



Notes

Chapter 1

1. Nyerere - *Freedom and Unity (Na Umoja): A Selection From Writings and Speeches 1952—1965*, volume 1, Oxford University Press, Dar es Salaam, 1966, pp. 108-113.

2. The South African 'homelands' or bantustans are areas of (usually inferior) land set aside for black people to live on. They are based on what used to be called the 'native reserves', as formally constituted under the 1913 Natives Land Act, which restricted black people's right to acquire land legally to only 13 per cent of the country's land area. Following the National Party's accession to power in 1948, when apartheid was introduced as an extension of the former segregationist policies, the 'reserves' became an important basis for the apartheid concept that black South Africans do not really share a common national identity. Rather, it is held, "Throughout its history, South Africa has been a geographic designation rather than a reflection of a national unity. ... There is no basis for the common perception that South Africa's black population is a homogenous mass of individuals who could pass for Europeans but for the colour of their skins. In fact, they comprise nine major ethnic groups, each with its own cultural identity, including language ... Today the traditional territories of those Black peoples (or sections of peoples) ... are being developed and consolidated into cohesive geopolitical bases or national states as far as possible." ("Profile: population", a leaflet published by the Bureau for Information, Pretoria, distributed by the South African embassy in London in 1988.) Despite the lack of international recognition for the 'independent homelands' and the *de facto* demographic erosion of this classical notion of apartheid, this construct has enabled 'white' South Africa to be the place for 'white' citizens, thus maintaining white political and economic supremacy. It remains relevant to the current contention over 'group rights' of any sort being a part of a future South Africa.

3. Excerpts from a speech by General Magnus Malan, 3.9.80., cited by D. Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making*, Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg, 1984, p.209.

4. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence, 1977, Pretoria, p. 5.

5. "South Africa's Regional Policy - Regional Cooperation: The Record and Outlook", D. Geldenhuys, paper to the South African Institute of International Affairs' Golden Jubilee Conference, Cape Town, March 1984, pp. 19-22; "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978", R. Davies and D. O'Meara, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 11 No. 2, April 1985, pp. 196-7; *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, Geldenhuys, op. cit., pp. 41, 103-4.

6. Davies and O'Meara, op. cit., pp. 197-8; Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy", op.

cit., p. 24.

7. Beyers Naude, a leading UDF cleric, explained this view of the 'cycle of violence' in January 1989 to an Oxfam staff meeting, shortly after 32 anti-apartheid organisations had been restricted. He said, "Fully legitimate, peaceful forms of opposition against an undemocratic, criminal system are the target of repression. Some organisations have stopped operating, others have gone underground. Seeing how one form of peaceful action after another is being outlawed, people have increasingly come to believe that violent opposition is the only option left. You see, although state repression had affected the activities of opposition organisations, it has made no difference to people's commitment to end apartheid."

8. "Political Conflict in South Africa: Data trends 1984-1988", Indicator Project South Africa, University of Natal, South Africa, December 1988, p. 14.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid, p. 93; *New Nation*, South Africa, 22-30.3.89.

11. "Race Relations Survey 1987/88", South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1988, pp. 817-30 lists all the restrictions introduced during 1986 and 1987, and details their implementation.

12. Excerpts from the White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply 1986, Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, 1986, p. 14.

13. See, for example, International Defence and Aid reports.

14. Interview with Oxfam fieldworker, 5 June 1989.

15. The nature of conflict in Natal, and Inkatha's role in South African politics, are complex areas of specialist study. For a range of views, see an interview with Chief Buthelezi in *Leadership* magazine's special edition on "Sanctions", 1988/89, pp. 102-4; *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa*, G. Mare and G. Hamilton, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987; "Violence in Natal/Kwazulu: Results and Conclusions from a Survey of Residents of Durban", M. Sutcliffe, IDASA research report, South Africa, 1989; and *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, Mzala, Zed Books, London, 1988.

16. Excerpts from a talk given by Alex Mbatha to Oxfam staff, Oxford, 17.11.82.

17. Excerpt from General Malan's preface to the White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply 1986, Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, 1986, p. iii.

Chapter 2

1. *Mission to South Africa - The Commonwealth Report: The Findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1986, p.126.

2. *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making*, D. Geldenhuys, Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg, 1984, p. 145.

3. However, this is not to say that the military element - whether threatened or actual - will disappear over the coming, critical period. In its 1989 'Five Year Plan', the ruling National Party states that "Efficient security services are indispensable for an orderly and peaceful community, providing a sound climate for political, economic, and social development." It goes on to outline its intention to "... maintain the preparedness of the South African Defence Force in terms of both manpower and equipment to enable it to withstand internal, regional, and international threats against South Africa ..."

4. The Reverend Mcebisi Xundu, interview with author, Oxford, September 1989.

The April 1989 Commonwealth-commissioned "Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions" made the same point concerning the South African government's 1988 decision to concede the implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia's independence and withdraw the SADF from Angola. It stated, "After a decade of talking, negotiations became serious when Pretoria was under pressure. Thus sanctions were an essential

part of the negotiations process, not an alternative to it.” (“Final report to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa”, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, p.2.)

5. *Africa Confidential*, 20.1.89, vol. 30 no. 2; 17.3.89, vol 30, no. 6; *Financial Times* 9.1.89; *Independent* 19.8.89, 24.89; *Daily Telegraph* 17.8.89.

6. *SouthScan*, vol. 4, No. 11, 15 March 1989. In point of fact, Mr Botha must have been referring to workers from the ‘homelands’, since there are few workers in the coal industry from outside South Africa. (Personal communication from Professor Green, August 1989.)

7. *SouthScan*, vol 4, no. 11, 15 March 1989.

8. Excerpt from “British Policy Towards South Africa”, FCO paper, 1988.

9. Southern African Fact Sheet no. 97, July 1987, published by Southern African Editorial Services CC, Sandton, South Africa.

10. *Independent*, 9.2.89.

11. *Ibid*.

12. See the National Party’s Five Year Plan. The political significance, of course, is that the essence of apartheid would remain, because ‘white’ South Africans would be able to retain a disproportionate share of political and economic power.

As far as protecting democratic rights is concerned, the ANC has proposed a Bill of Rights.

13. Excerpt from Thabo Mbeki’s speech to the Southern Africa Coalition, London, 13.10.89.

14. See, for example, *Front File*, Southern Africa Brief, August extra 1989, vol. 3 No. 11.

15. Lynda Chalker, then Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with special responsibility for southern Africa, at the British Council of Churches London conference, February 1989.

16. For a fuller explanation of the National Security Management System, see: D. Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, op. cit., p 140; “The Power and Limits of the Emergency State”, M. Swilling and M. Phillips, Centre for Policy Studies, University of Witwatersrand, paper given to the University of York Centre for Southern African Studies Research Seminar series, 1988/89; and “The Big Chill: From Reform to Counter-Revolution”, M. Swilling, an article in “Political Conflict in South Africa: Data trends 1984-1988”, Indicator Project South Africa, University of Natal, December 1988, pp. 92-4.

17. *Independent*, *Financial Times*, 29.11.89.

18. See, for example, “Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC and South Africa”, R.H. Green and C.B. Thompson, Chapter 9 of *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, eds. P. Johnson and D. Martin, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986.

19. “Mozambique and United States Policy”, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 100th congress, first session, 24.6.87.

20. Excerpt from the 1985 Nassau Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa.

21. See, for example, J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, CIIR, London, 1986, p. 252, and *Destructive Engagement*, eds P. Johnson and D. Martin, op. cit., p. 249.

22. South Africa is reported to have underwritten some \$5,000 m. worth of investments in the region between 1986 and 1988. (*Work in Progress*, South Africa, June/July 1988.)

23. As clearly explained in the National Party’s Five Year Plan.

24. Albeit by way of a complex offshore financing strategy which has been devised to overcome the ‘problem’ of official finance going to a project to benefit South Africa. (*Financial Times* 13.4.89.)

25. *Financial Times* 18.8.89; 28.8.89.

26. See *Work in Progress*, South Africa, June/July 1988.

27. Quoted in *The Southern African Economist*, April/May 1989 edition, Volume 2 no. 2. This

tallies with references made in the National Party's Five Year Plan unveiled in 1989.

28. *Resister*, Journal of the Committee on South African War Resistance, London and Amsterdam, no. 57, August/September 1988.

29. According to South African government claims.

30. "Southern Africa News and Views", quarterly publication by Quaker Peace and Service, London, October 1988.

31. However, clandestine South African support for rebel military/sabotage activities in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho has also been reported.

In Zambia, South Africa is reported to have backed the 'Mushala Gang' during the 1970s. This was a group of bandits active in North Western Province from 1976 to 1982, when Mushala was killed by Zambian security forces. See, for example, *Kaunda and Mushala Rebellion*, P. Wele, Multimedia Publications, Lusaka, 1987, pp. 76-9.

In Zimbabwe, South Africa is reported to have exacerbated the mid-1980s 'dissident' conflict in Matabeleland, which was finally resolved following the December 1987 Unity Agreement between ZANU and ZAPU. See J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, op. cit., pp. 173-83; J. Hanlon, section 4 of *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, ed. C. Stoneman, Macmillan, London, pp. 39-41; and "Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma", chapter 2 in *Destructive Engagement*, eds. P. Johnson and D. Martin, op. cit., pp. 43-72.

In Lesotho, South Africa is reported to have backed the Lesotho Liberation Army which conducted a sabotage campaign against the government in the early 1980s. See, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland: Captive States", R. Ajulu and D. Cammack, Chapter 5 of *Destructive Engagement*, eds. Johnson and Martin, op. cit., pp. 139-69.

32. "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa", the official document initialled on 13.7.88 in New York by the USA, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba, which was incorporated both into the "Protocol of Brazzaville", signed on 13.12.88 by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and into the final "Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa", signed on 22.12.88, at the UN in New York.

However, it has since been reported that South Africa continues to support UNITA clandestinely. See, for example, *SouthScan*, vol. 4 No. 34, 15.9.89; and the *Independent*, 13.2.89, which reported that South African forces made an incursion into Angola, reportedly to help a UNITA contingent.

33. A wide range of evidence for South African support of the MNR has been published. It consists of reports of border and airspace violations; reports of the capture of munitions, weapons, uniforms, documents, and other supplies originating from South Africa; confessions and testimonies from captured and defected MNR combatants; reports on the monitoring of radio transmissions between South Africa and the MNR; eyewitness accounts; and international intelligence findings as reported by government spokespeople.

34. That is when the 'Gorongosa Diaries', which proved direct South African government support for the MNR in contravention of the 1984 Nkomati Accord, were discovered when the MNR's HQ at Gorongosa in Mozambique's Sofala Province were captured by Zimbabwean and Mozambican troops.

'Casa Banana', the MNR's isolated mountain HQ, provided a base from which to attack the Beira corridor and to move northwards, cutting the rail link to Malawi and the road to Tete Province. The documents seized there revealed details of South African violations of the Nkomati Accord, including continued training, supply and direction of the MNR. They detailed South African air drops, the transmission of orders and strategies from the South African military, and visits to MNR bases in Mozambique by senior South African military officials and politicians, including the deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Louis Nel.

The Gorongosa documents have been reproduced and published by the Mozambican government. See also MIO (Mozambican Information Office) News Review No. 62 October

1985, and *Destructive Engagement*, eds Johnson and Martin, op. cit., pp. 36-8.

35. Letter from the South African Embassy, London, to Oxfam's Director, dated 28.7.87.

36. "Mozambique and United States Policy", Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 100th Congress, first session, 24.6.87.

37. Reported to have been mediated through the British Ambassador to South Africa. (*Weekly Mail*, 24.3.89; *Herald Tribune*, 24.3.89.)

38. *Independent*, 13.9.89.

39. *Independent*, 11.3.89.

40. *Weekly Mail*, 18-24.8.89, reporting on a dossier compiled by the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.

41. *New Nation*, South Africa, 5-11.5.89.

42. Excerpt from "British Aid to Southern Africa", speech to the SADCC Consultative Conference, Gaborone, 1987.

43. *Weekly Mail*, South Africa, 18-24 August, 1989.

44. *Independent* 18.7.89; *SouthScan* vol. 4 No. 28, 19.7.89.

45. *Weekly Mail*, South Africa, 18-24.8.89.

46. According to various newspaper reports, for example, the *Independent* 24.2.88; see also the appendix of "Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators: Western (private and public) support for Renamo and Unita", P. Nesbitt, ROAPE no. 43, 1988.

47. For example, the debate about the extent to which MNR arms and equipment are supplied by external sources such as South Africa or by material captured from the Mozambican army is one area of specialised contention. Another feature of the debate relates to the type and kind of evidence advanced. For example, a recent report commissioned by the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency in March 1989 was based on field research undertaken in November and December 1988. The researcher interviewed ex-MNR combatants and concluded,

"It is clear ... that there was no dramatic change in the pattern of supplies, command, or communications at any time from the assumption of South African control in 1980 until the end of 1988." [i.e. when the field research work was completed]

"The Nkomati Accord of 1984 was described by combatants present before and after the Accord as producing a greater emphasis on secrecy, and slightly less regularity of supplies, but no basic change in the pattern of relationships. Continued South African involvement through late 1984, in violation of the Accord, was irrefutably documented by the Gorongosa documents.

"Some observers now argue that South African assertions of non-support for Renamo should be believed because no recent 'smoking gun' evidence has been uncovered. The author's interviews and Mozambican eyewitness reports, together with South Africa's well-documented past record of deception, make it hard to accept such an argument as credible."

("The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants", a report by William Minter, for the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency, Washington DC, March 1989, p. 14.)

48. For a detailed discussion on this, see *Africa Confidential* 2.12.88; "The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) as Described by Ex-Participants", Research Report submitted to the Ford Foundation and Swedish International Development Agency, W. Minter, Washington, March 1989; and "The World This Week", Channel 4's documentary programme, screened on 24.6.89.

49. That is the evidence for forced labour advanced in the Gersony report of 1988 ("Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique", R. Gersony, Bureau for Refugee Programs, US State Department, Washington).

50. See, for example, "The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) as Described by Ex-

participants", Minter, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

51. See the *Southern Africa Review of Books*, April/May 1989, June/July 1989, and August/September 1989 editions.

52. William Minter, writing in the *Southern Africa Review of Books*, June/July 1989.

53. Particularly so within the context of the extreme colonial neglect of basic services for the black population. See Chapter 9.

54. "Angola to the 1990s, the Potential for Recovery", T. Hodges, EIU special report no. 1079, London, 1986, Chapter 1, pp. 4-17.

55. From 1966 to 1974, South Africa also provided intelligence and logistical support for the Portuguese 'counter-insurgency' forces during the struggle for Angolan independence.

56. Largely brought about by the politically embarrassing revelation that South Africa was involved 'on the same side', in the context of the contemporary climate of public distaste (following the Vietnam war) for involvement in foreign conflicts. ("Regional Security in Southern Africa: Angola", by J.A. Marcum, *Survival*, bi-monthly journal of The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988.

57. J.A. Marcum, op. cit., p. 6.

Chapter 3

1. It is also estimated that some 150,000 deaths of older children and adults have been caused by the collapse of medical services, together with malnutrition and/or not otherwise fatal diseases (in Mozambique and Angola). ("South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid", UN Economic Commission for Africa, ECA, 1989, p. 16.)

2. ECA, op.cit., p. 16; *Children on the Frontline: The impact of apartheid, destabilisation, and warfare on children in southern and South Africa*, UNICEF, New York, 1989, pp. 24, 38-40; an article entitled "Third World War" in *South* magazine, August 1986, p. 45; and "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique" by Robert Gersony, Bureau for Refugee Programs, US Department of State, Washington, 1988, p. 25.

3. Gersony, op. cit., pp. 20, 21.

4. 100,000 in Mozambique during the 1983-84 famine, and 100,000 in Angola during the 1980-85 famine. (UNICEF, *Children on the Frontline*, 1989 edition, op. cit., p. 24.)

5. UNICEF, *Children on the Frontline*, 1987 edition, p. 10. In this report, UNICEF give the Under-5 Mortality Rate for Mozambique as between 325 and 375 per 1,000 live births, and the Under-5 Mortality Rate for Angola as 325-375 per 1,000 live births.

6. ECA, op.cit., p. 20.

7. Correspondence with R. H. Green, Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

8. Information provided to Oxfam by SEAS (Angolan Social Services), April 1988.

9. Interview with Oxfam researcher, 'Lar Essanjo', Huambo, Angola, April 1988.

10. According to information given to Oxfam in April 1988. At the same time, the Angolan government estimated there to be 40,000. A proportion of the most severely wounded in Angola, known as the *muilados* - those who have lost a limb - are officially registered. There were 10,000 officially registered war-disabled in 1987, but health and rehabilitation officials readily agree that the national total must be far higher.

11. ECA, op cit., p. 26. 1987 data estimate the total population of Angola to be 9 million. (*World Development Report*, World Bank, Oxford 1988, p. 233.)

12. "The Emergency Situation in Angola: Priority non-food requirements for the year 1988", document prepared by the UN Africa Emergency Task Force in collaboration with the

Government of Angola, 'April 1988, p. 51. Two Oxfam staff members were part of the fact-finding mission to Angola on which the findings of this document were based.

13. According to Africa Watch, a US-based non-governmental organisation concerned with human rights, refugees' testimonies held that FAPLA (the MPLA government army) indiscriminately used landmines in some northern, UNITA-held, areas of the country. (*Angola. Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides*, Africa Watch, April 1989, New York, Washington, and London, pp. 65-9.)

14. "The Emergency Situation in Angola: Priority non-food requirements for the year 1988", op. cit., p. 4.

15. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Bomba Alta, Huambo, April 1988.

16. Information supplied by Bomba Alta staff to Oxfam researcher, April 1988.

17. In July 1989, an ACP-EEC Joint Assembly mission to southern Africa reported, "The major reason for such extensive population displacement in the region is fear of aggression resulting from the war situation in ... Mozambique and Angola. The conflict between the government forces in both countries and their respective 'bandit' or 'guerrilla' opponents has lasted for so long because other countries, notably South Africa, have continued to supply arms, equipment and logistic support with the hope of undermining internationally recognised governments." ("Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southern Africa", report of the Mission of Enquiry to Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola, April 29 - May 12, 1989.)

18. The numbers of people directly affected by conflict in Angola and Mozambique have been calculated (as at 31.12.89) as follows:

a. *Internally displaced people*: officially registered displaced people (i.e. those receiving relief assistance in designated reception or resettlement areas, who are often only registered for a few months until they are considered to be self-sufficient) number 1.7 m. in Mozambique and 700,000 in Angola, total 2.4 m. However, it is estimated that there are a total of 6.1 m. internally displaced people altogether in Mozambique and Angola, taking into account those who are not officially registered and those who were once officially registered but who are no longer deemed in need of relief assistance. Of these, an estimated 1 m. people have drifted away from the insecure rural areas into the cities, where they are largely destitute. (Figures based on Oxfam field reports; statistical annex and background papers for the OAU/UNHCR international conference on the Plight of Southern African Refugees, Returnees and Displaced People (SARRED), August 1988, Oslo; ECA, op. cit.)

b. *International refugees*: a total of 1,897,000 is based on the following estimates: 632,000 Angolans and 1,265,000 Mozambicans. (Oxfam field reports; statistical annex to SARRED, op. cit.; UNHCR official estimates; and information bulletins produced by the Refugee Service of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva.)

c. *Urban affected*: some 4 m. people living in towns and cities, without access to land, are now dependent on food aid, because their needs are no longer met from a rural surplus.

19. Using World Bank population estimates which give Mozambique's total population as 14.6 m. and Angola's as 9 m. (1987 figures given in *World Development Report 1988*). Estimates, breakdowns, and sources for numbers displaced and impoverished given in the statistical notes above.

20. Using the World Bank total population estimate for Malawi (1987 figures) of 7.9 m. (*World Development Report 1989*, p. 164) and an estimate of Mozambican refugees, as at December 1989, of 790,000.

21. Interview with author, Nsanje District Hospital, Southern Region, Malawi, June 1987.

22. "Angola to the 1990s: the Potential for Recovery", special report no. 1079 by T. Hodges, EIU *Economic Prospects Series*, London, 1987, pp. 15, 16.

23. Interview with author, Kayombo village, North West Province, Zambia, June 1987. However, the refugees were not living a problem-free life. Although they felt safe from the

threat of UNITA attacks, they expressed anxiety about the plans then proposed by the Zambian government to move all recent Angolan refugees away from the border areas to a large refugee settlement further into the province, at Maheba.

24. Information given to Oxfam by a fieldworker for the West German agency, Agro Action, Luanda, April 1988. Agro Action helps to run a resettlement programme for displaced Angolans near the coastal town of Sumbe.

25. There were 75,324 registered displaced in Waco Kungo town in April 1988, according to municipal records. (Oxfam research report, April 1988.)

26. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Kichocota (one of the displaced people's settlements in Waco Kungo), Kwanza Sul Province, April 1988. Maria's village was in the Kassongue area, on the border with Huambo Province.

27. Oxfam researcher's interview, Luanda, April 1988.

28. As at June 1987, when he was interviewed.

29. Interview with author, Muloza refugee camp, southern Malawi, June 1987.

30. According to "Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum", an updated report by the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), August 1988, Washington, p.20. In August 1987, it was reported in the South African Parliament that 31 people had died as a result of contact with the fence between 1 June 1986 and 3 August 1987. ("Race Relations Survey 1987/88", South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1988, p. 527.)

31. The following articles illustrate some of the problems refugees have encountered trying to cross into South Africa: *Refugees*, UNHCR's magazine, April 1987, pp. 27-9; article entitled "Ragged victims of a dirty war seek refuge in South Africa", *Independent* 16.10.86; and an article entitled "Police probe the case of a refugee shot on the wire", *Weekly Mail*, 18-24.8.89.

32. *Southscan* vol 4 No. 31, 25.8.89.

33. According to UNHCR's magazine *Refugees*, April 1987.

34. According to Oxfam field reports.

35. According to official South African government estimates. ("Race Relations Survey 1987/88", op. cit., p. 527.)

36. Early 1987, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations, "Survey 1987/88", op. cit., p. 854.

37. In April 1987, the deputy Minister of constitutional development and planning, and of public works and land affairs in South Africa, Mr Wilkens, said that refugees would be repatriated if they were found to be outside the particular 'homelands' where they are allowed to stay. ("Race Relations Survey 1987/88", South African Institute of Race Relations, op. cit., p. 17.)

38. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Ressano Garcia, Maputo Province, June 1987.

39. Ibid.

40. Which are supposed to be renewed every six months. However, Oxfam fieldworker reports indicate that there are no effective systems for ensuring re-registration; hence the task of estimating the numbers of refugees is further complicated. In view of this, Oxfam has based its working estimates on the numbers known to be registered and receiving relief assistance.

41. According to successive editions of the digest of The South African Institute of Race Relations.

42. 1989 figures, see above.

43. USCR, op. cit., pp. 25, 26.

44. As above. UNHCR was also criticised for not fielding sufficient staff along the border area, and in the capital Harare during such a difficult period.

45. USCR, op. cit., p. 26.

46. According to internal Oxfam reports, and official government statements at the time, the camps were very overcrowded. Oxfam also registered its concern to UNHCR that basic facilities

at the camps had been neglected.

47. USCR, op. cit.

48. According to the USCR, op. cit.

49. Unemployment is so widespread among South Africans in the 'homelands' that even this risky strategy creates additional problems. In October 1987, the Chief Minister of Lebowa said that the Mozambican refugees were being exploited by white farmers because the refugees were prepared to "work for nothing", which had led to increasing unemployment in Lebowa. ("Race Relations Survey 1987/88", op. cit., p. 855.)

50. As has been clearly pointed out by others, including the South African Council of Churches, and the United States Committee for Refugees, who have called for international action to get UNHCR fully operational in South Africa.

51. "The Emergency Situation in Mozambique: Priority requirements for the period 1989 - 1990", UN Office for Emergencies in Africa, New York, March 1989, p. 34. For an account of the background to food shortages in Angola, see Chapter 8.

52. 'Food security' is a term which has become commonplace in development work. Oxfam has chosen to give it the following working definition for the purposes of our fieldwork: lack of food security is the situation whereby "people are unable to obtain by production, gift, loan, or purchase enough food for survival". ("Food Emergencies in Sahelian Africa: Early Warning and Response. Alchemy or Science?", internal Oxfam paper, 1984.)

53. According to Oxfam field reports and press coverage.

54. Internal Oxfam field report on Gurue, Alto Molocue, Mocuba, and Lugela, February 1989.

55. Oxfam field report on the situation in Zambezia Province, 23.5.89.

56. Situation report from Oxfam emergency coordinator in Quelimane, Zambezia Province, 4.4.89.

57. Internal Oxfam report on food security and nutrition in Mozambique, 1987; UNICEF, *Children on the Frontline*, op. cit., p. 16.

58. Funding for the relief operation has been insufficient. The declining nutritional status has been documented by local surveys conducted by Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Refugee Committee, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme. (See, for example, "Food Provisioning Amongst Mozambican Refugees in Malawi: A Study of Aid, Livelihood, and Development", report prepared for the World Food Program by the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, 1989.)

59. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Zambezia Province, June 1987.

60. Oxfam report on Mankhokwe refugee settlement, Nsanje District, Southern Region, Malawi, June 1987.

61. Amnesty International have also documented human rights abuses by the Mozambican government, by the government of Angola, and by SWAPO, but these are few in number in comparison with those of their adversaries.

62. Extracts from the concluding section of Gersony, op. cit., pp. 25, 26. Following publication of the Gersony report, Phyllis Oakley (a State Department spokesperson) was quoted as saying "We are appalled by the findings", which she described as "horrificing". Another State Department official praised the report as "a careful, meticulous piece of investigation", adding "If anything, it understates the scope and magnitude of the problem." Another official said that the report "vindicates our reluctance to enter into any sort of relationship" with the MNR. (*New York Times*, 20.4.88.)

A RENAMO spokesperson in the USA reacted by dismissing the report as "politically commissioned and politically motivated". Mr Serapiao criticised the report's author for not visiting RENAMO zones in Mozambique and for not talking with RENAMO representatives. He argued that "traumatised refugees" can hardly be expected to speak "confidentially and candidly"

with foreign researchers, suggesting that "unsophisticated villagers" would have trouble differentiating between RENAMO and other forces. He alleged that Mozambique's government "and its Marxist allies have embarked on a systematic program of pseudo-guerrilla operations to discredit RENAMO politically ... and to alienate the populace from RENAMO." (*The Christian Science Monitor*, 25.4.88.)

63. Chief Chitui, the traditional leader of the refugees at Kunyinda settlement. At the time this interview was conducted, June 1987, most of the people at this settlement had fled to Malawi in September and October 1986.

64. Interview with author, Kunyinda settlement, Chikwawa District, Southern Region, Malawi, June 1987.

65. Ibid.

66. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Becon, Waco Kungo, Kwanza Sul Province, Angola, April 1988.

67. Ibid.

68. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Waco Kungo transit centre for displaced people, Waco Kungo, Kwanza Sul Province, April 1988.

69. Ibid.

70. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Rushinga East District, Mashonaland East Province, Zimbabwe, October 1988.

71. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Chipinge District, Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe, October 1988.

72. Estimated by the UN Institute for Namibia.

73. The most commonly used figure; see for example, "Report on Standing Committee 11: the Military Situation in and relating to Namibia", UN Council for Namibia, 1984, p. 3.

74. For a fuller account, see S. Smith, *Namibia: A Violation of Trust*, Oxfam, Oxford, 1986.

75. See, for example, "Namibia: Amnesty International's Concerns", Amnesty International, August 1989.

76. Figure based on *Namibia: The Facts*, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1989, p. 70; *Brutal Force: the apartheid war machine*, G. Cawthra, International Defence and Aid, London, 1986, p. 179; and UNICEF, op. cit., 1989 edition, p. 58.

77. *Namibia: Apartheid's Forgotten Children*, Oxfam, Oxford, 1988, p. 35.

78. See Amnesty International reports; International Defence and Aid reports; and, most recently, "Koevoet Versus the People of Namibia: report of a human rights mission to Namibia on behalf of the working group Kairos", M. Hinz and N.G. Leuven-Lachinski, Kairos, Utrecht, October 1989.

79. Oxfam field report, 1988.

80. Namibia Communications Centre report from Oniipa, northern Namibia, 9.9.88.

81. Former estimates, ranging up to 100,000, were revised downwards when the transition period commenced, and some 41,000 returnees arrived in Namibia. Allowance is made for the children still at school in the former refugee settlements.

82. "The War in Namibia: Social Consequences", T. Weaver, in *Namibia in Perspective*, eds. G. Totemeyer, V. Kandetu, and W. Werner, Council of Churches in Namibia, Windhoek, 1987, p. 240; and UNICEF, op. cit., p. 50.

83. T. Weaver, op. cit., pp. 240-41.

84. See S. Smith, op. cit.

85. UNICEF, op. cit., p. 58.

86. See S. Smith, op. cit.

87. See *Namibia: Apartheid's Forgotten Children*, Oxfam, op. cit., p. 42.

88. See T. Weaver, op. cit., p. 248; and UNICEF, op. cit., 1989 edition, p. 57.
89. Figures for the 1988/89 Financial Year.
90. That is, £2,740,872, during the 1988/89 financial year.
91. The total grants expenditure for the 1988/89 financial year in Malawi was £356,280.
92. £2.4 m. was spent on relief work in Mozambique during 1988/89, 92 per cent of total grants expenditure in Mozambique. The British government and the European Community, among other agencies, have generously matched many of our grants.
93. Oxfam internal reports. In January 1989, a field report stated that MNR attacks had occurred in Mueda, Nangade, and Palma Districts in December 1988.
94. For a full breakdown of Oxfam's relief grants in Mozambique, see the Oxfam Grants List produced annually.
95. UNICEF, *Children on the Frontline*, 1989 edition, op. cit., p. 23.
96. Interview with Oxfam researcher, at 'Lar Essanjo' children's home ('Home of Joy' in the Umbundu language), Huambo, Angola, April 1988.
97. Telex from Oxfam UK to the International Oxfams, March 1987.
98. Internal Oxfam telex, Maputo to Oxford, 27.7.87.
99. Interview with Oxfam's Zambezia-based emergency programme coordinator, February 1989.

Chapter 4

1. See Robert Gersony's report, "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique" (Bureau for Refugee Programs, US State Department, Washington, 1988) for a full account of the MNR's methods of controlling and extracting goods and services from the civilian population.
2. Data on localised refugee influxes from internal Oxfam field reports.
3. Using Malawi Red Cross Society refugee statistics for June 1988, and data from the 1987 national population census ("Malawi Population and Housing Census, 1987, Preliminary Report", National Statistical Office of the Government of Malawi, Zomba, December 1987, table 1.1.) which gives the (Malawian) population for Nsanje District as 201,311.
4. In Dedza District, according to several interviews recorded by the author in June 1987. Of these, one refugee family reported that Mozambican government troops had stolen their crops.
5. Interview with author, Nsanje Boma, June 1987. The District Commissioner's fear of cholera was later to prove well-founded: outbreaks occurred in March 1988 in Mankhokwe, and subsequently in settlements at Tengani, Nyamithuthu, Kunyinda, and Mkhwayi. (Field reports from Médecins sans Frontières.)
6. Interview with author, Lilongwe, Malawi, June 1987.
7. As experience was later to prove, this was an underestimate of the numbers of people without Malawian kin.
8. Telex, 24.9.86, MAL 065.
9. *Financial Times*, 12.9.86, *Times* 12.9.86, *Guardian* 12.9.86, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/8363/ii and ME/8363/4-5 13.9.86, ME/8364/ii and ME/8364/B/1-2 September 1986, sourced in *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 9 no. 1, January 1987.
10. Because of the political uncertainty surrounding the situation of the Mozambican refugees at this time, relief workers in Malawi had been advised by government authorities to refer to the refugees as 'displaced people'. The term 'refugee' was not current inside Malawi until the Malawian government had signed the standard UNHCR protocol agreement (which was not to happen until 1987), thereby granting the Mozambicans who had fled their country under duress the full legal status of refugees.
11. Internal Oxfam correspondence, 4.3.86, MAL 065.

12. Funds were found, and the requested grant was sent straightaway. Field telex, 10.6.86, MAL 065.
13. Oxfam made an immediate grant for £73,000 in support of this appeal.
14. When President Banda signed Malawi's accession to the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Malawi thus became the 104th state to accede to the UN Convention and Protocol), and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. (UNHCR's monthly magazine, *Refugees*, February, 1988.)
15. See note 9 above.
16. BBC SWB ME/8434/ii 5.12.86, ME/8435/ii 6.12.86., ME/8445/ii 18.12.86, ME/8447/ii 20.12.86., ME/8448/ii 22.12.86. Sourced in *TWQ* vol.9 no. 3, July 1987.
17. BBC SWB, ME/8447/ii, 20.12.86., sourced in *TWQ* vol. 9 no. 3., July 1987.
18. Interview between Oxfam Regional Representative and the author, Malawi, June 1987.
19. Statistics of the number of people affected are based on press reports in Zimbabwe, and on the following:
 - a. Unpublished Zimbabwe Government reports (quoted in the *Independent* of 29.5.89), listing 375 raids attributed to the MNR, with 355 civilians and 22 Zimbabwean soldiers killed, 280 civilians and 44 soldiers wounded, 667 civilians kidnapped and more than 400 missing; reports also list 29 MNR rebels killed, 5 wounded, and 45 captured.
 - b. A speech by the Provincial Governor of Manicaland Province in November 1988, mentioning 130 victims of MNR atrocities.However, Oxfam staff report that more atrocities were happening than were reported in the local media.
20. Districts in three border Provinces are affected, from the northernmost Rushinga District down to the southernmost Chiredzi District.
21. The issue is reported by the Zimbabwe press, although many say it is not comprehensively covered. However it is very under-reported in the British press, despite extensive British links with Zimbabwe in general, and with the commercial farms in the eastern border areas in particular.
22. Interviewees included village residents and leaders, health workers, a hospital matron, a doctor, school headmasters and teachers, and local government officials. To protect their identities, we do not give the names of individuals or their villages or places of work, except where names have already appeared in media reports.
23. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Rushinga District, Zimbabwe, October 1988.
24. See, for example, chapter 1 of *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, edited by Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, pp.1-42; *Serving Secretly*, by Ken Flower, John Murray, London, 1987.
25. "Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid", by Roger Martin, EIU *Political Risk* series, Special Report no. 1130, 1988, p. 131.
26. "The Security Threat from South Africa", M. Evans, section 14 of *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, edited by C. Stoneman, Macmillan, London, 1988, pp. 227-8.
27. EIU Quarterly Report on Zimbabwe, No. 4, 1988.
28. Which stated, "We have concurred that an attack against Mozambique shall be regarded as an attack against Zimbabwe ...". (Evans, op. cit., p.227.)
29. Both Malawi and Tanzania have committed troops inside Mozambique. Malawi sent troops to Mozambique by early 1987. Tanzania began sending troops in late 1986, according to reports in the *Zimbabwe Herald* of 5.3.87. Tanzania's troop contingent was withdrawn in November 1988, as reported in Tanzania's *Daily News* of 1.12.88, and the *Guardian* of 2.12.88.
30. *The Herald* (Harare), 12.11.86.
31. The BMATT, composed of British Army personnel, was sent to Zimbabwe to assist the

unique and complex process of integrating the rival armies who had fought during the liberation war.

32. According to a report in *The Namibian*, 20.11.87, Tanzania was expected to use this aid to buy Land Rovers and radio equipment in Britain to equip its troops. According to an article in *New African* journal (May 1989, p.17), Britain's role in providing the governments of Zimbabwe and Mozambique with defence assistance is deeply resented by the MNR.

33. Interview between Oxfam researcher and the village headman of a village in Chipinge District of Manicaland Province, eastern Zimbabwe, October 1988.

34. Information provided by Oxfam researcher, November 1988.

35. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Rushinga District, Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe, October 1988.

36. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Chipinge District, October 1988.

37. From 1980 to 1988, Oxfam's total expenditure on health and disability programmes in Zimbabwe totalled £1,488,074. (Oxfam grants lists 1979/80 to 1988/89.)

38. Oxfam grants lists, Manicaland Province medical programme, 1983/84 to 1988/89.

39. EPI is a worldwide UNICEF/WHO strategy, and one of the key elements of effective preventive health practice.

40. The hospital records demonstrate the rising numbers of admissions and out-patients being treated as a result of the breakdown in outreach, preventive services.

Admissions:	Outpatients:
1986: 5,387 patients admitted	1986: 34,900 patients treated
1987: 6,606	1987: 42,696
1988: 5,158 (only up to September)	(1988 figures not available at the time of the field research)

41. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Manicaland Province, November 1988.

42. The clinic staffing situation in November 1988 for Chipinge District:

Clinic:	Population served:	Staff numbers:
Zamuchiya	6,924 people	One nurse
Mahenye	4,662	No qualified staff
Mabe	8,363	One nurse
Kopera	10,137	One nurse
Gwenzi	10,071	One nurse

43. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Manicaland Province, 1988.

44. UNICEF, "Children and Women in Zimbabwe: a Situation Analysis", 1985; "Farm Labour in Zimbabwe: a Comparative Study in Health Status", R. Lowenson, in *Health Policy and Planning*, No. 1, 1986, Oxford, Oxford University Press; "Labour insecurity and health: an epidemiological study in Zimbabwe", R. Lowenson, in *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 27 No. 7, 1988, Pergamon Press, Oxford, pp. 733-41.

45. Interview with Oxfam researcher, eastern Zimbabwe, August, 1987.

46. See "An Evaluation of the 1985-86 Chipinge District Health Plan in Rural Council Areas", R. Lowenson, Manicaland Provincial Medical Office, 1987.

47. The low rate of Mozambican migrant workers' participation in preventative programmes means that they account for up to 80 per cent of hospital admissions in the relevant border areas, according to Oxfam-supported health staff working in eastern Zimbabwe.

48. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe, November 1988.

Chapter 5

1. Interview with author, Lusaka, June 1987.

2. Botswana is dependent on South African transport routes only until the Limpopo line in Mozambique is reopened. Before 1965, this was its main route for exports and non-RSA imports. (Personal communication with Professor R.H. Green, August 1989.)
3. "Sanctions and South Africa's Neighbours", ODI Briefing Paper, May 1987, London.
4. See, for example, J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, op. cit., pp. 199-218 for Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa, 225-31 for Botswana's dependence on South Africa, and 248-54 for Zambia's dependence on South Africa.
5. E.W. Epstein, *The Death of the Diamond*, Sphere Books, Falmouth, and J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, CIIR, London, 1986, p. 283. According to the *Times* of 1.6.89, de Beers and the Angolan government have also signed a new joint venture agreement.
6. "The Gold Mining Industry in the Transvaal, 1886 - 1899", P. Richardson and J.J. Van-Helten, one of the studies in a collection entitled *The South African War*, edited by P. Warwick, Longman, Harlow, 1980, p.22.
7. According to an Oxfam America study, UN trans-national companies invested three times as much capital in South Africa during the three decades after World War II as they had in the entire pre-war era. At the same time, the independent southern African states sought international investments to develop their economies in vain. By 1983, total US financial involvement in South Africa (including direct investment, bank loans, and stockholdings) had reached \$14.6 billion - equal to roughly two-thirds of the total gross domestic products of all the neighbouring countries combined. US direct investment counted for some 20 per cent of all direct foreign investment in South Africa, and was surpassed only by UK investment. (*The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa*, A. Seidman, Oxfam America Impact Audit No. 4, Africa World Press, New Jersey, 1984, p.41.)
8. See *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, eds. R. Palmer and N. Parsons, Heinemann, London, pp. 226, 227.
9. For a detailed description of these organisations' activities and interconnections, and those of the State Corporations, see *The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide*, vol. 1, eds. R. Davies, D. O'Meara, and S. Dlamini, Zed Press, London, 1988 edition, pp. 65-129.
10. See *South Africa Inc.: The Oppenheimer Empire*, D. Pallister, S. Stewart, and I. Lepper, Simon Schuster, London, 1987; *Transnationals in Southern Africa*, eds A. Seidman, R. Seidman, D. B. Ndlela, and K. Makamure, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986; *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, D. Innes, Heinemann, London, 1984.
11. *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge*, F. Wilson and M. Ramphela, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1989, p.199. The first "Report of the Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa" was produced in 1932.
12. 'Tropicals' from north of the 22nd parallel were not recruited between 1912 and 1933, because the death rate among the workers who had marched on foot from their homes down to the mines was particularly high, and because the mines and white farms of Southern Rhodesia were crying out for black labour. To replace them, the Chamber of Mines established the Native Recruiting Corporation, to recruit black labour from within the Union of South Africa, Basutoland, the Southern Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland. Later, medical advances and the working of new mines in the Orange Free State led to the ban being lifted and WNELA re-scouring Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Tanganyika.
13. See *Gold and Workers: A People's History of South Africa, 1886 - 1924*, vol. 1, L. Callinicos, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 34-5.
14. For a clear summary of the South African government's 'internalisation' and 'stabilisation' labour policies and what they mean for the neighbouring labour-supplying countries, see section 3.2 of "The Comparative Sociology of Migration: Two Case Studies", C. Murray, contribution to *Global Aspects Of Human Migration*, a forthcoming United Nations University study, and the

other references cited therein.

'Internalisation' is the policy of increasing the proportion of South African workers in the mines, and its successful implementation has involved substantial wage increases. 'Stabilisation' is the policy of adapting to the very substantial increase in the proportion of skilled miners in a labour force whose overall numbers are diminishing.

15. According to *Children on the Frontline: The impact of apartheid, destabilisation and warfare on children in southern and South Africa*, UNICEF, New York, updated edition, 1989, p.18. UNICEF bases its estimate on the following: the total number of officially registered migrant workers is in the order of 300,000, and the South African government claims there are a further 1.2 million unregistered 'illegal' migrant workers. Given that the 'illegal' workers will include purely seasonal migrants, especially in the domestic and agricultural sectors, the total estimate has been rounded down for an accurate reflection of the numbers 'highly dependent' on remittances.

In Mozambique alone, 1987 Ministry of Labour/UNDP sources estimated that some 70,000 families (or 350,000 people) in southern Mozambique (Gaza, Inhambane, and Maputo Provinces) were dependent on remittances in Rand from menfolk working in the South African mines. December 1986 Ministry of Labour information estimated that, in addition, there were some 5,000 migrant workers at home in Mozambique in between contracts, plus another 30,000 Mozambicans working on South African farms, plus 3,500 in other sectors of the South African economy, and around 160,000 people working (or searching for work) as illegal migrants.

16. When the British government took over direct administration a few years before the copper mining industry took off.

17. "Zambia's Urban Situation", by H.J. Simons, the first chapter of *Development in Zambia: A Reader*, edited by B. Turok, Zed Press, London, 1979, p. 5. Of course, the turbulent pre-colonial history of this area, including the ravages of the slave and ivory trades, should not be overlooked.

18. See note 12 above.

19. However, there was also much competition of interests, especially for labour, as the surrounding colonial economies developed. In Nyasaland (Malawi) for example, white settlers had to petition the colonial authorities to channel migrant labourers on to the emerging commercial agricultural estates instead of down to South Africa.

20. FRELIMO had committed itself to the eventual ending of migrant labour, but the economic consequences of Mozambique's colonial inheritance, the failure of the collective farm system (adopted as a major agricultural development policy after independence), drought, and — worst of all — war mean it would be impossible to absorb migrant labourers rapidly into the domestic economy.

21. *The Southern African Economist*, April/May 1989.

22. According to information supplied by the Ministry to Oxfam's researcher.

23. Interview with Oxfam researcher at the FRELIMO Miners Welfare Committee centre at Ressano Garcia just by the Mozambican/South African border, Maputo Province, June 1987.

24. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Maxixe, Inhambane Province, Mozambique, May 1987.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. *Beggar Your Neighbours*, J. Hanlon, op. cit., p. 77. The long-overdue wage increases to mine workers in the 1970s also increased dependence.

29. C. Murray, op. cit.

30. *Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho*, C. Murray, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. xi. Drought, a regular natural phenomenon affecting large areas of southern Africa, also played a role.

31. *Children on the Frontline*, UNICEF, 1987 edition, op. cit., p. 15.
32. 1987 TEBA figures.
33. Which policy was a key element in the subsequent political disaffection of the Lozi people of Western Province, who had woven migrancy into their economy. An Oxfam visitor to Western Province in May and June 1989 reported hearing Radio South Africa broadcasting in Lozi.
34. See note 12 above on 'tropicals'.
35. By 1920, some 50,000 Zambians were working outside their own country, mostly in South Africa and Rhodesia, more than the total number of waged workers inside Zambia/Northern Rhodesia. Ten years later, as the copper reserves were beginning to be exploited, some 113,000 Zambians had entered the waged labour market, 78,000 of them within Zambia. By 1969, five years after Zambia's independence, a third of all its citizens had moved away from their home district, most of them to Zambia's urban centres. (Statistics from Simons, op. cit., pp. 1-25.)
36. Even so, African farmers within reach of the urban centres found them to be a profitable food market. The colonial authorities took measures to rein back this trade in order to assist the European farmer settlers who were being established on prime land along the 'line of rail'.
37. *Children on the Frontline*, op. cit., 1989 edition, p. 18.
38. Foreign investment in South Africa is of three main types - direct investments, portfolio investments (purchase of stocks and shares), and loans. It has been and remains critical to the South African economy in a number of ways. Firstly, it generates foreign exchange which allows the imports of capital goods, on which the economy is highly dependent. Secondly, foreign investment gives the South African economy access to technology which it cannot produce itself. And thirdly, foreign borrowing finances government expenditure, state corporations, and the balance of payments deficit, as well as imports.
39. See J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, op. cit., pp. 67-9; *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, D. Innes, Heinemann, London, 1984, pp. 232-41; *Transnationals in Southern Africa*, eds. Seidman et al., op. cit., pp. 21-2; *South Africa Inc.: The Oppenheimer Empire*, Pallister et al., op. cit., pp. 162-84.
40. See "Sanctions Against South Africa", R. Moorsom, a background research report prepared for Oxfam, July 1986, p. 19.
41. In 1987, over the period January to July only (due to official restrictions on trade data), South Africa's trade surplus with Africa was given as R662.9 m. (*Survey of Race Relations 1987/88*, op. cit., pp. 419-20.)
42. See note 78.
43. See note 74.
44. See *Beggar Your Neighbours*, J. Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 71-3.
45. See *Beggar Your Neighbours*, J. Hanlon, op. cit., p. 73-6, and "SADCC in the 1990s", J. Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 89-94.
46. See *SADCC in the 1990s*, J. Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 89-94, for an overview of the SADCC energy programme.
47. For an up-to-date, country-by-country account of the ways in which South Africa has used 'transport diplomacy', see *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report*, P. Johnson, and D. Martin, a report prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, James Currey, London, 1989.
- Also, before South Africa's destabilisation took hold, other shortcomings were noticeable, including poor maintenance; inadequate rolling stock; breakdowns in cooperation between countries; and, until Zimbabwe was independent and sanctions could be lifted, its routes out through Mozambique were underutilised.
48. Based on data given in SADCC'S 1988/89 Annual Report.
49. Estimated by R.H. Green from background materials used in ECA study, op. cit. (Personal

communication with author, January 1990.)

50. With South Africa's volume of trade falling from over 14 m. tonnes in the early 1970s, to under 1 m. tonnes by the end of the 1980s. (R.H. Green, personal communication with the author, January 1990.)

51. Other international interests have also benefited from Namibia's colonial economy. In particular, business interests in the member states of the self-appointed 'Contact Group': Britain, the USA, Canada, France, and West Germany.

52. See, for example, *Namibia: A Violation of Trust*, S. Smith, Oxfam Public Affairs Unit, Oxford, 1986.

53. *SouthScan*, vol 4, no. 5, 1 February, 1989.

54. For South Africa's position, see "Question of Walvis Bay", press release from the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, 18.11.88, New York.

55. UN Security Council Resolution 432 of July 1978, the Namibia SCR preceding 435 which, as a result of South Africa's conditions to the Contact Group, omitted to mention Walvis Bay (according to an official South African source, see note 54).

See, "Walvis Bay — An Integral Part of Namibia: Statements in Support of the Territorial Integrity of Namibia including Walvis Bay, by Representatives to the Ninth Special Session of the General Assembly on the Question of Namibia", Special Supplement no. 2, June 1978, of the *Objective: Justice* series of UN Public Information Office publications.

56. See "Walvis Bay: Namibia's Port", R. Moorsom, IDAF, London, 1984.

57. See "Transforming A Wasted Land", no. 2 in *A Future for Namibia* series, R. Moorsom, CIIR, London, 1982.

58. "Economic Prospects for Namibia", ODI briefing paper, August 1989.

59. *Profile Namibia*, CIIR, 1989.

60. And even less in terms of end-user share, probably between 15 and 20 per cent. By comparison, Switzerland accounts for 31 per cent. (Personal communication from R.H. Green, January 1990, ODI briefing paper, op. cit.)

61. Uranium concentrate accounts for 38 per cent of export earnings, and diamonds account for 31 per cent. (ODI briefing paper, op. cit.)

62. See S. Smith, op. cit., pp. 34-40.

63. Some black farmers were, however, able to market beef and karakul pelts through official channels.

64. Economic Policy Document of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of SWAPO, November 1988, Luanda.

65. Of the TNCs in Namibia, South Africa hosts 35, the UK 25, West Germany 8, France 3, and Canada 2. (*Front File*, May 1989, vol. 3, no. 5.)

66. In 1987, the South African concerns' inshore fish quota was reduced from 91 per cent to 66 per cent. (EIU Country Profile, 1988/89.) The main South African parent companies involved (1983 data) were SANLAM, Liberty Life, Anglo American, Barlow Rand, Fisheries Development Corporation (state). ("Exploiting the Sea", R. Moorsom, no. 5 in the series *A Future for Namibia*, CIIR, London, 1984, p. 52.)

67. Ibid.

68. The figure of R892 is given in "Namibia: Fundamentals and Potential", H.A.R. Meiring, a paper compiled by the First National Development Bank, Windhoek, August 1989, p. 5. The official South African statistic for the debt is R549 m., an amount considered by the Administrator General to be "a truly healthy inheritance for the new government". (BBC World Summary of Broadcasts, ME/W0088 A2/1, 1.8.89.0)

69. United Nations Development Programme report, "Namibia: Fiscal and Financial Policies: Issues and Assistance Requirements. An Executive Summary", September 1989, p. 3.

70. H.A.R. Meiring, op. cit., p. 5.

71. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/W0088 A2/2, 1.8.89. Excerpts from the Administrator General's Budget presentation speech, 20.7.89, Windhoek.

72. According to Dr J. Faundez, of the Law Department of the University of Warwick, an expert on Namibia and international law. (Personal communication with the author, December 1989.)

73. The Rand Monetary Union was replaced by the Tripartite Monetary Agreement in 1986; the signatories are Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa (and formerly Botswana), with Namibia as an involuntary member. It links the countries of the RMA financially, although strictly speaking the Rand is no longer legal tender in Lesotho or Swaziland, and those countries are free to determine their own exchange rate policies. However, not least because of the common membership of SACU, in practice their currencies are tied to the Rand, with the result that South Africa retains some indirect control over their Central Banks.

SWAPO officials have said that it is SWAPO policy for Namibia, like Botswana, to leave the RMA and establish its own currency.

74. SACU is a regional arrangement involving Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (the 'BLS states') and South Africa, with Namibia as an involuntary member. It dates back to 1910, when Britain and South Africa made arrangements for the surrounding territories (now the BLS states). SACU allows for unlimited free trade among its members. Because South Africa has the most developed economy, its export sector has benefited from there being no tariff walls blocking its access to these nearby markets. The BLS states have benefited financially from the way in which payments from SACU's central customs pool are divided. However, the World Bank and the Ford Foundation, for example, argue that Lesotho's membership of SACU has impeded economic growth because the high tariff walls around SACU oblige it to import goods from South Africa (often uncompetitive on a world market comparative basis), and prevent the development of a national industrial/ manufacturing sector. For a full account, see J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, op. cit., pp. 81-90; and J. Hanlon, *SADCC in the 1990s*, op. cit., p. 32. SACU has been the main single vehicle which has integrated the BLS and Namibian economies with South Africa's. SWAPO's economic advisers are advising against independent Namibia's accession to SACU.

75. Estimated to be about US\$170 m. in 1989/90 under present SACU arrangements, equivalent to about 22 per cent of 1988/89 government revenue.

76. ODI briefing, op. cit.

77. J. Hanlon, *SADCC in the 1990s*, op. cit., p. 122, citing SWAPO's economic advisers.

78. During the 1970s, South Africa's exports to the SADCC region (not then so-called, of course) expanded fivefold, while the SADCC region's exports to South Africa increased by only 126 per cent at current prices, raising South Africa's trade surplus with the SADCC states from \$250 m. in 1970 to \$1.8 bn. in 1979. (ODI briefing paper, "Sanctions and South Africa's neighbours", May 1987, p. 3.)

79. *Southscan*, vol. 4 no. 35, 22.9.89.

80. Ibid.

81. See "Race Relations Survey 1987/88", op. cit., p. 419.

82. ODI briefing paper, "Sanctions and South Africa's Neighbours", May 1987. Statistics cited are from 1984.

83. Ibid., p. 3.

84. South Africa is also working to combat the restrictions which trading patterns place on it: through direct lobbying against sanctions, by establishing sanctions evasion mechanisms, through trying to diversify trading partners, by following import substitution programmes, stockpiling, etc.

85. Much has been published on this topic. For a cross-section of views and analysis see the

following: "Sanctions and South Africa's Neighbours", ODI briefing paper, op. cit.; "Sanctions Against South Africa", Oxfam background research report, R. Moorsom, op. cit., pp. 114-26; "Sanctions and South Africa: The Dynamics of Economic Isolation", M. Lipton, EIU Special Report no. 1119, London, January 1988, pp. 51-5 (see also the follow-up article by C. Stoneman in the *Southern Africa Review of Books*, Spring 1988 edition, pp. 32-4); *Economic Sanctions*, R. Renwick, Harvard University Centre for International Affairs, 1981, pp. 76-92; *The Sanctions Handbook*, J. Hanlon and R. Omond, Penguin, 1987, pp. 95-117; *Economic Effects of Sanctions on Southern Africa*, J. P. Hayes, Gower, Aldershot, 1987; "New Sanctions Against South Africa", R.C. Riddell, *Development Policy Review*, pp. 243-67; "SADCC in the 1990s", J. Hanlon, EIU Special Report no. 1158, op. cit., pp. 29-37.

86. See "Southern Africa: Apartheid and Sanctions, the SADCC View", an address given by Simba Makoni, Executive Secretary of SADCC, to the Annual General Meeting of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Sheffield, November, 1987. Published by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, 1988.

87. See *South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, J. Hanlon, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1989.

88. See, for example, ODI briefing paper, 1987, op. cit., p. 3; J. Hanlon, "SADCC in the 1990s", op. cit., pp. 33-4; "The Effects of Sanctions on the Frontline States", B. Weimar, paper delivered to the West German Zimbabwe network seminar, Bonn, November 1987.

89. ODI briefing paper, op. cit., p. 3.

90. Excluding the proportion of SA/SADCC trade conducted with the countries in the Rand Monetary Area, of course.

91. ODI briefing paper, op. cit., pp. 3 and 4.

92. However, Zambia and Mozambique's experiences of international support to help them meet the costs of sanctions against Rhodesia are not encouraging. President Kaunda said that the international community had been "more generous with moral than with material support". (R. Renwick, op. cit., p. 83.)

93. A recent EIU report claims that all the other SADCC states could withstand the effects (of the predictable range of responses and effects) following increased sanctions against South Africa. ("SADCC in the 1990s", J. Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 29-38.)

94. That is, GDP loss, 1980-1988, at 1988 prices.

95. See "Skills and Sanctions against South Africa", mimeo, part of the independent expert study on the evaluation and impact of sanctions against South Africa, N. Swainson, January 1989, which concludes, "...The failure of the state education system to provide enough skilled black labour in the past was the result of an apartheid system committed to the policy and practice of 'separate development'. From the late 1970s corporate capital and the state came to realise that the only way to satisfy the current demand for certain types of skills was to expand the system of internal training, and supplement the local labour force with a small input of specialist immigrants. Despite some improvement, the serious shortcomings in existing formal and informal training systems are evident."

96. Hence the widespread contraventions of the old Pass Laws, and the present contraventions of the Group Areas Act and other influx control measures.

97. The following excerpts are from a Progressive Federal Party leaflet entitled "Nat Gravy Train ... How Much Government Can You Afford?", published in 1987.

"The Nationalist Party has created a government structure that has turned out to be the longest gravy train ever seen - and it's getting longer every year ... Because of the duplications of government along Nat apartheid lines, we have 4 Ministers of Health, 5 Ministers of Education, 4 Ministers of Agriculture, and 6 Ministers dealing with housing. And with the homeland policy we find ourselves with 5 Presidents, 5 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 5 Finance Ministers, and 5 Ministers of Defence.

"And that's not all. Even these figures do not tell the whole story, since they do not include the

six non-independent national states with their 46 Ministers and the 481 members of their Legislative Assemblies...

- R1 in every R6 spent by government goes on pay and
- 12c in every R1 is spent on apartheid structures.
- The Civil Service has grown by 20 per cent since President Botha took over the reins
- There is one civil servant to every 27 citizens (in Britain it's one to every 94,000).
- Government salaries, administration and allowances now cost R40.5 million — 500 per cent more than in 1981..."

98. In the 1989 Herman Cohen hearings, it was established that the US Administration believes that international sanctions have affected the white South African outlook

It is also held that the September 1989 election results have disproved the view that "sanctions would drive white South Africans into the laager".

In November 1988, South Africa's Finance Director General, Chris Stals, said that more than R20 bn. had left South Africa over the previous three years as a result of international economic pressure on the country. (*Southscan*, vol. 3 no. 11, 9.11.88.)

According to the International Chamber of Commerce, and the UN Centre on TNCs, more than 550 foreign companies have disposed of their South African holdings between 1985 and 1989.

99. Excerpts from Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society entitled "South Africa: No Easy Answers", May 1988. Reproduced in *Perspectives on Africa*, HMSO, London, 1988.

100. War on Want Conference, "Peace and Development in the Frontline States", London, June 1988.

101. "South Africa: Building the Future. The Role of British Industry in South Africa", brochure produced by British Industry Committee on South Africa Limited (BICSA), London. BICSA was established in 1986, and states that its member companies represent the majority of British investment in South Africa. The Chairperson's Annual 1987/88 annual report stated, "We remain totally opposed to apartheid, but we shall continue to argue the positive case for maintaining British investment in South Africa and the importance of economic growth as a force for political change."

102. Excerpts from an address by the British Ambassador at the Annual General Meeting of the Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, 17.8.88. (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press release.)

103. South Africa is already involved in the upgrading of Maputo port, for example, as it is in South Africa's economic interests to improve the port's efficiency. But even on this project, it is argued that there could be greater cooperation, for instance in the technical assistance field, if it were possible to have normal political cooperation.

104. As Professor Green points out, "The pattern of selling high-cost manufactured goods and transport services for cheap labour and hard currency is not a viable one even with a democratic South Africa." (Personal communication with author, August 1989.)

105. See, for example, "Post-apartheid South Africa and its Neighbours", J. Hanlon, *Third World Quarterly*, April 1987.

106. Excerpt from "One View on the Realities of SADCC", article by A.M. Babu, *Africa Analysis*, 9.6.89.

107. Concluding statement from Simba Makoni's address to the Annual General Meeting of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, Sheffield, November 1987.

Chapter 6

1. Botswana is the key exception. Firstly because it has suffered relatively little from South Africa's regional policy, even though Gaborone has been the target of high-profile SADF attacks.

And secondly because Botswana has experienced high growth rates during the 1980s, and has had the ability to build up substantial foreign exchange reserves. See "Southern African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid", UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa, October 1989, p. 39.

2. For a full explanation of the different approaches to calculating the costs of destabilisation and warfare, see *ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

3. According to UNICEF, "The share of the national budget that goes to recurrent defence costs in Mozambique is 35 per cent, one of the highest in the world. Angola's defence budget is much larger than Mozambique's in absolute terms and absorbs a comparable percentage of total spending as well as half of all imports. Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe also have large armed forces, and Zimbabwe is spending in the order of US\$3 m. a week to defend its own and the region's trade routes through Mozambique." (*Children on the Frontline: The impact of apartheid, destabilisation and warfare on children in southern and South Africa*, UNICEF, New York, 1989 edition, p. 20.) For a full discussion of the diversion of scarce resources to defence, see also ECA, *op. cit.*, and "Apartheid Terrorism: the Destabilisation Report", a report prepared for the Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, James Currey, London, 1989.

4. Based on ECA, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

5. ECA *op. cit.*, p. 4.

6. ECA, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

7. *World Development Report 1989*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

8. "Policy Reform and Adjustment in an Economy under Siege: Malawi 1980-87", J.G. Kydd, *IDS Bulletin*, vol 19, no. 1, January 1988, Sussex, p.36.

9. EIU Country Report, 1987/88, p. 15.

10. Zimbabwean politicians were reported to be particularly irritated by the fact that their army was often having to escort Malawian convoys carrying goods of South African manufacture. By the end of 1987, Zimbabwe had demonstrated its point by reducing the number of weekly convoys. Malawi responded in two ways, which have themselves added to the drain on scarce foreign exchange reserves. Firstly by paying a reported \$4 m. p.a. in foreign exchange to Zimbabwe for the security of its convoys. And secondly by arranging for South African imports, and exports destined for the South African market, to be sent the long way round through Botswana and Zambia. (EIU Country Report on Malawi, no. 2, 1988, p. 34.)

11. EIU Country Profile for Malawi, 1987/88, pp. 22, 23.

12. Oxfam briefing paper, unpublished, on the effects of economic structural adjustment in Malawi (1988).

13. EIU Country Profile, 1987/88, p. 23.

14. *Africa Economic Digest*, vol. 9, no. 25, 1-7.7.88, p. 12.

15. Interview with the author, Blantyre, June 1987.

Chapter 7

1. See, for example, The International Freedom Foundation (IFF): "Diplomacy From A Position of Strength", *Freedom Bulletin* no. 10, 1988, published by the IFF's southern African branch in South Africa.

2. First articulated in the January 1987 publication of "A US Policy Toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa", US Department of State, Washington. In essence, this report found that the US policy of 'constructive engagement' had failed. However, no in-depth replacement was formulated by the US Administration until 3 October 1989, when Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, gave testimony to the Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Two key points emerging from the Administration's new position are (1) that the USA believes that the pressure of

sanctions has "played a key role in stimulating new thinking within the white power structure. It is now increasingly clear to that government that the well-being of the white minority cannot be sustained without a negotiated political settlement that results in political equality for all South Africans"; and (2) that the South African government should prove its seriousness of intent by beginning the process of creating a climate for negotiations, with substantial progress to be under way by February 1990.

3. *Leadership*, vol. 8 no. 1, March 1989.

4. Examples given are the South African role in ending the bus hi-jacking during the Pope's 1988 visit to Lesotho, and its role in Bophuthatswana during the 'attempted coup' of February 1988.

5. *Leadership*, March 1989.

6. Additionally, a number of other military capacities had been extended. See *SouthScan*, vol. 4 no. 8, 22.2.89, reporting on information made available by the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa.

7. *Herald*, Zimbabwe 10.2.89; *The Chronicle*, Zimbabwe, 11.2.89.

8. See *Namibia: A Violation of Trust*, S. Smith, Oxford, Oxfam, 1986.

9. This widely held view should be contrasted with the analysis of South Africa's Director General of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden, published in March 1989: "The Quiet South African", an article in *Leadership* magazine, Cape Town, March 1989.

10. For a balanced analysis of the complexities behind this development, see "Treacherous Crossing: Namibian Independence Debacle", *Southern African Report*, vol. 5, no. 1, July 1989, Toronto, pp. 15-17. Strategic errors of judgement by SWAPO, combined with poor UN/South African coordination on the ground, and the fact that SWAPO was excluded from the tripartite Namibia/Angola agreement, were the key factors behind this debacle.

11. See, for example, British press reports during the last two weeks of June 1989.

12. For a clear report, see "Background to Gbadolite", *Front File*, vol. 3, no. 11, August 1989 (extra edition), p. 8.

13. Internal Oxfam report, December 1988.

14. The South African Director-General of Foreign Affairs has said, "We have made Mozambique a high priority in our Department for the next year." (Interview in *Leadership* magazine, March 1989.)

15. Although the degree to which this occurs has been a matter of academic dispute.

16. M. Hall, op. cit.

17. *Independent*, 30.3.89.

18. In 1988, COSATU and NACTU organised joint actions, agreeing that they had common aims. And in 1989, there were further moves towards unity in action between the United Democratic Front and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). (*Guardian*, 17.8.89; *Independent*, 17.8.89.)

19. See, for example, an article entitled "W. Cape strategy aims to avoid mistakes of 1985", *SouthScan* 22.9.89.

20. For a full account of the various types of affiliation, and the various organisations connected with the MDM, see *Business Day*, South Africa, 30.8.89.

21. According to official statistics, 74.7 per cent of South Africa's population are 'African', 2.6 per cent are 'Coloured', and 14 per cent are 'White'. (Central Statistical Service data, given in "Race Relations Survey, 1987/88", South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1988, p.11.)

22. The high costs of running the apartheid state, and the high military costs incurred by South Africa's regional policy have also played a part in the country's economic difficulties.

23. According to *Africa Confidential*, 22.9.89, R25,000 m. have left South Africa since 1985. Of this, R15,000 m. have gone to service foreign debt obligations, and R10,000 m. have gone in

other ways: because South African investors prefer to invest abroad; because foreign companies have sold their businesses to local companies; because individual South Africans have prepared nest-eggs abroad; and because some fraudulent deals have been made by manipulating the dual exchange rate of the 'financial' and the 'commercial' Rand.

According to the United Nations 'Centre on Transnational Corporations' background papers for the September 1989 Geneva public hearings on transnational corporations in South Africa and Namibia, at least 88 South African transnationals have been identified as having controlling interests in 437 companies in 44 countries. The bulk of these investments are in Brazil, the USA, Britain and West Germany.

24. For example, this was evidenced shortly before the October 1989 Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth summit (at which a call for increased sanctions against South Africa was widely expected to be resisted by Mrs Thatcher), when President de Klerk — with ostentatious timing — publicly advised London and Washington that he was about to release eight prominent political prisoners. An article in the *Sunday Telegraph* of 15.10.89 read, "... President de Klerk's government has apparently done everything in its power in the last few weeks to support the view that internal South African policy is being drawn up to please officials in London ... British officials find South Africa's rather obvious attempts to throw Mrs Thatcher a bone embarrassing and unnecessary."

25. According to the *Weekly Mail* (15-21.9.89), the ANC interpreted the election results as a sign that white South Africans had endorsed change.

26. This is a cumulative total; it includes subsidiary organisations and some which are probably defunct.

27. *Independent* 18.10.89.

Chapter 8

1. Entitled "South Africa: Quo Vadis?", Oxford, 6.3.85. Transcripts available from Oxfam.

2. See, for example, *Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia, and South Africa, 1900-45*, M. Chanock, Manchester, 1977; *Southern Africa Since 1800*, D. Denoon with B. Nyeko and J.B. Webster, Longman, London, second edition, 1984; *The Failure of South African Expansion*, R. Hyam, London, 1972; *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa*, S. Marks and R. Rathbone, Longman, London, 1982; *South Africa in Africa*, S.C. Nolutschungu, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1975; *A New History of Southern Africa*, N. Parsons, Macmillan, 1982; *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, R. Palmer and N. Parsons, Heinemann, London, 1977; *Class and Colour in South Africa*, H.J. Simons and R.E. Simons, Penguin, London, 1969; *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique*, L. Vail and L. White, Heinemann, London, 1980; *Magomero: Portrait of an African Village*, L. White, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

3. See *Namibia: A Violation of Trust*, S. Smith, Oxfam, Oxford, 1986.

4. *The Courier*, no. 116, July-August 1989, p. 59. There is some controversy over the comparative nature of commodity price decline: see "Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth", World Bank, Washington, November 1989, pp. 24-5.

5. *Africa in History*, B. Davidson, Paladin, St Albans, 1978, pp. 207, 208. The Atlantic slave trade ravaged the peoples along the western African seaboard from the mouth of the Senegal river to southern Angola for over two centuries.

6. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) consists of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,

Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, the USA, Japan, Finland, Australia, and New Zealand.

7. However, it should be stressed from the outset that the SADCC region encompasses a wide range of economic circumstances ranging from comparatively successful Botswana, through debt-ridden Zambia, to devastated Mozambique.

8. "Statement on External Debt", South Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 3.3.88.

9. Normal strategies for this include increasing the range of primary exports and therefore spreading the risk; establishing processing industries to 'add value' to primary commodities; and setting up 'import substitution' initiatives.

10. EIU Country Report, 1988/89, p. 16.

11. Which does, however, centre on adding value to the country's agricultural produce, and on import substitution.

12. *Financial Times*, 28.6.89.

13. Tenant labourers on some of these estates (especially in the Central Region where the system of 'visiting tenants' was introduced to attract labour because casual migrant labour is more readily available in the land-hungry Southern Region) are also allowed to grow Burley.

14. Obviously, developments in Mozambique were also a likely factor.

15. According to UNCTAD, the US\$ price in cents per lb., deflated in 1985 terms, was 117.9 in 1964 and 64.3 in 1985. ("Consideration of the Situation in, and Problems of, the World Market for Copper. A Review of Major Trends and Developments in the World Copper Market up to 1985." TD/B/C.1/RM/COPPER/2, November 1986, UN, p. 21.)

16. "Primary Commodities: Market Developments and Outlook", Commodities Division of the Research Department, IMF, Washington, July 1989, pp. 83-8.

17. See, *Zambia: Debt and Poverty*, J. Clark with C. Allison, Oxfam, Oxford, 1989.

18. "Angola to the 1990s: The Potential for Recovery", T. Hodges, EIU Special report No. 1079, January 1987, p. 52.

19. See EIU Country Review 1988/89.

20. For a good overview of these factors, see "Commodity Prices: Investing in Decline?", ODI briefing paper, London, March 1988. For data on how commodity prices have moved in relation to the Manufactured Goods Index, see, for example, ODA Commodity Price Charts, published regularly.

21. See *The Courier*, no. 116, July-August, 1989.

22. According to the Year Book of the International Sugar Organisation.

23. See "European Community Trade Barriers to Tropical Agricultural Products", M. Davenport, ODI Working Paper no. 27, London, 1988, pp. 91-6.

24. See, *The Hunger Crop: Poverty and the Sugar Industry*, B. Coote, Oxfam, Oxford, 1987.

25. *The Courier*, no. 116, July-August 1989, p. 63.

26. However, as some of the 'free trade' zones in the ASEAN bloc demonstrate, enclave industrial development and restrictive employment practices mean that countries in the South can produce for this lucrative market without having to attend to the development needs of the poor.

27. ODI, March 1988, op. cit., p. 2.

28. In 1969, the Pearson report pointed out the great importance of trade to the South, and how the need for aid often arises from the inadequacy of foreign exchange earnings and the difficulty of increasing them. It made a number of recommendations for changes in the North.

In 1980, the Brandt report concluded that countries in the South should be enabled to develop their commodity sectors and 'add value' to their products through a number of measures to be adopted by countries in the North.

In 1983, the Brandt Commission recommended a further set of emergency measures on world trade to be adopted by the North.

In 1987, the Brundtland report pointed out the disastrous environmental consequences that the commodity trade and the debt crisis were causing. A number of measures for international action were recommended.

29. "SADCC in the 1990s: Development on the Frontline", J. Hanlon, EIU special report no. 1158, 1989, pp. 60, 61, drawing on research done by the Christian Michelsen Institute.

30. Excerpt from a speech by Dr S.H.S. Makoni to the Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Conference, Gaborone, October 1989.

31. Quoted in J. Hanlon, EIU 1989, op. cit., p. 65.

32. Excerpt from the conclusion of Nyerere's inaugural statement to the South Commission, Dar es Salaam, 27.7.87.

33. "Statement on External Debt", adopted by the South Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 3.3.88. While the World Bank and others highlight the role played by sub-Saharan Africa's rate of population growth, it should be noted that in most SADCC states (according to World Bank data) the projected rate of population growth for 1987-2000 is dropping.

34. *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, The World Bank, Washington, November 1989, p. 4. In addition, the IMF says, "On the assumption that there are no severe commodity shocks, sub-Saharan African countries pursue appropriate development policies, and the international economic environment improves, it is projected that during 1989-92 real GDP in sub-Saharan Africa could grow at an annual rate of close to 4 per cent ..." (*Finance and Development*, quarterly publication of the IMF and the World Bank, September 1989, p. 31.)

35. Growth in the SADCC region in 1988 averaged 4.5 per cent. According to SADCC, this was the first time since the 1970s that it had exceeded the rate of population growth in the majority of member states. This improved economic performance is thought to be due to economic growth in the industrialised North, some aspects of economic reform policies, and favourable weather conditions.

36. *World Bank Debt Tables, 1988/89*, World Bank. However, the total figure for sub-Saharan Africa's debt is greatly distorted by the inclusion of the debts of Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. Both of these countries have debts comparable to the world's Highly Indebted Countries, at \$27,769 m. and \$8,450 m. respectively. (World Bank, 1987 data.)

37. "African Debt: The Search for Solutions", T. Killick and M. Martin, UN Africa Recovery Programme Briefing Paper no. 1, June 1989, p. 1. The HICs are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, The Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Nigeria, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

38. EIU Country Profiles, 1988/89.

39. Ibid., p. 41.

40. For a useful discussion of the way in which the economic consequences of conflict affect the wider economy, see "South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid", UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), pp. 11-14.

41. R. Renwick, "Economic Sanctions", *Harvard Studies in International Affairs* no. 45, Cambridge, Mass, 1981..

42. *Mozambique: A Cry For Peace*, J. Quan, Oxfam, Oxford, 1987, p. 3.

43. See *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa*, A. Seidman, Oxfam America, Africa World Press, New Jersey, 1984, Chapter 3.

44. "Debt in the SADCC region: Zambia Case Study", A. M. Mwanza, paper given to the SAPES Conference on SADCC Problems and Prospects for Regional Political and Economic Cooperation, Gaborone, October, 1989, p. 4.

45. After 1981, there was a substantial real reduction in net capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa, with a 30-40 per cent fall in 1984-85 alone. Much of this was the result of a virtual cessation of bank lending.

The SADCC region experienced a sharp decline in official resource flows at this time. In real terms, official flows dropped by 39.2 per cent between 1981 and 1983. (Statistics based on OECD data, "Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries", OECD, 1984-1987, Paris.)

As far as aid levels are concerned, although global aid levels were stagnant throughout the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa did better than the rest of the developing world, as its share of the total OECD aid flows rose from 32 per cent in 1980-82 to 39 per cent in 1987 (the USA was an exception, giving proportionately far less than the average for other OECD donors). Aid flows to the region have not, and would not anyway be expected to, compensate for the fall-off in other financial flows, just as they have not compensated for the economic costs of South Africa's regional aggression.

Private direct investment also fell away. For a thorough discussion of the declining levels of British TNC investment in English-speaking Africa, see "British Transnational Corporations in Sub Saharan Africa: Corporate Responses to Economic Crises in the 1980s", P. Bennell, mimeo, July 1989.

46. A.M. Mwanza, op. cit., p. 6.

47. See "Debt in the SADCC Region: A Case Study of Malawi", C. Chipeta, paper for a conference entitled "Debt in the SADCC Region", Brussels, January, 1989.

48. For a fuller account, see "The Problem of Official Debt Owed by Developing Countries", P.S. Mistry, paper produced for the FONDAD (Forum on Debt and Development) Conference, Brussels, August 1989.

49. The following recommended debt reduction and cancellation measures are in line with those urged on European governments and banks by two European NGO groups, the Forum on Debt and Development, and the British Overseas Aid Group.

50. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) consists of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR.

51. T. Killick and M. Martin, op. cit., p. 8. By the end of 1988, Britain, Canada, West Germany, and the Scandinavian Group had cancelled almost all aid debt owed to them by sub-Saharan Africa; total cancellation exceeded \$3.2 bn. but will reduce debt service only by some \$125 m. yearly, because these loans had soft terms. (Ibid.)

52. OECD debt tables.

53. P.S. Mistry, op. cit.

54. Sources: for concessional and non-concessional World Bank debt, *World Bank Debt Tables, 1989/90*; for IMF debt, OECD data.

55. *The Southern African Economist*, October/November 1989.

56. Ibid.

57. The World Bank and the IMF have argued that the poor would have been worse off had there been no structural adjustment. However, increasingly, they acknowledge that some groups in society are vulnerable to some adjustment measures in the short term.

58. See, for example, *Adjustment With A Human Face. Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth*, eds. G.A. Cornia, R. Jolly, and F. Stewart, 2 vols., UNICEF, Oxford, 1987; "The Social Consequences of Adjustment and Dependency on Primary Commodities in sub-Saharan Africa", UNICEF, New York, 1989, paper presented to the ACC Inter-agency Expert Meeting on Commodities organised by UNCTAD, May 1989, Geneva; *Zambia: Debt and Poverty*, J. Clark and C. Allison, Oxfam, Oxford, 1989; and an Oxfam-supported literature search of studies documenting the impact of economic adjustment programmes, undertaken during the 1980s, at household level in the nine SADCC states, mimeo, 1989.

UNICEF's study (Cornia et al., *ibid.*) is the most comprehensive study to date. It found evidence of rising malnutrition in ten African, six Latin American, and two Asian countries;

rising infant mortality rates in four countries (one in Africa); an end to the trend towards child health improvement in at least 21 countries; and an increase in the proportion of low-birthweight babies in at least ten countries.

59. Mozambique is omitted from this list because Oxfam's programme there concentrates almost wholly on relief.

60. *The World Bank: A Critical Analysis*, C. Payer, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1982, p. 153.

61. Interview with Oxfam researcher, Maputo, 2.9.87.

62. Because each member nation has, in addition to its voting power according to wealth, a block of votes which is the same size for each country.

63. World Bank Annual report, 1989, pp. 194-7; IMF Survey (Supplement on the Fund), August 1989.

64. Interview with author, Lusaka, 17.6.87.

65. For an account of this period in Zambia's adjustment history, see J. Clark and C. Allison, op. cit., pp. 17-25.

Programme Aid is the main form of non-project aid. It is used to finance vital imports, usually to assist countries with particularly acute balance of payments problems.

66. World Bank Annual Report 1989, p. 81.

67. "Adjusting to Recession: Will the Poor Recover?", ODI briefing paper, London, November 1988 edition, p. 1.

68. See, for example, "The Impact of the IMF/World Bank on the People of Africa with Special Reference to Zambia and especially on Women and Children", D.C. Muntemba, IFAA, London, 1987.

69. In 1982, 7.8 per cent of the national budget was spent on health, whereas by 1985 this proportion had dropped to 5.7 per cent. More dramatically, the foreign exchange value of the budget declined from \$49.4 m. in 1982 to \$19.7 m. in 1985, reflecting a substantial loss of purchasing power for the health service at a time when the national Primary Health Care programme was being established. ("Debt and Poverty: A Case Study of Zambia", J. Clark with D. Keen, Oxfam, Oxford, May 1988.)

Although recurrent PHC expenditure is designed to be far more cost-effective than, say, that for tertiary services, nevertheless the initial outlay on items such as motor cycles, drug kits, production of training manuals, etc. was affected by budget cut-backs. NGOs like Oxfam were therefore requested to fund PHC capital items.

70. Excerpt from a speech by Dr S.H.S. Makoni to the SAPES Conference, Gaborone, October, 1989.

71. See, for example, the "Brandt report", published in 1980, which stressed the fundamental, global nature of the economic crisis. (*North-South: A Programme for Survival, The report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt*, Pan, London, 1980.)

72. According to World Bank data, 61.1 per cent of the national total of household income goes to the top 20 per cent of the population, while 3.4 per cent goes to the bottom 20 per cent of the population. (*World Development Report 1989*, op. cit., p. 222.)

73. See, for example, UNICEF, "The Social Consequences of Adjustment and Dependency on Primary Commodities in sub-Saharan Africa", op. cit.; and "The Politics of Adjustment Policy", A. Sawyerr, UN Economic Commission for Africa, ECA/ICHD/88/29, Addis Ababa, 1988.

74. See "Commodity Prices: Investing in Decline?", ODI, op. cit., p. 6.

75. See A. Sawyerr, op. cit.

76. UNICEF, May 1989, op. cit., pp. 28-9.

77. A good summary is to be found in *Africa: What Can Be Done?*, B. Turok, IFAA/Zed,

London, 1987.

78. However, this period was the time when Zambia was also having to meet the costs of the Rhodesian conflict and the international policies aimed at ending it.

79. See, for example, "Towards Another Development in Rural Zambia", R. Dumont, 1979, mimeo.

80. See "Elite Conflict and Socio-Political Change in Zambia", M. Szeftel, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1978.

81. According to, for example, various articles by J. Kydd and R. Christiansen (for a bibliography of their work, see *IDS Bulletin* vol. 19, no 2, University of Sussex, Falmer, April 1988, p. 80); "Household Food and Nutritional Security in Malawi", V. Quinn, M. Chiligo, and J.P. Gittinger, paper presented to the Symposium on Agricultural Policies for Growth and Development, November 1988, Mangochi, Malawi.

82. Although it should be noted that some 66,000 'visiting tenants' (as estate labourers are sometimes called) on commercial estates are also permitted to grow Burley. (*Financial Times*, 28.6.89.)

83. M Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country", forthcoming article in *Africa* 60 (1), 1990; J. Quan, op. cit., p. 6; see also the correspondence in the *Southern Africa Review of Books*, April/May, June/July, and August/September editions, 1989.

84. "Policy Reform and Adjustment in an Economy Under Siege: Malawi 1980 - 87", J. Kydd, *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 19 no. 1, 1988, Sussex, pp. 31,40. According to this source, among President Banda's policy and practice has been "a proclamation of fiscal conservatism, which was adhered to during the post-Independence 'austerity' when the fiscal effort had to be increased as the UK recurrent grant was phased out. But this stance was somewhat bogus, as an ambitious palace building programme was commenced in the late 1960s. From the mid-1970s Banda became profligate, as noted earlier."

85. According to an internal Oxfam Country report based on local press reports.

86. See, for example, T. Killick and M. Martin, op. cit., p. 3. For statistics on sub-Saharan Africa's falling volumes of exports during the 1980s, see *World Development Report 1989*, op. cit., p. 10.

87. *Guardian*, 10.11.88.

Chapter 9

1. During the 1980s, much of the South African investment has been bought out. For example, South African Breweries transferred its majority ownership of the Delta Corporation, the largest company in Zimbabwe, to the Zimbabwean Government. (*Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics, and Society*, C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, Pinter, London and New York, 1989, p. 139.)

2. The World Bank is backing government initiatives to replace some old investment holdings with local and fresh international investment, in order to stimulate employment and the introduction of new technology.

3. "Growth with Equity" was the title of a 1981 paper which was the precursor of the First National Development Plan.

4. EIU Country Profile, 1987/88, p. 37.

5. See, for example, Lomé briefing no. 4 December 1988, op. cit.

6. For a full account of the human rights abuses of this period, see "Zimbabwe: Wages of War", Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York, 1986; and "Zimbabwe: A Break With the Past?: Human Rights and Political Unity", Africa Watch, London, 1989.

7. *The Independent*, 28.10.1989.

8. *Financial Gazette*, Harare, 8.9.89.

9. For example, the 'standstill' July 1988 government budget reduced the year's allocation to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, and Rural Resettlement by 13.5 per cent, among other spending cuts aimed at reducing the budget deficit, projected at the time to reach a new record of Z\$1,149.7 m. (US\$ 618.2 m.). (*Africa Economic Digest*, vol. 9, no. 30, 5 - 11.8.88, p. 2.)

10. The peasant sector's contribution to crop sales rose dramatically from Z\$12 million in 1979 (4.5 per cent of the total) to over Z\$300 million in 1988 (22 per cent of all crop sales). (*Financial Times*, 21.8.89.)

11. See "Land and Agricultural Development", D. Weiner, Chapter 6 in *Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa*, ed. C. Stoneman, Macmillan, London, 1988, pp. 63-89.

12. *Independent*, 28.10.1989.

13. For example, in November 1989 — reportedly with an eye on the following year's parliamentary elections — President Mugabe pledged to complete the unfinished business of the liberation struggle with a renewed resettlement programme.

14. *Financial Gazette*, Harare, 10.8.89.

15. *Africa Confidential*, 22.9.89.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. The EIU, for example, suggests that negotiations with the World Bank to expand Zimbabwe's Export Revolving Fund (which was originally established in 1983 to promote manufactured exports, and became self-financing by 1985) have been made conditional on Zimbabwe liberalising its trade through removing the import tariff walls it has erected to protect its manufacturing industry.

19. 28.10.89.

20. For academic summaries of this view, see C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-34; and D. Weiner, *op. cit.*

21. According to 1986 FAO data, quoted by Stoneman and Cliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

22. See "Indigenous conservation in Zimbabwe: soil erosion, land-use planning, and rural life", K.B. Wilson, mimeo, paper submitted to African Studies of the UK Conference, Cambridge, September 1988; "Trees and Fields in Southern Zimbabwe", K.B. Wilson, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2, January 1989.

23. Unlike Malawi, Zimbabwe did well from tobacco in the 1989 auctions. This was due to a number of factors: the highest output for 25 years, a good quality crop, and high prices (partly assured by Zimbabwe's preferential access to the EC market, which was expected to take 46 per cent of output). (*Financial Times*, 26.10.89.)

24. Excerpt from an Oxfam report, "Rural Development in Zimbabwe: proposals for a new strategy", S. Nyoni, November, 1980.

25. According to "Planning for Equity in Health", Ministry of Health, Harare, 1984, p. 4, quoted in "The political economy of health and nutrition", R. Lowenson and D. Sanders, section 9 in C. Stoneman, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

26. See, for example, a report submitted to the Rhodesian Bishops' Conference, "Some Aspects of the Dehumanising Effects of the War", August 1978.

27. Oxfam report on its Zimbabwe medical programme, 1980.

28. Called "Planning for Equity in Health".

29. By mid-1981, an estimated 100,000 undernourished young children and their mothers were receiving supplementary foodstuffs. The programme had to continue for a second year because of widespread drought.

30. In 1979/80, the two main hospitals in Salisbury (now Harare) consumed 31 per cent of the

total health budget, while only 8 per cent was allocated for preventive health care services for the whole of the country. (C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, op. cit., p. 173.)

31. The minimum wage at the time was Z\$70 per month. However, as part of the economic stabilisation measures, the Z\$150 limit has remained fixed, while the minimum wage has risen to Z\$158, largely an inflationary adjustment. By the end of the 1980s, most people were having to pay for health care. See "The Economy, The Health Sector, and Child Health in Zimbabwe Since Independence", R. Davies and D. Sanders, mimeo, 1986, p. 15.

32. See "Planning For Equity in Health", Ministry of Health, Harare, 1984.

33. "The Struggle for Health", J. Gilmurray, R. Riddell, and D. Sanders, no. 7 in the series *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, CIIR, London, 1979, pp. 22,23. These are academic assessments, made with caution, since comprehensive, accurate, and time-series data were very scant. These figures represent the estimated IMR rates among the 'African' population; in comparison, the IMR for whites was estimated at 17 per thousand live births. However, even this wide range of estimated IMR statistics for the black population masks regional disparities. For example, according to a 1976 report from the Provincial Medical Officer of Health for Matabeleland, IMR figures were up to 300 per thousand live births in the Binga District. (Ibid.)

34. R. Davies and D. Sanders, op. cit., p. 21. This figure was based on a nationwide survey and was calculated according to population data from the 1982 Population Census. Again, the lack of hard time-series data at this point means the statistics should be used with caution.

35. Ibid., p. 16.

36. C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, op. cit., p. 174.

37. C. Stoneman et al., 1988, op. cit., p. 140.

38. Real government health expenditure rose 27.5 per cent in 1980/81, and a further 47 per cent in 1981/82, but then fell slightly and has since more or less stabilised.

39. R. Davies and D. Sanders, op. cit., p. 6.

40. For details of how economic stabilisation policies during the 1980s have affected health in Zimbabwe, see "The Political Economy of Health and Nutrition", R. Loewenson and D. Sanders, chapter 9 in *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, op. cit., pp. 133-52; "Adjustment Policies and the Welfare of Children: Zimbabwe, 1980-1985", R. Davies and D. Sanders, case study no. 10 in *Adjustment with a Human Face*, UNICEF, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 272-99; C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, op. cit., pp. 172-5.

41. Extract from an internal report, "Oxfam Primary Health Care Project in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe. A Report of the four years in Chimanimani District, December 1983 - December 1987", pp. 45, 46.

42. Translated from Sindebele, from "Development and Underdevelopment, Participation and Self Reliance: as defined by villagers and experienced through ORAP programmes", ORAP report on a seminar held at Vusisuzwe Development Centre, Silobela, Zimbabwe, April 1984 (ZIM 069). Oxfam is among the donor organisations which support ORAP.

43. ORAP is registered with the Ministry of Social Services as a non-profit making organisation, and is a non-governmental, non-party political association. An early statement of ORAP's function and orientation declares: "ORAP member group projects promote local production, generate income, circulate local capital and goods, reduce urban dependency and are cooperative in nature. These characteristics are in conformity with the Government of Zimbabwe's policies for rural development." A number of other foreign NGOs have also supported ORAP, and ODA has contributed towards Oxfam grants to ORAP as part of the 'co-funding' scheme run in conjunction with British NGOs.

44. In 1988, an ORAP worker explained, "In ORAP, we have been through and are still working at a long process of debate about our development and what it means to us. We find, for example, that a lot of the current 'development jargon' is confusing. We have learned that we need to define our own meanings of such widely used terms as 'participation', 'self-reliance', and

'underdevelopment'. We have come to learn that they are meaningless as slogans unless rural people themselves have met to define what they understand and mean by these terms." (Interview with ORAP coordinator, Birmingham, September, 1988.)

See also, for a discussion of the need for local definitions of 'participation', "Participation in the Context of Rural Development in Zimbabwe", S. Nyoni, chapter 12 of *The Importance of People: Experiences, lessons and ideas on rural development training in Zimbabwe: Hlekweni and Beyond*, ed. M. de Graaf, Hlekweni FRSC, Bulawayo, 1987, pp. 121-6.

45. Interview with Sithembiso Nyoni, ORAP coordinator, September 1988.

46. See *Africa Analysis*, 28.4.89, which warns that the raising of the EC beef quota may lead to the Cold Storage Commission encouraging the over-culling of cattle stocks held in the Communal Areas. This is because, in addition to their commercial value in terms of marketed meat and milk, cattle provide valuable draught power and manure. It is thought that cattle holdings for rural families in the CAs are already below subsistence levels, yet also above sustainable carrying capacity, unless more land can be secured for drought-year use.

47. Excerpt from "ORAP's First Four Years: An Overview of the Work", J. Khabo, C. Mzaca and M. Ndiweni, ORAP, Bulawayo, April 1984, p. 6.

48. Excerpt from Vusisizwe seminar report, ORAP, op. cit.

49. S. Nyoni, op. cit. p. 124.

50. At 1988 prices. ("South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid", UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, p. 6.)

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-9.

52. At the CBI/CZI conference, "Zimbabwe: Opportunities for Trade and Investment", London, 12.5.1989.

53. According to UNICEF (1987 data), Malawi has the sixth highest (national average) Under-5 mortality rate in the world, at 267 per 1000 live births. From the mid-1980s, Malawi's rank in the world table has dropped from fourth place, because warfare in Mozambique and Angola have pushed those countries into third and fourth places respectively. (*The State of the World's Children* 1989, UNICEF, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 64.)

54. "Policy Reform and Adjustment in an Economy Under Siege: Malawi 1980-87", J. Kydd, *IDS Bulletin*, January 1988, p. 38. Projection based on the findings of the 1980/81 National Sample Survey of Agriculture.

55. *Ibid.* According to a survey in central Malawi (Liwonde Agricultural Development Division), only 33 per cent of the farming families surveyed had large enough land holdings on which to produce enough for their subsistence needs and a little surplus produce for sale. In this survey area, land holdings of at least one hectare per family were necessary to achieve subsistence and a small cash income. Among the survey sample, 29 per cent of the households surveyed had holdings of less than 0.5 ha. and could produce, on average, only 37 per cent of their basic food requirements (assuming that they devoted all their land to food crops). (Malawi Country Review, 1985, internal Oxfam document.)

56. Extract from Oxfam's 1987/88 Annual Report for Malawi: case-study from Oxfam's village research programme in Mulanje District of southern Region, Malawi.

57. "Malawi's Export Crop Boom: A Reappraisal", J. Kydd, *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 19 no. 2, Sussex, April 1988, p. 71, quoting World Bank data and the results of air photo surveys. According to this source, it is hard to be precise about the amount of land held by the commercial estates, because complete statistics are not published by the government.

58. For detailed studies on the land issue during the colonial era, see: "The State and the Creation of Colonial Malawi's Agricultural Economy", L. Vail, Chapter 3 of *Imperialism, Colonialism, and Hunger: East and Central Africa*, ed. R.I. Rotberg, Lexington Books, 1983; "Johnston and Jameson: a comparative study in the imposition of colonial rule", R.H. Palmer, chapter in *The*

Early History of Malawi, Longman, Harlow, 1971, pp. 311-13, 314-15; "Working Conditions and Worker Responses on Nyasaland Tea Estates, 1930 - 1953", R.H. Palmer, *Journal of African History*, 27, 1986, pp. 105-8, 125-6; and "Land Policies in Malawi: An Examination of the Colonial Legacy", B. Pachai, *Journal of African History*, XIV, 4, 1973.

59. L. Vail, op. cit., p. 44.

60. "Malawi's Agricultural Export Strategy and Implications for Income Distribution", R.E. Christiansen and J.G. Kydd, US Department of Agriculture, Staff report no. AGES870224, Washington, 1987, p. 6.

61. See *The Story of an African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth Century Malawi*, M. Vaughan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

62. See, for example, Chapter 10 of *Land and Politics in Malawi, 1875-1975*, B. Pachai, The Limestone Press, Ontario, 1978, pp. 186-204. By the mid-1960s, when Malawi became independent, employment data show that the dominant sector was smallholder agriculture. In contrast, by 1977, 50 per cent of the male labour force was engaged in waged employment in the expanding estate sector, with a consequent reduction in male labour available for domestic production.

63. For a thorough discussion of the economic and developmental implications of this period, see "Malawi's Export Crop Boom: A Reappraisal", J. Kydd, *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 19, no. 2, April 1988, pp. 71-80; and "Malawi's Agricultural Export Strategy and Implications for Income Distribution", R. Christianson and J. Kydd, op. cit., p.6.

64. ADMARC has since been drastically restructured as part of Malawi's structural adjustment programme.

65. From 1971 to 1980, ADMARC made profits of MK 182 m. on its handling of peasant sector tobacco, groundnuts and cotton. In 1978, ADMARC invested 68 per cent of its profits in estate production, 4.3 per cent in peasant production, and the remainder in financial investments which gave it a controlling interest in the country's two commercial banks of the time, which in turn were directed by government to make substantial loans, beyond the limits of financial prudence, to the estate sector, including estates owned by the President's company. (1981/82 internal Oxfam report, based on the work of Christiansen and Kydd, op. cit.)

66. See "Structural Adjustment, Agricultural Development and the Poor: Some Observations on Malawi", U. Lele, World Bank, 1988.

67. This section is based on briefings from Jonathan Kydd and an internal Oxfam report, both of 1981/82.

68. Over half of the country's 1978-81 borrowings were on non-concessional terms, according to the EIU 1988/89 Country Profile, p. 33. By the late 1980s, most of the debt was on concessional terms, according to OECD debt tables and "African Debt: The Search for Solutions", UN Africa Recovery Programme briefing paper no. 1, June 1989.

69. The London Club is the annual meeting of the commercial banks who have lent to Third World countries. The Paris Club is the annual meeting of nations (normally OECD countries) who have lent to Third World countries.

70. It is estimated that, if Malawi continues with its economic reform programme, its debt-service ratio (as a proportion of the export of goods and services) will decline to 27.3 per cent in 1992. ("Debt in the SADCC Region: A Case Study of Malawi", C. Chipeta, paper given to a conference of NGOs on "Debt in the SADCC region", Brussels, January, 1989.)

71. For a summary, see EIU Country report 1989/90, p. 10.

72. A useful chronological summary of Malawi's economic reform initiatives over the period 1979-1988 is given in a recent unpublished report by the Overseas Development Institute, London.

73. As the World Bank has admitted (see U. Lele, op. cit.).

74. The rates for workers in the three main urban centres of the country, Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Mzuzu, rose to MK 2.17 (\$0.82). Rates in smaller District towns were raised to MK 1.74 (\$0.65), and rural rates rose to MK 1.74.

75. *Africa Economic Digest*, 8.5.89.

76. According to *Africa Economic Digest*, 30.10.89, average input prices for fertiliser rose between 23 per cent and 47 per cent, while the producer price for maize was to be increased by 8 per cent.

77. For a thorough discussion of the complex issue of food security in Malawi, see "Household Food and Nutritional Security in Malawi", V. Quinn, M. Chiligo, and J.P. Gittinger, paper presented to the Symposium on Agricultural Policies for Growth and Development, November 1-4, 1988, Mangochi, Malawi.

78. Oxfam reports indicate that this was also due to two other factors: firstly drought in the 1986/87 agricultural season and the 'grain borer' pest, which together affected the national harvest; and secondly the extra drain on national food stocks caused by the influx of Mozambican refugees, before international food aid for the refugees had been requested.

79. Oxfam fieldworkers reported that a bag of maize was selling at prices from MK60 to MK90 during October-December 1987. According to a recent, unpublished report by ODI, which compared 1987/88 prices in four different areas, prices reached their peak in December/January — the start of the hungry season — and declined in March/April.

80. According to a recent, unpublished report by ODI, *ibid*.

81. According to the World Bank's Head of its Southern Africa Department's Agriculture Division in a letter to Oxfam of 2.2.89.

82. Oxfam undertook its action research programme because it was felt to be essential to any future development support in the area. Our experience is that if people are to participate actively in identifying and acting upon the development constraints they face, they must first be directly involved in assessing their own needs and analysing their own problems. Malawian researchers were fielded to facilitate community debate and to undertake 'listening surveys'. The results were reported directly to the village people concerned, so that they had full access to the information gathered, and were able to comment on and improve the analysis.

83. Final Report, Oxfam Action Research Programme, Mulanje District, July 1988, pp. 38, 86.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

85. EIU, Quarterly Report, no. 2, 1988, pp. 31, 32, and World Bank press release.

86. Action Research Final Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 46, 47.

87. See *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People*, B. Davidson, Longman, Harlow, 1972; *Africa in Modern History: The Search for a New Society*, B. Davidson, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978; *The African Slave Trade From the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century*, volume 2 of *The History of Africa* series, UNESCO, Paris, 1985.

88. However, it has to be noted that the relationship between production and equitable access to food is a very complex one. Exporting food crops does not of itself entail equitable food security.

89. UNICEF estimates that the Under-5 Mortality Rate for both Angola and Mozambique is between 325-375. (*Children on the Frontline*, 1989 edition, pp. 38-40.)

90. "The Emergency Situation in Angola: Priority non-food requirements for the year 1988", UN African Emergency Task Force in collaboration with the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, 1988, p. 71.

91. Angola was 'discovered' by the Portuguese voyager Diogo Cao in 1483. It became independent in 1975, after the fall of Portugal's military dictatorship in 1974.

92. For example, the EIU special report, *op. cit.*; a joint UN/NGO emergency needs assessment mission of late 1987; a joint USAID/US NGO mission of 1988; and various internal Oxfam reports.

93. According to T. Hodges, op. cit., p. 86.
94. UN report, op. cit., p. 3. It has also to be noted that the Angolan government did not then place top priority on getting food aid.
95. 1985 data.
96. The USA has insisted on its right to continue support for UNITA, even right through the delicate 1988 negotiations when the USA sponsored agreement to Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola.
97. Hansard, Oral Answers, 8.2.89, col. 977.
98. The average harvest is 600 kg per hectare for maize. (Final Report, US Government Assessment Team to Angola, October 1988.)
99. In the 1988 Geneva Appeal background document.

Chapter 10

1. Legally, the UK was the colonial power in Namibia from 1920, when Namibia was placed under a League of Nations mandate to be administered by South Africa on behalf of the British Crown, until 1966 when the UN General Assembly revoked the mandate.
2. Britain does, of course, acknowledge its special relationship to its former colonies, as demonstrated by the formation and continued importance given to the Commonwealth, and by the British Overseas Aid Programme, which expressly focuses on Commonwealth countries.
3. See, for example, *The Third Portuguese Empire*, G. Clarence-Smith, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1985; and *In The Eye of the Storm: Angola's People*, B. Davidson, Longman, London, 1972.
4. Appendix to item no. 29, under "Correspondence respecting Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field on the Conclusion of the War in South Africa, March-June, 1902", State Papers 95, 1901-02, p. 146.
5. Report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on South Africa, 1986, Volume I. HMSO, London, p. x.
6. Eurostat data from "External Trade, Monthly Statistics", Eurostat no. 5, 1989. Note that Eurostat data give aggregate figures for Namibia and South Africa.
7. As compared to between 20 and 40 per cent for the industrialised countries of the OECD. (UN Commission on TNCs (UN CTC), "The South African Economy and TNCs", Public Hearings on the Activities of TNCs in South Africa and Namibia, Geneva, September 1989, E/C.10/AC.4/1989/5, p. 7.)
8. For a full analysis of the relative changes in the pattern of South Africa's main trading partners, see *South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, report prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1989.
9. UN CTC, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/5, p. 7.
10. Ibid.
11. "External Trade, monthly statistics", no. 5 1989, Eurostat.
12. Which give £808 m. as the value of imports from South Africa in 1988.
13. According to R.H. Green (personal communication, January 1990).
14. *The Times* and the *Herald Tribune*, 21.8.89.
15. *South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, op. cit., p. 256.
16. "Key Facts", ECGD promotional leaflet, DTI, London.
17. Hansard, col. 203, 28.11.89.
18. "The Role of Transnational Banks in South Africa", paper no. 6 tabled at the UN Commission of Transnational Corporations Public Hearings on the Activities of TNCs in South Africa and Namibia, September 1989, p. 22.

19. "Sanctions, loans, and the South African economy", A. Hirsch, chapter 21 of *Sanctions Against Apartheid*, ed. M. Orkin, CIIR, London, 1989, pp. 282,323.
20. "Sanctions Against South Africa", R. Moorsom, a background report prepared for Oxfam, Oxford, July 1986, p. 23.
21. "List of TNCs with interests in South Africa and Namibia", report of the UN CTCs, Public Hearings on the Activities of TNCs in South Africa and Namibia, Geneva, September 1989, E/C.10/AC.4/1989/8, pp. 19-31.
22. See R. Moorsom, op. cit., pp. 25, 26.
23. *Africa Economic Digest*, 11.9.89. The UN Commission on TNCs puts the figure at 277 between 1984 and mid-1989. (UN CTC Public Hearings 1989, op. cit., report no. E/C.10/AC.4/1989/2, p. 3.)
24. UN CTC, Public Hearings 1989, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/2., pp. 4, 5.
25. Ibid., pp. 9-16.
26. Ibid., pp. 17-20.
27. The UK government produces only broad estimates every few years, and the South African Reserve Bank does not break down investment figures on a country-by-country basis.
28. The UK South Africa Trade Association, British Industry Committee on South Africa, South African Reserve Bank, and the Department of Trade (UK).
29. Direct investment is that put into subsidiaries, associates, plant, branches, and long-term ventures, etc. Indirect investment is portfolio investment in government securities and private sector stock, etc.
30. *Apartheid in Crisis: a compilation of information on trade and investment in South Africa*, 5th edition, May 1989, Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, p. 6.
31. Using the estimates given above and information provided by the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin. (*Apartheid in Crisis*, op. cit., p. 9.)
32. UN CTC, Public Hearings September 1989, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/8, pp. 12, 24-8.
33. UN CTC, Public Hearings, September 1989, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/5, p. 12.
34. UN CTC, Public Hearings September 1989, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/8, pp. 8-11, 34, 35.
35. "Apartheid for Export", ICFTU, Geneva, 1989.
36. As reproduced in *Banking on Apartheid: the Financial Links Report*, prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, James Currey, London, 1989, p. 6.
37. "No Credit", J. Hanlon, Standing Committee of European NGOs, 1989.
38. Based on "The Role of Transnational Banks in South Africa", UN CTC, Public Hearings of September 1989, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/6, p. 7.
39. "No Credit", J. Hanlon, Standing Committee of European NGOs, 1989.
40. UN CTC, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/6, p. 11.
41. South Africa's moratorium covered \$13.6 bn., mostly short-term debt owed to banks and not covered by government guarantees. (J. Hanlon, "No Credit", op. cit.)
42. *Guardian* 4.6.87.
43. UN CTC, Public Hearings September 1989, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/5, p. 19.
44. See *ibid.*, p. 11, for fuller details on the breakdown of loans made from UK banks and those made from UK branches of banks incorporated outside the UK.
45. Ibid., p. 8.
46. Ibid., p. 21.
47. For fuller details, see *ibid.*, pp. 21-4.
48. See *Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa in the Changing Global Economy*, A. Seidman and Makgetla N. Seidman, Zed Press, London, 1980; and *The Roots of Crisis in*

Southern Africa, A. Seidman, Oxfam America, Africa World Press, New Jersey, 1984.

49. According to a speech to SADCC in February by Chris Patten, then the Minister for Overseas Development. In addition, by the end of 1988, the Commonwealth Development Corporation had committed a cumulative total of £267 m. in the SADCC region. (Ibid.)

50. According to Department of Trade data, published in *Census of Overseas Assets*, 1984. Calculations based on the South African Reserve Bank's data would put the figure at 1.85 per cent.

51. For an account of falling UK direct private investment levels throughout sub-Saharan Africa, see "British Transnational Corporations in sub-Saharan Africa: Corporate Responses to Economic Crisis in the 1980s", P. Bennel, mimeo, July 1989.

52. Based on *Beggar Your Neighbours*, J. Hanlon, CIIR, London, 1986, pp. 282-306.

53. For details of Zimbabwe's foreign investment profile, see, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*, C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, Pinter, London and New York, 1989, pp. 138-41.

54. This excludes UK multilateral aid for refugees given through UNHCR and ICRC.

55. UK delegation's statement to SADCC's 1989 Annual Consultative Conference.

56. For a full discussion of the role of the 'Aid and Trade Provision', see the Foreign Affairs Select Committee's second report, 1986-7, on bilateral aid.

57. "British Aid Statistics, 1984-1988", ODA, London, 1989, p. 26.

58. "Britain's Voice in South Africa", FCO, London, 1989, p. 23.

59. See the communiqué of the EC Foreign Ministers, Luxembourg, 10.9.85, and the European Council's statement of 27.6.86.

60. Until Namibia's independence, and therefore its 'statehood', Britain could not have a fully accredited diplomatic representation there. However, shortly after the internationally recognised transition process to independence began, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were able to open a Liaison Office in anticipation of independence. Before independence, therefore, British diplomatic affairs regarding Namibia were directly controlled by the British Embassy in Pretoria. However, Namibia's colonial status did not prevent successive British governments from permitting substantial British business operations in Namibia, even in defiance of the United Nations' Council for Namibia's Decree for the protection of Namibia's natural resources. (See *Namibia: A Violation of Trust*, S. Smith, Oxfam, Oxford, 1986, pp. 69-72.)

61. Excerpt from her speech to the British Council of Churches conference, London, 28.2.89.

62. Britain's historical 'kith and kin' legacy forms an important part of white South African society. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which this has shaped British policy towards South Africa over the years, but it has undoubtedly been significant, as has, more recently, the issue of British citizens in South Africa.

There is an estimated 1 million white South Africans holding, or entitled to, British passports (according to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee's 1986 report on South Africa). Although the prospect remains remote, the British government is keen that any future political changes in South Africa should not be so dramatic as to precipitate a mass influx of refugees to the UK.

It is still sometimes argued that the Cape sea route is strategically important to Britain. However, in the nuclear era, it is now widely thought that this view is obsolete.

63. FCO memorandum, as quoted in the Foreign Affairs Select Committee's 1986 report on South Africa, op. cit., p. vii.

64. Excerpt from an interview in *Leadership*, vol. 8 no. 3, Cape Town, May 1989.

65. As quoted in *Britain and South Africa: The Way Forward*, British Council of Churches, February 1989, p. 19.

66. This section is limited to Britain's relationship with those countries which have been discussed in this book. British links with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Tanzania are therefore not examined. For a discussion of Britain's links with Namibia, see *Namibia: A*

Violation of Trust, S. Smith, Oxfam, Oxford, 1986.

67. "Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid. A Political Risk Analysis", R. Martin, EIU special report no. 1130, London, July 1988, p. 99.

68. Information made available to Oxfam researcher, Harare, November 1989.

69. "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1984-1987", OECD, p. 198.

70. Although the Malawi/Tanzania part of the 'northern corridor' helps Malawi only, Britain pressed for its inclusion in the SADCC portfolio. The reconstruction of the Nacala line also assists provinces within Mozambique, and the Beira line mainly assists Zimbabwe, but also helps Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique.

71. Programme Aid is an official category specifically available to help with balance of payments support while a country is following an IMF-approved structural adjustment programme. Zambia could, therefore, have calculated that its break with the IMF would entail this result. Nevertheless, in the face of the rapidly declining economic situation in Zambia and its adverse effects on the urban poor, Oxfam argued that the British government could use the withheld Programme Aid resources for specially targeted assistance to those worst affected by the short-term economic results of structural adjustment. ODA, however, refused to agree to this suggestion for change of use.

72. Because of the widely held view that Britain, in insisting on an EC mission so shortly after rejecting the findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons mission (which recommended sanctions), was deliberately trying to undermine the Commonwealth's effort to form a coherent and coordinated international policy on ending apartheid in South Africa.

73. As of end November 1989, see Hansard, col. 203, 28.11.89.

74. *Financial Times* and *Guardian*, 3.1.89.

75. Hansard, 16.12.87. Britain's total gross bilateral aid to Angola for 1986 was £317,000.

76. Excerpt from the Prime Minister's interview with the South African newspaper *Beeld*, 29.11.89.

77. Excerpt from Sir Robin Renwick's speech to the Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, 17.8.89.

78. Speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society, 17.5.88.

79. See, for example, *Britain's Voice in South Africa*, FCO, London, 1989.

80. On this issue, however, the British government has often been criticised for not doing enough. For example, it was widely noted that the British government failed to intercede over the Delmas trial, in which extra-parliamentary opposition was effectively judged to be a treasonable offence, whereas other western governments strongly signalled their disapproval.

81. According to the *Independent*, 16.12.89.

82. See para. 21.5, section III, of the Harare Declaration, appendix 2.

83. Although SWAPO agreed to abide by its terms, they were not directly party to the negotiations, and nor was the UN, which, in international law, is the body responsible for the administration of the territory up to independence.

84. The UN's Special Representative and South Africa's Administrator General were constantly in dispute over transition issues. These disputes included the establishment of conditions under which refugees could safely return; the delayed repeal of discriminatory legislation; and the establishment of electoral registration and balloting law for free and fair elections.

85. *British Policy Towards South Africa*, FCO, London, 1988.

86. *Beeld*, op. cit.

87. See point 3 of the draft declaration to the UNGA sixteenth special session, 15.12.89, which was unanimously accepted. It differs slightly from the Harare Declaration's para. 16.3, section II, but stands none the less firmly against 'Group rights' being enshrined in the constitution.

88. Excerpt from her speech to the BCC conference, London, 28.2.89.

89. From Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, 17.5.89.
90. This point was addressed to Mrs Chalker during the plenary session of the conference of the British Council of Churches, London, 28.2.89.
91. *Anti-Apartheid News*, February 1989, p. 4.
92. *Observer* 21.5.89.
93. Hansard, col. 975, 8.2.89.
94. *Anti-Apartheid News*, March 1989, p. 4.
95. Excerpt from her speech to the BCC conference, London, 28.2.89.
96. British statements on the ANC have highlighted objections to its policy of armed struggle, and minimised the role it plays in South African political affairs. At the Vancouver Commonwealth summit of October 1987, Mrs Thatcher dismissed the ANC as a "typical terrorist organisation". Later, and less publicly, the Foreign Office stated, "We acknowledge that the ANC is an important focus for black opinion in South Africa, and one of the representative organisations of the opposition. A central purpose of our Ministerial and other contacts with the ANC has been to seek to persuade them that violence and acts of terrorism are not the right approach." (FCO statement on British policy towards South Africa, 1988.)
- When asked to reconcile these two positions, Mrs Thatcher explained, "As a political movement, the ANC undoubtedly is a factor in South African politics. The question is how to get it to give up the politics of violence. The best approach is by offering the possibility of negotiations." (*Beeld*, 29.11.88.)
97. The highest official level at which the British government had met the ANC as at the end of 1989 was Ministerial level, as demonstrated by the contacts Mrs Chalker had as a Minister of State at the FCO. Sir Geoffrey Howe met ANC representatives in late 1986, but Mrs Thatcher later played this down, telling the House of Commons that he had met them in his capacity as the President of the European Community Council of Ministers, and not in his capacity as the British Foreign Minister. (*Guardian* 23.10.87.)
98. Excerpt from the UDF delegation's statement of 13.7.89.
99. In his speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society, May 1988.
100. For example, it has been estimated that R20 billion left South Africa as a result of financial sanctions between mid-1984 and mid-1988, a figure estimated to rise to R25 billion by 1990. International sanctions are also thought to have been a key factor responsible for South Africa's falling national economic growth rate. ("Facing the Nineties: Business Amidst Sanctions and Disinvestment", a speech given to the 8th national congress of Chartered Accountants in Durban, by Chris van Wyck, Managing Director of the Trust Bank of Africa Ltd., June 1988.) The author estimates that without sanctions and disinvestment, the 1988 economic growth rate could have been 4.5 per cent instead of 2.5 per cent.
101. See "Southern Africa: the Way Ahead, the Kuala Lumpur Statement", and "Southern Africa: The Way Ahead: Britain's View", both of 22.10.89.
102. See "South Africa: The Sanctions Report", Commonwealth Secretariat, op. cit., p. 211.
103. Interview with Jay Naidoo, *SouthScan*, vol 4 no. 20/21, 24.5.89.
104. See "British Aid to Southern Africa: A Force for Peaceful Development", FCO, London, 1987.
105. For example, successive Ministerial statements in parliament referred only to Britain's diplomatic requests to Pretoria to "abide by the terms of the Nkomati Accord".
106. When in September of that year, a few days after State President Botha had pledged to cease supporting the MNR, Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Foreign Secretary, said he hoped Pretoria would indeed cease its support. (FCO transcript of the press conference given by Sir Geoffrey Howe at Maputo airport, Mozambique, 19.9.88; *Independent* 19.9.88; *Financial Times* 21.9.88.)
107. *Leadership* magazine, Cape Town, May 1989. Indicating that UK diplomatic pressure lay

behind the September 1988 meeting of Presidents Chissano and Botha, Sir Robin Renwick stated, "We have worked hard to contribute to the process of attempting to normalise relations between South Africa and Mozambique, which culminated in the meeting between President Chissano and President Botha." (*Weekly Mail*, South Africa, 24.3.89.)

108. "Britain and International Debt Relief", paper produced by the Reference Services of the Central Office of Information, London, February 1989.

109. *Financial Times* 10.6.88.

110. Hansard, col. 204, 28.11.89.

111. See, for example, Chris Patten's statement (as ODA Minister) on behalf of the UK delegation, to SADCC's 1989 Annual Consultative Conference.

112. See, for example, "Aid and the Private Sector: The British View", C. Patten, *Development International*, May/June 1987.

113. Excerpt from Chris Patten's statement on behalf of the UK delegation to SADCC's 1989 annual meeting.

Chapter 11

1. Consisting of Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and West Germany. The EC's key decision-making bodies are the Council of Ministers and its administrative arm, the European Commission, based in Brussels. The European Parliament has the important power of budget approval.

2. These are approximate figures only. Official EC trade figures combine data for South Africa and Namibia. A notional allowance has been made for this.

3. Comparing export levels in the early 1980s with those of the later 1980s. ("Lomé Briefing", monthly review published by the Liaison Committee of the Development NGOs to the European Communities, Brussels, no. 4, December 1988, p. 2.)

4. EC members plus Austria, Switzerland, and Turkey. (*South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, Commonwealth, op. cit., p. 77.)

5. UN CTC report E/C.10/AC.4/1989/5, p. 8, and "Statistics on trade with South Africa", Commonwealth news release, 5.8.88.

6. UN CTC, op. cit., E/C.10/AC.4/1989/5, pp. 10, 11.

7. "No Credit", J. Hanlon, Standing Committee of NGOs, Brussels, 1989, table 1.

8. Table compiled by Dr P. Goodison, Fonds voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (FOS)/Holland Committee on Southern Africa, Brussels, from EC sources.

9. Although expenditure on SADCC projects has sometimes been drawn from National Indicative Programme funds. Under Lomé III (1985-1990), 141 m. ECU was allocated to SADCC's Programme of Action.

10. Source: South Africa/Namibia Association (SANAM) internal memo, 12.1.89.

11. See "The European Community and Southern Africa: Looking Towards Lomé IV", AWEPA, The Hague, 1989, pp. 8-11.

EC funds for structural adjustment are available via two routes under Lomé IV. The bulk will be drawn from a special fund which will be available as and when required by eligible ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) states. In addition some programmable NIP funds, which are normally used for traditional project aid, can be retained for import support. ("Negotiating the Fourth Lomé Convention", ODI briefing paper, London, October 1989.)

12. STABEX was first introduced under Lomé I, and SYSMIN under Lomé II.

13. "The European Community and Southern Africa: looking towards Lomé IV", The Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid (AWEPA), The Hague, 1989, p. 6.

14. Sugar prices fell from a free-market price peak of 28.7 US cents per lb. in 1980 to a low of 4.1 US cents per lb. in 1988.
15. Its quota is 21,500 tonnes.
16. *Financial Times*, 10.10.89.
17. See "Developing Countries and 1992", ODI briefing paper, London, 1989.
18. "Negotiating the Fourth Lomé Convention", ODI briefing, London, October 1989, pp. 3, 4.
19. The Treaty of Rome does not give the EC a direct mandate to act on debt issues, because it does not have competence to deal with financial policy. How this will be affected by moves towards European Monetary Union is not clear.
20. One technical reason for this is that not all EC member states have their own single-country representation on the IMF and World Bank boards.
21. IMF and World Bank annual reports for 1989.
22. Statement by EC Foreign Ministers, 10 September 1985.
23. Statement by the European Council, The Hague, 27 June 1986.
24. Statement by Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 16 September 1986.
25. *Weekly Mail*, South Africa, 30.6.89.
26. Excerpt from the EPC press release, Luxembourg, 10.9.85.
27. Excerpt from the Simons Report, European Parliament, 1987, compiled on behalf of the External Relations Committee and adopted by the European Parliament in 1987.
28. This trend is accentuated by the internal organisation of EC structures whereby the implementation of restrictive measures falls within the scope of the all-powerful European Political Cooperation (EPC), while the implementation of the Special Programme falls under the Commission for Development and Cooperation.
29. Excerpt from the Commissioner's speech to the SADCC Annual Consultative Conference, Gaborone, February 1987.
30. Excerpt from the speech of the Director General for Development, Arusha, January 1988.
31. Excerpt from the speech of the EC's Development Commissioner, Luanda, February 1989.
32. *Weekly Mail*, South Africa, 30.6.89.
33. Hansard, 19.1.89, col. 270.
34. ODA Press Office.
35. Internal memo for FOS 7.3.88, and SANAM Secretariat figures, September 1989.
36. Although Oxfam does not channel EC Special Programme funds to South Africa.
37. *New Nation*, South Africa, 25.2.88.
38. EPC press release, 6.9.89.
39. FCO letter to War on Want, 9.3.89.
40. *Guardian*, 29.1.89.

Chapter 12

1. UNSCR 418 of 1977, acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter.
2. UN General Assembly Resolution 41/35 F, of 1986.
3. EC Council of Ministers Statement, September 1985.
4. By the UN Economic Commission for Africa, in its publication, "South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid", 1989. The ECA estimates that the first year of a four-year reconstruction programme would need \$3.475 bn., with the annual amount declining to \$2.6 bn. in the fourth year.
5. Submission to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee on Management of Third World Debt, Oxfam, December 1989.



Appendix 1

Proposed Five Year Action Plan of the National Party

This Five Year Plan of Action is based on the Programme of Principles and the 1987 Election Manifesto of the National Party, as well as the complete Plan of Action of 1989, all of which remain relevant and valid and, indeed, opened the way for this Five Year Plan of Action.

THE GOAL:

The National Party aims to create

A new South Africa in which every South African can live in safety, prosperity and dignity, as an individual and as a member of a group.

The new South Africa must

- * be a *democracy* in which
- * no individual or group *dominates or is dominated*,
- * the *independence of the judiciary* is upheld and honoured,
- * *civilised norms* apply,
- * a dynamic economy thrives, based on *free enterprise*,
- * everybody lives in *safety* and *harmony*, and
- * *as good neighbours* to the international community.

In short

A South Africa to be proud of!

COMMITMENT:

We, as the National Party, commit ourselves

- * to *pursue energetically* each of the cardinal points of this ideal for the future;
- * to show *real progress* within *the next five years* in respect of each of the key objectives contained in this Plan of Action;
- * to uphold all the commitments contained in our Programme of Principles and our Manifesto of 1987;
- * to put to the electorate any new constitutional principles before implementation, and to submit constitutional changes to Parliament for approval.

1 A DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION FOR ALL

Every South African has the right to participate in decision-making at all levels of government that affect his interests, subject to the principle of non-domination.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * promote those values that unite us;
- * engage the leaders of groups who are committed to peaceful solutions in talks and negotiations;
- * start institutions in which these leaders can participate in the creation of a new South Africa;
- * review the position of the Head of State, his functions and powers, and the manner of his election.

NEGOTIATED PARTICIPATION FOR EVERYONE WILL CREATE A JUST SOUTH AFRICA OF WHICH WE ALL CAN BE PROUD.

2 NO DOMINATION: PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

The diversity of the South African population necessitates the protection of individuals and of minorities. Domination, of whatever nature, will bring bloodshed, poverty and misery.

To ensure continued democracy, the participation of all groups and individuals must be permanently protected, with checks and balances to prevent domination.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * promote the peaceful settlement of political disputes, and non-domination, as exalted values;
- * promote, by continued action, self-determination regarding own

affairs, along with joint decision-making on general affairs, by means of division and devolution of power in a non-discriminatory manner;

- * inject a new dynamic into the process of negotiation to seek agreement among leaders on:
 - a basis for eliminating and preventing domination,
 - an objective and depoliticised deadlock-breaking mechanism to take final decisions in case of disputes,
 - a more just and meaningful basis on which groups may be defined for political participation;
- give constitutional expression to the protection of human rights — both individual rights and group values;
- * give content to the overall juridical and structural protection of groups in constitutional structures;
- * reinforce the process of negotiation with independent expert research and advice.

JUST AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION BY ALL.

3 THE JUDICIARY AND EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW

A strong, independent judiciary is an essential guarantee for the protection of individual rights and group values, and to ensure stable democracy and justice for all.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * continue with law reform in order to ensure the availability of full justice to all;
- * guarantee the inviolability of judges and officers of law to ensure the independence of the judiciary;
- * ensure the conduct of proper and lawful public administration by constant review of the jurisdiction of the Advocate General.

A SOUND, STRONG AND INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS THE CORNERSTONE OF A JUST AND FREE SOUTH AFRICA.

4 CIVILISED NORMS; SOCIAL WELFARE

Each individual and each group must have the freedom to enjoy a community life of his choice. Because of the diverse needs of the people of South Africa, this must be embodied in the principle of 'live and let live'.

The practical application of this principle must eventually be in the form of a set of arrangements mutually acceptable to all groups, arrived at through negotiation.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * negotiate with leaders to find a mutually acceptable basis for maintenance of own community life, own residential areas and own schools for those who so wish, and for the provision and utilisation of public amenities;
- * within means, promote effective education on all levels;
- * promote home ownership and appropriate welfare housing;
- * make progress in respect of the housing needs of rapidly urbanising groups, within the limits of affordability;
- * make available new and established residential areas, after thorough consultation with the inhabitants, to provide for people who prefer living in free settlement areas;
- * maintain own residential areas according to the Group Areas Act in a firm, yet sensitive manner until an acceptable alternative method can be put into practice;
- * show progress in the provision of public amenities in order to provide, as far as possible, for the needs of the various communities;
- * open up amenities where necessary and where this can take place without causing serious conflict; amenities which have been successfully opened shall not be closed again;
- * ensure the prevention of health hazards and poor social conditions caused by over-population and illegal squatting by the proper implementation of local by-laws and other applicable measures.

THE PRINCIPLE OF 'LIVE AND LET LIVE' WILL BRING SATISFACTION BECAUSE IT OFFERS AN ORDERLY EXISTENCE TO ALL ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN CHOICE.

5 A DYNAMIC ECONOMY

A healthy and dynamic economy is essential for stability, peace and prosperity.

Adversities such as the worst drought in living memory, a prolonged slump in the gold price, and the most vicious international attempt — over more than two decades — to destroy the South African economy by boycotts, sanctions and disinvestment, have strained the economy of the country and of every business and household.

A concerted effort by the government and the people of South Africa is

necessary to restore the health and prosperity of our economy and the well-being of all our people.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * lower personal income tax, reducing marginal rates to a maximum of 40 per cent at the income level of R100,000 (as far as possible in terms of 1989 values) instead of the present 45 per cent at R80,000;
- * reduce company tax from 50 to 40 per cent, together with the phasing out of tax abatements as recommended by the Margo Commission;
- * reduce the deficit before borrowing to attain an acceptable level of around 3 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product in order to relieve pressure on interest rates;
- * reduce inflation;
- * follow a continuous programme of privatisation and deregulation;
- * implement an industrial strategy focussed on export promotion and import replacement;
- * promote the further beneficiation of South Africa's raw materials;
- * continue to reconstruct the agricultural sector;
- * promote the vast tourism potential of our country.

THIS REALISTIC ECONOMIC PLAN PLACES SOUTH AFRICA ON THE ROAD TO SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY.

6 SECURITY

The first duty of a state or government is to protect people and their property against enemies and criminal elements. Efficient security services are indispensable for an orderly and peaceful community, providing a sound climate for political, economic and social development.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * equip the South African Police adequately with manpower and resources to enable them to counter crime even more effectively;
- * maintain the preparedness of the South African Defence Force in terms of both manpower and equipment to enable it to withstand internal, regional and international threats against South Africa;
- * limit the involvement of the Citizen Force and Commando members, especially as far as annual camps are concerned, with due regard to the security situation;
- * enable the South African Prison Service to carry out its role of custody and rehabilitation even more efficiently.

A STRONG DEFENCE FORCE AND A STRONG POLICE FORCE WILL REMAIN THE BASIS FOR A STRONG AND JUST SOUTH AFRICA.

7 THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The Republic of South Africa must regain its rightful place in the international community, while maintaining the honour and dignity of our country.

The National Party will, within the next five years

- * promote the successful conclusion of the independence process for South West Africa/Namibia;
- * promote peace and stability in all the countries of the southern African region, and particularly Angola and Mozambique;
- * promote economic cooperation among all the countries of southern Africa;
- * counter boycotts and sanctions while working to improve the image South Africa.

THE NATIONAL PARTY CAN BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND IN THE REST OF THE WORLD BECAUSE THE NATIONAL PARTY PUTS SOUTH AFRICA FIRST.



Appendix 2

Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa

Harare, Zimbabwe: August 21, 1989

I PREAMBLE

1.0. The people of Africa, singly, collectively, and acting through the OAU, are engaged in serious efforts to establish peace throughout the continent by ending all conflicts through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all.

2.0 We reaffirm our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial, racial and apartheid domination exists, there can neither be peace nor justice.

3.0 Accordingly, we reiterate that while the apartheid system in South Africa persists, the peoples of our continent as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental to the stability and development of Africa.

4.0 With regard to the region of Southern Africa, the entire continent is vitally interested that the processes, in which it is involved, leading to the complete and genuine independence of Namibia, as well as peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time. Equally, Africa is deeply concerned that the destabilisation by South Africa of all the countries of the region, whether through direct aggression, sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion and other means, should end immediately.

5.0 We recognise the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can only be achieved when the system of apartheid in South Africa has been liquidated and South Africa transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country. We therefore reiterate that all the necessary measures should be adopted now, to bring a speedy end to the apartheid system, in the interest of all the people of Southern Africa, our continent and the world at large.

6.0 We believe that, as a result of the liberation struggle and international pressure against apartheid, as well as global efforts to liquidate regional conflicts, possibilities exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of South Africa. For these possibilities to lead to fundamental change in South Africa, the Pretoria regime must abandon its abhorrent concepts and practices of racial domination and its record of failure to honour agreements, all of which have already resulted in the loss of so many lives and the destruction of so much property in the countries of Southern Africa.

7.0 We reaffirm our recognition of the right of all peoples, including those of South Africa, to determine their own destiny, and to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together to build a harmonious society. The Organisation of African Unity remains committed to do everything possible and necessary to assist the people of South Africa, in such ways as the representatives of the oppressed may determine, to achieve this objective. We are certain that, arising from its duty to help end the criminal apartheid system, the rest of the world community is ready to extend similar assistance to the people of South Africa.

8.0 We make these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed. We believe that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own government, as equal members of society. No individual or group of individuals has any rights to govern others without their consent. The apartheid system violates all these fundamental and universal principles. Correctly characterised as a crime against humanity, it is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in South Africa. It has sought to dehumanise entire peoples. It has imposed a brutal war on the whole region of Southern Africa, resulting in untold loss of life, destruction of property, and massive displacement of innocent men, women and children. This scourge and affront to humanity must be fought and eradicated in its totality.

9.0 We have therefore supported and continue to support all those in South

Africa who pursue this noble objective through political, armed and other forms of struggle. We believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interest of all humanity.

10.0 While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have repeatedly expressed our preference for a solution arrived at by peaceful means. We know that the majority of the people of South Africa and their liberation movement, who have been compelled to take up arms, have also upheld this position for many decades, and continue to do so.

11.0 The positions contained in this Declaration are consistent with and are a continuation of those elaborated in the Lusaka Manifesto, two decades ago. They take into account the changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since that Manifesto was adopted by the OAU and the rest of the international community. They constitute a new challenge to the Pretoria regime to join in the noble effort to end the apartheid system, an objective to which the OAU has been committed from its birth.

12.0 Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to help intensify the liberation struggle and international pressure against the system of apartheid until this system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens.

13.0 In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding directly to the wishes of the representatives of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder. We are convinced that their implementation will lead to a speedy end of the apartheid system and therefore the opening of a new dawn of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in which racism, colonial domination and white minority rule on our continent would be abolished for ever.

II STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

14.0 We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing preference of the majority of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement.

15.0 We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their overall struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their

country into a non-racial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives, and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims of the negotiations.

16.0 We are at one with them that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order based on the following principles, among others:

16.1 South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state.

16.2 All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex, or creed.

16.3 All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of universal suffrage, exercised through one person one vote, under a common voters' roll.

16.4 All people have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism.

16.5 All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights.

16.6 South Africa shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of all before the law.

16.7 South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary.

16.8 There shall be created an economic order which shall promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans.

16.9 A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation with all peoples.

17.0 We believe that agreement on the above principles shall constitute the foundation for an internationally acceptable solution which shall enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the African and world community of nations.

III CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

18.0 Together with the rest of the world, we believe that it is essential, before any negotiations take place, that the necessary climate for negotiations be created. The apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

19.0 Accordingly, the present regime should, at the very least:

19.1 Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain

from imposing any restrictions on them;

19.2 Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and people;

19.3 Remove all troops from the townships;

19.4 End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including, the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and,

19.5 Cease all political trials and political executions.

20.0 These measures are necessary to produce the conditions in which free political discussion can take place — an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the process of remaking their country. The measures listed above should therefore precede negotiations.

IV GUIDELINES TO THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

21.0 We support the view of the South African liberation movement that upon the creation of this climate, the process of negotiations should commence along the following lines:

21.1 Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire.

21.2 Negotiations should then proceed to establish the basis for the adoption of a new Constitution by agreeing on, among others, the Principles enunciated above.

21.3 Having agreed on these principles, the parties should then negotiate the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new Constitution.

21.4 The parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order.

21.5 The parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order including the holding of elections.

21.6 After the adoption of a new Constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed to have formally terminated.

21.7 For its part, the international community would lift the sanctions that have been imposed against apartheid South Africa.

22.0 The new South Africa shall qualify for membership of the Organisation of African Unity.

V PROGRAMME OF ACTION

23.0 In pursuance of the objectives stated in this document, the Organisation of African Unity hereby commits itself to:

23.1 Inform governments and inter-governmental organisations throughout the world, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commonwealth and others of these perspectives, and solicit their support;

23.2 Mandate the OAU ad-hoc committee on Southern Africa, acting as the representative of the OAU, assisted by the Frontline States, to remain seized of the issue of a political resolution of the South African question;

23.3 Step up all-round support for the South African liberation movement and campaign in the rest of the world in pursuance of this objective;

23.4 Intensify the campaign for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against apartheid South Africa: in this regard, immediately mobilise against the rescheduling of Pretoria's foreign debts; work for the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo and the full observance by all countries of the arms embargo;

23.5 Ensure that the African continent does not relax existing measures for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa;

23.6 Continue to monitor the situation in Namibia and extend all necessary support to SWAPO in its struggle for a genuinely independent Namibia;

23.7 Extend such assistance as the Governments of Angola and Mozambique may request in order to secure peace for their peoples; and

23.8 Render all possible assistance to the Frontline States to enable them to withstand Pretoria's campaign of aggression and destabilisation and enable them to continue to give their all-round support to the people of Namibia and South Africa.

24.0 We appeal to all people of goodwill throughout the world to support this Programme of Action as a necessary measure to secure the earliest liquidation of the apartheid system and the transformation of South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial country.



Appendix 3

Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (A/RES/S-16/1)

PREAMBLE

We, the States Members of the United Nations, assembled at the sixteenth special session of the General Assembly, a special session on *apartheid* and its destructive consequences in southern Africa, guided by the fundamental and universal principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the context of our efforts to establish peace throughout the world by ending all conflicts through negotiations, and desirous of making serious efforts to bring an end to the unacceptable situation prevailing in southern Africa, which is a result of the policies and practices of *apartheid*, through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all:

Reaffirming our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial and racial domination or *apartheid* exist, there can be neither peace nor justice;

Reiterating accordingly that, while the *apartheid* system in South Africa persists, the peoples of Africa as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental to the stability and development of the continent;

Recognizing that, with regard to southern Africa, the entire world is vitally interested that the processes in which that region is involved, leading to the

genuine national independence of Namibia and peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time, and equally recognizing that the world is deeply concerned that destabilization by South Africa of the countries of the region, whether through direct aggression, sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion or other means, is unacceptable in all its forms and must not occur;

Also recognizing the reality that permanent peace and stability in southern Africa can only be achieved when the system of *apartheid* in South Africa has been eradicated and South Africa has been transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, and therefore reiterating that all the necessary measures should be adopted now to bring a speedy end to the *apartheid* system in the interest of all the people of southern Africa, the continent and the world at large;

Believing that, as a result of the legitimate struggle of the South African people for the elimination of *apartheid*, and of international pressure against that system, as well as global efforts to resolve regional conflicts, possibilities exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of South Africa;

Reaffirming the right of all peoples, including the people of South Africa, to determine their own destiny and to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together to build a harmonious society, and remaining committed to doing everything possible and necessary to assist the people of South Africa, in such ways as they may, through their genuine representatives, determine to achieve this objective;

Making these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed, that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own government, as equal members of society, and that no individual or group of individuals has any right to govern others without their democratic consent, and reiterating that the *apartheid* system violates all these fundamental and universal principles;

Affirming that *apartheid*, characterized as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind, is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in South Africa, has sought to dehumanize entire peoples, and has imposed a brutal war on the region of southern Africa, which has resulted in untold loss of life, destruction of property and massive displacement of innocent men, women and children and which is a scourge and affront to humanity that must be fought and eradicated in its totality;

Therefore we support and continue to support all those in South Africa who pursue this noble objective. We believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interest of all humanity;

While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have repeatedly expressed our objective of a solution arrived at by peaceful means; we note that the people of South Africa, and their liberation movements who felt compelled to take up arms, have also upheld their preference for this position for many decades and continue to do so;

Welcoming the Declaration of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Organization of African Unity in Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa, adopted at Harare on 21 August 1989, and subsequently endorsed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at its Ninth Summit Conference held in Belgrade in September 1989, as a reaffirmation of readiness to resolve the problems of South Africa through negotiations. The Declaration is consistent with the positions contained in the Lusaka Manifesto of two decades ago, in particular regarding the preference of the African people for peaceful change, and takes into account the changes that have taken place in southern Africa since then. This Declaration constitutes a new challenge to the Pretoria regime to join in the noble efforts to end the *apartheid* system, an objective to which the United Nations has always been committed;

Noting with appreciation that the Commonwealth Heads of Government, at their meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1989, noted with satisfaction the strong preference for the path of negotiated and peaceful settlement inherent in the Harare Declaration and considered what further steps they might take to advance the prospects for negotiations;

Also noting with appreciation that the Francophone Summit in Dakar in May 1989 likewise called for negotiations between Pretoria and representatives of the majority of the people with a view to the establishment of a democratic and egalitarian system in South Africa;

Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to increase support for the legitimate struggle of the South African people, including maintaining international pressure against the system of *apartheid* until that system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens;

In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding directly to the wishes of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder, convinced that their implementation will lead to a speedy end of the *apartheid* system and heralding the dawn of a new

era of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in a continent finally free from racism, white minority rule and colonial domination;

DECLARE AS FOLLOWS:

1 A conjuncture of circumstances exists, which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the South African regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, given the repeated expression of the majority of the people of South Africa of their long-standing preference to arrive at a political settlement, could create the possibility to end *apartheid* through negotiations.

2 We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their legitimate struggle, to join together to negotiate an end to the *apartheid* system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives, and not the amendment or reform of the *apartheid* system, should be the goals of the negotiations.

3 We are at one with the people of South Africa that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order determined by them and based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We hold therefore the following fundamental principles to be of importance:

- (a) South Africa shall become a united, non-racial and democratic State;
- (b) All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed;
- (c) All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of universal, equal suffrage, under a non-racial voters' roll, and by secret ballot, in a united and non-fragmented South Africa;
- (d) All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism;
- (e) all shall enjoy universally recognized human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched bill of rights;
- (f) South Africa shall have a legal system that will guarantee equality of all before the law;
- (g) South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary;
- (h) There shall be created an economic order that will promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans;
- (i) A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship,

and mutually beneficial cooperation with all peoples.

4 We believe that acceptance of these fundamental principles could constitute the basis for an internationally acceptable solution that will enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the world community of nations.

A. Climate for negotiations

5 We believe that it is essential that the necessary climate be created for negotiations. There is an urgent need to respond positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

6 Accordingly, the present South African regime should, at the least:

- (a) Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;
- (b) Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons;
- (c) Remove all troops from the townships;
- (d) End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity;
- (e) Cease all political trials and political executions.

7 These measures would help create the necessary climate in which free political discussion can take place — an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the process of remaking their country.

B. Guidelines to the process of negotiations

8 We are of the view that the parties concerned should, in the context of the necessary climate, negotiate the future of their country and its people in good faith and in an atmosphere which, by mutual agreement between the liberation movements and the South African regime, would be free of violence. The process could commence along the following guidelines:

- (a) Agreement on the mechanism for the drawing up of a new constitution, based on, amongst others, the principles enunciated above, and the basis for its adoption;
- (b) Agreement on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order;
- (c) Agreed transitional arrangements and modalities on the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution, and of the transition to a democratic order, including the holding of elections.

C. Programme of action

9 In pursuance of the objectives stated in this Declaration, we hereby decide:

- (a) To remain seized of the issue of a political resolution of the South African question;
- (b) To step up all-round support for the opponents of *apartheid* and to campaign internationally in pursuance of this objective;
- (c) To use concerted and effective measures, including the full observance by all countries of the mandatory arms embargo, aimed at applying pressure to ensure a speedy end to *apartheid*;
- (d) To ensure that the international community does not relax existing measures aimed at encouraging the South African regime to eradicate *apartheid*, until there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes, bearing in mind the objectives of this declaration;
- (e) To render all possible assistance to the front-line and neighbouring States to enable them: to rebuild their economies, which have been adversely affected by South Africa's acts of aggression and destabilization; to withstand any further such acts; and to continue to support the peoples of Namibia and South Africa;
- (f) To extend such assistance to the Governments of Angola and Mozambique as they may request in order to secure peace for their peoples, and to encourage and support peace initiatives undertaken by the Governments of Angola and Mozambique aimed at bringing about peace and normalization of life in their countries;
- (g) The new South Africa shall, upon adoption of the new constitution, participate fully in relevant organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations.

10 We request the Secretary-General to transmit copies of the present Declaration to the South African Government and the representatives of the oppressed people of South Africa, and also request the Secretary-General to prepare a report and submit it to the General Assembly by 1 July 1990 on the progress made in the implementation of the present Declaration.



Further reading on southern Africa

Donald Denoon and Balam Nyeko: *Southern Africa Since 1800* (Harlow: Longman, 1984)

Joseph Hanlon: *Beggar Your Neighbours* (London: James Currey, 1986)

Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.): *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986)

Phyllis Johnson and David Martin: *Apartheid Terrorism — The Destabilization Report: A Report on the Devastation of the Frontline States*, prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (London: Commonwealth Secretariat and James Currey, 1989)

Tom Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (Harlow: Longman, 1983)

William Minter: *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986)

Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons: *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977)

Neil Parsons: *A New History of Southern Africa* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983)

Colin Stoneman (ed.): *Zimbabwe's Prospects* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988)

