


The Key to Peace:

UNLOCKING THE HUMAN POTENTIAL OF SUDAN



INTERAGENCY PAPER MAY 2002



**“The history and nature of
the Sudan conflict
demonstrates that a military
solution cannot bring
lasting peace and stability
to the country”**

The IGAD Declaration of Principles

Preface

This report, produced by six aid agencies operating in Sudan, articulates the appalling human cost of Sudan's conflict. It calls for urgent and sustained action on the part of warring parties and the international community to bring about an immediate end to that suffering. Although the report refers to areas in which the warring parties can make progress, its primary audience is concerned governments, agencies, and NGOs working on and in Sudan.

The report does not seek to provide an in-depth political analysis of the conflict, as this information is widely available elsewhere. Nor does it provide blue-print solutions to conflict or poverty. Instead it provides recommendations for action based on two key premises, namely:

- a) the appalling human cost of Sudan's conflict is both poorly understood and inadequately communicated. **Sudanese people have only known a decade of peace since 1955 and their experience must now inform peace and development processes.** This report hopes to highlight the human catastrophe of Sudan's conflict, including the sometimes intangible social and opportunity costs of war.
- b) in the midst of conflict and human rights violations, there are positive developments that can be encouraged and reinforced. **The human potential of Sudan can be unlocked now in support of sustained peace, and in support of development which itself creates the demand for peace.** The report highlights a range of efforts at local, national, and international levels which could contribute to the achievement of this goal.

Recommendations summary

To the above end, the report makes recommendations on ways in which warring parties, governments, donors, and agencies can:

- **Ensure convergence of international efforts towards a just and sustained peace based on the Declaration of Principles.** Such efforts need to be cognisant of, and reinforce, civil-society peace initiatives.
- **Immediately end the human rights abuses perpetrated by all warring parties in all areas of Sudan.** The rights of communities currently denied access to humanitarian assistance must also be protected. To this end, the confidence-building measures proposed by Senator John Danforth in late 2001 and agreed to by the warring parties must be immediately and fully implemented, and US engagement sustained.ⁱ
- **Invest in the capacity of Sudan's people to respond to the ongoing crisis, particularly through education, health, and through the creation of equitable economic and judicial structures.** Long-term investment by donors is required now to enable citizens to challenge the status quo and to participate fully in peace and development, now and in the future.

ⁱ This report was finalised prior to the recent release of Senator Danforth's report to the US President dated 26th April 2002

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Summary

This report, produced by six international agencies with long experience of working with war-affected communities in Sudan, exposes the relentless human costs of Sudan's conflict. **Such is the interminable nature of the conflict that its impact on ordinary and poor Sudanese is difficult to comprehend and is poorly articulated and communicated.** This report, which communicates these costs, is intended to provoke immediate and sustained efforts to end the suffering.

The vast majority of Sudanese people are exhausted by the war and disappointed by the lack of progress in the current peace process. **Ending the war and achieving a durable peace is the only way to break the cycle of humanitarian crises and human rights abuse. Peace will allow the people of Sudan to move toward truly sustainable development and to fully unlock their country's potential.** The report comes at a critical time: there is currently an opportunity for all concerned governments, agencies, and warring parties to work in concert to bring about a just and sustainable peace.

Indeed, a new commitment to peace is emerging as both sides in the conflict begin to implement the confidence-building measures proposed by the US government's peace envoy Senator John Danforth in late 2001. Other governments are joining with humanitarian agencies and with communities across Sudan to show renewed interest in a just and sustained peace: the UK has appointed a peace envoy; Norway has contributed monitors for the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains that Switzerland helped to broker; and Kenya has appointed a special envoy to support regional peace efforts. Sudanese people are also finding new ways to build bridges between communities and have engaged in local reconciliation efforts that are bringing real dividends.

The humanitarian situation remains intolerable

However, despite this progress, the humanitarian crisis affecting Sudan remains intolerable. The protracted civil war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) still tears families apart. Much of the social fabric and economic life of war-affected Sudanese communities has been destroyed. Over the last 19 years, conflict has increased people's vulnerability to famine, eroded their already fragile coping strategies and destroyed vital assets and livelihoods. **Fighting has now claimed more than two million lives, and has**

caused the largest displacement of people in Africa and today, it is estimated that ninety-two per cent of Sudan's people live below the poverty line. After so many years of incessant conflict, the levels of destruction are difficult to comprehend and communicate, even when seen at first-hand.

As the conflict continues, men and boys become soldiers or join militias (sometimes voluntarily, sometimes forcibly); and economic opportunities diminish, especially for poor populations. The consequences are stark, particularly in southern Sudan. There, school enrollment is intolerably low – at least a generation of children has already been deprived of education – and there are almost no job opportunities outside the military. Throughout Sudan, health facilities are inadequate for the needs of the poor; under-five and infant mortality rates are unacceptably high with at least one child in ten dying before the age of five.¹ The figure is nearer one in five in the south.² Most children succumb to preventable disease.

All sides to the conflict are guilty of widespread human rights abuses, including assault, rape, abduction and forcible displacement. Warring parties have targeted civilians and uncontrolled militia groups wreak destruction on property and livelihoods, exacting a terrible human cost. The activities of unaccountable warring parties continue unabated. Militias attack, rape and abduct civilians creating fear, distress and massive displacement. Large areas of southern Sudan, especially Bahr al-Ghazal, have been devastated by militia activity.

The extraction of oil is fuelling war and allowing increased military expenditure to occur. Indeed, a major segment of government expenditure is now military at an estimated US\$ 246 million per year.³ Conflict in the oil fields is escalating as warring parties reposition and shift allegiances. The February 2002 attack in the remote town of Bieh, which killed at least 24 people, was a tragic reminder that civilians are paying the cost of oil extraction.

The four million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as refugees in neighbouring countries, have fled the war, famine and, more recently, conflict in the oilfields. The IDPs are largely poor and landless. They often lack access to basic services, including clean water, health and education. Yet it is the area of economic and political rights which many IDPs cite as being crucial to their long-term welfare.

Lost opportunities

Sudan is a country with a variety of natural resources and vast economic potential. **However, partly because the benefits of those resources are inequitably shared, major economic opportunities are being lost and the conflict becomes ever more intractable.** The revenues resulting from resource exploitation are not directed to vital services and infrastructure and are often used for military purposes.

The peace process for Sudan has also failed ordinary and poor Sudanese. The process, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD),⁴ has been characterised by eight years of ineffective negotiations that neither side appears to have taken seriously. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) provides a legitimate framework for negotiations and addresses key issues such as the right to self-determination and the separation of religion and state. The premise of the DOP is unity, with the right to a referendum on unity or separation if agreement is not reached.

The lack of progress with IGAD has led to other proposals being put forward. The most recent, from Libya and Egypt, proposes the formation of a transitional government charged with adopting constitutional reforms and organising genuine elections. The proposal makes no reference to the referendum on self-determination that forms part of IGAD's negotiating platform, and this makes it unacceptable to the SPLM/A.

The longevity of the war, as well as the multiple interests of regional and international governments have complicated efforts to find peace in Sudan. States, both regional and international, have provided support for warring parties at various times, and have shown insufficient commitment to working towards a just and comprehensive solution. **Among donors and international leaders there has been confusion, contrary policies, and lack of continuity.**

The benefits of peace

A peaceful Sudan could attract considerable revenue through foreign direct investment and trade. Peace could allow the redirecting of spending to poverty eradication and to the vital sectors of health and education. The re-establishment of international development relationships could bring relief to poor rural communities and bring Sudan back into the international community. The exploitation of oil generates huge revenue, yet if it could be extracted under more peaceful circumstances, oil companies would have lower overheads and the government could negotiate a higher share of the profits. Whilst the potential benefits of oil are often over-stated, it is clear

that wealth-sharing arrangements could play a part in increasing trust, improving services, and contributing to the well-being of poor Sudanese.

If a just and durable peace were firmly established, then resettlement or reintegration could be more attractive opportunities for displaced people and refugees. Markets and trade routes could be re-established, and if markets were functioning effectively then food security could also be improved. There would be 'peace savings' too. The annual cost of food aid for displaced people in South Darfur in 1998 and 1999 averaged nearly \$1.5m. Since 1983, \$2bn has been spent on relief and rehabilitation through Operation Life Line (OLS) Sudan alone. Sudan will still need investment and sustained development assistance, but in the context of peace, advances could be more durable and used to strengthen trust and confidence among and between communities.

Progress is possible

It must be clearly acknowledged that progress in Sudan is possible, now. This report draws attention to a range of opportunities that exist at local and national levels, which can and should be nurtured and reinforced. **Investing in Sudan's people would allow communities to play a more meaningful and informed role in political life and hold their leaders accountable to agreed policies and resolutions.** Donors, agencies, and NGOs looking for practical options for support will find positive examples of progress, as well as areas which still require urgent and sustained attention.

The human costs of conflict are the central concern of the humanitarian agencies which have authored this report. The need to advocate for a permanent end to Sudan's suffering is a commitment which is shared with equal conviction. Ending the conflict will require coherent and co-ordinated efforts by the international community, working in concert with Sudanese peace interests. Durable peace can only emerge from the collaborative efforts of the Sudanese people and the international community. **Yet, this will, in the first instance, require a genuine commitment among the international community to establish convergent approaches to peace in Sudan.**

The following recommendations, which emerge from research as well as the long experience of the contributing agencies, attempt to demonstrate how the various opportunities for peace and development that currently exist at community, national and international levels can be exploited now.

Recommendations

Support for peace

The warring parties, having shown good faith in agreeing to the confidence-building measures proposed by Senator Danforth in late 2001 under the auspices of the US government, should now work towards their full implementation with sustained US engagement. Furthermore, both sides should renew their commitment to the Declaration of Principles and agree to and publicise a timetable of continuous dialogue in support of a just and peaceful settlement to the conflict.

Concerned governments, international leaders and agencies need to ensure that the confidence-building measures are fully implemented and reinforced with sustained political action at the highest levels using a combination of pressures and incentives. Interim steps which reduce the potential for violence and which address humanitarian concerns are vital, but they cannot be a substitute for political resolution.

Peace envoys, concerned governments and agencies need to demonstrate their commitment to more convergent and coherent policies. Sustained, co-ordinated efforts are needed to bring about a just and long-lasting peace. To this end, joint missions, such as those undertaken by the UK and France to Nigeria and DRC, are encouraged, as are common statements following diplomatic or thematic missions (human rights, IDPs, etc). Unified positions and strategies should be articulated.

Decision makers need to consult continuously with civil society and support community reconciliation efforts. Collaborative and inclusive efforts, which bring together Sudanese peace interests and the international community, are urgently needed. Support to inter-tribal conferences and meetings, which identify alternatives to violence and help re-establish inter-communal trust, are vital. The international community can help sustain progress by providing resources to support the implementation of recommendations emerging from such meetings.

Humanitarian access, rights and protection

All warring parties need to respect the needs and priorities of displaced, refugee and other conflict-affected groups with regards to humanitarian

assistance. The warring parties, international governments, NGOs and the UN need to ensure that there is unrestricted access to vulnerable and war-affected communities, regardless of their location, in accordance with the provisions of International Humanitarian Law.

The ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains needs to be monitored and the free movement of civilians and access to humanitarian assistance guaranteed. The warring parties, in co-operation with the international community, must work towards maintaining and extending the ceasefire in the context of an overall peace process.

There must be an end to human rights abuses being perpetrated in the oil fields. The minimum conditions to achieve positive change are the cessation of civilian attacks and the termination of inequitable and non-transparent use of oil revenues. Concerned governments, as well as other international and regional actors, should insist that an independent monitoring presence is established, and that parties to the conflict agree to a more equitable sharing of wealth and resources.

Companies must ensure that their operations cause no further harm to local communities. Oil companies must undertake to co-operate with independent assessments, ensure that security forces protecting oil installations adhere to the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights, and consider carefully the direct and indirect effects of their operations on the safety and rights of local people.

Protection of civilians, including from displacement, must be guaranteed. Recent agreements in principle, such as a ban on the bombing of civilians, must be immediately put into practice. Monitors need to be in place as soon as modalities are agreed. All concerned parties, local and international, should consistently and unequivocally condemn attacks against innocent civilians and humanitarian facilities. The international community must be unified about speaking out against abuses committed by all sides in the conflict.

Co-ordinated efforts by the government, opposition forces, agencies, and NGOs are needed to ensure that the rights and protection of IDPs are guaranteed.

In particular these efforts should ensure a co-ordinated, multi-agency contribution to a national policy workshop planned for 2002. IDPs right to integration, resettlement or return should be respected. To this end, donors and NGOs are encouraged to work with the government in exploring land tenure and livelihood choices together with the provision of health and education services.

It is necessary to develop long-term solutions for women and children whose families have been fragmented by conflict and who have as a consequence lost vital assets. Family reunification programmes will be necessary for IDPs, and particularly for abductees.

Authorities must ensure that NGOs and agencies have full access to IDP camps and settlements in order to provide humanitarian assistance and to monitor the human rights and humanitarian situation on the ground. Regular meetings with the government could provide a forum for sharing information and for developing rights-focused approaches.

Concerned governments, agencies and NGOs should support the implementation of the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Abductions.

The Commission is urged to apply pressure on the Government and SPLM to agree locations and modalities of return for abductees. Both parties, working in co-operation with others, are encouraged to explore the possibilities of linking the return of abductees to the 'periods of tranquility'. Using days of tranquility for the return of abductees is a concrete way of demonstrating impact and of building trust and confidence between communities.

Long-term development and investment in people

Building peace requires long-term investment: in people, to enable them to challenge the status quo, in the provision of education and health, in the building of representative governance, and in the creation of an equitable economic and judicial framework.

Many donors have hitherto been reluctant to provide longer-term assistance to communities throughout Sudan, at least until there is peace. We urge donors now to reverse their earlier policies and engage with existing

opportunities. Long-term support must not, however, undermine local structures or self-reliance where this exists, for example in the Nuba Mountains.

Donors are encouraged to ensure more 'joined-up' cross-government approaches to relief, rehabilitation, and development, based on a comprehensive analysis of the central issues facing Sudan.

Better understanding of the local political context could allow donors and NGOs to develop more appropriate tools and strategies for addressing local humanitarian need, establishing more sustained programmes and simultaneously expanding the space for confidence building and conflict transformation.

External support should be given to encouraging the establishment and accountable functioning of genuinely representative, broad-based non-state organisations, networks, and platforms.

The contributions of civil society throughout Sudan to peace and good governance need to be recognised and reinforced, for example through rights-based training, capacity building, enhanced access to information and representative media, and civic education. By creating platforms for dialogue between state and non-state actors, connections can be made between local, national, and international policy objectives.

Introduction

This report exposes the relentless human costs of Sudan's conflict. The war has exacted a terrible human cost and it must end. Now. Ending the war and achieving a durable peace is the only way to break the cycle of humanitarian crises and human rights abuse. Peace will allow the people of Sudan to move toward truly sustainable development and to fully unlock their country's potential. This potential can however also be tapped now to accelerate the demand for peace.

This report comes at a critical time: there is currently an opportunity for building peace, as international and regional governments engage with Sudan in earnest after years of comparative isolation. **Ending the conflict will require coherent and coordinated efforts by the international community working in concert with Sudanese peace interests. It is an opportunity that cannot be lost.**

At international level, governments and agencies have a range of political, diplomatic, funding and aid instruments at their disposal that can be used flexibly and creatively in pursuit of peace. **International governments,**

agencies and donors are therefore urged to explore new ways of rising to the humanitarian challenges facing poor and vulnerable Sudanese whilst continuing to press for peace at the highest political and diplomatic levels.

If political and humanitarian support is to be effective, an enhanced awareness of how the conflict is harming ordinary and poor Sudanese is urgently required. **This report specifically aims to draw attention to the human costs of conflict, which have hitherto been poorly articulated, and to demonstrate that progress, which alleviates suffering and reduces violence, is possible even in the bleakest situations.**

The report also makes specific recommendations to warring parties and international governments and agencies in breaking the cycle of violence and humanitarian crises. **The recommendations seek to highlight how the various opportunities for peace and development that currently exist at community, national and international levels, can be exploited now.**

Key facts at a glance

- Three generations have lived through war. There has only been one decade of peace since 1955.
- More than two million people have died because of war since 1983.⁵ More than four million have been displaced.
- Eighty-five per cent of the inhabitants of southern Sudan are thought to have been displaced at least once in the last fifteen years.⁶
- Ninety-two per cent of the population live below the poverty line.⁷
- Only about one in three children go to school in Sudan. The adult literacy rate is less than 15 per cent in conflict zones.⁸
- Less than one-quarter of the population of southern Sudan, and only about 60 per cent of people in the north, have access to safe water.
- Leprosy, river blindness, polio and other diseases are rife in southern Sudan, where only 30-40 per cent of people live within one day's walk of a health facility.
- Approximately 80 per cent of all cases of guinea worm are found in Sudan.
- At least one in ten children die before they reach five.⁹ This figure is closer to one in five in the south.¹⁰
- Maternal mortality rates in northern Sudan are 509 per 100,000 live births,¹¹ and as high as 865 per 100,000 live births in the south.¹²
- At least 6,000 women and children have been abducted since 1983; some are still being held captive. There are approximately 17,000 child soldiers in southern Sudan.¹³
- Frequent denials of access affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to more than one million people.
- A major part of government expenditure is military: at least US\$ 246m per year.¹⁴
- Landmines are estimated to have injured or killed 70,000 people between 1983 and 1999.¹⁵

Section 1: The Context

The roots of conflict

Sudan has known only one fragile decade of peace since 1955. **The conflict has now claimed more than two million lives, caused the largest internal displacement of people in the world, and is responsible for the erosion of health, education, and other vital services.** People's lives have been shattered by violence and the levels of destruction are difficult to comprehend, even when seen at first-hand.

The war is often portrayed as a confrontation between a northern Arab Islamic government and a southern Christian African minority, but it is much more complex than that. The crisis has its roots in the colonial past: under British-Egyptian rule, northern and southern Sudan were run by separate colonial administrations, and although the British attempted to reverse the policy of separate development in the last decade of the colonial era, they had 'neither the time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that might have ensured protection for the south in a united Sudan'.¹⁶ Thus the divisions were perpetuated, contributing to the acute economic and social disparities that persist today.

The inability of successive administrations to address the critical governance issues and to implement policies necessary for equity, inclusion and decentralisation of power have deepened the divisions within society. This is reflected in the fact that there have been four military coups d'état since independence.

There is also a conflict of identities. For southern populations, independence did not bring freedom, but merely 'a change of outside masters'.¹⁷ Events since then have reinforced this perception of cultural and religious subordination: for example, the imposition of Sharia law, the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the increase in abductions and the discrimination experienced by displaced people. Mistrust and resentment have deepened as the conflict drags on. It is not surprising then, that many Sudanese see the war as a struggle for dignity, freedom and equality.



Exacerbation of the conflict

Factional fighting

The nature of the conflict has changed over the last ten years. Since 1991, much of the fighting has been between and within southern factions, rather than with the Khartoum government. The strife often has an ethnic component, which deepens hostility and makes the likelihood of reconciliation more remote. The parties to the civil war, who have engaged in 'proxy wars' by supplying combatants with weapons and resources, have deliberately exploited these inter-communal conflicts. The emergence of factions and warlords can also be seen as evidence of self-interest and discontent with the leadership, and signals a 'culture' that allows undisciplined commanders and militias to raid and pillage with impunity. The merger of factions, whilst potentially positive in the long-term, has generally led to an intensification of violence and abuse in the short term. This is true of the conflict in the oil exploration areas of Western Upper Nile, where shifting alliances have altered the front lines and created destabilisation and displacement.

Unlock potential: Support genuine reconciliation efforts that promote sustained peace

The cessation of inter-factional hostilities between the SPLA and the SSDF could lead to a huge decrease in the vicious inter-factional fighting which has characterised the war during the last 10 years. The merger, combined with the planned unification of military, civil, administrative and humanitarian structures could do much to reduce the atrocities committed against civilians, improve access for the purpose of protection and the provision of humanitarian assistance, and provide greater unity of purpose from which the opposition can negotiate peace. However, if these positive benefits are to be realised, greater commitment by armed groups to respecting the rights of Sudanese civilians is a prerequisite. The rapid and extensive deployment of monitors under the Danforth proposal is necessary if warring parties are to be held accountable to their commitments.

Concerned governments and agencies need to be cognisant of the dangers of supporting mergers which do not aim to reduce conflict, but should support mergers which explicitly aim to reduce violence and increase accountability of leaders to communities.

Oil extraction

The extraction of oil is fuelling the war and allowing greater military expenditure. Since 1999, oil drilling and exploration, has further increased the displacement of Nuer populations in western Upper Nile. Oil companies have refused to acknowledge the extent of the problem. The few community development projects being funded by oil companies do little to mitigate the massive human cost of the displacement and civilian casualties.

The exploitation of oil has also changed the economic and political balance of the conflict. Indeed it is estimated that Khartoum's defence expenditure has doubled over the last two years.¹⁸ Oil production currently runs at 230,000 barrels a day, earning the government \$500m in 2000 and \$800m in 2001¹⁹ – around 40 per cent of its total revenue.²⁰ The IMF gives a conservative estimate (in 1999, the most recent data available) of military spending at \$246m, equivalent to 27 per cent of all government spending and representing the largest budget line.²¹ There

is little evidence of oil revenue being invested in alleviating poverty or providing health or education services.

The oil fields themselves are a strategic target and the scene of increased fighting, bombing raids, helicopter gunship attacks, and human rights abuses. Increasing numbers of reports describe levels of displacement and human rights abuses resulting from fighting around, or due to, the presence of contested oil fields. The UN Human Rights Rapporteur records that 'the exploitation of Sudan's oil resources is clearly exacerbating the conflict'.²² The ongoing clearing of land for 'security reasons' is having a devastating affect on civilians. As long as each side believes it can gain the upper hand at an 'acceptable cost', there is little incentive for resolution.²³

The extraction of oil has implications across Sudan's borders too. Sudan's neighbours now have access to relatively inexpensive oil and this may alter the political balance in the future, specifically in the context of the regionally-led peace process. In addition, oil has altered Sudan's foreign relationships and allowed the country to emerge from international isolation. China has become a major trade partner with Sudan, while Russian companies are starting to invest in Sudanese oil, and the Russian government is beginning to resume military cooperation with its former cold war client.²⁴ A military co-operation accord to be signed with Russia has been proposed.²⁵ A number of European firms are also involved in the Sudanese oil industry, including several well-known British engineering companies. Some of these firms construct and maintain pumping equipment, while some reportedly manage the security arrangements for the oil facilities.

Ineffective peace processes

The peace process for Sudan, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD),ⁱⁱ has been characterised by eight years of ineffective negotiations that neither side has taken seriously. **The Declaration of Principles (DOP) provides a legitimate framework for negotiation and addresses such issues as the right to self-determination and the separation of religion and state.** The premise of the DOP is unity, with the right to a referendum if agreement is not reached. The member states of IGAD have been weak in pushing the process

ii The Inter Government Authority for Development is the sub-regional body for the Horn of Africa and normally includes the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Sudan

iii The IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) is a forum for dialogue between IGAD member countries and donor countries that support IGAD

forward, and this has allowed the warring parties to obstruct progress. The IGAD Secretariat has provided insufficient leadership, although it has now been strengthened by the appointment of the Kenyan special envoy General Lazarus Sumbeiywo. The IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)ⁱⁱⁱ has also failed to give adequate support and is in vital need of reform.

'The history and nature of the Sudan conflict demonstrates that a military solution cannot bring lasting peace and stability to the country.'

'A peaceful and just political solution must be the common objective of the parties to the conflict, the rights of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed and maintaining the unity of Sudan must be given priority by all the parties... in the political, legal economic and social framework of the country.'

From Appendix 3: Declaration of Principles, Sponsored by IGAD

The lack of progress with IGAD has led to other proposals being put forward. The most recent, from Libya and Egypt, proposed the formation of a transitional government charged with adopting constitutional reforms and organising genuine elections, yet makes no reference to the referendum on self-determination that forms part of IGAD's negotiating platform. This makes it unacceptable to the SPLM/A. The failure of the IGAD peace process and the unwillingness of the warring parties to concede any gains is leading to a situation in which separation is becoming a more attractive option for the people of southern Sudan who see less and less hope of an equitable and unified state.

Sudanese voices

Peter Gatkuoth is a Nuer, living in Western Upper Nile. 'This war between us and the Dinka – if it had been with spears, like in the old days, that would have been OK. What prolonged the war was the use of guns. If you have a cow, you can buy a gun. People come to attack at night, and surround your homestead, and kill everyone. In this village we had two girls abducted by the Dinka. But now there is peace, since Wunlit. Some people came from the Dinka, raiding our cattle, to confuse us, but the SPLM and SPDF sorted it out. I lost ten cattle, and haven't been able to revenge it, but if you want your children to survive, you will make peace and won't think of revenge. Now we just need peace.'

Unlock potential: support local peace processes

Some local peace processes are emerging, such as the Wunlit 'people-to-people' peace agreement between Nuer and Dinka communities. The Wunlit Process was a milestone in the development of a more relaxed political climate as it involved the frank discussion of contentious issues. The Lilir Peace Agreement, held in Upper Nile in 2000, continued the trend towards openness. A similar agreement has been reached in Abyei too. These initiatives are re-establishing a degree of trust between communities. They encourage free movement of people and help create the space for development initiatives to take root; they thus offer lessons for future administrations and for those attempting to broker peace. Currently however, there are few mechanisms for linking these local peace processes to higher-level peace efforts. If more inclusive peace processes are sought, then genuine connections need to be established.

Furthermore, local peace agreements need to demonstrate that 'peace dividends' are possible. The provision of health services, safe water and education can help to sustain peace agreements and reduce resource-based conflict. The re-establishment of trade relationships and markets can build links for future co-operation. Donors and agencies can provide very practical support by allocating resources to support the implementation of recommendations emerging from inter-tribal meetings.

Section 2: Regional and international dimensions

This section of the report describes the various regional and international geo-political interests that have thus far impeded the search for a just and durable peace settlement in Sudan. **It also outlines some of the policies and instruments at the disposal of international governments and donors, which could be used more effectively to alleviate humanitarian suffering, to reduce conflict, and to promote peace.**

Regional political engagement

Regional and international interests have complicated the civil war. Egypt has political and economic interests in Sudan as a result of its dependence on the Nile, and will not countenance a separate southern state. Egypt's interests cannot be separated from Middle Eastern political realities or Sudan's strategic links to the Red Sea and to the Indian Ocean seaways. Egypt has a critical role to play in the support of peace. Yet the IGAD process, which excludes Egypt, does not allow for the voicing of Egyptian concerns or interests.

Other regional players have at various times provided military bases and supplies, as well as more covert support for the warring parties. Uganda, until recently, supported the SPLM/A, whilst the Khartoum government supported the rebel Lords Resistance Army (LRA), which has attacked, raided and terrorised communities in northern Uganda for over a decade. The efforts of the Carter Centre in normalising relations between Sudan and Uganda may provide a new basis for political interaction and could be important for reducing cross border attacks. The two countries are currently collaborating to end the activities of the LRA and to release the large numbers of children abducted by the rebel army. This is proving to be a difficult exercise and has, for the short term at least, increased violence and confusion on the ground.

Ethiopia allowed the SPLM to be based in its territories until 1991 when a new government took power in Addis Ababa. Since then both Ethiopia and Eritrea have had troubled relations with Sudan. Although it supports the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) opposition group, Eritrea has recently normalised relations with Sudan. Ethiopia has also re-engaged, despite its concerns about inequitable sharing of Nile waters.^{iv} While these new alignments are determined by political-economic realities, the redefining of relations could be a step toward more significant regional dialogue. Kenya, as noted, is taking a lead role in the regional peace process.

Unlock potential: learn from the Nile Basin Initiative

Whilst not directly related to conflict in Sudan, The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which involves all Nile Riparian states, is actively seeking to create inter-state trust and to develop joint programmes of water development that bring mutual benefits to states and their communities. The Initiative, which is primarily supported by the Government of Canada and the World Bank in co-operation with other donors, also includes a conflict-prevention objective. Still in relative infancy, the Initiative could provide lessons for donors on how to approach regional trust building and economic integration, and demonstrate how shared regional concerns can be a springboard for cooperation.

By evaluating the NBI and publicising best practice, regional and international governments could increase their understanding and awareness of one model of resource-sharing and regional confidence building.

International political engagement

Former US Administrations pursued an isolationist policy with respect to Khartoum, while at the same time acknowledging political support for the SPLM/A. In 1993, Sudan was added to the US list of states supporting terrorism as a result of the attempted assassination of Egypt's President Mubarak. Under the Clinton administration, US policy was guided by the perceived threat Sudan posed to international and regional security. During this period sanctions were imposed on Sudan, but the bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical company in 1998 was the nadir of US-Sudan relations. A strong US domestic constituency that opposes the Khartoum government on the grounds of religious domination and slavery was, and is, a factor in US relations with Khartoum.

However, pressure, largely from US-based NGOs working in Sudan, helped shift the Clinton administration towards a policy of 'constructive engagement' during the latter part of its tenure. Under President Bush the policy of engagement appears to have continued. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that Sudan is a priority, and the appointment of Senator John Danforth is evidence of high-level political commitment. US policy on Sudan has not yet been fully articulated, and there has been some uncertainty as to its final direction. Events since 11 September have not clarified the policy situation, although there has been a change of emphasis as the US government

^{iv} Ethiopia does not recognise a 1959 Treaty, which divides the Nile waters between Sudan and Egypt. Whilst the Nile Basin Initiative (see box) is taking steps to manage water development more equitably, Ethiopia maintains concerns that its needs may be subjugated by both Egypt and Sudan.

places the war on terrorism at the top of its foreign-policy agenda. The US government did not veto the lifting of UN sanctions on Khartoum in September 2001, but has yet to lift its own sanctions. Also on hold is the Sudan Peace Act, which could provide assistance to Sudan's opposition groups and punish foreign or US companies dealing with Sudan; there is growing pressure within the USA, particularly among the Christian-right constituency, to push this Bill forward. Conversely, there is pressure from business interests in the US to overturn it.

Unlock potential: shift from humanitarian action to political resolution

Currently, the US Government's continued engagement is conditional upon genuine progress being made with Senator Danforth's plan to forestall abductions, prevent the bombing of civilians, provide humanitarian access through 'periods of tranquility' – for vaccination programmes – and to implement a monitored cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains. Whilst progress on Senator Danforth's points of late 2001 are paramount if human suffering is to be reduced, such measures need to be reinforced by political action at the highest levels if the goal of a just and sustainable peace is to be achieved.

Those committed to peace in Sudan need to maintain a focus on a comprehensive peace settlement. Although interim steps which reduce the potential for violence and address humanitarian concerns are vital, they cannot be a substitute for political resolution.

In contrast to the US Government approach, the European Union (EU) has pursued a policy of 'constructive engagement' with the government of Sudan since 1999. The EU initiated 'critical dialogue' with Khartoum, guided by the Articles of the Cotonou Agreement, as part of a process of encouraging normalised EU relations with Sudan. Progress is, and will continue to be, subject to achieving agreed benchmarks. Thus, measurable improvements in democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance will be central to continuing engagement. By means of this process, it is anticipated that Sudan will

eventually become part of the Cotonou Framework Agreement that determines the relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.^v Significantly, the EU is looking at longer-term funding opportunities, and this is explored in more depth below.

Bilaterally, the governments of Norway, the UK, and Switzerland are continuing to play an active role in advancing the cause of peace. Norway has provided a lead member of the Joint Monitoring Commission for the Nuba Mountains ceasefire agreement. The Norwegian Minister for Development Assistance has, in an unprecedented move, been given direct responsibility for Sudan (normally under Foreign Affairs). This should assist the implementation of a cross-government policy. Switzerland has appointed a field co-ordinator for Nuba. The UK has appointed a peace envoy, who is supported by both the British Foreign Office and Department for International Development (DFID). The envoy will work across government departments and promote 'joined-up' government approaches to Sudan. The UK has also established a cross-department conflict fund for which Sudan could be a priority candidate. The US Government is also planning to establish an expanded Sudan unit in the State Department with cross-departmental representation.

Instituting joined-up government mechanisms such as these is evidence that governments recognise that incoherent approaches can undermine thoughtful international engagement. However, if these approaches are to be effective in Sudan, policies need to be based on a deep, comprehensive, and shared analysis of the central issues and of the impact of the humanitarian crisis.

Despite the fact that governments are now paying more attention to Sudan, the lack of coherence between governments is still of great concern. The gap between the EU and the US may be narrowing, but within the EU itself there are still disparate approaches. At best, incoherence can lead to confusion; at worst it prevents genuine and concerted strategic approaches to peace being implemented.

^v The Cotonou Partnership Agreement defines the EU's relationship with 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Aid to Sudan under the terms of the predecessor Lome Agreement was unilaterally suspended by the EU in 1990.

Donor policies in support of peace and development

Governments and donors have not generally promoted sustained assistance to Sudan, despite often-high levels of support to relief and rehabilitation. One of the major constraints to community development projects in Sudan has been the lack of funding for development assistance. For Sudanese attempting to build futures outside the context of conflict, the lack of long-term vision by many donors is an obstacle. Yet, there are exceptions. The Netherlands has been active in supporting civil-society peace efforts and has initiated a project, 'engendering peace,' that brings together women from northern and southern Sudan. The US Government is proposing to disburse more than \$US40m of development funding over a five-year period in support of the important sectors of agriculture and education. The UK is said to be reviewing its funding criteria in favour of more sustained support.

Unlock potential: ensure long-term investment in people

A constraint for donors is the institutional and budgetary commitment to the concept of a 'relief to development continuum'. Whilst the need to respond to crisis on the basis of the humanitarian imperative is incontrovertible, it is also true that large areas of Sudan are relatively stable and free from conflict.^{vi} Stable areas could provide a supportive environment for more sustained activities. It is possible to respond to a variegated environment and to shift away from a one-policy-fits-all approach.

Better understanding of the local political context could allow donors and NGOs to develop more appropriate tools and strategies for addressing local humanitarian need, establishing more sustained programmes and simultaneously expanding the space for confidence building and conflict transformation. Central to progress in this area is the nurturing of a genuinely representative and broad-based civil society. To this end, donors and agencies should support platforms which bring together non-state actors and which establish dialogue with authorities.

Long-term investment in education, health and in the building of representative governance and in the creation of an equitable economic and judicial framework can assist people to challenge the status quo and thus take a more active role in political and economic life.

Although the EU suspended formal co-operation with Sudan in 1990, largely because of concerns over human rights and governance, unspent European Development Funds (EDF) are being disbursed under the EU's Humanitarian Plus initiative. These funds will be directed toward developing the resilience of communities to cope on a more long-term basis. There is also potential for additional EDF development funding if the EU-Sudan normalisation process stays on track.

Many donors already have in place – if not in practice – a range of policies that could potentially contribute to poverty alleviation and conflict transformation. The UK has developed a manual to assist project planners to improve the effectiveness of aid through better analysis of conflict. The manual assesses the 'conflict-related risks associated with development or humanitarian assistance and to develop options for conflict-sensitive policies and programmes'. It also aims to improve the 'effectiveness of development policy and programmes in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction'. It will be applied to Sudan.²⁶

The Netherlands Government has established a conflict management and humanitarian aid department that aims to integrate strategies for development co-operation, political mediation, emergency aid, economic sanctions, and military operations. Likewise, the US Government has developed an integrated strategy for support in southern Sudan.

The EU has a range of policies and principles that can be used to promote peace and development and has developed its own manual to help planning in situations of 'high tension and open conflict'. Also importantly, the EU, in developing Country Strategy Papers (the EU's standard planning and development assistance framework for each country), must now demonstrate that civil society has been consulted and involved in the identification of national priorities. In preparing for this process the EU has begun an exercise to map the range of civil society actors in Sudan. Whilst welcome, it is imperative that such an undertaking reflects the views and experience of a wide range of representative non-state actors in both government and opposition-held areas of Sudan.

Similarly, the IGAD IPF 'Planning for Peace' exercise involved extensive consultation with civil-society groups, members of communities across Sudan, and local authorities of various kinds. The study found that all these local stakeholders are frustrated with the lack of inclusivity of governance institutions and peace negotiations. The international community should continue to support such consultative processes and should implement the study's recommendations to ensure that local communities are fully involved in all decisions that affect their future.

Unlock potential: apply peace-building policies

Over the last five to six years, many donors have developed policies and strategies which aim to reduce the potential negative impact of relief interventions and address the underlying causes of conflict. These policies emerge from a better understanding of the links between conflict and external assistance. While humanitarian aid remains vital and lives must be saved, it is widely recognised, for instance, that aid can sometimes 'cement divisions between conflicting groups and may contribute to the entrenchment of war economies and ultimately to the prolongation of war'.²⁷ Emergency relief can also distort social relations, entrench inequalities and allow elite groups to benefit, unless it is strategically targeted. Donors have also acknowledged that conflict can undermine the benefits of development and have expressed the need to address the roots of conflict in tandem with more conflict-sensitive assistance programmes. A driving force behind policy reform is a consensus that the costs of conflict cannot be sustained. Yet, despite interest in Sudan and the many policy instruments available to them, donors and concerned governments have not yet been able to translate these commitments into effective action.

It is possible, whilst respecting the humanitarian imperative and International Humanitarian Law (IHL),^{vii} to use aid and political instruments more creatively and effectively and to institute peace-building programmes.

Impoverished and war-affected communities feel the costs of Sudan's conflict disproportionately. Although the need to overturn these appalling conditions is not disputed, the seriousness of the situation has not been grasped and the means to effect change are poorly understood. Furthermore, the important achievements that have been made remain insufficiently articulated and so remain relatively inaccessible. In the following section, the tragic human costs of conflict, as well as the potential for exploiting opportunities at local, national, and international levels, are illustrated.

^{vii} IHL includes the four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, and the 'Hague Law', dating from 1899. These laws prohibit the targeting of civilians and civilian property, protect the rights of prisoners of war, and limit the means by which wars are fought. They apply to all conflicts, and all warring parties are bound by them.

Section 3: The costs of conflict

The protracted civil war is tearing families apart, and eroding the social fabric and economic life of communities. Conflict has increased people's vulnerability to famine, undermined already fragile coping strategies and destroyed vital assets and livelihoods. As the conflict continues, social services and infrastructure deteriorate, men and boys become soldiers or join militias (sometimes voluntarily, sometimes forcibly), and economic opportunities diminish, especially for poor populations. The consequences have been stark, particularly in southern Sudan. There, school enrollment is intolerably low – at least one generation of children has already been deprived of education – and there are almost no job opportunities outside the military.

Sudan now has more than four million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and large numbers of refugees in neighbouring countries. The IDPs, who have fled war, famine and, more recently, conflict over the oilfields, are largely poor and landless. They often lack access to basic services, including clean water, health and education.

It is nevertheless possible to take advantage of nascent developments at community level and provide assistance in ways that reduce humanitarian suffering while maximising opportunities for increased trust and confidence.

It is hoped that this section will provide pointers to those who are looking for ways to link peace and development efforts at community level to higher-level political and humanitarian processes.

The economic and opportunity costs of conflict

Sudan is a country with a variety of natural resources and vast economic potential. However, partly because the benefits of those resources are inequitably shared, this potential is being lost. The revenues from resource exploitation are not routinely directed to the priority areas of poverty alleviation and service provision in marginalised areas, and there is increasing concern that military spending is rising. In 1999, the war consumed as much as half the national income,²⁹ and it is estimated that military expenditure has doubled since the oil pipeline was completed.³⁰ The SPLA has also spent heavily on weaponry, which has been supplied by a range of sources; this contrasts with the lack of investment in public services such as health and education.

Conflict has dissuaded investors and restricted access to resources. As a result, dozens of industrial and agricultural projects have been delayed or cancelled leaving the potential of Sudan unrealised. The mineral-rich south offers prospects for mining: chromite reserves in southern Blue Nile state alone are estimated at one million tonnes, but production has fallen by 80 per cent since the 1980s because of the escalation of the fighting in the area.³¹ Many promising projects have been shelved: minerals, timber, livestock, fish and other products could bring prosperity if managed sustainably and equitably, but they are currently part of a 'war economy' that perpetuates conflict. The manufacturing sector, short of foreign exchange to buy essential imports, has been deeply affected: most industries operated at less than 50 per cent capacity during the 1990s.³²

Conflict has also incapacitated Sudan's ability to trade internationally. US trade sanctions banning US exports to Sudan and Sudanese imports to the US have been in place since 1997 (except for US exports of food, medicine and medical equipment since 2000). Trade opportunities within the region have also been lost because of the war.

Although GDP increased by an average 6.6 per cent between 1996 and 2000, growth was largely cancelled by the fiscal instability caused by conflict. Today, the Ministry of Finance is unable to plan ahead because of the likelihood of sudden demands from the military. The tax collection system has also been adversely affected by war.³³

The impact of oil extraction is of current interest. Oil could bring huge benefits to the people of Sudan. As noted above, the IMF gives a conservative estimate of military spending in 1999 as being \$246m, equivalent to 27 per cent of all government spending and representing the largest budget line.³⁴ **It needs to be acknowledged that few of the benefits of natural-resource extraction in Sudan reach poor and marginalised communities.**

A peaceful Sudan could attract considerable revenue through foreign direct investment and trade. **Peace could allow spending to be redirected towards poverty eradication and to the vital sectors of health and education which could in turn bring benefits to communities. If peace were established and economic stability improved, then debt relief could also be an option.**

The re-establishment of international development relationships could bring relief to poor rural communities and bring Sudan back into the international community. The exploitation of oil generates huge revenue, yet if it could be extracted under more peaceful circumstances, oil companies would have lower overheads and the government could negotiate a higher share of the profits than the five per cent it is currently receiving. Whilst the potential benefits of oil are often over-stated, it is clear that wealth-sharing arrangements could play a part in increasing trust, improving services, and contributing to the well being of poor Sudanese.

The political costs: the impact on governance and the rule of law

Successive administrations have been unable or unwilling to bridge the cultural divide, or to create the policies necessary for equity and inclusion. Power and wealth have become concentrated in the hands of the few, and the militarisation of politics has deepened divisions, leaving many Sudanese feeling politically and socially marginalised. **Throughout Sudan, limited participation by citizens in political life means that there are few opportunities for dialogue and few peaceful means for dealing with grievances.**

Neither party to the conflict has sought to promote democracy or has established truly accountable public institutions. A new law on political parties introduced in 1999 might eventually improve political diversity. Civil society is generally viewed with suspicion and the press is subject to censorship and other restrictions. Legislation explicitly discourages challenges to the state: the 2001 National Security Forces Act, for instance, permits the arrest and detaining of 'individuals for a period of several months without judicial review, depending on the crime'.³⁵

National Liberation Conventions – forums for SPLM policy formulation – have not been convened since 1994.^{viii} This is troubling many Sudanese, who feel excluded from the political system and see little space for voicing their concerns. The leadership tightly controls many aspects of SPLM administration, and there is insufficient separation of military and civilian structures. In addition, civil authorities do not release official statistics on taxation, which means that citizens cannot see how their money is being spent.

People throughout Sudan are disillusioned by the lack of political accountability. This has serious implications for future peace and democracy. At present, there are only four functioning statutory laws in SPLM areas and none in other parts of south Sudan. Improved legislation could help provide the legal framework for a functioning and accountable society.

Unlock potential: support legal reform

In 1999, the SPLM appointed its first Chief Justice and Deputy and in 2000 attempted to establish a civilian judiciary, an important step away from the military tribunals which operated exclusively from 1983. There is increased interest from civil society in the institutions of the judiciary, prisons, and police. Demand is growing for reform and investment in these institutions in order that an enabling environment be created for developmental activities to expand. The voice of women is increasingly important in the development of both law and policy and of the practicalities of the justice system. There is work going on in Yei County to record abuses of women through the courts and under customary law. Women are increasingly engaging with the law and legal system and are demanding reform, better treatment, and representation.

If such work is to have long-term benefits, donors and agencies need to invest in legal structures and expand legal-reform programmes across community and district divides. Women in particular need to be encouraged to participate in such programmes. This will require greater attention to the provision of information, awareness-raising programmes, empowerment, and education.

There are some positive signs. The SPLM and government of Sudan have committed to abide by a range of agreements and international conventions, including the UN/OLS Ground Rules^x and the Convention on the Rights of the Child; this includes a commitment to address the issue of child soldiers. Both sides have also agreed to support a landmines response initiative (described in more detail below). NGOs and some agencies are supporting the development of local governance systems and of civil society institutions through which rehabilitation aid can be channeled. Important consideration is also being given to the strengthening of civil society in order to encourage

viii The last convention set up a civil administration structure, which is a good basis for future improvements. However, the key decision-making processes are still controlled by unaccountable leaders, rather than elected representatives. The next convention, which is being discussed, is likely to address these issues.

xi The OLS Ground Rules bind all parties to respect the humanitarian imperative and ensure that the rights of aid beneficiaries are respected.

greater participation in decision-making and more effective engagement with authorities. As noted in section 2 of this report, the EU, in recognising the key role of civil society in national strategy formulation, is already taking steps to map the range and capacity of non-state actors.

Unlock potential: enhance the capacity of civil society

Across Sudan, civil-society groups and structures, including traditional institutions, are attempting to promote political, social, economic, and judicial reform. Many others are supporting local peace and development efforts. These contributions need to be recognised and reinforced through activities such as rights-based training, capacity building, enhanced access to media and information, the provision of popular radio programmes addressing legal or constitutional reform issues, and the training of advocates, particularly of women. Civic education could help communities hold leaders accountable to laws and allow legal principles to take root. By creating platforms for dialogue between state and non-state actors, connections can be made between local and national policy objectives.

External support should be given to encouraging the establishment of genuinely representative, broad-based and accountable non-state organisations, networks, and platforms where these do not exist. Priority should be given to enhancing the capacity of these groups where they do exist.

Despite improvements, the gulf between high-level politics and the administrations at county and community level is still immense. There is still no widespread understanding among warring parties of the vital role that civil society can play in both building and sustaining peace. Nor is there sufficient political will to create the space for the full participation of civil society. It is possible to build the capacity of civil society in the context of conflict, but without investment in education, literacy, and civic education, the impact of such work will remain limited. **Investing in Sudan's people would allow communities to play a more meaningful and informed role in political life and hold their leaders accountable to agreed policies and resolutions.**

The human costs

All sides to the conflict are guilty of widespread human rights abuses, including assault, rape, abduction and forcible displacement. Warring parties have targeted civilians while uncontrolled militia groups wreak destruction



on property and livelihoods, exacting a terrible human toll. The activities of militias continue unabated, with ever-increasing levels of violence. This has led to massive displacement throughout large areas of southern Sudan, especially Bahr el Ghazal.

Sudanese voices

'My name is Elario Uyaka. I am living here beside the road because I fled the fighting in Raga. We heard news that civilians were being killed by soldiers, so we just packed some food, some cooking pots, and left, heading for Tambura. My wife Helena is pregnant, so the journey was very hard for her. My three-year-old son walked, even though it was a long way – 45 days. But our little girl, Carlena, had to be carried by my wife. Carlena is still suffering from hunger, she is very thin, and she is always tired and confused.'

The conflict has traumatised families throughout Sudan. More than 50,000 children in the south have lost both their parents, while 170,000 have no information about their natural parents.³⁶ As many as 17,000 child soldiers may be fighting in the south, which adds to the breakdown of families, increases trauma, and denies affected children the chance of even limited education.³⁷ For Sudanese communities, which depend upon kinship support, the break-up of families strikes at the very heart of survival systems.

Sudanese voices

Rebecca Nyahale used to live in Old Fangak, Jonglei Region. One night in early 2001, the town was attacked and captured by a rebel movement. Rebecca awoke to gunshots and fled her home, empty-handed. She became separated from her husband and five children as she made her way through rivers and swamps to a group of islands. She lived there for five months. Finally she decided to return to her parent's area, which was a month's walk away. 'I don't know when I will see my children again,' she says. 'The only way our problems can be solved is if there is peace in Sudan.'

The availability of small arms and the breakdown of social structures are leading to the abandonment of traditional means of fighting in favour of more violent raiding and banditry. Small arms are everywhere, turning small domestic incidents into communal conflicts in a matter of hours, and finding their way into neighbouring countries, leading to further destabilisation and bloodshed. Despite the proliferation of small arms, the 1994 EU arms embargo has been neither monitored nor enforced.

A UN embargo has been proposed at various times but has not been seriously considered at policy level. At the regional level, an IGAD-sponsored project is attempting to bring together all member states to address the issue of the illicit arms trade. The project aims to harmonise legal mechanisms, strengthen policing and border controls and involve civil society in monitoring, and in the long term decommissioning of weapons.

'If there is ever peace in this County, the chiefs will have to mobilise the communities to say to the government, "You brought these guns, now take them back – we don't want them".'

Chief in Juba County, southern Sudan, 2001

Landmines (perhaps two million in total) are a huge problem, killing and maiming civilians and preventing people from cultivating their land. Landmines are estimated to have injured or killed 70,000 people between 1983 and 1999.³⁸

Unlock potential: implement national agreements

The government of Sudan has signed the Ottawa Landmines Convention, but has yet to ratify the accord. In October 2001, the SPLA deposited a deed with the Geneva Call in Switzerland committing the Movement to a ban on anti-personal mines and to cooperate on mine action.^x In response to this, the EU has provided one-year funding to the establishment of a cross-line programme called the Sudan Land Mines Information and Response Initiative, to map landmine and unexploded ordnance risk across Sudan, to work with communities in risk reduction, and eventually to commence de-mining activities. This programme is being implemented in partnership with UK Landmine Action, Oxfam GB and local partners in both north and south Sudan. Implementation of the programme, and independent monitoring and publicising of its progress, could do much to build trust between the warring parties.

Attacks on civilians

Villages and humanitarian relief stations have been targeted by both government forces and the SPLA. During the year 2001, for example, 130 Antonov bombing raids were reported, which resulted in the deaths of almost 100 civilians and injuries to at least 75 more. It is also likely that some raids in remote areas go unreported.

Government helicopter gunships attacked a relief station at Bieh in February 2002 leading to the death of at least 24 people and the wounding of dozens of others. A joint statement from UN directors described the incident as part of an 'alarming pattern of attacks by the Sudanese Government and associated militias against civilians at or near food distribution points and looting of humanitarian facilities'.³⁹ The directors said that the attacks were especially shocking "when set against the backdrop of a population in dire need of assistance". Attacks have altered recently: bombing by high-flying Antonov planes has been accompanied by the use of helicopter gunships, resulting in greater destruction and increased civilian casualties. The SPLA's record is also poor with respect to attacks on humanitarian stations. It attacked and looted a humanitarian station in Nyal in February 2001 and also stands accused of looting food and doing little to prevent soldiers committing rape in many areas. There are in general, and especially in the oil fields, increasing levels of civilian displacement and deaths. All warring parties are accused of gross violations of human rights, including the direct targeting of civilians that is also out of all proportion to any military objectives.

Sudanese voices

Yak Gatdet Kok describes how troops came to her village of Ngaryang, near Nhialdiu, just over three weeks ago. First, the soldiers came to loot their cattle. Soon after, three gunships came to terrorise the village. They flew low and soldiers in the back began shooting at the civilians as they attempted to flee. Many people were killed. 'I saw bodies on the ground as I ran with my children. The gunships were shooting at us so I could not stop to see if they were alive,' she said. The gunships also fired rockets that set the village on fire.

Source: Interviews by Christian Aid in Western Upper Nile, March 2002

^x The Geneva Call is an independent, international, non-governmental mechanism for Non-State Actors to commit themselves to a total ban on antipersonnel mines.

Unlock potential: protect civilians

A proposal to protect civilians against aerial bombardment has been agreed by both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A under the auspices of the US Government. The agreement reconfirms the warring parties' obligations under the Geneva Conventions, and specifically precludes them from targeting or intentionally attacking non-combatant civilians. In addition, they must refrain from targeting civilian objects or facilities, such as schools, hospitals, religious premises, health and food distribution centres, or relief operations, and to refrain from endangering the safety of civilians by using them as 'human shields'. The parties also agreed to the establishment of a Verification Mission to investigate, evaluate, and report on alleged incidents involving serious violations.

The agreement has the potential to reduce suffering and could allow large numbers of displaced people, particularly those in Western Upper Nile, to return to their homes and livelihoods. Civilians must be protected and all parties must be fully committed to the agreement. Violations must be made public and dealt with transparently. If the proposal has any impact at all, the Verification Mission is essential. It must start immediately, and monitors be deployed as soon as modalities are agreed.

Denial of access to humanitarian assistance

According to both international humanitarian law and the Operation Lifeline Sudan (UN/OLS) agreements between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, all sides to the conflict must respect the right of access by war-affected and vulnerable people to humanitarian assistance.^{xi} Indeed the UN/OLS agreement was based on the imperative of access following the 1988-9 conflict-induced famine.^{xii} Hitherto, 'negotiated access, the basis of OLS, is both its greatest strength as well as its greatest weakness, since it allows government and armed opposition movements to deny OLS access to people in need'.⁴⁰ Warring parties have consistently refused to allow full and unrestricted access. Regular denials of

access affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to more than one million people.

Denials frequently prevent access to the most 'at-risk' populations, and particularly affect Eastern Equatoria, and those displaced by recent attacks near the oilfields. Access to Southern Blue Nile is minimal. Communities in the Nuba Mountains also have been marginalised by conflict and their lack of access to sustained assistance. The conflict has led to the 'widespread destruction of traditional sources of livelihoods and massive internal displacement, with few Nuba retaining access to their traditional farming land'⁴¹. The repeated denial of humanitarian access over the last decade, has only served to reinforce the Nuba people's isolation. The cease-fire agreed between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan, and permission granted to deliver humanitarian assistance to all areas of the Nuba Mountains, could finally bring benefits. The deployment of monitors on the ground, to ensure that cross-line humanitarian access is possible, will be crucial to the success and expansion of the ceasefire.

However, it also needs to be recognised that the conflict in the Nuba Mountains cannot be dealt with in isolation from a comprehensive peace agreement. Nuba is not currently dealt with in the IGAD negotiation process. Ceasefires, however important in the short-term, cannot be a substitute for sustained political action.



^{xi} U.N./OLS was established in 1989. It is a tripartite agreement of negotiated access endorsed by the Government of Sudan, the SPLM, and the United Nations.

^{xii} Under the OLS framework, a consortium of UN agencies and more than 45 international and indigenous NGOs are able to provide emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance. Many other NGOs provide assistance outside the OLS framework.

Unlock potential: support self-reliance and conflict transformation

There are well-grounded fears that opening up the Nuba Mountains to humanitarian assistance could undermine the self-reliance of the Nuba people and exacerbate local conflict. The UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Sudan in cooperation with NGOs, has agreed that all assistance programmes in the Nuba must 'enhance the Nuba people's capacity for self-reliance within a sustained process of conflict transformation guided by the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves'. In order that this become a reality on the ground, truly principled approaches to external assistance are required. A principled framework agreement has been designed and it now up to NGOs and agencies to conform to it and learn from its application. Assistance must be based on need, but initially emphasise those who have been previously denied access to assistance, in order to address the imbalances that exist between communities. Programmes should explicitly foster links between communities and strengthen local cooperation.

NGOs have made progress in developing methodologies which analyse the potential for maximising positive benefits whilst minimising the risks of conflict. CARE, for example, has developed a benefits-harms methodology and training manual which now informs all project development. It emerged from long experience of working in Sudan.

Principled frameworks, conflict impact assessments, and benefit-harms approaches need to be developed and employed in all programming in Sudan. Where appropriate, agencies need to ensure compliance to agreed principled approaches.

Abduction of civilians

A further disturbing feature of the conflict is the abduction of women and children during raids. The vast majority of abductions of Dinka women and children are tied to the Murahaleen and Popular Defence Force (PDF) raiding in northern Bahr el Ghazal. These distinct militia units are comprised largely of armed horsemen from the Baggara pastoral tribes of Darfur and Kordofan. The Government of Sudan began using PDF militias as part of its military strategy in the fight against the SPLA in 1983. The PDF loot

and pillage from communities; it is during such raids that children, women and livestock – mainly cattle – are taken from their villages. Murahaleen raiding occurs further north on the northern margins of Dinka territory.

The pattern of raiding has been in place for many centuries and is associated with historical inter-communal conflicts over access to dry season grazing and water, as well as cattle. Whilst Murahaleen raiding is not therefore an outcome of the civil war, it has most certainly been fuelled by it. Raiders are allegedly supplied with arms by the government, and are paid to protect the train on its journey to and from Wau. Movements of the train are accompanied by numerous bloody attacks on nearby villages.

Abductees are used as unpaid domestic workers, threatened with beatings or death if they try to escape, and are often forced to perform sexual services for their captors.⁴² Although the exact number of children and women abducted over the years cannot be verified, Save the Children UK and UNICEF estimate numbers to be between 10,000 and 17,000, with an estimated 6,000 people still held. The practice of redeeming slaves for a fee complicates the problem. 'Irregularities' associated with the 'redemption' practice have been reported, some implicating the SPLA.

Sudanese voices

A woman who was abducted from Aweil West in 1998 tells her story: 'Arabs on horseback came and started shooting their guns in the air. They came and started beating us, and my elder son was killed. One of my step-daughters, who was pregnant, was beaten and she had a miscarriage later. We walked without food to the collection point. At night you could hear the cries of women and girls being raped. If they refused, you just heard the sound of gunfire. We started moving towards the north in groups. If you were too weak to walk they could just get rid of you. My co-wife, Lucy, was given a load and she was also carrying her child, so she put the load down because it was too heavy for her. The horseman just came and beat her, then took the child and threw her against a big tree, and the child passed away. It was horrible. I do not want to remember it. In Nyala my elder daughter was raped. After six months we had been doing some housework and we managed to have some money, so I sent her back to the south. Then I heard that someone was moving in the villages asking for those who had been abducted and who wanted to go back to their home. When we arrived at Aweil I was so happy; I could not believe I was going back to my home again.'

In 1999, in response to intense international pressure, the Government took a public stand on abductions, announcing that henceforth it was their policy to reunify all abductees and eradicate the practice within Sudan. The Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC) was established within the Ministry of Justice and given the mandate to oversee the tracing, retrieval, documentation, and reunification of abductees. There have been other significant developments within both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM with regard to abductions, in response to international criticism of CEAWC's lack of progress and reinforced by the formation and activation of the Commission of Enquiry (see below). To date, CEAWC has identified 1,800 possible cases of abduction, of which 700 have been returned and reunified with their families, and approximately 300 are awaiting identification of family communities.

Unlock potential: support and monitor implementation of Commission recommendations

The most important and significant development with regard to abductions that has taken place recently has been the US Government decision to engage with this issue at the highest political level. In December 2001 as part of the Danforth peace agenda, both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM agreed to facilitate and support the visit to Sudan of a US-led international Commission of Enquiry into the practice of slavery, abductions and forced servitude. While some elements within Sudan's government still reject allegations that slavery exists, both parties have condemned the practice, agreed to investigate all claims and allegations promptly and vigorously, and prosecute those who engage in the slave trade in accordance with international and Sudanese law. To this end, the Commission of Enquiry has been formed and will visit Sudan between 8 April and 27 May to:

- conduct an inquiry into the practices of slavery, abduction and forced servitude in both Government and SPLM-controlled areas;
- recommend means by which these practices can be monitored and prevented;
- propose ways through which those responsible may be brought to account.

The mission will present a brief report of its findings and recommendations to the Sudanese parties, to the governments of the countries from which the participants are drawn, and to the wider public.

The international humanitarian community can support this process by monitoring its progress and providing financial support for the implementation of its recommendations.

A recently agreed project being undertaken by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) is trying to gather reliable data, but is meeting resistance from some elements within local authorities. It is extremely important that this research be allowed to go ahead. The information collected will not only help in establishing the real magnitude of the problem of abductions, but will be extremely useful in expediting the tracing and identification of the abductees and their families.

Unlock potential: support local mechanisms

At local level too there has been progress. Mechanisms for the tracing, retrieval, and reunification of abducted women and children have been encouraged through co-operation between Dinka and Arab chiefs, with markets being used as a focal point by those Dinka who are unable to travel deep into northern villages in search of abducted relatives. Traders can facilitate re-unifications as a means of building up trust with the Dinka, thereby ensuring their security and the continuity of trade in the area.

Donors and NGOs can assist in this process through the provision of resources and by encouraging reciprocal support to both sides. Such efforts can build trust and allow the expansion of local initiatives that create and strengthen links across conflict lines.

Finally, we believe that buying back women and children who have been abducted undermines their dignity and that it is morally wrong to trade in human beings. This method also fails to address the root causes behind abductions and does nothing to protect the rights of people at risk of abduction or those who have been abducted. While it is true that local people who succeed in tracing abducted relatives do sometimes 'pay' a token fee to the abductor or mediator (usually in kind), introducing relatively large cash payments appears to have perverted this practice, encouraging people to pose as 'slaves' for monetary gain.

Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

Sudan has in excess of four million internally displaced people, and large numbers of refugees in neighbouring countries. It is estimated that one million Sudanese fled the country between 1983 and 1993.⁴³ **Eighty-five per cent of the inhabitants of southern Sudan are thought to have been displaced at least once in the last fifteen years.**⁴⁴ IDPs flee war, famine, and conflict. They are often multiply displaced, suffer hardship and trauma, have few employment opportunities and are often exploited by 'employers', and harassed if they move beyond camps or settlements.

The constant forced movement breaks up communities, leads to impoverishment, and exacerbates malnutrition and disease. The acceptance of IDPs by already poor host communities stretches their ability to cope, especially during dry-season and hunger-gap periods, and can finally impoverish the host family. If displaced people do not have tools, seeds, or land they are unable to plant and harvest, thus contributing to a cycle of food insecurity and vulnerability.

Some IDPs become a source of cheap labour for host communities, forced to endure exploitative conditions because they have no legal access to land or protection.

Unlock potential: ensure rights and representation for IDPs

IDPs are vulnerable to attack by local communities. In 1987, one thousand Dinka IDPs, most of them women and children, were massacred in Ed Da'ein, Darfur. Despite this dreadful attack, Dinka who later had to flee conflict in the south returned to Darfur. A number of IDP camps were established and the Dinka, to supplement their rations, began to seek work with local farmers. They were often exploited and drawn into a form of share-cropping which left them in debt and sometimes destitute.

Working with local authorities and the host communities, NGOs including Oxfam and Save the Children UK were able to influence decision-makers to address the situation. They helped provide displaced Dinka communities with water, education, sanitation, and healthcare. More crucially, they advocated for land to be allocated to the displaced so that they would be less dependent on aid and the system of share-cropping. The government has now given many of these displaced households the rights to land, and it seems

In other situations, IDPs may be expected to provide resources in exchange for support. In 1998, for example, IDPs from Bahr el Ghazal were obliged to exchange cattle for access to land in Western Equatoria.

It is estimated that in the settlements around Khartoum alone, there are up to two million IDPs, many of them women and children. A recent study of an unplanned settlement in Khartoum found that 40 per cent of the inhabitants were women and 40 per cent children.⁴⁶ Children often have to be left alone and unsupervised while their parents seek work. Indeed, many street children originate from displaced families. There are now an estimated 34,000 street children in Khartoum.

The definition of displacement in Sudan also leads to confusion and to the manipulation of aid assistance. Populations on the move through seasonal migration cycles are often confused with those displaced by conflict and IDP figures are sometimes used as a political bargaining tool by the warring parties to lever assistance from the international community. This leads to an environment of distrust, and compromises delivery of assistance to those who are truly vulnerable. However, it cannot be denied that the numbers of displaced people are exceptionally high, making the provision of services increasingly difficult.

that they will now be able to move towards self-sufficiency. The provision of land to IDPs is being replicated in other areas too. In En Nahud, CARE-International is working with the local authorities to allocate land for agriculture. The issue of land tenure is sensitive, not least because it can be perceived as enforced resettlement or acculturation. For IDPs around Khartoum, resettlement has been associated with the destruction of homes. Whilst it is difficult to obtain figures, it is estimated that between 1988 and 1993, 800,000 people living in informal settlements around Khartoum had their homes demolished.

To secure their future, IDPs need the options of integration, return, or resettlement. These options will need to be supported if their long-term self-sufficiency is to be guaranteed. It is important to understand that 'the successful return of people once forced to migrate should not be seen as an argument that return is always the best solution'.⁴⁵

Sudanese voices

Sheikh Abdullah Ahmed (name changed) used to live in the Nuba Mountains. 'One night, four rebels came to my house, and said that they needed food. I asked them not to enter the village, and provided them with two big bulls for their men. Some people from the neighbouring villages found the remains of the bulls, and suspected that I had provided them to the rebels, and informed the authorities. When I heard about this, I went to stay the night in a relative's house. In the early morning hours I heard shooting near my house. My elder daughter came running to inform me that our house was cordoned by fifty armed soldiers looking for me.' Sheik Abdullah left the village and spent 63 days in hiding in the bush. 'I remember spending three days without food. Then I decided to sell all our livestock and move the family to Port Sudan.' He now works as a security guard for a monthly salary of 8000 Sudanese Dinars (US\$30), which hardly covers the family's water needs.

As a result of some donor and Government of Sudan policies, it has proved difficult to make long-term plans for the welfare of IDPs, even though many have been displaced for 15–20 years. In general, government policies and practices, as well as unaccountable behaviour by opposition forces, has exacerbated the problem faced by IDPs. There has been a general unwillingness to accept the IDPs as citizens with full rights or to provide legal protection and secure access to land and services. **Protection from forced displacement, and protection from abuse while displaced, are vital.**

Unlock potential: support policy reform

There are signs, however, that the Government is taking a more pragmatic approach to the issue of IDPs, having embarked on a system of land allocation and increased service provision. The impact of this shift is yet to be seen, but the mission by Francis Deng in 2001⁴⁷ and the planned workshop to formulate policy in 2002 could provide a basis for change and the improvement of conditions for IDPs. It could also allow progress to be made in applying the UN framework for IDPs to Sudan.

Co-ordinated efforts by the government, opposition forces, agencies and NGOs are needed to ensure that the rights and protection of IDPs are guaranteed. In particular, all parties should work to ensure a co-ordinated multi-agency contribution to a national policy workshop.

Livelihood costs and food insecurity

Food insecurity has plagued Sudan since the conflict resumed in 1983: more than 570,000 people have died of hunger-related causes since that time.⁴⁸ Whenever large-scale food insecurity does occur, it is often directly or indirectly the result of conflict. The Bahr el Ghazal crisis of 1998 was a 'devastating illustration of how armed raids and resultant massive displacement led to a terrible famine'.⁴⁹

Food insecurity is manifested in many ways: at least 40 per cent of households in northern Bahr el Ghazal have lost all their cattle as a result of raids. Sudan has the potential to generate food surpluses, yet millions of its people regularly face hunger. In northern areas, malnutrition rates of up to 50 per cent have been recorded during the 'hunger gap' period,⁵⁰ with high rates of malnutrition also reported among children under-five.

The Land Act of 1970 technically abolished all communal land holdings and indigenous tenure systems, and from 1983 the government restricted the authority of local leaders such as **omdas** and **sheikhs** to manage land use. Mechanised farming was promoted in many areas of high agricultural potential, such as Southern Kordofan, to the detriment of sustainable small-scale production. This had the dual effect of restricting communities' access to food, and further polarising the relationship between the large-scale farmers (typically riverain Arabs from the north) and local peasant farmers.⁵¹ At the same time, cattle-herders, who were also denied access to key grazing areas because of the expansion of mechanised farming, started to encroach on the lands of the Nuba subsistence farmers. Such changes fed into the dynamics of the conflict that has engulfed the Nuba mountains from 1987 onwards.

The lack of effective government policies which support sustainable food security, such as safety-net provision, strategic movement of annual surpluses to food deficit areas, investments in diversity for small-scale farmers and viable emergency preparedness mechanisms, also contribute to chronic food insecurity throughout northern and southern Sudan.

Kassala State, Eastern Sudan, was self sufficient in food production until it was affected by conflict in the early 90s. Due to hostilities between government troops and the opposition NDA, and the use of landmines, much of the State became immensely insecure. Almost 10 per cent of the mechanised farming land was abandoned, agricultural costs rose by 20 per cent due to decreased labour availability, as people fled the fighting, and 30 per cent of the river Gash delta, a key resource area for farming and pastoralism, became inaccessible. Agricultural productivity decreased by about one-third, pastoral migrations and trade were also affected, and the social fabric of the Beja community was disrupted as a result.⁵² The area is still recovering.

Conflict has led to the 'closure of markets; restrictions of movement; curtailment of trade routes and exchange relationships; displacement of people; abandonment of agriculture; loss of cattle and crops; and reduced ability for secure storage'.⁵³ These are critical issues: food security is partly dependent on the ability to trade, and the curtailment of trade links therefore has a direct bearing on people's well-being. In a few stable areas, cross-border trade is an important part of the local economy. In Yei, for example, farmers are now planting high-yielding maize for the Ugandan market.⁵⁴ However, the high transport costs, caused by the poor state of the roads, makes this trade difficult for people further from the border. In Sudan, the terms of trade are often fixed to benefit an elite, and armed groups often rely on food 'taxed' from communities. At times, warring parties have deliberately engineered food insecurity. A proportion of the food distributed by aid agencies often ends up in the hands of the military, with the result that the most vulnerable members of the population receive less than they require.

Sudanese voices

Agawil Bak Bak is a 42-year-old widow with five children, living in southern Darfur: 'When I was young, my family lived in southern Sudan. In 1987 some Rizeigat militia attacked the village. They took all the cows in the village, killed ten men and burned the houses. We ran away empty-handed, and survived by eating fruit from trees and drinking water from ponds. Around these ponds we sometimes found the bodies of dead people who had been killed by the militia, or had died of hunger. We went to Babanosa, where we stayed in a camp near the railway station. In the camp, life was very difficult because it was completely different from our lifestyle when we were in the south – there are lots of diseases and problems. My husband died of disease a year after our arrival. Then I went to Gad El Seed camp. Life there was very difficult; there was a shortage of water and land to cultivate and no job opportunities. So we came to Sanam El Naga where we were given a house, a farm, and there is safe drinking water, health



facilities, and education.' Although much of the southern population receives relief food, this seldom accounts for more than 10 per cent of their needs⁵⁵ and people must rely on

their own strategies to survive. These strategies take a number of forms. The eating of wild foods is an immediate alternative; turning to relatives and community leaders is another. The nature and longevity of the conflict, however, has stretched these tactics to breaking point. Under the pressures of mass impoverishment and displacement, strategies for coping with famine are leading to the sale or consumption of productive assets, condemning many households to a cycle of ever-deepening impoverishment. The traditional 'safety nets' that protected the most vulnerable members of society are no longer sufficient. The impact on displaced populations is indicative of the level of the humanitarian crisis. Of a total of just over six million IDPs and refugees in the Horn of Africa who will receive food aid this year, nearly one half are Sudanese.⁵⁶

Unlock potential: support markets and economic recovery.

In order to meet the needs of a population that had no access to basic healthcare, education, shelter and consumer goods, CARE instituted an integrated economic recovery programme. The integrated approach had two primary objectives: to improve household food security and to increase the economic self-sufficiency of the people of Tambura county. After one year, the recipients of seeds and agricultural tools became surplus producers. A market for the surplus was identified, and barter agreements with farmers set up. Consumer goods such as soap, salt, second-hand clothes, utensils, and blankets were exchanged for surplus agricultural produce. The programme also promoted cross-border trade with neighbouring CAR, DRC, and Uganda, and this led to the establishment of the Tambura Marketing and Development Association.

The potential of increasing food security exists in many areas of Sudan. Investment in markets, rural feeder roads, economic diversification, cooperative associations, and cattle restocking can improve food security and enhance self-reliance. Ensuring that emergency preparedness policies are in place is essential if swift and appropriate action is to be taken during times of food crisis.

Education

Education is internationally acknowledged as a fundamental, universal right. Educating women reduces under-five morbidity and mortality rates and maternal mortality rates, and increases productivity. Conversely, illiteracy is a barrier to progress in development and for popular participation. Education in Sudan is in a pitiful state: the war has led 'to a near collapse in the education system'; it is only now being gradually reconstructed.⁵⁷ Schools in southern Sudan are mostly makeshift structures built by parent-teacher associations or the local community, staffed mainly by volunteers and supported by community contributions, which are severely reduced during times of food insecurity or conflict. Lack of adequate remuneration makes it hard to recruit and train qualified staff. To add to the difficulties, aerial bombardment puts children in some places in fear of their lives.



Sudanese voices

Johannes Gaddiet-Biel, who is in his mid twenties, is a headmaster in Nyal. In early 2001 there was a good school building and he had over 600 pupils. These days he has only 374 pupils and teaches in an old NGO building, vacated because of the fighting. 'Our school was burned by the SPLA forces of Peter Gadet who attacked our village. We used to have 25 teachers, but many of them have left for Khartoum or Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. Now there are only ten. Lots of school materials – papers, pens, a blackboard – had been supplied by UNICEF, but many were burned. They even burned the benches we used to sit on. The pupils share pens, sometimes one between five children – in fact, even the teachers have to share. We used to be supported by the community with school fees and sorghum, but now the system has collapsed as people can't manage.' Despite these problems, Johannes and his fellow teachers continue to teach, come what may. Human resources are not yet completely lost.


The lack of educational provision in rural areas inhibits the growth of the economy and has led many young men to join the army, in the absence of viable alternatives. In conflict-affected communities, educational provision was inadequate even before the current civil war: in 1976 it was estimated that over 90 per cent of the population of southern Sudan had never attended school. The lack of trained staff meant that one-third of posts in government institutions were vacant.⁵⁸

Education facts at a glance

- Out of the 1.6m children aged between 5 and 14 years in southern Sudan, only 18 per cent are in school.
- In the south, 62 per cent of pupils do not have text books, while 78 per cent of teachers do not have teachers' guides, even for lower primary grades.
- Many more boys than girls receive an education. This is true throughout Sudan.
- In the north, only about 38 per cent of the population is literate. The figure is probably under 15 per cent in the south.
- In the north, adult literacy varies from 75 per cent in Khartoum to just 29 per cent in Western Darfur.
- In Western Darfur, only 9 per cent of school-age children were enrolled in school in 2001.

References: Federal Ministry of Health / Central Bureau of Statistics/ UNICEF, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Report, 2000; UNICEF, 2001, Education for All: Assessment Report, Southern Sudan

School enrollment as proportion of total child population in southern Sudan, 2001⁵⁹



Education and health are not budgetary priorities in most areas of Sudan. Provision is therefore poor and local authorities have to find their own resources. Teachers' salaries are routinely paid several months late and strikes are common. The quality of education has also reduced since the conflict resumed. The educational materials that are available in conflict-affected areas are woefully inadequate. Even when teaching materials are available, the lack of central organisation means that there is no common syllabus: some areas use the Ugandan syllabus, others the Kenyan. However, since neither the Kenyan nor Ugandan examination boards cater for pupils outside their borders, candidates cannot be properly certified when they complete their schooling.

This situation is made more difficult because the choice of language and religious content are controversial. Illiteracy and poverty mean that the print media cannot be used to give people an informed perspective on social and political issues;⁶⁰ this is a serious constraint on the effective functioning of civil society.

Sudanese voices

In the shanty areas of Port Sudan town, eastern Sudan, twenty-year-old Justin lives with his younger sister and mother in a one-room house made of jute bags. Justin used to live with his family in Juba town. After an attack by rebel troops, Justin's father went missing. He has not seen his father for the past ten years. With the support of relatives, the family moved to the north. 'I joined level one basic education instead of level four, because in Juba I studied in English, while in the North they study in Arabic. I started my education and continued till I reached level four. My mother works as a housemaid in the town and earns very little money, which forces me to wash cars in the town after school. Now I am at level 8 basic education and in a few months I will sit for secondary school certificate. I'm supposed to pay Sudanese pounds 37000 exam fees (about US\$14) but I don't know how to get it. I know I'm supposed to be at university by this time and not in primary school. I hope I will succeed in completing my education and be able to take care of my mother and younger sister.'

The lack of schooling for girls prevents them from developing sustainable livelihoods and reduces their income-generating potential. Because there are currently so few literate women in peripheral areas, most of the local humanitarian personnel are male. This makes it more difficult to identify the needs of vulnerable women and girls. Many women are excluded from decision-making processes because of lack of education and their low status in society. Their voice is seldom heard in public forums, especially in war-affected communities. As one study succinctly put it: 'neglect of both primary and secondary education puts the achievements of the rest of the aid operation in jeopardy'.⁶¹



Unlock potential: invest in education.

Education is a right. This is increasingly recognised by authorities as well as communities across Sudan. The recent introduction in the south of parent-teacher associations (PTAs) could improve dialogue between communities, civil authorities and agencies, and improve the quality of education. Until recently, the SPLM/A gave no financial support to education, but it has now pledged – under considerable pressure – to devote 10 per cent of the tax revenue it collects in Bahr el Ghazal Region to education.^{xiii}

Education could bring important secondary benefits to Sudan too. It has the potential to accelerate development, increase awareness, enhance economic opportunities, and enable civil society to challenge the legacy of poor governance that helps sustain conflict. Recognising the centrality of education, the UN established the 2015 target of 'education for all'. However, some donors have not undertaken to support education in Sudan and have yet to acknowledge that education can take place in a conflict-affected environment.

Achieving the 2015 targets must be the goal in conflict-affected as well as peaceful countries and donors are strongly urged to reverse policies that do not prioritise the provision of education.

Health care

Health facilities are inadequate for the needs of the poor. Under-five and infant mortality rates are unacceptably high, with most children succumbing to preventable disease. The healthcare system has been ravaged by war. Many people in remote areas have to travel for days to receive basic treatment,



and medical facilities receive supplies irregularly. The government has largely privatised the healthcare system; **the 92 per cent of the population who live below the poverty line have great difficulty in affording adequate treatment.**

Health facts at a glance

- An average of 319 women die per 100,000 births in northern Sudan. In Government controlled areas of the south, the rate is 763 per 100,000 births.⁶²
- Malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, and acute respiratory infections – all to a large extent preventable – account for more than 66 per cent of attendance at health facilities.⁶³
- In the Nuba Mountains, there was recently only one doctor for every 300,000 people. Health workers are often insufficiently trained or equipped to treat patients.
- Sudan has 77 per cent of all global cases of guinea worm infection, and diarrhoea kills many thousands of children every year.
- Water-related diseases account for up to 80 per cent of epidemics in southern Sudan.⁶⁴
- Less than 35 per cent of the population in the south has access to adequate sanitation.⁶⁵


Diseases like malaria and diarrhoea, which are linked to poverty, are common and often fatal. Leprosy, polio, and measles, which have been largely eradicated elsewhere in the world, are still found. Unfortunately, accurate figures on morbidity and mortality are unavailable because of inadequate reporting and a lack of baseline statistics.

In most government-controlled areas, primary-health care is supplied by private dispensaries, which the poorest people cannot afford to use. One NGO-subsidised clinic in urban Port Sudan serves poor patients who travel up to 60 km to receive free or cut-price care. There are few clinics or hospitals in rural areas.

^{xiii} The Governor of Bahr el Ghazal Region made this pledge in 2001. It is to be hoped that this example will be followed in other regions as well.


Vaccination rates among children vary tremendously. Almost 90 per cent of children are protected from polio in Khartoum, but only 18.1 per cent in Western Darfur.⁶⁶ A high percentage of children are completely unvaccinated.

Percentage of children aged 12-23 months not vaccinated against any childhood diseases, selected areas of Sudan, 2000⁶⁷



The graph below shows that health facilities have always been inadequate in Sudan, and have been massively affected by conflict.

Total health facilities in southern Sudan, 1983–2001⁶⁸



Armed forces frequently target health facilities, with the aim of weakening communities and seizing medicines that can be sold on the black market: Heiban hospital in Nuba Mountains was destroyed by Government of Sudan forces in May 2001, and Murahaleen have been seen selling recently looted medicines in Wau market⁶⁹.



Sudanese voices

James Bantor is a community health worker in Majak, Western Upper Nile. He was one of the famous 'lost boys', child soldiers who walked hundreds of miles from Ethiopia into Kenya. 'I stayed in Kakuma refugee camp for six years and went to school. Then in 1998 I was given the choice to return to Sudan or be resettled in a more peaceful country. I decided to come back to Sudan, to see my family and assist my village. My parents gave thanks to God and slaughtered a bull when I arrived here.' As a health worker, he sometimes has to work without sufficient medical supplies, due to insecurity and government flight bans. 'When I have few supplies, I just give people the best advice that I can,' says James, 'because to encourage and motivate people is even more important than to give them material things.'


Unlock potential: support long-term investment in health

Sleeping sickness, spread by the tsetse fly, is endemic across Western Equatoria, and if untreated, can cause lethargy and weakness, followed by coma and death within 3-12 months. A control programme that had kept the infection rate to a manageable 0.5 per cent of the population disintegrated in 1989 due to conflict: by 1998, the rate in Tambura County had risen to approximately 20 per cent. CARE International ran a treatment and prevention programme, and infection rates eventually fell to two per cent. However, funding for the programme has now been withdrawn, which means that levels of infection could once again rise to epidemic proportions within three years.⁷⁰

Lack of access to safe water has major effects on health and productivity. Women and children often walk for hours to collect water, and in areas of conflict they are exposed to the risk of physical attack. Most households use contaminated water, often taking supplies from pools in fields and roads, and as a result suffer from water-borne diseases. The network of water points across the country requires massive investment in maintenance and repair. Provision of safe water, as well as hygiene education, are key needs in southern Sudan particularly, with the potential to save lives as well as labour-hours.

A relevant example comes from Western Sudan. The people of Ghebeshat in N. Darfur have no local source at all, and have to travel up to seven hours into Chad to find it. Elsewhere in Darfur, migration by pastoralists to find water can bring them into conflict with other communities. While urban areas generally have adequate supplies, many of the poorest people, especially those in shanty areas, rely on water vendors and spend a large proportion of their income on water.

Percentage of population with access to safe drinking water. Selected areas of Sudan 2000⁷¹



Armed groups often target water sources, planting landmines around them, poisoning the water and wrecking the pumps.⁷² Conflict limits access to water in other ways too. By forcing civilians to leave the towns and villages and move to areas without water points or where they compete for water with host communities, people’s access is further limited.

Proportion of households using safe water, 1999 ⁷³		
Region	Dry season (%)	Cultivation season (%)
Bahr el Ghazal	40.2	12
Lakes	16	15.2
Upper Nile	1.4	1
Jonglei	5.5	1.9
W. Equatoria	23.8	31.9
E. Equatoria	25	22.7
Overall	25.6	14.8

In Northern Upper Nile, there is just one pump for a population of approximately 140,000 people. The Murle community of Lokongole district, Pibor County, has no safe water supply and has received no education in hygiene; as a result, water-borne diseases are rife.⁷⁴

Lack of safe water exacerbates infant malnutrition and other childhood diseases. Although 99 per cent of the water samples taken from boreholes or protected wells drilled by Oxfam are safe, only 20–30 per cent of the samples taken at household level are safe. This is because of contamination from dirty containers: a function of poverty.



Guinea worm is endemic to Sudan: about 54,000 cases were reported during 2000 (77 per cent of the world total).⁷⁵ The disease is spread through contaminated water. Although guinea-worm disease is not fatal, it is debilitating and painful, and thus reduces the availability of labour for food production. There is no cure, but the disease can be eradicated by providing safe water sources and using filter cloths and pipes. However, only 27 per cent of endemic villages have access to these services. The number of endemic villages rose last year with the increased mobility caused by displacement and conflict.

NGOs regard a water consumption of 20 litres per person per day as the minimum, yet in southern Sudan in 1999 the average consumption was only about two litres per day – barely enough for drinking requirements, let alone cooking and washing.⁷⁶ Conflict, poverty, lack of access to clean water and lack of awareness of hygiene are often the underlying causes of child malnutrition – which means that food relief is sometimes an insufficient response to malnutrition emergencies.

HIV/AIDS

One of the most daunting challenges facing Sudanese society is the spread of HIV/AIDS. HIV was first detected in Sudan in 1986 and prevalence is currently estimated at one per cent of the general population, although 1.6 per cent of blood donors tested HIV positive in 2000.⁷⁷ The spread of the disease is exacerbated by the widespread lack of awareness: in Kordofan in 2000, only 6.9 per cent of men and women knew that HIV and other STDs were sexually transmitted.⁷⁸

In opposition-held areas, there has been no comprehensive HIV/AIDS survey, but small-scale individual studies have been carried out. Health experts fear that the high prevalence of TB may indicate rising numbers of people with HIV/AIDS. Prevalence rates are highest in government-held towns in the south; Juba and surrounding Equatoria are thought to have 47 per cent of all HIV positive cases in Sudan.

Some HIV/ AIDS prevalence surveys, selected areas of Sudan, 1996–2000 ⁷⁹

Date	Location	Sample group	Prevalence
1996	Juba	Antenatal clinic attendees	5%
1997-1998	Maridi	General Population	2.6 %
1997-1998	Juba	General Population	3.3 %
1997-1998	Chukudum	General Population	3.8 %
1999	Yei	Blood donors	18.6 %
2000	Yambio	General Population	7.2 %
2000	Nimule	Hospital patients	20 %
2000	Chukudum	Hospital patients	28.7 %

There is a high risk that HIV/AIDS will spread quickly through southern Sudan, because of the frequency and scale of population movements; the widespread ignorance about HIV/AIDS, the lack of basic medical care for HIV/AIDS-related illnesses; cultural practices such as polygamy, wife inheritance and scarring or bloodletting with unsterilized knives; and the lack of mass media to disseminate prevention messages. The military also play a significant role in the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Unlock potential: support AIDS awareness and health provision

American Refugee Committee and International Rescue Committee, in partnership with the New Sudan National AIDS Council, are jointly implementing an OFDA/ USAID-funded 18 month pilot project in two major population centres in Southern Sudan: Yei and Rumbek. With the overall goal of reducing HIV transmission, the programmes interventions are focused on HIV/AIDS awareness raising, behaviour change communication to reduce high-risk practices, improving the quality of reproductive health services and practices, strengthening the surveillance of HIV/AIDS/ STIs, and increasing the capacity of agencies and community-based organisations working in the area to mitigate the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Conclusions and recommendations

The humanitarian crises and the appalling human costs outlined in this report exist primarily because of the 36 years of conflict Sudan has experienced since 1955. Three generations of Sudanese have lived through a war which has killed two million people, displaced four million others, and exacerbated already chronic food insecurity.

Hundreds of thousands of families have been broken up through conscription, war-related deaths or forced displacement. The dispersion of populations prevents people from planting crops, results in the loss of assets such as livestock and land, and disrupts traditional support mechanisms which have enabled communities to survive in the past. The culture of sharing resources within communities, so vital for the maintenance of self-sufficiency and dignity, is being eroded in war-affected areas, and thousands of people are now regularly reliant on food relief.

If peace were to be firmly established, then resettlement, reintegration, and return could be meaningful opportunities for IDPs and refugees; development could be more sustained in war-affected areas; and infrastructural improvements could be funded across the country. The massive potential of Sudan – a huge country, rich in timber, agricultural land, minerals and human resources – could be realised, to the benefit of the entire region. There would be ‘peace savings’ too: the annual cost of food aid for displaced people in South Darfur in 1998 and 1999 averaged nearly \$1.5m. Indeed, since 1983, US\$2bn in relief and rehabilitation aid has been committed to Sudan through Operation Lifeline Sudan alone. If peace were achieved, aid could be invested in programmes with greater long-term returns, and military spending could be redirected towards meeting the basic needs of the poor. In addition, relations with neighbouring countries could be improved and regional stability would enhance trade and result in a ‘win-win’ situation.

Overturning the conflict is the only answer. This requires coherent and coordinated efforts by the international community working in concert with Sudanese peace interests. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM, who have signed agreements under the auspices of US Senator John Danforth, must now demonstrate their commitment to peace through the full and timely implementation of

those proposals and move quickly towards a comprehensive peace agreement.

The following recommendations, which emerge from research as well as the long experience of the contributing agencies, attempt to demonstrate how the various opportunities for peace and development that exist at community, national, and international levels, can be exploited.

Recommendations summary

Warring parties, concerned governments and agencies are called on to:

- **Ensure convergence of international efforts towards a just and sustained peace based on the Declaration of Principles.** Such efforts need to be cognisant of, and reinforce, civil-society peace initiatives.
- **Immediately end the human rights abuses perpetrated by all warring parties in all areas of Sudan.** The rights of communities currently denied access to humanitarian assistance must also be protected. To this end, the confidence-building measures proposed by Senator John Danforth in late 2001 must be immediately and fully implemented.
- **Invest in the capacity of Sudan’s people to respond to the ongoing crisis, particularly through education, health, and through the creation of equitable economic and judicial structures.** Long-term investment by donors is required now to enable citizens to challenge the status quo and to participate fully in peace and development, now and in the future.

Specific recommendations

Support for peace

The warring parties, having shown good faith in agreeing to the confidence-building measures proposed by Senator Danforth in late 2001 under the auspices of the US government, should now work towards their full implementation, with sustained US engagement.

Furthermore, both sides should renew their commitment to the Declaration of Principles and agree to and publicise a timetable of continuous dialogue in support of a just and peaceful settlement to the conflict.

Concerned governments, international leaders and agencies need to ensure that the confidence-building measures are fully implemented and reinforced with sustained political action at the highest levels using a combination of pressures and incentives. Interim steps which reduce the potential for violence and which address humanitarian concerns are vital, but they cannot be a substitute for political resolution.

Peace envoys, concerned governments and agencies need to demonstrate their commitment to more convergent and coherent policies. Sustained, co-ordinated efforts are needed to bring about a just and long-lasting peace.

The lack of international and regional convergence has allowed confusion and uncoordinated action to continue unchecked. Convergence of strategies towards the achievement of a just and sustainable peace must be a central objective of all external players. To this end joint missions, such as those undertaken by the UK and France to Nigeria and DRC are encouraged as are common statements following diplomatic or thematic missions (human rights, IDPs, etc). Unified positions and strategies should be developed and articulated.

Decision makers need to consult continuously with civil society and support community reconciliation efforts.

Collaborative and inclusive efforts, which bring together Sudanese peace interests and the international community, are urgently needed. Support to inter-tribal conferences and meetings, which identify alternatives to violence and help re-establish inter-communal trust, are vital. The international community can help sustain progress by providing resources to support the implementation of recommendations emerging from such meetings.

Humanitarian access, rights and protection

All warring parties need to respect the needs and priorities of displaced, refugee and other conflict-affected groups. The warring parties, international governments, NGOs and the UN need to ensure that there is unrestricted access to vulnerable and war-affected communities, regardless of their location, in accordance with the provisions of International Humanitarian Law.

The ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains needs to be monitored and the free movement of civilians and access to humanitarian assistance guaranteed. The warring parties, in co-operation with the international community, must work towards maintaining and extending the ceasefire in the context of an overall peace process.

There must be an end to human rights abuses being perpetrated in the oil fields. The minimum conditions to achieve positive change are the cessation of civilian attacks and the termination of inequitable and non-transparent use of oil revenues. Concerned governments, as well as other international and regional actors, should insist that an independent monitoring presence is established, and that parties to the conflict agree to a more equitable sharing of wealth and resources.

Companies must ensure that their operations cause no further harm to local communities. Oil companies must undertake to co-operate with independent assessments, ensure that security forces protecting oil installations adhere to the voluntary principles of security and human rights, and consider carefully the direct and indirect effects of their operations on the safety and rights of local people.

Protection of civilians including from displacement must be guaranteed. Recent agreements in principle, such as a ban on the bombing of civilians, must be immediately put into practice. Monitors need to be in place as soon as modalities are agreed. All concerned parties, local and international, should consistently and unequivocally condemn attacks against innocent civilians and humanitarian facilities. The international community must be unified about speaking out against abuses committed by all sides in the conflict.

Co-ordinated efforts by the government, opposition forces, agencies, and NGOs are needed to ensure that the rights and protection of IDPs are guaranteed. In particular these efforts should ensure a co-ordinated multi-agency contribution to a national policy workshop planned for 2002. IDPs right to integration, resettlement or return should be respected and to this end, donors and NGOs are encouraged to work with the government in exploring land tenure and livelihood choices together with the provision of health and education services. It is necessary to develop long-term solutions for women and children whose families have been fragmented by conflict and who have as a consequence lost vital assets. Family reunification programmes will be necessary for IDPs, and particularly for abductees.

Authorities must ensure that NGOs and agencies have full access to IDP camps and settlements in order to provide humanitarian assistance and to monitor the human rights and humanitarian situation on the ground. Regular meetings with the government could provide a forum for sharing information and for developing rights-focused approaches.

Concerned governments, agencies and NGOs should support the implementation of the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Abductions.

The Commission is urged to apply pressure on the Government and SPLM to agree locations and modalities of return for abductees. Both parties, working in cooperation with others, are encouraged to explore the possibilities of linking the return of abductees to the 'periods of tranquility'. Using days of tranquility for return of abductees is a concrete way of demonstrating impact and of building trust and confidence between communities.

Long-term development and investment in people

Building peace requires long-term investment: in people to enable them to challenge the status quo, in the provision of education and health, in the building of representative governance, and in the creation of an equitable economic and judicial framework.

Many donors have hitherto been reluctant to provide longer-term assistance to communities throughout Sudan at least until there is peace. We urge donors now to reverse their earlier policies and engage with existing opportunities. Long-term support must not, however, undermine local structures or self-reliance where this exists, for example in the Nuba Mountains.

Donors are encouraged to ensure more 'joined-up' cross-government approaches to relief, rehabilitation, and development based on a comprehensive analysis of the central issues facing Sudan.

Better understanding of the local political context could allow donors and NGOs to develop more appropriate tools and strategies for addressing local humanitarian need, establishing more sustained programmes and simultaneously expanding the space for confidence building and conflict transformation.

External support should be given to encouraging the establishment and accountable functioning of genuinely representative, broad-based non-state organisations, networks, and platforms.

The contributions of civil society throughout Sudan to peace and good governance need to be recognised and reinforced, for example through rights-based training, capacity building, enhanced access to information and representative media, and civic education. By creating platforms for dialogue between state and non-state actors, connections can be made between local, national, and international policy objectives.

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
OXFAM Great Britain (GB)
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Oxfam GB first started work in Sudan in the 1980s, providing support to Ugandan refugees in the south of the country. In 1984 an Oxfam office was opened in Khartoum, and Oxfam provided a response to the famine of 1984/85. As the situation improved, Oxfam remained to provide longer-term assistance, especially for marginalised and displaced communities. Oxfam now works across the country, implementing community-based programmes in the fields of healthcare, water and sanitation, food security, and local conflict resolution, as well as providing humanitarian assistance in conflict areas.



TEARFUND
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Tearfund UK has been funding local partners in Sudan, on all sides of the conflict, since 1972. Tearfund's Disaster Response Team, the emergency arm of Tearfund UK, also launched an operational response to the famine of Bahr el Ghazal in southern Sudan in 1998. Since 1998, Tearfund has implemented a number of relief interventions in a wide variety of sectors including nutrition, household food security and community health education.



SAVE THE CHILDREN UK
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Save the Children (UK) began working in Sudan in 1950, when it responded to famine in the south. Since then, Save the Children has continued to work in both northern and southern areas of the country, assisting people affected by the conflict in south Sudan, as well as those who have fled their homes and sought refuge in Khartoum and the transitional zone.

Save the Children UK works alongside Save the Children US, Save the Children New Zealand and Save the Children Sweden in Sudan, and receives funding from Save the Children Denmark and Norway. Save the Children works with local NGOs wherever possible, and always with local communities.



CARE INTERNATIONAL
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CARE has been operating in Sudan since 1979 providing support to poor and war-affected communities. Currently, CARE operates on both sides of the conflict and works with partners and communities to bring about sustained changes in people's lives. CARE seeks to assist IDPs and other vulnerable populations in the areas of reproductive health, education, food security and emergency relief.

CARE's work is based on principles of rights-based programming and is reinforced by vigorous advocacy efforts which aim to draw attention to the root causes of conflict and to highlight the need for enduring peace.



CHRISTIAN AID
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Christian Aid has worked in Sudan for more than 30 years and today has 24 Sudanese partners in both north and south Sudan. Christian Aid has consistently condemned human rights violations on both sides of the conflict. Through its work with indigenous Sudanese NGOs, it is actively involved in the promotion of peace at all levels, strengthening community groups and civil society, education, and food security.



INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
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The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has been associated with relief efforts aimed at individuals affected by the conflict in the Sudan for 19 years, and was an original member of the Operation Lifeline Sudan coalition in 1989. Currently working in both northern and southern Sudan, IRC focuses on primary health care including water and sanitation. IRC also places a strong emphasis on capacity building of local communities. The program in the north focuses on capacity building of national NGOs and civil structure. The program in the south focuses on capacity building of the health care system through the training of Sudanese individuals as health workers.

