme results, and, based on the lessons learned during the evaluation, to make recommendations for the implementation of media programmes in Aceh in the future. These recommendations as well as focusing on programme implementation and management, also relate to network strengthening and programme proposals as a response to external issues, especially with regard to implementation of the elections of regional heads.

This evaluation also involves:

- Documenting programme implementation, including outputs, outcomes and impacts, of all AMRA partners.
- Documenting the processes and mechanisms of collaboration between AMRA partners and Free Voice.
- Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the AMRA programmes run by the each of the partners and of Free Voice as programme coordinator.
- Identifying the programme sustainability, particularly with regard to the management of 6 radio stations in various districts/municipalities of Aceh.
- Analysing the quality of local news broadcasts via KBR 68H and 6 radio stations in the AMRA network.
- Identifying and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of programme management, including the structure, and the administration and financial systems of each of the AMRA partners.

- Gathering lessons learned and recommendations for future programme implementation from AMRA partners and the evaluator, on programme design to coordination and collaboration and programme management.

## **Evaluator**

This evaluation was carried out by Wandy Nicodemus Tuturoong (Binyo), an independent media consultant with 11 years experience in the media business. As a journalist, Binyo ran and developed media programmes when working for The Asia Foundation, an international non-government organisation. Since mid-2004, Binyo has worked as an independent media consultant while editing books on humanitarian issues and democracy published by an independent publisher in Jakarta.

For the purposes of this evaluation, working alone Binyo gathered information and analysed various aspects of the AMRA programme, from programme management and coordination through impacts on the target groups. Binyo also acted as facilitator at a workshop organised to present the findings of the evaluation and gather input for future programme development.

## **Scope and Limitations of Evaluation**

The scope of this evaluation is as stated in the terms of reference prepared by Free Voice for this project evaluation. The focus of data collection and analysis in this evaluation is on programme planning, programme history, implementation, results, collaboration, and programme management, including the management of 6 radio stations under the coordination of KBR 68H. Data were gathered in Jakarta (to meet with the directors and managers of institutions running AMRA programmes) and in Aceh (to meet with programme implementers in the field and also one of the programme donors, Oxfam).

Although visits were made to all radio stations supported by AMRA, the purpose of this evaluation was not to analyse the news content of the stations in a set timeframe (to identify trends and consistency in news reports). With just one day allocated for visits to each of the stations, the evaluator could only make analyses on the basis of available data (programme transcripts from each of the stations), voice data, and reports sent by the stations to KBR 68H, which coordinates these reports for relay via satellite on the “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai” programmes.

The purpose of this evaluation is not to evaluate the performance of donors supporting the AMRA programme. However, aspects of management of donor programmes, such as coordination and so forth, that impact on programme implementation in the field, are presented as part of this report.

## **Report Lay-Out**

This report is organised into six sections. Section one, this section, is the introduction. Section two discusses the methodology of the evaluation, and section three, the purpose, goals and objectives, and approach of the AMRA programme. Section four concerns internal and external factors affecting programme results and programme management. Section five presents the key findings of the evaluation, which are arranged according to

the key aspects of the evaluation, as stated in the terms of reference for the evaluator. The final section provides a summary of programme achievements and lessons learned, as well as recommendations for future programme implementation.

## Methodology

### Summary of Evaluation Aspects

External evaluation of the AMRA programme, as stated in the terms of reference, covers the following aspects:

- *Relevance*

Since the inception of the AMRA programme, the media landscape and its needs have been influenced by social-political factors, the most important of these being the reconstruction and peacebuilding processes. The evaluation looks at the relevance of the AMRA programme in this constantly changing environment, and at the extent to which AMRA activities have contributed to achieving the purpose and objectives stated in programme documents.

- *Effectiveness*

During the course of the programme, and in response to the changing social-political environment in Aceh following the tsunami, the partners have made revisions to their activities. This evaluation looks at the results that have been achieved in the period May 2005 to June 2006. In addition, it also compares the results achieved with the objectives stated in programme documents, and looks at whether these results have kept the programmes in keeping with the overall programme goals.

- *Efficiency*

The total budget for the AMRA programme is one million euros. This evaluation measures programme efficiency in terms of financial expenditure and use of human resources related to efforts to achieve the programme goals. This evaluation is also intended to answer the question of whether financial and human resources for the AMRA programme have been used in such a way as to achieve the greatest impact. It also makes recommendations, where appropriate, on more efficient use of resources to achieve objectives. This will be done by looking at programme and financial performance at two levels: programme implementers (AMRA partners) and programme manager (Free Voice).

- *Impact*

A year since the inception of the AMRA programme, it can be concluded that in general the focus for the next, or final, year of the programme should be on AMRA programme impacts. To make this conclusion, the evaluation made analysis of impacts at the following levels:

- 1) The media landscape in Aceh, by looking at the programme impacts on AMRA partner target groups, such as the media and journalists/journalist organisations.
- 2) On audiences and target groups that benefit indirectly from the AMRA programme. Special attention is given to the accountability of each of the stations to their listeners, and to whether their editorial teams are a fair representation of the local community.
- 3) Gender analysis: Special attention is also given to women's issues as an inclusive part of programme implementation, including empowerment of women programme staff. The evaluator was required, as far as possible, to look at how

women are treated in news reports and other programmes produced by radio stations and in reportage produced by journalists who have received training from AJI under the AMRA programme.

- *Sustainability*

In a general way, this evaluation also looks at the capacity of AMRA partners, including their direct beneficiaries groups, to continue their programmes independently. The direct beneficiaries in this context are the six radio stations that receive support from the AMRA programme via KBR 68H. Here, the evaluator makes specific recommendations on the financial situation of the six stations and how they will achieve financial sustainability in the AMRA programme.

## **Evaluation Tools and Methods**

In performing this evaluation, the evaluator gathered data directly from AMRA partners, including from their implementers in the field. Before collecting data, the evaluator provided a report outline indicating what kind of information would be presented and collected from the field. Next, the evaluator requested input and recommendations from Free Voice and AMRA partners, thus making this a participatory evaluation. The advantage of this process is that it combines the technical skills and experience of the evaluator and of the programme implementers, which makes for sharper analysis and better recommendations. In the final stage of data collection, the evaluator presented the key results to AMRA partners, providing the basis for collaborative analysis and recommendation in a participatory workshop.

The evaluator employed several methods to gather data, including:

**Literature and document reviews:** The evaluator reviewed key documents, including grant agreements, routine reports, workshop proceedings, training reports, relevant internal e-mail, and various other reports. These kinds of data were used to identify programme results, develop a programme history, and get a picture of internal management systems and relations built with partners.

**Interviews:** The evaluator interviewed Free Voice management, AMRA partners and their implementers in the field, training facilitators and donors (Oxfam). Also interviewed were stakeholders involved in development of the programme from the outset, including a member of the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Bimo Nugroho).

**Program Monitoring:** The evaluator was able to carry out programme monitoring only in the context of analysing radio programmes produced by KBR 68H and the 6 radio stations supported by this programme, and during the advocacy training programme conducted by AJI in Bireuen on July 29-30, 2006, which happened to coincide with the collection of data for the evaluation.

**Workshops:** Upon completion of the data collection phase, the evaluator organised a workshop in Banda Aceh on August 1-2, 2006. With the assistance of the Free Voice Local Coordinator, this workshop helped the evaluator to clarify some of the data, and most importantly, provided input on lessons learned and recommendations for the future.

At the same time, this workshop also helped AMRA programme partners to collectively analyse their experiences to anticipate challenges facing the media in Aceh in general – which were clearly identifiable when they were able to identify the challenges facing the media and propose activities in anticipation of the direct election of regional heads on December 10, 2006.

### **List of Information Sources**

A complete list of written sources of information and interviews is provided in the appendices to this report.

### **Evaluation Schedule**

The evaluation schedule is shown below:

<b>Activity</b>	<b>No. of Days</b>	<b>Date</b>
Preparatory phase	-	Early July 2006
Field visit phase	18 days	15-30 July 2006, 3-4 August 2006
Reporting phase	10 days (including draft and final version)	5 August – 15 August
Participatory workshop for AMRA partners	3 days (1 day for preparation and 2 days for implementation)	31 July-2 August 2006
<b>Total</b>	<b>31 days</b>	

## **ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**

### **Scheme of Media Situation in Aceh**

**[Figure Removed]**

### **Background the AMRA Programme**

The tsunami that struck Aceh on December 26, 2004 had a direct impact on the media situation in Aceh in general. From the scheme above, the problems facing ‘media players’ in Aceh at that time can be identified. Journalist associations dealing with the affairs of journalists were faced with the fact that many of their members were unable to work, and that they and their families, too, were suffering trauma. On top of this was the ongoing conflict in Aceh, which led to continued violence against journalists.

The media sector was with destruction of infrastructure that left that its workers unable to work and the public in general without reliable access to information. The media regulator, in this case the newly established regional office of the Indonesian broadcasting commission, was still experiencing a lack of funds, making it increasingly difficult for it to perform its functions as regulator.

These, among others, were some of the problems facing the media in Aceh in the immediate wake of the tsunami. It was these problems that a donor consortium made up of Free Voice, Oxfam, ICCO and NED tried to address along with several of its media partners (AJI, KBR 68H, and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission or KPI) through a programme that they called Aceh Media Reconstruction Assistance or AMRA (*See Appendix V, Workshop Proceedings, for full details of the problems/challenges facing the media in Aceh after the tsunami*).

Free Voice initiated the development of this programme, after providing humanitarian aid of 10,000 euros (in collaboration with the Dutch Journalist Association, NVJ) to journalists through AJI and carrying out a brief assessment of the media situation in Aceh at that time. From there, Free Voice developed a proposal for media reconstruction in Aceh with the participation of KBR 68H and AJI, and later, on request, the Aceh office of the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPID Aceh). Due to limited funds available to Free Voice to support this sizeable programme, Free Voice sent this proposal to several international organisations. Novib/Oxfam, ICCO and NED were the organisations that subsequently declared their commitment to supporting this programme.

On May 26, 2006, the AMRA programme contract was officially signed by representatives of Free Voice, KPI, KBR 68H and AJI. The funding provided amounted to € **1,097,927**, made up of contributions from Novib/Oxfam (€ 450,380), ICCO (€ 450,055), NED (€ 41,599) and Free Voice (€ 155,893). Oxfam, ICCO and Free Voice have been parties to this contract since May 2005, and were joined by NED in June 2005. This aid was given to KBR 68H (€ 646,889), KPI (€ 25,392), AJI (€ 38,513) and Free

Voice as programme implementer (€ 386,196). The duration of the programme was to be for 20 months, from April 2005 to December 2006.

The short-term goal of the AMRA project was the reconstruction of local broadcast media in Aceh, and its long-term goal, the establishment of local embedded and sustainable media in Aceh.

In brief, the AMRA programme includes the following components:

- I. Construction and reconstruction of local radio stations (including training, technical and production assistance, and local news exchange). Implemented by KBR 68H.
- II. Capacity building assistance for the local broadcasting commission to enable it to perform its regulatory function and monitor the development and performance of the broadcast sector in Aceh. Implemented by KP and KPID Aceh.
- III. Counselling and professional training for starting and experienced local print and broadcast journalists and advocacy on the rights of media workers and press freedom in general. Also strengthening local affiliates of AJI in Aceh. Implemented by AJI in close consultation with AJI Banda Aceh and AJI Lhokseumawe.
- IV. Programme management and donor coordination, collaborative production of talkshows with NGOs for the regional programme, “Kabar Aceh. Facilitating network meetings between local radio stations and local stakeholders (such as NGOs, community groups, and others) with a view to sharing perspectives and ideas, and possibly producing collaborative programmes. Implemented by Free Voice.

The following scheme (copied from the original found in the AMRA Programme Proposal) provides a visual representation of the AMRA programme:

**[Figure Removed]**

As mentioned earlier, to manage this programme, Free Voice appointed a local coordinator to act as facilitator and liaison to ensure that the expected results are achieved. The AMRA contract (ID-1268/25905367) states that “...if the situation allows the coordinator will also initiate and jointly organize meetings between the different stakeholders that will eventually make for a strong and sustainable [both in social as well as economic aspects] network of local media in Aceh that is in tune with the society it is part of”. The coordinator works alone without the assistance of staff or the support of a local secretariat.

The initial programme design demonstrates that activities in the AMRA programme in general are highly relevant to the context of the problems facing the media in Aceh in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. This is largely because the AMRA programme is a direct response to real problems and challenges facing the media. The relevance of the AMRA programme is discussed in greater detail in the chapter on Findings (*See Appendix V, Workshop Proceedings, for full details of the AMRA Response Programme to Problems/Challenges facing the media in Aceh in the aftermath of the tsunami*).

# FINDINGS

## PROGRAM HISTORY AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

### External and Internal Situation Surrounding the Program

As its name suggests, the AMRA programme is intended as a response to the tsunami that devastated Aceh, and in particular laid waste to media infrastructure and the existence of the media in general. During the first two quarters (first three months) of 2005, the external situation facing the media community in Aceh was a reflection of any emergency situation arising as the consequence of a disaster. Donors made commitments to support reconstruction and rehabilitation in Aceh from the first quarter of 2005 (January – March 2005).

At that time the pre-AMRA programme in place, with Free Voice working in collaboration with NVJ and AJI to provide humanitarian aid to journalists and their families. At the same time, Free Voice was making an assessment and developing a basic proposal together with AJI and KBR 68H. In March 2005, AJI opened the Media Center Aceh (MCA) in Banda Aceh to assist journalists from Aceh and others locate media journalistic and general information on Aceh following the tsunami.

It was not until the second quarter that the AMRA programme was officially initiated, in May 2005, coinciding with the start of the term of office of the Free Voice Local Coordinator for this programme in Banda Aceh. Just one month later, in June 2005, KBR 68H had begun implementing its first programme – management training for station managers in Medan. This, then, gives a general picture of the internal situation of the AMRA programme in response to the external situation in the first two quarters of 2005.

This demonstrates the high degree of relevance of the AMRA programme, because it was done at the right time and with the involvement of partners that have a strategic role in media life in Aceh in general.

During the third quarter of 2005, the external situation facing the people of Aceh, as well as still displaying a post-tsunami emergency “atmosphere”, was also marked by the signing of the peace accord in Aceh between the Indonesian government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Helsinki, on August 15, 2005.

Meantime, in the AMRA internal context, several activities had been going on more or less simultaneously during the third quarter of 2005. These included basic journalism training and trauma counselling for journalists and their families in July 2005. KBR 68H meanwhile had begun the physical construction of Radio Rapeja FM and had also started distributing transistor radios to the local people to provide access to information on development in Aceh in September 2005. To manage this programme effectively, KBR 68H appointed a programme coordinator the same month. During this period, no programmes had been implemented specifically in response to the peace accord signed in Helsinki other than KBR 68H talkshows and news coverage on the special programme

“Kabar Aceh”, which is aired by several radio stations in Aceh (the most recent report for 2006 states that “Kabar Aceh” is broadcast by 25 radio stations in Aceh).

In the fourth or final quarter of 2005, when the entire media community was still concentrating on infrastructure rehabilitation and restoring their work mechanisms, the Indonesian ministry of communication and information unexpectedly issued a series of government regulations related to broadcasting in Indonesia. Unsurprisingly, this development in the external situation directly undermined the ability of KPI, and KPID in particular, as the regulator receiving support from AMRA, to play an effective role in Aceh.

However, internally, KPID itself was experiencing problems with programme implementation, largely because the KPID did not have adequate secretariat staff to support its work as regulator, and partly due to the delay in its official appointment as government media agent. On top of this were difficulties in coordination between KPI, as signatory of the contract with Free Voice, and KPID Aceh. To address this situation, Free Voice and KPI agreed to transfer programme management directly to KPID. This agreement was officially sealed with the signing of a new contract between Free Voice and KPID (not KPI) in October 2005. After the signing of this second contract, KPID programmes started to run quite smoothly, notably with the implementation of a seminar-workshop on legal aspects of broadcasting, which was followed by a licensing workshop and business due diligence studies for radio station managers in Aceh.

Still in the internal context of the AMRA programme, KBR 68H implemented a substantial number of activities in the final quarter of 2005. As well as continuing to distribute transistor radios to the public, KBR 68H also completed reconstruction of Radio Suara Indah Tapak Tuan and construction of Radio Citra Pesona in Singkil, and provided radio journalist training and in-house training at Radio Rapeja and Radio Citra Pesona. Meanwhile, AJI continued with the trauma counselling programme begun the previous quarter.

In the second quarter of 2006, there were almost no external factors that directly affected implementation of the AMRA programme in Aceh. Thus, there were no significant internal problems with programme implementation during that period. KPID did their strategic planning in February in Medan and began making an inventory of broadcasting media in the second quarter of 2006. At that time, the Free Voice Local Coordinator began performing other functions in addition to his/her coordination function, by carrying out selection of the four radio stations to receive grant funds.

Meanwhile, besides continuing to distribute transistor radios, KBR 68H undertook the reconstruction of Radio Gipsi in Langsa, Radio NaRa in Nagan Raya, and Radio Telangke FM in Gayo Lues. The training programme continued too, with internship training at KBR 68H headquarters in Jakarta and in-house training at Radio Suara Indah Tapak Tuan and Radio NaRa. AJI was only able to begin in-depth reporting in June 2006 in Meulaboh, because of technical problems arising from the fact that the budget had been calculated in dollars (instead of euros), and also because the participants were not ready to do investigative journalism, which was to have been the topic of this training.

In follow up to the signing of the Helsinki peace accord, particularly to assist in socialising this document to the public, Free Voice and KBR 68H launched a talkshow called “Aceh Damai” which has been aired as a part of the “Kabar Aceh” programme since January 2006.

In the third quarter of 2006, a significant development in the external situation occurred with the passing of the law on the governance of Aceh on 11 July 2006. There was almost no internal programme response from AMRA to this new development. But AMRA partners attending the external evaluation workshop held on 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of August 2006, did suggest that there was a need for advocacy on this law, particularly because article 125, which concerns communication and information, had the potential to threaten media freedom in Aceh.

Internally, during this quarter, AJI ran advocacy training at the end of July 2006 in Bireuen. KBR 68H ran a marketing and management and programme production capacity workshop for the managers and producers of 6 radio stations in the AMRA network. Of note was signing of an agreement by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) – an official committee set up to follow up on the Helsinki peace accord – and KBR 68H to support the distribution of transistor radios to the public. Distribution of transistor radios it was thought would facilitate and make more effective socialisation of the peace accord to the public via the media.

On the programme management side, during the same quarter, between July and August 2006, an independent evaluator was sent by Free Voice to perform an evaluation, which included a participatory evaluation workshop, and to make recommendations for future implementation of the AMRA programme.

During the last quarter of 2006, one event that AMRA should prepare for is the direct elections of regional head, which is scheduled to take place on December 10, 2006. (*See Appendix II, Programme History, for details of the internal and external factors affecting implementation of the AMRA programme*).

### **Conclusions**

- In general, AMRA programmes are highly relevant to needs and have been implemented in an appropriate timeframe, with the exception of the KPID Aceh programme, the start of which was delayed due to teething problems with the secretariat and supporting staff.
- No initiatives have been started by AMRA partners outside those agreed in the contract with Free Voice.
- External developments to which AMRA has responded include the signing of the peace accord, which was followed up by development of the talkshow “Aceh Damai”.
- An external development that has interfered with the AMRA programme run by KPID Aceh was the passing of a government regulation that “transferred” the authority of KPID Aceh as broadcast regulator.
- There has been no specific response to the law on the governance of Aceh passed on July 11, 2006, other than this event being reported by KBR 68H and its network stations.

### **Recommendations**

- A key external development that the AMRA partners should prepare for together is the direct elections of regional heads in Aceh, scheduled to take place on December 10, 2006.
- AMRA should respond to the law on the governance of Aceh, in particular by performing advocacy on article 125 of the law which concerns communication and information, which

has the potential to threaten media freedom. It is not too late for the AMRA network to monitor the preparation of the *qanan* or government regulation that will regulate this article in more detail.

- AMRA should collectively optimise its network in anticipation of external issues that affect the media in general, starting with the law on the governance of Aceh, the direct general elections of regional heads, and the government regulations on broadcasting.

## **RESULTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

### **I. Reconstruction of Local Radio by KBR 68H**

Based on the AMRA programme proposal, several of the activities under the coordination of KBR 68H aim to establish a regional connected, sustainable, independent and local embedded news network. This is to be achieved by:

- Assisting with the renovation of three damaged KBR 68H partner stations.
- Assisting with the development of three new radio stations that will become a part of the KBR 68H network.
- Supporting the Radio Support Center in Binjai to purchase and distribute transistor radios and provide grant funds as part of the technical assistance for local radio stations, including stations that are not part of the KBR 68H network (previously, these grant funds had been disbursed by Free Voice directly through its local coordinator in Banda Aceh).
- Providing equipment assistance to radio stations to enable them to broadcast regional news from KBR 68H.
- Providing technical, journalism and radio management assistance for the staff of radio stations that are members of the KBR 68H network.

In general, these programmes have been progressing quite well and have produced measurable outputs. Seen solely from the “establishment of the radio sector” perspective, several of KBR 68H’s activities have met the initial targets stated in the programme proposal. A very obvious indication of this is the establishment and operation of six radio stations built or reconstructed by KBR 68H, including Radio Rapeja FM in Aceh Jaya, Radio NaRa in Nagan Raya, Radio Suara Indah Tapak Tuan in Tapak Tuan, Radio Citra Pesona in Aceh Singkil, Radio Gipsi in Langsa, and Radio Telangke FM in Gayo Lues. Radio Telangke FM did experience a rather prolonged delay in getting on air and producing its own programmes – it finally went on air on July 24, 2006 and started producing local programmes on August 1, 2006. But this was more to do with delay in getting electricity and a phone line installed in the Radio Telangke FM office, which is located on a hill several dozen metres from the main road.

The advent of these local radio stations, coupled with the distribution of 29,925 transistor radios to people in several areas of Aceh, produced the tangible outcome of opening up access to independent information to the people of Aceh. Likewise, the new programmes and regional talkshows, “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai”, which are produced by KBR 68H and aired by all members of its network in Aceh, have brought strong local colour to news of Aceh. The existence of these new broadcast media have also had an impact on the availability of opportunities for the people of Aceh to participate meaningfully in the development and peacebuilding process in this region – although whether these opportunities are used to the full requires further research.

However, these stations are still having technical problems, such as those experienced by Radio Suara Indah Tapak Tuan and Radio Rapeja. These two stations have had to go off air as a result of transmitter-related damage. There were two reasons for this. First, the

lack of experienced technical staff at these two new stations, which means that technicians have to be brought in from Banda Aceh or Medan. Second, a problem specific to Radio Rapeja, is the limited supply of electricity in Lamno (blackouts from morning on), which means that this station has to rely on an electricity generator from morning to evening.

Yet, if seen from “the quality programmes and local news” perspective, which should be an outcome of the editorial training programmes, KBR 68H still has to give more direction to these new stations. So far, there is no rating of radio journalists – at least not in the world of radio journalism in Indonesia – that could be used to determine the quality of journalists that have received training from KBR 68H. Therefore, the yardstick for quality of radio news focuses more on the content. It is on this basis, despite all its limitations, that evaluation of “the quality of programmes and local news” was made (*Analysis of the Content of Local News from the six stations supported by AMRA is presented separately in another section of this report*).

Through its various training activities – from radio station management workshops, management and marketing training for radio stations, radio journalism training, and radio programme production training, though in-house training at each of the stations and internship training at KBR 68H – there has been an increase in the capacity to manage radio stations and produce various kinds of programmes. However, like any other educational process, these will take time and intensive and repetitive experimentation before they meet the standards of good radio management and radio journalism. The overall impact of these training activities has been an improvement in the quality of journalism and of the radio stations sending staff to these training activities. There is, however, still room for improvement. (*Details of the outputs-outcomes-impacts of KBR 68H activities are presented in Appendix 1, Impacts*).

### **Conclusions**

- From the infrastructure or hardware perspective of “establishment of the radio sector”, several of KBR 68H’s programmes have met the initial targets stated in the programme proposal. Evidence of this is the establishment and operation of six radio stations under its coordination.
- The advent of these new stations, coupled with the distribution of transistor radios, especially in radio blank spots, has provided local people access to independent information.
- The technical problem of maintenance of broadcast equipment is one facing all these new radio stations.
- Although most have participated in training provided by KBR 68H, the quality of local news produced by the journalists of these new stations needs to be improved.

### **Recommendations**

- The focus of programme implementation for KBR 68H for the coming period should be on improving the quality of the reportage produced by the radio journalists at the six stations in Aceh.
- KBR 68H should prepare clear parameters for measuring the quality of radio journalism, both in terms of content analysis and journalism skills.
- Efforts should be made to build the capacity of radio technicians in Aceh, among others through internships, in-house training, and sharing of experience among the six radio stations.

## **II. Counselling, Training and Advocacy by AJI**

Somewhat different from KBR 68H, in the AMRA programme proposal the programmes run by AJI focus more on empowering journalists in Aceh. This empowerment is not limited to efforts to develop the professionalism of journalists, but also involves raising the spirits of journalists in Aceh and their families, who are still traumatised as a result of the tsunami, and enabling journalists to speak up about the frequent violence they continue to be subjected to as a legacy of the prolonged conflict in this region.

In the AMRA programme proposal, the main objective of the AMRA programme run by AJI is to provide counselling and professional training for starting and experienced local print and broadcast journalists and advocate the rights of media workers and press freedom in general. This programme also aims to strengthen the existing local affiliates of AJI in Aceh. These objectives are to be achieved through:

- Trauma counselling
- Basic journalism training
- Training in investigative reporting (which was later replaced by training in in-depth reporting because the participants were not ready for training in investigative reporting)
- Advocacy training and handling of cases

From the output side, implementation of several AJI activities has been going quite well. Only the training in investigative reporting was not implemented, in view of the results of an evaluation performed by AJI indicating that most of journalists in Aceh lacked basic journalism skills and were still accustomed to reporting talking news – turning people's opinions into news without any regard for balance of resources. Training in in-depth reporting was chosen as replacement to enable journalists' to make better analysis of issues in Aceh.

As facilitator of trauma counselling for journalists, AJI had some difficulties getting journalists – most of whom are men – to participate in this important activity. This is because they are ashamed to admit that they are suffering trauma. As a result most of the participants in the trauma counselling programme are women who are relatives of journalists.

Another activity that AJI has not been able to implement yet is management of cases related to advocacy activities. This is because the AJI advocacy training did not take place until July 29-30, 2006 in Bireun – coinciding with the data collection for the external evaluation of the AMRA programme.

In terms of outcomes, the trauma counselling has had some fairly positive results. Run in collaboration with a foundation that has experience in dealing with cases of trauma, this programme takes a fairly systematic approach, starting from exploring problems and emotions, group counselling and various types of therapy, through to holistic relaxation (of muscles, senses and emotions), hypnosis, and assist therapy or nerve assist. From qualitative perspective, monitoring using questionnaires, focus group discussions and direct observations indicates positive results. Overall qualitative improvement is

indicated by the self-assessment score, which averaged 7.89 at the first monitoring, 8.04 at the second, 8.19 at the third, and 8.22 at the fourth (the higher the score, the better). (See Appendix VI, *Self Assessment Profile*, for more details).

These positive results have had a direct impact, enabling the participants to resume their normal lives and do activities, including work.

The outcome of the journalism training – both the basic journalism training and the training in in-depth reporting – which involved bringing in experienced facilitators from Jakarta, has been an improvement in basic journalism skills and in the ability of some participants to prepare reportage plans – at least that is what the sample plans made by the training participants indicate.

AJI has a fairly good system for monitoring training participants, which involved mentoring by a facilitator for two months after the training, via fax and internet. Around twenty journalists who participated in training routinely send their articles to their mentors for assessment. The problem is that not all journalists have access to fax and the internet, so mentoring and monitoring is not possible for all participants.

Training of this kind can only have an indirect impact – an improvement in the quality of the journalism of participants who take part in the training. And it has a direct positive impact for the media employing these journalist – although internal problems facing the media often reduce this impact. To improve the quality of journalism in general in Aceh, having one or two training sessions like these is not enough. Creative ways of collectively creating a culture of good journalism need to be explored.

The outcomes of the advocacy training are increased knowledge of the key steps involved in advocacy and identification of the violence and criminality to which journalists in Aceh are subjected. Attacks on journalists have often been kept quiet because the two parties involved – the journalist and the attackers – have chosen to “make peace”. And although no cases have yet been handled within the context of the AMRA programme, it has at least had the impact of raising awareness of systematically advocating issues. The training participants have even set up the beginnings of a journalist advocacy network for Aceh. Another impact of this activity is that AJI has transferred and improved the organising skills of AJI Lhokseumawe as implementer of this programme (See Appendix I, *Impacts, for details of outputs-outcomes-impacts of AJI activities*).

### **Conclusions**

- In general, AJI activities in the context of AMRA have run as planned, with the exception of the training in investigative journalism which was replaced by training in in-depth reporting due to the lack of qualifications of the participants.
- The trauma counselling programme has had positive qualitative results for its participants. But AJI has had difficulties getting men journalists to take part in the trauma counselling programme because they are ashamed to admit that men can suffer trauma too.
- The training programmes implemented by AJI adopt good methodologies, from implementation through performance evaluation of the participants. But attention still needs to be given to improving the quality of journalism in Aceh in general.

- Through the advocacy training programme, AJI has been able to create an embryo Aceh journalists' advocacy network and at the same time transfer and improve the skills of AJI Lhokseumawe.

### **Recommendations**

- In the context of improving the quality of journalism in general in Aceh, as well as continuing with capacity building programmes for local journalists, AJI should campaign for professionalism and a press code of ethics.
- AJI should monitor the mental health of men journalists, who generally do not want to participate in the trauma counselling programme.
- AJI should forge more linkages between the Aceh journalists' advocacy network and experts and legal advisors in Aceh to optimise its advocacy work.

### **III. Capacity Building by KPID**

The KPID portion of the AMRA programme is basically to do with optimising its role as broadcast regulator in Aceh. The programme proposal states that the goal is to provide capacity building for the local broadcast commission with the aim of enabling the local Independent Broadcast Commission of Aceh (IBC NAD or KPID NAD) to regulate and monitor the development and performance of the local broadcast sector in Aceh. This goal is to be achieved through:

- Performing monthly monitoring of the development of radio stations and analysis of their content
- Holding seminars on broadcast regulators
- Performing due diligence studies of radio stations destroyed by the tsunami (including mapping their ownership, in view of the fact that several broadcast license holders have passed away)
- Developing and implementing regulation procedures
- Developing a strategic fundraising plan

Up to October 2005, as mentioned in the section on programme history, KPID was unable to run its programmes. The delay in the inauguration of KPID by regional government and the lack of secretariat support were the main reasons for this. Another reason was the complexities of the administrative coordination between KPI (as signatory of the AMRA contract) and KPID as programme implementer. However, this problem was solved in October 2005 with the signing of a new contract giving KPID the authority to manage AMRA programme funds directly without having to go through KPI. A month after the signing of this second contract, KPID had begun its first activity under the AMRA programme – a seminar/workshop on the legal aspects of broadcasting following the tsunami, and a licensing and business due diligence study simulation workshop for broadcast institutions (business, private sector, and community).

From the output side, since November 2005, KPID programmes have been running quite smoothly. The seminar/workshop and seminar, both on regulation of the broadcast sector, were attended by representatives of broadcast institutions, including several new radio stations that do not yet have licences. The strategic planning and inventorying of broadcast institutions in Aceh also went ahead without any serious hitches.

In terms of outcomes, the initial KPID activities related to regulation, especially licensing, have created an understanding of the licensing process and the procedures for performing a due diligence study among the participants of the seminar/workshop and workshop – and this only when the workshop, which was a follow up to the seminar/workshop, was implemented. The problem was that many of the participants from the broadcast media did not understand the Law on Broadcasting (No. 32/2002). In addition, the broadcast regulators – KPID, the Monitoring Agency (*Balai Monitoring*), the office of communications (*Dinas Perhubungan*) and Radio Republic Indonesia (RRI) Banda Aceh – had made an agreement to work together to address the problems facing broadcast institutions.

In the strategic planning context, KPID has produced a strategic plan to form the basis of its work in the long-term. Inventorying of broadcast institutions in Aceh has provided KPID the basic data to formulate and prepare broadcast sector policies that are based on accurate information.

However, the impact of the programmes implemented by KPID has been limited to socialisation and recognition of its role as regulator and some improvement in its organisational capacity, especially in terms of efficiency of information and data management. Direct impacts, such as making it easier for broadcast media to obtain licenses is something that some of the new stations, including those supported by AMRA, would like to see – although KPID does say that it is trying to make the procedure less complicated.

But KPID is not entirely to blame for the problem, bearing in mind that the capacity of its secretariat is limited since it is supported by just two staff. Then there was the government regulation on broadcast institutions issued by the Ministry of Communication and Information at the end of 2005, which “trimmed” the authority of KPI and KPID as regulators. This obviously made KPID nervous about expanding its role. For example, KPID was unable to do much when Radio Suara Perempuan was “closed up” by the Monitoring Agency in mid July 2006 for not having a frequency licence – despite the fact that from the point of view of the content of its broadcasts, this radio station has the potential to play a media role in the context of good governance.

With all its limitations, KPID needs support from civil society and the media sector in Aceh in general, including the AMRA network, to support its advocacy and optimise its role as democratically elected and public service oriented broadcast regulator.

### **Conclusions**

- KPID programmes began to run smoothly after the signing of a second contract with Free Voice under which KPID itself assumes responsibility for the administrative and financial management of the programmes.
- Through seminar/workshop and workshop activities, KPID has provided the owners of new radio stations an understanding of the licensing process and business due diligence studies. But new stations, including those supported by AMRA, continue to complain that it is not easy to obtain a licence.
- Government regulations on broadcasting issued in 2005 “trimmed” the authority of KPI and KPID, leaving them unable to do much when Radio Suara Perempuan was “closed up” by the Monitoring Agency.

### **Recommendations**

- KPID should collaborate with media institutions in Aceh, especially those in the AMRA network, to get support for strengthening its role as broadcast regulator.
- KPID should open up dialogue with the owners of new radio stations in Aceh who feel it is difficult to meet the licensing conditions, and find a joint solution to this problem.

### **IV. Programme Management, Distribution of Transistor Radios, and Administration of Grant Funds by Free Voice**

The main activities performed by Free Voice in the AMRA programme aim to support the creation of sustainable and local embedded, independent media in Aceh. This is to be achieved through:

- Programme management
- Distribution of transistor radios
- Administration of grant funds
- Collaborative production of a talkshow involving local NGOs and radio stations (This programme subsequently became a part of the regional programme “Kabar Aceh” produced by KBR 68H, which is for the exchange of opinions and ideas to provide the public debate on issues surrounding reconstruction and the social-political climate in Aceh).

Under this programme, some activities receive direct support from KBR 68H, notably the distribution of transistor radios and collaborative production of the talkshow “Aceh Damai” which is slotted in to the “Kabar Aceh” programme (most of the information on this can be found elsewhere in this report in the sections on distribution of transistor radios by KBR 68H and analysis of the content of news on local radio programmes). Administration of grant funds, which under the programme proposal were to have been given to KBR 68H, has not been realised yet. So far, the Free Voice Local Coordinator in Banda Aceh has completed the selection process, but the funds have yet to be disbursed. The four radio stations selected as recipients of grand funds are Radio Nakata in Lhoksukon, Radio Getsu Nada in Bireuen, Radio Aceh News FM in Aceh Besar, and Radio Askar Kencana in Sigli.

Should this grant fund programme go ahead, it is expected that this activity will support the goals of programmes implemented through other activities run by KBR 68H, particularly on in terms of outcome (availability of quality regional information and news for the people of Aceh) and impact (providing the people of Aceh more opportunities to actively participate in the development and peacebuilding processes in their area).

In terms of output, the Aceh Damai programme has been aired once a week by 25 radio stations throughout Aceh. Its outcome has been the dissemination of information on the content and consequences of the Helsinki peace accord signed by the Indonesian government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka on August 15, 2005. This programme has also had the direct impact of boosting support for the peace process in Aceh through discourse and debate developed and broadcast via this programme. Feedback received by KBR 68H via SMS, phone, and direct comment is evidence of this. (*More on “Aceh Damai”, which is a part of the “Kabar Aceh” programme, is discussed in the Analysis of the Content of News section of this report*).

Programme management by Free Voice will be discussed in a separate section on Programme Management.

**Conclusions**

- Distribution of transistor radios and production of the talkshow “Aceh Damai” receive direct support from KBR 68H, and have been running smoothly.
- Selection of the recipients of grant funds has been completed, but the funds have yet to be disbursed.

**Recommendations**

- As well as disbursing the grant funds, Free Voice should clarify the division of roles with KBR 68H, which in the programme proposal is designated the party responsible for the administration of this programme.

## **ASPECTS OF EVALUATION**

### **I. Relevance**

The relevance of the AMRA programme in general will be analysed using four main indicators:

- The programme is designed to respond to real problems and challenges
- The programme is flexible to changes in conditions and the social context
- Programme design is participatory
- The majority of beneficiaries are local people

Looking at the history of the AMRA programme, each of the activities carried out by the partners has proven that this programme is designed to respond to problems or challenges that arose in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami on December 26, 2004. The trauma counselling programmes and the training offered by AJI, the construction and reconstruction of radio stations by KBR 68H, the institutional strengthening of KPID as broadcast regulator, and the management functions performed by Free Voice did not simply emerge without any analysis of real needs.

The programme has also proven flexible. On the approval of Free Voice, AJI changed the plan to provide training in investigative journalism to training in in-depth reporting based on contextual analysis of the readiness of the participants. In the case of KBR 68H, the addition of the “Aceh Damai” talkshow programme is an example of a flexible response to the signing of the peace accord between the Indonesian government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. Another example of the flexibility of the programme was the signing of the second contract between KPID and Free Voice that allowed KPID to manage the financial and administrative aspects of the programme without having to go through KPI. All this was done on the approval of Free Voice as overall programme manager.

In the context of programme design, design of all the activity programmes of AJI, KBR 68H, and KPID was participatory and coordinated with Free Voice, which then consolidated them into the AMRA Programme Proposal.

The beneficiaries of the AMRA programme – of the training and trauma counselling by AJI, of the construction of radio stations and distribution of transistor radios by KBR 68H, of the activities supported by KPID as regulator, and even of the grant fund programme managed by Free Voice – are for the most part the people of Aceh. But as to its effectiveness, this will be discussed in a separate section.

### **Conclusions**

- The AMRA programmes run by the AMRA partners have high relevance because they were planned in response to real problems, are flexible to changing conditions, were designed in a participatory way, and have local people as their main beneficiaries.

### **Recommendations**

- (The evaluator has no specific recommendations concerning the relevance of the programme, except to keep up the responsive, flexible, participatory approach and make continuous internal evaluation to ensure that the main beneficiaries are local people).

## **II. Effectiveness**

The main indicators for analysing this aspect are:

- The programme has clear target groups
- Programme results are measurable
- The programmes are implemented within the agreed timeframe
- The programme adopts appropriate methodologies

In terms of target groups, all AMRA partners have clear and appropriate target groups as the parties that are expected to obtain the greatest benefit from the various AMRA programmes. However, not many men participated in the trauma counselling programme by AJI (see the section on Results and Achievements for more details). Likewise, in terms of the measurability of programme results, as shown in the section on Results and Achievements, all the activities have had outputs, outcomes and impacts, although varying in breadth and depth.

Regarding the timeframe for programme implementation, it was only KPID whose entire programme was delayed for any significant length of time (this is also discussed in the section on Results and Achievements). Other than that, in general, the programmes organised by AJI and KBR 68H have run according to plan. One or two programmes suffered delays, such as the advocacy training by AJI which held up because of a delay in instalment of funds from Free Voice due to an error in the calculation of the activity budget, which should have been translated from rupiahs to euros but was mistakenly translated from rupiahs to US dollars. Another delay was in the operation of Radio Telangke FM in Gayo Lues under the coordination of KBR 68H. The reason for this delay was due to difficulties getting electricity and telephone connections installed in the Radio Telangke FM building, which is situated on a hill several dozen metres from the main road.

As far as methodology is concerned, AJI, KBR 68H, KPID and Free Voice – which performed the selection of recipients of grant funds – have each adopted fairly systematic methodologies to implement their programmes in general. AJI has a system of post-training monitoring of its journalism training programmes. KBR 68H exercises control of news reporting and monitors the marketing action plans of the six radio stations under its coordination. Similarly, KPID, with the data it has on broadcast institutions, will be able to design broadcast regulations that are based on accurate field data. Free Voice itself has developed criteria for grant fund recipients – although the funds have yet to be disbursed.

Nevertheless, there are ways – which are also discussed in the section on Results and Achievements – to better optimise the methods for achieving results, especially for raising the quality of radio journalism in the case of KBR 68H, and to smooth the licensing process for new radio stations in the case of KPID.

### **Conclusions**

- The AMRA programmes have been running quite effectively, because they have clear target groups, programme results are measurable, most have run within the agreed timeframe, and they adopt quite good methodologies.

### **Recommendations**

- (As per the recommendations in the section on Results and Achievements, KBR 68H should develop criteria for assessing the quality of radio journalists, and there is a need for dialogue between KPID and the managers of new radio stations in Aceh to facilitate the licensing process for these stations).

### **III. Efficiency**

The indicators for analysing efficiency are:

- Maximum use of the AMRA network
- Optimal use of local capacities
- Creative use of budget
- Cost-efficient use of media or alternative facilities

On average, AJI, KBR 68H and KPID do not make optimal use of AMRA networks to support the activity programmes they are running. AJI networks only with AJI affiliates in other cities from its headquarters. Likewise, KPID and KBR 68H make more use of their own internal networks. Free Voice, as liaison between the partners tends to deal with the partners individually rather than collectively. The reason given for this is that during the first year the focus of the programme was on infrastructure and hardware construction and reconstruction – as the name, Aceh Media Reconstruction Assistance, suggests.

However, in terms of use of local capacities, AJI, KBR 68H and primarily KPID have started to rely on Aceh human resources to support their programmes. AJI and KBR 68H are still experiencing difficulties making optimal use of local facilitators for their training activities. The reason is that the training participants tend to respect facilitators from Jakarta more than they do local facilitators, many of whom they already know. KPID, on the other hand, consists of people chose for their authority in the broadcasting sector. In the case of Free Voice, the criteria for provision of grant funds were designed by the Local Coordinator, who is a native of Aceh.

Unfortunately, as far as creative use of budget is concerned, information gathered from the field and the evaluation workshop was insufficient to indicate whether or not the partners had done as much as they could in this area. Nevertheless, KBR 68H did say that efficient use had been made of funds as the result of guidance given to the radio stations under its coordination for streamlining their organisations.

Similarly, not much information was obtained regarding the cost-effective use of media or alternative facilities. KBR 68H made efficient use of the Radio Support Center in Binjai for the distribution of radio equipment and transistor radios. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, which destroyed key infrastructure and damaged transportation routes in Aceh, sending radio equipment to locations around Aceh could be very costly. Though the support centre, equipment could be dispatched in a more systematic manner, thus keeping costs down.

### **Conclusions**

- Although optimal use has been made of local capacities, in general the AMRA programme has not shown to be efficient, primarily because optimal use is not made of its network, more creative use could be made of budget, and cost-efficient use is not made of media or alternative facilities – except in the case of KBR 68H.

### **Recommendations**

- Each of the AMRA partners should be encouraged to be more efficient by making optimal use of the AMRA network, being creative in their use of budget, and making cost-efficient use of media and alternative facilities. This could be done by Free Voice, by, for example requesting that these efficiency indicators be included in the reports of each of the partners.

## **IV. Impact**

The indicators used to analyse the impact of the AMRA programme are:

- Has direct impact on the target group
- Has impacts on the media community and the general public
- Has impacts and special focus on women's issues
- Leaves footprints

In terms of direct impact on target groups, all AMRA partners have fulfilled this indicator. The participants of the training and trauma counselling programmes by AJI, participants of the training for managers of radio stations in Aceh by KBR 68H, and participants of the KPID seminar/workshops and workshops have all felt a direct impact from the AMRA programmes.

AMRA programmes have had impacts on the media community, too, since their target is the media community, either journalists or radio managers. KBR 68H programmes have had the most concrete impact on the general public because the advent of radio media in blankspot locations has given local communities access to independent, local information. In the case of the training programmes for journalists run by AJI, however, it is very difficult to measure the breadth of their impact on the general public. Obviously, building the capacity of journalists will improve the quality of journalism in general, which in turn will impact on the lives of people as media consumers. The KPID programmes are not designed to have any impact outside their target group.

The weakest aspect here is the impact and focus on women's issues. AJI is faced with the unique problem of there being few women journalists that it can invite to join in the AJI training. However, most of the participants on the AJI trauma counselling programme were women and they felt that the programme was very beneficial. KBR 68H, although teaching about discrimination in its journalism training programmes, provides no specific training on gender perspective reporting to the radio stations under its coordination. If the stations air women's programmes, they do so on their own initiative and not as part of the KBR 68H programme design (the profiles of the radio stations supported by the AMRA programme are analysed in a separate section). Similarly, the KPID programmes are not specifically designed to target women.

As for footprints, the one that people most easily recall is the construction of radio stations in Aceh and their local programmes, which are part of the KBR 68H programme. AJI has left several clear footprints, too, such as the establishment of the Aceh Media Center, books published after training courses, and the advocacy network for media reporters. There is only one footprint for KPID – the post-tsunami database of broadcast institutions in Aceh.

### **Conclusions**

- The impact of the AMRA programmes has been felt by the target groups, the media community, and to some extent, the general public. In addition are the footprints left behind by each of the AMARA partners after their programmes have ended.
- However, the impact and focus of the AMRA programmes on women's issues is seriously lacking.

### **Recommendations**

- The AMRA partners should place special focus on women's issues, among others by making activity attendance records that tag women participants for gender perspective reporting

## **V. Sustainability**

The indicators used to analyse sustainability are:

- Able to or has the potential to be self-sustainable
- Has sustainable programmes (even without donors)
- Has competent human resources
- Has good resources support network

In terms of the potential to be self-sustainable, each of the AMRA partners has this, especially KBR 68H, which is in fact already self-sustainable. KPID as a state institution also has its own operational budget, although it does have weaknesses in terms of programme development. AJI, especially in Banda Aceh, has its own secretariat and has introduced members' fees, which, although not sufficient to support its programmes is the most obvious indication of its potential to be self-sustainable. Radio stations under the coordination of KBR 68H, too, in general have this potential – although several are still weak in this respect (the profiles of these radio stations are analysed in separate section of this report).

But, as to whether the AMRA programmes are sustainable without donor support, in the context of AJI, it is not easy to say. So far, the AJI training programmes have relied entirely on donor support. However, facilitators at AJI Banda Aceh also open up the possibility of offering free training organised by campus press. For KBR 68H, even without donors, its radio programmes will continue to be produced as a part of its public responsibility. KPID to has to continue running its “traditional programmes” as regulator, as a consequence of being a state institution, in spite of its limited resources.

The AMRA partners each have fairly good quality resources. In fact, in the context of AJI, AJI has begun transferring skills and experience to AJI Banda Aceh. However, both AJI and KBR 68H still need to do capacity building to improve the quality of journalism

as a whole. But in the context of sustainability this would not be enough, because what is needed is the capacity to manage programmes effectively.

Another plus is that each the AMRA partners – AJI, KBR 68H and KPID – has linkages with networks of national organisations. AJI Banda Aceh and AJI Lhokseumawe are part of the AJI Indonesia network, KBR 68H has a network of more than 400 radio stations throughout Indonesia, and KPID is affiliated with its umbrella organisation, KPI in Jakarta.

### **Conclusions**

- In general, the AMRA partners have the ability and potential to be self-sufficient because they are supported by fairly good human and other resources. However, the AMRA partners have not made optimal use of the “AMRA network” itself to strengthen their sustainability.

### **Recommendations**

- The AMRA partners should be encouraged to make optimal use of the “AMRA network” to enable them to manage opportunities to collectively run programmes, for example in the context of the elections of regional heads, to strengthen their sustainability.

## **VI. Coordination/Collaboration**

The indicators used to analyse this aspect are:

- Routine meetings are convened
- There is exchange of information (face to face or via any available media)
- Does collective planning in anticipation of changes in the social context
- Has a tagline that symbolically binds all the partners

At the very start of the programme, on May 3, 2005, Free Voice convened a meeting with all AMRA partners to ensure the smooth running of the programme. A year later, in around May 2006, a meeting facilitated by Free Voice was held to strengthen the collaboration among the partners. To facilitate exchange of information, the Free Voice Local Coordinator also acted as liaison among the partners in the field, particularly in the context of programme administration and implementation.

However, more intensive meetings to discuss the response of the network as a whole to external issues emerging in Aceh have not been held. As key stakeholders in media development, especially in the area of press freedom, in Aceh, the AMRA network is a very strategic force. If the AMRA network could consolidate and voice its interests collectively, the impact would be significant in the social-political context in Aceh.

Moreover, exchange of information between partners tends to be between individuals. As an example, several of the radio stations under KBR 68H have had contact with KPID, although purely in the context of communication between a broadcast institution and the broadcast regulator. Another example is the “Aceh Damai” programme, which was a response by KBR 68H and Free Voice to the signing of the peace accord in Helsinki. But this plan did not involve the KPID or AJI institutions, which are also part of the AMRA network.

A slogan or motto that symbolically binds the AMRA network, even a name for the network among AMRA partners, has not been developed. AMRA is the name of a programme, not the name of a network. And among programme managers in the field, the name AMRA is little used.

### **Conclusions**

- Free Voice has tried to act as liaison for the AMRA partners to ensure more effective communication, but there have been no intensive meetings of the partners to collectively plan responses to external developments, or to design a motto to symbolically bind the network as a whole.

### **Recommendations**

- Collaboration among AMRA partners to address external developments have the potential to threaten the media in general in Aceh should be encouraged. This would mean selecting a Network Coordinator domiciled in Banda Aceh from among the AMRA partners.
- A name should be thought of for the “AMRA network”, such as *Koalisi Media Aceh untuk Demokrasi dan Perdamaian* (Aceh Media Coalition for Democracy and Peace) or *Koalisi Media Aceh untuk Pemilu Damai* (Aceh Media Coalition for Peaceful Elections), or the like.

## **VII. Exit Strategy**

The indicators used to analyse this aspect are:

- Implementation of initial or basic programmes has proceeded smoothly
- There is continuous capacity building for recipients
- Recipients recognise the need to anticipate and plan for future developments
- Aid relations with donors are systematically phased out

Implementation of basic programmes to respond to the post-tsunami emergency situation – from trauma counselling programmes and journalism training, through construction and reconstruction of radio stations in blankspots, and socialisation of the role of KPID as regulator – as noted in the section on Results and Achievements, proceeded quite smoothly,

AMRA partners continue to provide capacity building. AJI continues to run training programmes under the AMRA programme as well as training supported by other organisations. KBR 68H still runs internships and in-house training to improve the quality of the journalism of journalists in Aceh. And KPID carried out strategic planning in early 2005 as a part of its institutional capacity building.

As for building the awareness of recipients of the need to anticipate and plan for future developments, this has been done primarily by KBR 68H and also by KPID. KBR 68H has provided management and marketing training for radio stations under its coordination to enable them to become self sustaining as soon as possible. KPID has addressed this aspect via strategic planning.

The final aspect, systematic phasing out of aid relations with donors, was not assessed in this mid-term evaluation. This will be done as part of the final evaluation of the AMRA programme in 2007.

### **Conclusions**

- So far, the AMRA partners have implemented the key phases of the exit strategy quite well, though the priorities of AJI in Banda Aceh are unclear.

### **Recommendations**

- AJI should be encouraged to clarify its future programme development priorities, including for when it no longer receives support from AMRA/Free Voice.
- The partners should be helped to understand that relations with donors are never long term and that they must “ended appropriately” – and leave clear footprints.

## **VIII. Programme Management**

The indicators used to analyse programme management are:

- Clarity of purpose
- Structure
- Helping mechanism – including planning, monitoring and evaluation, media design system, grant system, and systems of administration and finance
- Coordination system
- Remuneration system
- Leadership
- Staff capacity

In terms of clarity of purpose, the AMRA partners and Free Voice as facilitator have clarity of understanding as to what must be achieved by the AMRA programme. However, there is an information gap on the ground as to the identity of the partners involved in AMRA. This was found, for example, among programme managers at AJI Banda Aceh and several radio stations in the KBR 68H network.

As for structure, Free Voice relies solely on a local coordinator, who is helped from a distance by the support system in the Netherlands. This local coordinator, as well as carrying out coordination and administration functions, also performs other function such as selecting recipients for grant funds. Initially, the local coordinator worked only 3 days a week, but now works 5 days. During the media reconstruction phase of the AMRA programme, the functions of the local coordinator have been performed quite well, although there is still a need to increase collective coordination among the network members. However, if in the future the AMRA network should begin actively responding to external issues, such as media advocacy or the elections of regional heads this coming December, it will be necessary to think about field support for the local coordinator, especially so that developments on the ground that may lead to changes in the status quo can be closely followed and so that the local coordinator can act as facilitator or troubleshooter if necessary.

KPID has limited supporting staff, with only 2 people employed to do all the work of the secretariat. As a consequence, KPID members have to double up as members of programme implementation teams. AJI and KBR 68H, on the other hand, have appointed

a programme officer and a programme coordinator, who are responsible for implementation of the AMRA programme.

In terms of planning, and internal monitoring and evaluation, Free Voice does this itself using staff sent from the Netherlands, with the assistance of the local coordinator. External evaluations are performed by independent evaluators. In AJI, all internal monitoring and evaluation is performed by its programme coordinator. At KBR 68H, this task is performed by the programme coordinator, with the assistance of the Radio Support Centre in Binjai – at least within the context of delivering radio equipment and distributing transistor radios. KPID has no clear system of planning, monitoring and evaluation. As it has limited support staff, everything is done collectively by the KPID members.

In terms of media design system, only to KBR 68H together with Free Voice has programmes relevant to this aspect of helping mechanisms. Drawing on its experience as the spearhead of radio journalism in Indonesia, KBR 68H has designed a local news programme called “Kabar Aceh”, which is aired real time via satellite by 25 radio stations in Aceh. This programme incorporates the talkshow “Aceh Damai”, which was designed in response to the peace accord for Aceh signed by the Indonesian government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. (*See the section on Content Analysis of Local News for more details*).

Free Voice has its own method for selecting grant recipients, but at the time of writing this report, the grants had yet to be disbursed because they were awaiting execution from Free Voice in the Netherlands. In addition to distributing these grants, KBR 68H was also entrusted with distributing subsidies to several radio stations under its coordination. This system has been running quite well, because it is supported by the KBR 68H administration and finance sections, which have experience in carrying out activities of this kind.

KBR 68H’s financial and administration sections, and AJI’s, have experience of managing collaborative programmes with various donors. Both have standard financial and administration systems that are differentiated from programme implementation. KPID, however, has little experience working with donors, and KPID member has to take on this dual function. In the case of Free Voice, these systems are run directly from headquarters in the Netherlands (*An independent auditor would be better qualified to make an assessment of the programme’s financial and administrative performance*).

As for coordination, there is coordination between the individual AMRA partners and Free Voice, and vice-versa. Coordination takes place face-to-face and via regular e-mail communication.

Each of the AMRA partners and Free Voice has their own remuneration systems. The AMRA programme budget proposal gives the figures for the salaries and honorariums agreed by Free Voice and the individual partners as compensation for the work done by the programme implementers.

In terms of leadership, the role of Free Voice is limited to performing the coordination and administration functions for the individual programmes, which it does fairly

efficiently and effectively. AJI and KBR 68H have given the authority from programme management to their programme officer and programme coordinator. In the case of KBR 68H, the director of this organisation often performs direct supervision of programme implementation. KPID, in keeping with the collective nature of its organisation, also adopts collective leadership and management. However, in the future, once this organisation's support system is in place, the functions of the members of KPID as broadcast regulator will have to be differentiated from the secretariat functions (KPID members should not take on multiple functions; but concentrate on performing their duties as regulator, including facilitating the licensing process for new radio stations).

As for staff capacity, each of the AMRA partners and Free Voice has people with authority and competence in their fields. KBR 68H has people experienced in management, marketing, and radio programme production. AJI has reporters who as well as being experienced, also comply strictly with the journalism code of ethics, including refusing bribes. The same is true of KPID, which consists of high-profile representatives of the broadcast sector in Aceh. Still ongoing, and in need of continuous monitoring, is the transfer of skills and knowledge, especially from AJI Indonesia to local AJI affiliates in Aceh, and from KBR 68H to radio stations under its coordination.

### **Conclusions**

- In general, management of the AMRA programme by Free Voice has been implemented fairly efficiently and effectively, although in terms of structure, in the field it relies solely on one local coordinator. This is because the key aspects of programme management – such as helping mechanisms, coordination systems, remuneration systems, leadership and staff capacity – function fairly well.
- However, should the AMRA network start to actively and collectively respond to external issues, support for the local coordinator will be needed.
- Free Voice, KBR 68H and AJI have fulfilled some of the key indicators for programme management
- However, KPID continues to rely on a collective model of programme management and leadership.

### **Recommendations**

- In the context of future programme management, thought needs to be given to supporting the work of the local coordinator, particularly in the context of building the effectiveness of coordination and of the work done by the AMRA network. This could be done in two ways: providing the local coordinator an assistant, or providing additional support for an “AMRA Network Coordinator”, chosen from among the AMRA partners to perform this function.
- KPID should continue to lobby for additional funding support from the state so it can strengthen its secretariat team and at the same time design a system of management that does not overlap with programme implementation, to enable the members of KPID to optimise its role as regulator.
- In terms of programme management, AJI and KBR 66H in particular should continue with their transfer of skills and knowledge to their local partners.

## **IX. External Relations**

The indicators used to analyse the external relations of the partners are:

- Relations with donors
- Relations with government

- Relations with service providers
- Relations with other stakeholders

In the context of relations with donors, AJI, KBR 68H and KPID have more contact with Free Voice as the liaison with other donors. Similarly, coordination with other donors, is performed, fairly efficiently and effectively, by Free Voice, mainly by internet or email. There have been no face-to-face meetings of all the donors. Donors tend to rely on the reports provided by Free Voice (NED, which normally visits the projects it supports at least once a year, has not made any visits to date). This should perhaps be noted as a weakness in donor coordination. But it is largely to do with the physical distance between the donors. Only Oxfam, which happens to have an office in Banda Aceh, has more of an opportunity to make occasional direct observations of programme implementation. However, there has been no exploration to identify and create synergy between the AMRA programme and other programmes supported by Oxfam in Aceh – an area that perhaps the “AMRA network” needs to address in the future.

Individually, all the AMRA partners have good relations with government. AJI Banda Aceh as the regional journalist’s organisation had received numerous invitations to attend official government functions. KBR 68H has even received an award from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its independent information services. One aspect requiring KBR 68H’s attention is encouraging the new stations under its coordination to forge good relations with local government while at same time maintaining their independence. KPID is a quasi government organisation, so it has no problems in this context. What KPID needs to work on is its relations with civil society and broadcast media to gain legitimisation and support as regulator. In the case of Free Voice, relations with government are not a problem, because in the context of post-tsunami Aceh, there is facilitation for international organisations to run their programmes in Aceh.

In terms of relations with service providers, AJI has proved itself capable of working with experienced facilitators in the fields of journalism and advocacy, most of whom are from Jakarta. As explained in the previous section, AJI has difficulties using local facilitators because of the high standard that participants have come to expect of facilitators from Jakarta. But in the context of the trauma counselling programme, AJI collaborated with fairly experienced local therapists, Yayasan Psikodista in Banda Aceh. Free Voice has used the services of an independent consultant to perform this mid term evaluation, to get an objective view of programme implementation and design and to produce recommendations for improving the programme in the future. KBR 68H tends to use its own staff to run its programmes, which are more to do with radio management and production of radio programmes. KPID has no programmes that involve service providers.

Relations with other stakeholders are mainly undertaken individually by the AMRA partners. In the context of advocacy on violence against journalists, for example, AJI involves a number of lawyers in its activities so that they are more familiar with the problems facing the media. As well as being of great benefit to AJI, the lawyers too gain a great deal from these relations, because they gain media popularity for their support in cases involving journalists. KBR 68H builds more relations with other stakeholders because its talkshow programmes, such as “Aceh Damai”, involve resources from a

variety of backgrounds, including academics, activists, government and so on. KPID has involved the owners of broadcast institutions as participants in its programmes. Free Voice does not have much direct contact with other stakeholder and tends to leave this up to the AMRA partners.

### **Conclusions**

- External relations, notably donor coordination, are managed fairly effectively and efficiently by Free Voice as the liaison between the donors. However, due to the physical distances involved, there has never been a face-to-face meeting of all donors. Only Oxfam, which has an office in Banda Aceh, would be able to make field visits to observe programme implementation.
- In general, there are no problems in the context of relations between the AMRA partners and government or service providers.
- Good relations with other stakeholders have mainly been developed individually by the AMRA partners.

### **Recommendations**

- If possible, try to convene a face-to-face meeting of AMRA donors to discuss the future of the programme and the AMRA network, including the best exit strategy. If this is not possible, then the system so far adopted by Free Voice will suffice.
- The “AMRA network” should try to create synergy – as far as is possible – with other programmes supported by Oxfam, as an AMRA donor that has other programmes in Aceh.

## **X. Specific Aspects: Local Radios**

### **A. Content Analysis of Local News**

With regard to analysing the content of news, primarily the content of local news on Aceh, one thing that the evaluator was unable to do was to make analysis of the consistency and quality of reportage due to time constraints, as just one day was allocated for visits to each of the stations. Therefore, this first analysis of the news of the six radio stations in Aceh relied on transcripts given to the evaluator by each of the stations. KBR 68H only makes analysis of the “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai” programmes, which is of course relevant to the context of local news. With the assistance of the KBR 68H Reportage Coordinator – as the person responsible for reports from contributors in the regions – several news items sent by radio reporters in Aceh in July and August 2006 were also obtained.

Based on these materials, the indicators used to make the analysis were:

- Technical quality of reportage
- Ability to select issues (local, strategic)
- Impartiality in reporting (and basics of radio journalism in general)
- Positive listener response

#### ***Radio NaRa FM –Nagan Raya District***

In terms of technical quality of reportage, in general, this station, which is the only one in Nagan Raya district, meets the standards for radio journalism. But, individually, the capacity of its reporters varies. A variety of local issues have been selected, from *the rising price of rice in Nagan Raya, outbreaks of malaria, the condition of barracks,*

*kerosene shortages, and the drastic decline in harvests in Nagan Raya, to data on the number of school drop outs in Nagan Raya.* However, the quality and quantity of these reports still needs to be enhanced. As to its impartiality, Radio NaRa is constrained by its limited coverage, which makes it difficult to find a balance of sources. As the only radio source of information in its area, listener response to its reportage is quite positive.

***Radio Suara Indah Tapak Tuan (SIT) –Tapak Tuan District***

It is rather difficult to analyse the technical quality of its reportage, largely because it does not provide regular contributions to the “Kabar Aceh” programme. This also makes it difficult to analyse its ability to select local issues, and impossible to see whether there is variety in its selection of local issues. Although Radio SIT tries to convey impartiality in its reports, this could be enhanced with basic knowledge of radio journalism, including selection and balance of sources and so on. As a key source of information in Tapak Tuan district, listener response to this radio station is quite positive.

***Radio Telangke FM –Gayo Lues District***

In view of the fact that this radio station only officially began operating and airing local programmes on August 1, 2006, there is not enough data to make an analysis. During discussions with the managers of this station, they mentioned several strategic issues that they intend to raise, including *the elections of regional heads, the problems facing farmers in Gayo Lues, good governance at the local level, and issues related to the local economy and business.*

***Radio Citra Pesona FM (RCP) – Aceh Singkil District (prospective Subussalam Municipality)***

In terms of technical quality, the reportage of this radio station meets the standards of radio journalism. It has also selected a variety of strategic local issues, including *the planned elections of regional heads, local identity card services, kerosene shortages, and damage to local infrastructure (bridges).* However, it is difficult for its reporters to pursue local strategic issues due to a shortage of competent sources. This also affects its impartiality difficult to analyse because, although the desire for impartiality exists, its sources are often one-sided. As a key source of local information and news, listener response to local news broadcast by this radio station is fairly positive.

***Radio Rapeja –Lamno Subdistrict, Aceh Jaya District***

The problem facing this radio station as far as the technical quality of its reportage is concerned, is the poor audio quality of its broadcasts. However, it does select quite a variety of local issues, such as *the relocation of 36 villages in Aceh Jaya, the decade needed to build Calang city, the poor construction of schools in Aceh Jaya, and elephants rampaging through villagers’ gardens.* Its reporters, however, still need training in the basics of radio journalism. Unfortunately, although the issues reported on a quite interesting, the quantity of news contributions in general is insufficient to make an analysis of the impartiality of its reports. Listener response to this, the only radio station in Aceh Jaya district, is quite positive.

***Radio Gipsi –Langsa Municipality***

The technical quality of the news produced by this station meets the standards of radio journalism. However, new innovations are needed to continue to raise the quality, for

example by producing features. A variety of local strategic issues have been covered, including *problems facing IDPs, graft in an international organisation based in Langsa, the difficulties involved in getting identity cards, and the lack of local teaching staff*. However, the quality of its reporters varies, which has a direct impact on the capacity to do in-depth reporting on these issues. The reportage suggests a desire for impartiality, but the quality of its reportage and journalism needs to be enhanced to make it more professional. Like the other stations, the news programmes broadcast by Radio Gipsi get a positive response from listeners.

***KBR 68H (For the Kabar Aceh & Aceh Damai programmes)***

In the context of the regional news programme, “Kabar Aceh”, the role of KBR 68H is that of facilitator, selecting reports from local contributors in Aceh. Therefore, assessment of the technical quality of reportage, the capacity to select issues, and impartiality in reporting are not appropriate parameters in the case of KBR 68H. However, the news selected by the KBR 68H editorial team covered local strategic issues such as *the performance of the Aceh Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency, passing of the law on governance of Aceh, the shut down of Radio Suara Perempuan and Radio SEHA by the Monitoring Agency, local opposition to the construction of an Indonesian military command in Lamteuba, and preparations for the elections of regional heads in Aceh*, as well as other issues related to the post-tsunami reconstruction process. These issues are categorised as strategic because they concern the interests of people of Aceh in general and are not straight news items filled with reports on the ceremonial activities of regional government. As to listener response in general, this is demonstrated by the comments of Aceh leaders gathered by programme coordinator, Eni Mulia. For example, the leader of the Aceh provincial parliament, Sayed Faud Zakaria, expressed his appreciation of the KBR 68H initiative to bring together news from the far flung regions of Aceh. He believes that “Kabar Aceh” provides an alternative source of information to the established print media. Another comment on “Kabar Aceh” came from Husni Bahri, NAD provincial secretary and socialisation of the peace accord team leader, who said he always listens to “Kabar Aceh”. And it’s not just politicians and government officers – people from the Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka say they tune into “Kabar Aceh”, too.

In the bi-weekly talkshow, “Aceh Damai”, KBR 68H has raised a number of issues related to Aceh peacebuilding, interviewing sources competent in their fields. Issues raised include *criticism of the performance of the Aceh Reintegration Agency and peacebuilding in Aceh after the law on governance in Aceh*. Sources interviewed include director of the Aceh Reintegration Agency, Yusni Saby; coordinator of the Aceh Working Group, Rusdi Marpuang; former chair of the committee for the preparation of the bill on the governance of Aceh, Ferry Mursyidan Baldan; SIRA activist, Muhammad Nazar; and representatives of Gerakan Merdeka Aceh and regional government in Aceh. These examples indicate that the choice of issues covered is highly relevant and contextual, and that the sources selected are competent and balanced. To complement this talkshow, five of the radio stations in the AMRA network (minus Radio Telangke FM) take an active part in these talkshow – thereby promoting these five stations to listeners across Aceh. The data sample obtained for this programme indicates that responses from 6 callers can be accommodated in the limited time available, and at least 10 short

messages sent in via SMS are read out. This indicates that radio listeners in Aceh are very enthusiastic about this programme.

## **B. Profile of Radio Stations in the Field**

Information about the programmes, management, reach and sustainability of each of the local radios supported by AMRA is summarised in the matrix on the following pages.

<b>Aspect PROGRAMMES</b>	<b>NaRa FM</b>	<b>SIT</b>	<b>Telangke</b>	<b>RCP</b>	<b>Rapeja</b>	<b>Gipsi</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local</li> <li>Local News</li> </ul>	<p>YES Average 16 hours a day</p> <p>YES Average 75 minutes a day (The remainder from the KBR 68H programme "Kabar Aceh")</p>	<p>YES Average 16 hours a day</p> <p>YES Average 1 hour a day (The remainder from the KBR 68H programme "Kabar Aceh")</p>	<p>YES Average 12 hours a day</p> <p>Average 1 hour a day (The remainder from the KBR 68H programme "Kabar Aceh")</p>	<p>YES Average 16 hours a day</p> <p>Average 1 hour a day (The remainder from the KBR 68H programme "Kabar Aceh")</p>	<p>YES Average 14 hours a day</p> <p>Average 1 hour a day (The remainder from the KBR 68H programme "Kabar Aceh")</p>	<p>YES Average 14.5 hours a day</p> <p>Average 1 hour a day (The remainder from the KBR 68H programme "Kabar Aceh")</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women's</li> </ul>	-	-	-	YES (a portion of a programme for young women) Broadcast for an average 1 hour a day, Monday to Thursday	-	YES Broadcast 2 hours a week, a programme from Journal Perempuan (Women's Journal)
<b>MANAGEMENT</b>						
<b>Clarity of Purpose</b>	YES Provided by KBR 68H when first set up	YES Provided by KBR 68H when first set up	YES Provided by KBR 68H when first set up	YES Provided by KBR 68H when first set up	YES Provided by KBR 68H when first reconstructed	YES Provided by KBR 68H when first reconstructed
<b>Structure</b>	YES Basic radio structure in general	YES Basic radio structure in general	YES Basic radio structure in general	YES Basic radio structure in general	YES BUT holders of several key positions do not do the work they should	YES Basic radio structure in general
<b>Admin. &amp; Finance Systems</b>	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Coordination System</b>	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES BUT the radio director spends more time in Banda Aceh than in Lamno	YES
<b>Remuneration System</b>	YES	YES BUT feels it is unable to provide adequate remuneration	- Not yet operational, went on air on July 25, 2006	YES	YES BUT feels it is unable to provide adequate remuneration (Rp3,000 per news item)	YES
<b>Leadership</b>	YES	YES	YES	YES	- Station director and manger do not take much of a role – the head of finance & admin has more involvement	YES
<b>Staff Capacity</b>	YES BUT feels it needs to improve editing and marketing	YES BUT feels it needs to improve marketing	- (just started up)	YES BUT feels it needs to improve marketing	- BUT feels it needs to improve editing and marketing	YES Feels it has a shortage or reporters, especially women

<b>Subdistricts</b>	12 subdistricts plus parts of Aceh Barat, Aceh Tengah & Aceh Jaya	6 subdistricts	8 subdistricts plus parts of Aceh Tenggara	15 subdistricts plus parts of Sumatera Utara & Aceh Selatan	4 subdistricts plus parts of Aceh Besar	5 subdistricts plus parts of Aceh Timur, Aceh Tamiang & Sumatera Utara
• <b>Number of Listeners</b>	Approximately 12,000	Approximately 16,000	Approximately 3,000	Approximately 10,000	Approximately 15,000	Approximately 17,500
• <b>Number of Competitors</b>	-	3 community radio stations	1 local government radio station	1 private radio station	-	2 private radio stations
<b>potential to be self-sustainable</b>	YES As the only radio station in Nagan Raya district & it is accepted by the public and local government. All that remains is to build market potential. Still receives subsidy of Rp 8.5 million/month	YES As the only private radio station in Tapak Tuan & it is accepted by the local community. All that remains is to build market potential. Still receives subsidy of Rp 4.5 million/month	YES As the only private radio station in Gayo Lues & it has a great deal of interest from the public and local companies. All that remains is to build market potential. Still receives subsidy of Rp 9 million/month	YES Well accepted by public & local officials. All that remains is to build market potential. Still receives subsidy of Rp 9 million/month	INSUFFICIENT No evidence of any enthusiasm on the part of management to grow this into a self sustainable radio station. Still receives subsidy of Rp 4.5 million/month.	YES Self-sustainable a month after going on air (post reconstruction). Receives no subsidy.
• <b>Has sustainable programmes (even without donors)</b>	YES Evident from local programmes and programmes relayed from KBR 68H. And in exploiting market potential	YES Evident from local programmes and programmes relayed from KBR 68H. And in exploiting market potential	YES Evident from local programmes and programmes relayed from KBR 68H. And in exploiting market potential	YES Evident from local programmes and programmes relayed from KBR 68H. And in exploiting market potential	YES BUT limited to a few local programmes and programmes relayed from KBR 68H.	YES Evident from local programmes and programmes relayed from KBR 68H. And in exploiting market potential
• <b>Has competent human resources</b>	YES In general has human resources with potential	YES In general has human resources with potential	YES In general has human resources with potential	YES In general has human resources with potential	INSUFFICIENT Lack of leadership means a lack of potential in its human resources	YES In general has human resources with potential
• <b>Has good resources support network</b>	YES Relies on KBR 68H networks plus local resources networks	YES Relies on KBR 68H networks plus local resources networks	YES Relies on KBR 68H networks plus local resources networks	YES Relies on KBR 68H networks plus local resources networks	YES BUT relies entirely on KBR 68H networks	YES Relies on KBR 68H networks plus local resources networks

In terms of programmes the data overleaf indicate that, despite a shortage of reporters, the radio stations in the AMRA network have been able to produce local news programmes of an average duration of 1 hour a day, with the exception of Radio Rapeja, which only produces 30 minutes as compared with Radio NaRa, which produces 75 minutes of news. With the addition of “Kabar Aceh”, which also broadcasts regional news on Aceh, and national news items relayed from KBR 68H, these stations, though new, perform their function as providers of information to the people of Aceh. However, only Radio Citra Pesona and Radio Gipsi produce programmes on women’s issues, which are allocated an average of 2 hours a week.

In terms of management in general, almost all the stations have structure, standardised work mechanisms, and fairly good leadership. Only Radio Rapeja has problems with its management that have hampered the development of this radio station, which is located in one of the areas worst hit by the tsunami.

In terms of reach, in general the radio stations in the AMRA network reach an average of between 4 and 12 subdistricts. All stations, with the exception of Radio SIT, reach more than one subdistrict. Radio NaRa reaches 4 subdistricts, while Radio Gipsi reaches 4 subdistricts and parts of the province of Sumatra Utara. By their own estimate, these stations have on average more than 10,000 listeners – except Radio Telangke FM, which has only recently gone on air, which has around 3,000 listeners. Radio Gipsi FM has 17,500 listeners.

Judging from the four sustainability indicators – able or has the potential to be self-sustainable, has sustainable programmes (even without donors), has competent human resources, and has good resources support networks – the radio stations in the AMRA network, in general, have good prospects for growth. Radio Gipsi, within the first month of operations, had become self-sustainable and receives no subsidies from KBR 68H. Only Radio Rapeja has a particular weakness in this aspect – mainly because of its weak leadership and lack of enthusiasm or desire to grow.

### **Conclusions**

- The technical quality of the reportage of the six radio stations supported by AMRA is fairly good, they are able to select a variety of local issues, and they generate positive listener response. However, there are still weaknesses in their capacity to implement the basics of radio journalism in general, including selection and balance of sources.
- For the “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai” programmes produced by KBR 68H, the news selected (by KBR 68H) is very strategic and relevant to the interests of the people of Aceh. Listener response is very varied and positive.
- In terms of management, with the exception of Radio Rapeja, the five other radio stations supported by AMRA network have structure, standard work mechanisms, and fairly good leadership.
- The reach of the six stations is fairly wide (on average more than 10,000 listeners)
- In terms of sustainability, Radio Rapeja is the weakest compared with the other stations supported by AMRA.

### **Recommendations**

- (As per the recommendation in the section on Results and Achievements to focus on strengthening the quality of the radio journalism of the six stations supported by AMRA)
- Continue supporting or finding support for continuation of “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai”, which have important implications for reconstruction and peacebuilding in Aceh

- For a limited period, KBR 68H should encourage Radio Rapeja to make improvements in its organisational management, enabling this station to grow in line with the other radio stations supported by AMRA.

## CONCLUSIONS

### A. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### **Programme History**

##### **Conclusions**

- In general, AMRA programmes are highly relevant to needs and have been implemented in an appropriate timeframe, with the exception of the KPID Aceh programme, the start of which was delayed due to teething problems with the secretariat and supporting staff.
- No initiatives have been started by AMRA partners outside those agreed in the contract with Free Voice.
- External developments to which AMRA has responded include the signing of the peace accord, which was followed up by development of the talkshow “Aceh Damai”.
- An external development that has interfered with the AMRA programme run by KPID Aceh was the passing of a government regulation that “transferred” the authority of KPID Aceh as broadcast regulator.
- There has been no specific response to the law on the governance of Aceh passed on July 11, 2006, other than this event being reported by KBR 68H and its network stations.

##### **Recommendations**

- A key external development that the AMRA partners should prepare for together is the direct elections of regional heads in Aceh, scheduled to take place on December 10, 2006.
- AMRA should respond to the law on the governance of Aceh, in particular by performing advocacy on article 125 of the law which concerns communication and information, which has the potential to threaten media freedom. It is not too late for the AMRA network to monitor the preparation of the *qanan* or government regulation that will regulate this article in more detail.
- AMRA should collectively optimise its network in anticipation of external issues that affect the media in general, starting with the law on the governance of Aceh, the direct general elections of regional heads, and the government regulations on broadcasting.

#### **Results and Achievements of KBR 68H**

##### **Conclusions**

- From the infrastructure or hardware perspective of “establishment of the radio sector”, several of KBR 68H’s programmes have met the initial targets stated in the programme proposal. Evidence of this is the establishment and operation of six radio stations under its coordination.
- The advent of these new stations, coupled with the distribution of transistor radios, especially in radio blank spots, has provided local people access to independent information.
- The technical problem of maintenance of broadcast equipment is one facing all these new radio stations.
- Although most have participated in training provided by KBR 68H, the quality of local news produced by the journalists of these new stations needs to be improved.

##### **Recommendations**

- The focus of programme implementation for KBR 68H for the coming period should be on improving the quality of the reportage produced by the radio journalists at the six stations in Aceh.
- KBR 68H should prepare clear parameters for measuring the quality of radio journalism, both in terms of content analysis and journalism skills.
- Efforts should be made to build the capacity of radio technicians in Aceh, among others through internships, in-house training, and sharing of experience among the six radio stations.

## ***Results and Achievements of AJI***

### ***Conclusions***

- In general, AJI activities in the context of AMRA have run as planned, with the exception of the training in investigative journalism which was replaced by training in in-depth reporting due to the lack of qualifications of the participants.
- The trauma counselling programme has had positive qualitative results for its participants. But AJI has had difficulties getting men journalists to take part in the trauma counselling programme because they are ashamed to admit that men can suffer trauma too.
- The training programmes implemented by AJI adopt good methodologies, from implementation through performance evaluation of the participants. But attention still needs to be given to improving the quality of journalism in Aceh in general.
- Through the advocacy training programme, AJI has been able to create an embryo Aceh journalists' advocacy network and at the same time transfer and improve the skills of AJI Lhokseumawe.

### ***Recommendations***

- In the context of improving the quality of journalism in general in Aceh, as well as continuing with capacity building programmes for local journalists, AJI should campaign for professionalism and a press code of ethics.
- AJI should monitor the mental health of men journalists, who generally do not want to participate in the trauma counselling programme.
- AJI should forge more linkages between the Aceh journalists' advocacy network and experts and legal advisors in Aceh to optimise its advocacy work.

## ***Results and Achievements of KPID***

### ***Conclusions***

- KPID programmes began to run smoothly after the signing of a second contract with Free Voice under which KPID itself assumes responsibility for the administrative and financial management of the programmes.
- Through seminar/workshop and workshop activities, KPID has provided the owners of new radio stations an understanding of the licensing process and business due diligence studies. But new stations, including those supported by AMRA, continue to complain that it is not easy to obtain a licence.
- Government regulations on broadcasting issued in 2005 "trimmed" the authority of KPI and KPID, leaving them unable to do much when Radio Suara Perempuan was "closed up" by the Monitoring Agency.

### ***Recommendations***

- KPID should collaborate with media institutions in Aceh, especially those in the AMRA network, to get support for strengthening its role as broadcast regulator.
- KPID should open up dialogue with the owners of new radio stations in Aceh who feel it is difficult to meet the licensing conditions, and find a joint solution to this problem.

## ***Results and Achievements of Free Voice (Local Coordinator)***

### ***Conclusions***

- Distribution of transistor radios and production of the talkshow "Aceh Damai" receive direct support from KBR 68H, and have been running smoothly.
- Selection of the recipients of grant funds has been completed, but the funds have yet to be disbursed.

### ***Recommendations***

- As well as disbursing the grant funds, Free Voice should clarify the division of roles with KBR 68H, which in the programme proposal is designated the party responsible for the administration of this programme.

## **Relevance**

### **Conclusions**

- The AMRA programmes run by the AMRA partners have high relevance because they were planned in response to real problems, are flexible to changing conditions, were designed in a participatory way, and have local people as their main beneficiaries.

### **Recommendations**

- (The evaluator has no specific recommendations concerning the relevance of the programme, except to keep up the responsive, flexible, participatory approach and make continuous internal evaluation to ensure that the main beneficiaries are local people).

## **Effectiveness**

### **Conclusions**

- The AMRA programmes have been running quite effectively, because they have clear target groups, programme results are measurable, most have run within the agreed timeframe, and they adopt quite good methodologies.

### **Recommendations**

- (As per the recommendations in the section on Results and Achievements, KBR 68H should develop criteria for assessing the quality of radio journalists, and there is a need for dialogue between KPID and the managers of new radio stations in Aceh to facilitate the licensing process for these stations).

## **Efficiency**

### **Conclusions**

- Although optimal use has been made of local capacities, in general the AMRA programme has not shown to be efficient, primarily because optimal use is not made of its network, more creative use could be made of budget, and cost-efficient use is not made of media or alternative facilities – except in the case of KBR 68H.

### **Recommendations**

- Each of the AMRA partners should be encouraged to be more efficient by making optimal use of the AMRA network, being creative in their use of budget, and making cost-efficient use of media and alternative facilities. This could be done by Free Voice, by, for example requesting that these efficiency indicators be included in the reports of each of the partners.

## **Impact**

### **Conclusions**

- The impact of the AMRA programmes have been felt by the target groups, the media community, and to some extent, the general public. In addition are the footprints left behind by each of the AMARA partners after their programmes have ended.
- However, the impact and focus of the AMRA programmes on women's issues is seriously lacking.

### **Recommendations**

- The AMRA partners should place special focus on women's issues, among others by making activity attendance records that tag women participants for gender perspective reporting

## **Sustainability**

### **Conclusions**

- In general, the AMRA partners have the ability and potential to be self-sufficient because they are supported by fairly good human and other resources. However, the AMRA partners have not made optimal use of the "AMRA network" itself to strengthen their sustainability.

### **Recommendations**

- The AMRA partners should be encouraged to make optimal use of the "AMRA network" to enable them to manage opportunities to collectively run programmes, for example in the context of the elections of regional heads, to strengthen their sustainability.

## **Coordination/Collaboration**

### **Conclusions**

- Free Voice has tried to act as liaison for the AMRA partners to ensure more effective communication, but there have been no intensive meetings of the partners to collectively plan responses to external developments, or to design a motto to symbolically bind the network as a whole.

### **Recommendations**

- Collaboration among AMRA partners to address external developments have the potential to threaten the media in general in Aceh should be encouraged. This would mean selecting a Network Coordinator domiciled in Banda Aceh from among the AMRA partners.
- A name should be thought of for the “AMRA network”, such as *Koalisi Media Aceh untuk Demokrasi dan Perdamaian* (Aceh Media Coalition for Democracy and Peace) or *Koalisi Media Aceh untuk Pemilu Damai* (Aceh Media Coalition for Peaceful Elections), or the like.

## **Exit Strategy**

### **Conclusions**

- So far, the AMRA partners have implemented the key phases of the exit strategy quite well, though the priorities of AJI in Banda Aceh are unclear.

### **Recommendations**

- AJI should be encouraged to clarify its future programme development priorities, including for when it no longer receives support from AMRA/Free Voice.
- The partners should be helped to understand that relations with donors are never long term and that they must “ended appropriately” – and leave clear footprints.

## **Programme Management**

### **Conclusions**

- In general, management of the AMRA programme by Free Voice has been implemented fairly efficiently and effectively, although in terms of structure, in the field it relies solely on one local coordinator. This is because the key aspects of programme management – such as helping mechanisms, coordination systems, remuneration systems, leadership and staff capacity – function fairly well.
- However, should the AMRA network start to actively and collectively respond to external issues, support for the local coordinator will be needed.
- Free Voice, KBR 68H and AJI have fulfilled some of the key indicators for programme management
- However, KPID continues to rely on a collective model of programme management and leadership.

### **Recommendations**

- In the context of future programme management, thought needs to be given to supporting the work of the local coordinator, particularly in the context of building the effectiveness of coordination and of the work done by the AMRA network. This could be done in two ways: providing the local coordinator an assistant, or providing additional support for an “AMRA Network Coordinator”, chosen from among the AMRA partners to perform this function.
- KPID should continue to lobby for additional funding support from the state so it can strengthen its secretariat team and at the same time design a system of management that does not overlap with programme implementation, to enable the members of KPID to optimise its role as regulator.
- In terms of programme management, AJI and KBR 66H in particular should continue with their transfer of skills and knowledge to their local partners.

## **External Relations**

### **Conclusions**

- External relations, notably donor coordination, are managed fairly effectively and efficiently by Free Voice as the liaison between the donors. However, due to the physical distances involved, there has never been a face-to-face meeting of all donors. Only Oxfam, which has an office in Banda Aceh, would be able to make field visits to observe programme implementation.
- In general, there are no problems in the context of relations between the AMRA partners and government or service providers.
- Good relations with other stakeholders have mainly been developed individually by the AMRA partners.

### **Recommendations**

- If possible, try to convene a face-to-face meeting of AMRA donors to discuss the future of the programme and the AMRA network, including the best exit strategy. If this is not possible, then the system so far adopted by Free Voice will suffice.
- The “AMRA network” should try to create synergy – as far as is possible – with other programmes supported by Oxfam, as an AMRA donor that has other programmes in Aceh.

## **Specific Aspects: Local Radios**

### **Conclusions**

- The technical quality of the reportage of the six radio stations supported by AMRA is fairly good, they are able to select a variety of local issues, and they generate positive listener response. However, there are still weaknesses in their capacity to implement the basics of radio journalism in general, including selection and balance of sources.
- For the “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai” programmes produced by KBR 68H, the news selected (by KBR 68H) is very strategic and relevant to the interests of the people of Aceh. Listener response is very varied and positive.
- In terms of management, with the exception of Radio Rapeja, the five other radio stations supported by AMRA network have structure, standard work mechanisms, and fairly good leadership.
- The reach of the six stations is fairly wide (on average more than 10,000 listeners)
- In terms of sustainability, Radio Rapeja is the weakest compared with the other stations supported by AMRA.

### **Recommendations**

- (As per the recommendation in the section on Results and Achievements to focus on strengthening the quality of the radio journalism of the six stations supported by AMRA)
- Continue supporting or finding support for continuation of “Kabar Aceh” and “Aceh Damai”, which have important implications for reconstruction and peacebuilding in Aceh
- For a limited period, KBR 68H should encourage Radio Rapeja to make improvements in its organisational management, enabling this station to grow in line with the other radio stations supported by AMRA.

## **B. Lessons Learned**

Through a participatory process during the AMRA Programme Evaluation Workshop (August 1-2, 2006) the AMRA partners, or more specifically, representatives from KPI, KPID, KBR 68H and its six radio stations, and from AJI Indonesia, AJI Banda Aceh, and AJI Lhokseumawe, formulated the lessons they had learned from the programmes they have run so far. These can be summarised as follows (see Appendix V, Workshop Results, for details):

- The programme would run better if there were routine collective coordination among the partners, allowing them to respond rapidly to external developments, such as the law on the governance of Aceh. Strengthening the network is vital.

- The programme would run better if it were based on assessment, i.e. mapping and inventorying of social problems relevant to the media post tsunami.
- The programme would run better if it were designed in a participatory way appropriate to the capacities of the individual partners rather than in a top-down way.
- The programme would run better if the programme achievement indicators were determined collectively.
- The programme would run better if there were periodic joint programme evaluation.
- The programme would run better if mapping of resources and local capacities, including accurate mapping of local partners, had been performed, thus supporting programme implementation from the outset.
- The programme would run better if there were a coordinator (appointed from among the AMRA partners) who could facilitate routine meetings between the network partners.
- The programme would run better if the human resources had been better prepared through continuous training programmes.
- The programme would run better if there were flexibility in the use of budget (to respond to changing needs)
- The programme would run better if more attention were given to involving women in the programme.

### **C. Footprints**

Although the AMRA programme is only at its mid point, it has already left several footprints. At the evaluation workshop, the AMRA partners collectively identified these footprints, though not were able to provide footprints that would easily identified with by the general public. Presented here are the strong footprints, grouped by AMRA partner:

#### **KPID**

- A database of broadcast institutions in Aceh

#### **AJI**

- Establishment of the Aceh Media Center
- Publication of books on journalism, trauma management & advocacy
- Establishment of an advocacy network for journalists

#### **KBR 68H**

- Construction of Radio Citra Pesona 104 FM, the first private radio station in Aceh Singkil District
- Construction of Radio NaRa 104 FM, the first private radio station in Nagan Raya District
- Construction of Telangke FM, the first private radio station in Gayo Lues District
- Reconstruction & renovation of Radio Suara Indah Tapak Tuan in Aceh Selatan District
- Reconstruction & renovation of Radio Rapeja, the first and only radio station in Lamno, Aceh Jaya District
- Reconstruction & renovation of Radio Gipsi FM, the longest established radio station in Langsa Municipality
- Distribution of 29,925 transistor radios to the public
- Equal dissemination of information to the people of Aceh

### **D. Specific Recommendations in Anticipation of the Elections of Regional Heads**

To prepare for the elections of regional heads, which is scheduled to take place in December 2006, Free Voice should take into consideration several recommendations from the AMRA partners. These recommendations were produced at the Evaluation Workshop after the partners had identified the challenges for the media in run up to the

elections (see Appendix V, Workshop Results, for more details). The possibility of accommodating these recommendations aside, the following points need to be considered:

- The AMRA network needs to consolidate soon, which would include choosing a coordinator from among the partners who is able to more effectively anticipate the challenges and threats that will face the media during the elections of regional heads, including the threat of violence against journalists; the challenge of building professionalism and media ethics, and the capacity of journalists covering the elections; the challenge of ensuring that the media does not become a political vehicle for politicians; the challenge for KPID as regulator to produce ground rules and a code of ethics for the broadcast media on making programmes and reporting on the elections; and the challenge of rapidly disseminating information on election procedures and mechanisms to the general public.
- In this regard, the AMRA network must present a united front to the public – which would include thinking of an official name for the network – in order to have more effective impact and influence
- The formation of a responsive and sustainable collective AMRA network would be a most tangible additional footprint, should the AMRA programme come to an end.

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